

A. Avtorkhanov

## THE ORIGIN OF PARTOCRACY

### VOLUME ONE

Central Committee and Lenin

SOWING Cover by artist V. Schechter 2nd edition,  
1981 © 1973 Posey-  
Weyad, W. Saugasvek K.S.

#### D. What is a partocracy

Already in the time of Aristotle, three main forms of government were known - autocracy, aristocracy (oligarchy) and democracy.

The subsequent history of legal thought and state formations for almost two and a half thousand years did not introduce any significant innovations into this classification. Only at the beginning of our century, in connection with the seizure of state power in Russia by the Bolsheviks, a new, hitherto unknown fourth form of government appeared - the communist partocracy, which now dominates in fourteen countries on three continents, covering more than a third of the population of the entire globe. Communist partocracy, being a new unique form, nevertheless embodies the most important elements of all three classical forms - autocracy (Stalin's tyranny), oligarchy (Politburo dictatorship) and pseudo-democracy (Soviet system).

The February Revolution of 1917 gave Russia democracy (popular power, that is, the power of the entire people), and the October Revolution, which took place eight months later, gave Russia partocracy (party power, that is, the power of a part of the people).

Even if we agree with the official doctrine that the October Revolution was not a mono-party revolution, but a revolution of an entire class

- "proletarian revolution", - then in this case it remains the revolution of an insignificant part of the people, because the industrial proletariat in Russia by 1917 made up only 2.5% of the total population of the Empire.

The term "partocracy", first used by this author in his last book, published in English (Te Sotman1\$0 Rau arragail\$, MMota Rita Sotrapu, Mem Work, 1968), seems to the author to be the most adequate expression of the essence of Lenin's doctrine of the dictatorship of the Communist Party. The titled book explores how partocracy functions; in the book that is now being brought to the attention of the reader, the birth of partocracy is considered.

Let's make a very brief digression into the history of the state and law.

Ever since man left the primitive state and became - according to Aristotle - a "political animal", his thought has been constantly struggling with the problem of creating an ideally organized community of people, which is called the state (this concept includes not only a permanent territory, a settled people, but also a form of government). If you take only the written history of Western civilization, then we really state that "in the beginning there was a word - this word was Right!" In what darkness and for how long

the legal thought of people would have wandered if the ancient Roman law had not stood at the cradle of our civilization from the famous "12 tables" (451-450 BC), through the brilliant galaxy of the founders of classical Roman jurisprudence to the beginning of the 2nd century (Gaius, Celsus, Julian, Africanus, Pomponius, Papinian) and to the crown of all past lawmaking - the codification of Justinian (529-534 A.D.)!

In treatises on law, the philosophy of law and the state, both ancient and medieval, as well as new and modern writers, questions of the nature of the state and the form of state government have always occupied a prominent place.

Plato and Aristotle, and then Cicero, explained the origin of the State by the sociable nature of man, by the attraction of people to each other. In modern times, in connection with the formation of nation-states, new theories have appeared that explain the origin of the state, on the contrary, by the quarrelsomeness of man, his desire for absolute freedom, that is, for chaos. Therefore, a person had to be accustomed to relative freedom, that is, to respect for the freedom of another person. It may

to do only a certain order established by people in their mutual interests, the highest expression of this order is the state. Hence the state is a product of human reason against the arbitrariness of the state of nature (Maagga(ana) of natural law.

It is the result of an agreement between people. The founder of the "contractual theory" Hobbes argued that the state put an end to the "struggle of all against all" when everyone renounces their unlimited rights in favor of one - the supreme power of the state. Jean-Jacques Rousseau did not agree with Hobbes that by negotiating with others, a person leaves the state of nature and law. Uniting even with others, a person remains free. "Freedom is inalienable," said Rousseau. Locke argued that a person, even in the state of nature, clothes himself with a number of rights associated with the concepts of freedom and property, but in this state there is no provision for these rights, only the contract regulates and ensures them. All great philosophers and jurists emphasize the moral postulates of law, which are based on concern for the common good and justice. Aristotle says that the state educates a person in the spirit of virtue, and Hegel introduces the last moment in the development of the idea of will precisely in the field of moral improvement. Only Kant, contrary to the moral foundations of his "categorical imperative", does not see any role of moral and ethical motives in the formation of the state. The author of the "Critique of Pure Reason" believes that the highest principle of Law and the State is pure reason, in which experience does not participate at all, therefore he considers the "contractual theory" an unproven hypothesis. The "contractual theory" was also rejected by other German scientists, opposing it to the "organic theory" (the State is an "organism" created by God).

Since almost all legal theorists agreed that the purpose of the state is the implementation of the moral law, concern for the common good" of the people, a new theory has emerged, according to which the historical purpose of the state is to become an organ of the "general welfare". From here there was only one step to the most famous of all these theories, which immediately became the current law - to the German theory - "enlightened absolutism" (18th-18th centuries).

This theory was based on the idea that since the goal of the state is "the well-being of all", then for its practical implementation

the state needs unlimited powers (absolutism).

This very theory of "enlightened absolutism" was the consecration of the practice of the police state (Pol7e1\$aa{}), when the state intervenes in absolutely all branches of a person's life - social, economic, spiritual, personal, whatever!

The reaction to the theory and practice of police law was, finally, the modern Western theory of the rule of law (Weight 5 \$ {aa {}}) with the separation of powers: legislative, executive and judicial. This legal state is the type of modern Western democracy in different types of government (parliamentary state, presidential state, constitutional monarchy). Already the variety of types of a democratic state shows that democracy is not a universal key and not a template. In accordance with many factors and features - historical, national, geopolitical - each country modifies and adapts to its conditions the norms and institutions of a legal democratic state.

However, it should be noted that over time, Western democracy has also undergone major structural changes. Between the sovereign of power - the people - and the bearer of popular sovereignty - the parliament - a mediastinum was formed in the form of political parties. "Direct democracy", to which Rousseau called for a return, has turned into "indirect democracy" - parties rule on behalf of the people. Universal and direct suffrage has essentially also turned into the right of Western party apparatchiks to appoint future deputies long before these candidates for deputies stand before their voters. The people actually choose not people, but parties, proceeding not from the personal qualities of a deputy, but from the party's election program. Even more. A party member who has become a deputy, bound by the factional discipline of his party, votes when passing laws in parliament not as he himself wants, but as ordered by the leadership of his faction. True, the constitution says otherwise. Thus, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany says: "Deputies of the German Bundestag ... are representatives of the whole people, they are not bound by instructions and instructions and are responsible only to their conscience" (Article 38). But a deputy who will adhere to the letter and spirit of this article, ignoring the "instructions" and "instructions" of the party, will not be nominated by the party in the next elections, and get into parliament without

party lists is almost impossible.

Examining the influence of political parties in the system of power in the same Federal Republic of Germany, a German law professor notes: "The right of parties to appoint officials is universal.

the evil of federal administration - from the communes to the very personal office of the chancellor (Vin4esKan7] egapa {} ... The parties do not tolerate other gods around them. Whoever is not for them is against them... The distance between the political staff and the "people" has become even greater, it is perhaps even more significant today than it was in the Weimar Republic or even in the Bismarck empire. The "state of parties" (Razeep- $\{aa\}$ ) - the basis of parliamentary democracy - has not stabilized so much that it would be impossible to call it into question again on behalf of the "people" (Vlsvaga Goemept! , Zeemala-Wead, this IDag, collection, article by Prof. Wilhelm Gennis).

It is in this sense that modern Western democracy - Razeep  $\{aa\}$  - also bears some features of a partocracy, albeit a multi-party one.

But the undoubted advantage of democracy over the Soviet partocracy lies in the fact that, firstly, in order to win the trust of voters, different political parties compete with each other not only in setting up platforms that optimally take into account the needs of the broad masses of the people, but also in implementing the appropriate reforms after coming to power. Secondly, people do have a choice between several party platforms. Thirdly, the party that has found itself in opposition exercises such effective control over the activities of the government party through parliament that society is guaranteed compliance with the laws of the ruling party. Fourthly, both the ruling and opposition parties, both the parliament and the executive branch are under the vigilant eye of the free press, which does not spare any of the representatives of power - from the minister to the president - if it comes to their abuse of power. Fifth, if you are not satisfied with any of the existing parties, then you can create a new party from your like-minded people and run with it in the elections. And, finally, sixthly, there is an independent supreme constitutional court, which equally monitors the observance of the country's constitution and the executive branch - parliament. In a word, in agreement with Churchill, we can say: democracy is not an ideal form of government, but it

the best of all forms that man has hitherto thought of.

The statements of Marx and Engels about the state were original, albeit ridiculous.

Briefly, the essence of the teachings of Marx and Engels on the state is as follows: 1) the state arose as a result of the division of society into antagonistic classes; 2) the state is an instrument of the dictatorship of one class over another; 3) in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism there will be a provisional state called the "dictatorship of the proletariat", understood as the dictatorship of the majority and as one of the forms of democracy; 4) with the disappearance of antagonistic classes, the state also disappears, it simply dies out as unnecessary.

In Anti-Dühring, Engels quite seriously argued that the first act of the new proletarian state - the law on the nationalization of the means of production - would, at the same time, be its last act as a state. Now, instead of managing people, Engels said, there will be management of things. However, in order to prove the utopian nature of the Marxist theory of the state, the victory of the Russian Marxists in Russia was needed. True, at first Lenin himself was captivated by the utopia of Marx and Engels. This alone explains why such a real politician as Lenin naively declared the principles of his program after the seizure of power

the following provisions: 1) in the new Soviet state there will be "the payment of all officials, with the election and turnover of all of them at any time, not higher than the average salary of a good worker" ("April Theses", 1917); 2) The Soviet state will be a new "type of state without a police force, without a standing army, without a privileged bureaucracy" (Lenin's resolution at the April party conference in 1917); 3) Lenin triumphantly quotes Engels: "A society that organizes production in a new way on the basis of a free and equal association of producers will send the state machine everywhere to where it will have its proper place: to the museum of antiquities, next to the spinning wheel and with the bronze ax" (Lenin, State and Revolution).

When Lenin came to power, he became convinced of the groundlessness of the theory of Marx and Engels, as well as of his own naivety. What Lenin wanted to abolish - the standing army, the secret police and the privileged bureaucracy - has become precisely the three "pillars" on which the dictatorship has been based for 56 years now.

The bankruptcy of both the utopian theory of Marx and Engels on the withering away of the state and his own doctrine of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" forced Lenin to formulate a fundamentally new theory about the nature of Soviet power and its sovereign. Beginning in 1919, in a number of works (the answer of the Cadet Party, a discussion about trade unions, a discussion with the "Workers' Opposition", reports at the 2nd Congress of the Comintern and at the 10th Party Congress, the book "The childhood disease of "leftism" in communism"), Lenin interprets "dictatorship of the proletariat" as the dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party alone. Lenin's fundamental theses on this score are numerous. We present only the main ones. In one place, Lenin says: "It is impossible to carry out the dictatorship of the proletariat through an organized proletariat without exception... The party, so to speak, absorbs the vanguard of the proletariat, and this vanguard implements the dictatorship" (Lenin, vol. XXY, 3rd ed., p. 64-65). Elsewhere: "The dictatorship is carried out by the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks" (Lenin, vol. XXY, p. 193); in the third place: "When we are reproached for the dictatorship of one party, we say: "Yes, the dictatorship of one party! We stand on it, and we cannot leave this soil" (Lenin, vol. XXTU, p. 423); in the fourth place: "We must know and remember that the entire legal and factual constitution of the Soviet Republic is based on the fact that the Party corrects everything, appoints and builds according to one principle" (Lenin, vol. 31, 4th ed. p. 342 ).

However, the "dictatorship of the party" is the same abstraction as the "dictatorship of the proletariat". Therefore, it is important to know the address of that "vanguard in the vanguard" that directly implements the "dictatorship of the party." Lenin also gives us this address when he writes: "The Party is led by... a Central Committee of 19 people, and the current work in Moscow still has to be carried out by narrow collegiums... The Orgburo (now the Secretariat - A. A.) and the Politburo... It turns out, therefore, the real "oligarchy" (if these quotes are really Leninist, then they are, of course, superfluous. - A. A.) ... Not a single important political issue is resolved by any state institution in our republic without the guidance of the Central Committee of the party ...

Such is the general mechanism of proletarian state power, considered "from above" from the point of view of the practice of exercising dictatorship... This mechanism grew out of small, illegal, underground circles over the course of 25 years" (Lenin, vol. XXY, pp. 193-194).

This absolute dictatorship with a narrow oligarchic leadership

at the top, with a closed hierarchical party apparatus along the vertical and a multi-million base of party hangers-on at the base of the pyramid of power - there is a phenomenon that is unique not only in its classical organization, but also in the breadth and depth of its coverage by influence, control, leadership of the entire people as a whole, each individual in separately. These features make the Bolshevik "state of a new type" an unprecedented totalitarian partocracy in history.

Let's try to identify the characteristic features that distinguish partocracy both from the forms of autocracy known so far, and from the so-called "totalitarian states". Bringing the communist, national socialist and fascist systems under one general heading, to one general totalitarian form of government, is a flagrant misunderstanding. Here the seductive idea of generalizing phenomena of the same type obscured not only the essence of each of these systems, but also the gigantic difference between them. This approach overlooks another important circumstance - fascism, like National Socialism, was, firstly, a reaction to the communist action, and secondly, an imitation - of Bolshevism, which adopted the weapons and methods of struggle of its opponent into its combat arsenal. . However, this imitation was and remains a very imperfect counterfeit of the phenomenal original. Let us try to illustrate what has been said with some comparative analysis of the leading elements of national socialism and communism. Let's start with the definition of "totalitarianism". What is totalitarianism anyway?

Here is the Soviet definition:

"A totalitarian state is a kind of bourgeois state with an open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary imperialist elements. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy\* were totalitarian states.

Here is the English definition:

"Totalitarian state, an expression used in relation to the Nazi government in Germany, to the fascist in Italy and to the communist in Russia, in which there is a complete centralization of control. In totalitarian states, the political parties are destroyed or "coordinated" within one party, and the conflict between classes is concealed by the emphasis on the organic unity in the state" (Epsusore Cha VgCatshsa, vo1. 22, p. 313, 1947).

\*) TSB, vol. 43, p. 67, 2nd edition.

Here is the German definition:

"Totalitarianism represents the extreme form of the rise of the tendency towards centralization, unification and unilateral regulation of all political, social and spiritual life" (Pas Estscher Gehschtkon, "Zaar ira Royik", 5. 294).

The Fischer Lexicon also includes National Socialist Germany, Fascist Italy and the USSR as totalitarian states.

Thus, it turns out that the cited Soviet and Western sources are unanimous in recognizing the National Socialist and Fa-

the shist state a totalitarian state. They agree among themselves that the main content of the totalitarian system is its dictatorial, terrorist, anti-human essence. But that is where the convergence of views between them ends. The USSR does not recognize itself as a totalitarian state, and considers the totalitarian state itself to be only a "variety" of the modern "bourgeois", that is, a Western legal state (see above the Soviet definition). On the contrary, Western theorists find many similarities between communism and National Socialism (fascism), which makes them legally police totalitarian states.

It should be noted that the definition of totalitarianism in Western literature was based not only on the practice of ruling totalitarian states, but also on the doctrine, even the terminology of Mussolini, the founder of fascism. Furthermore. The fact that Mussolini had only a goal, an ideal, the researchers recognized as a fact, that is, what should be was recognized as existing. From this came the confusion of communist reality with the fascist dream. This is best seen if we turn to the very doctrine of fascism on the subject. Thus, in the article "The Doctrine of Fascism" \*) Mussolini says that for this doctrine "everything is in the state, nothing human and spiritual exists outside the state ... In this sense, the state is totalitarian and fascist domination synthesizes and unites all values, interprets develops and embodies the whole life of the people. There are no individuals or groups outside the state...

Fascism wants to change not the forms of human life, but its content, man, his character, beliefs.

It is easy to see that Mussolini opposes the state to the people, puts the state above the people, he, as it were, paraphrases and turns over the well-known formula of Lincoln \*\*) in order to put forward the diametrically opposite idea "the people from the state, for the state and through the state." The primacy of the state over law

\*) "Italian Encyclopedia", vol. 14, we quote in the translation of M. Vishniak, "Socialist Vestnik", No. 9, 1956, September, p. 169. \*\*) reorle apa Bu Te reore".

("Etatical theory") was recognized as an absolute postulate, while the rule of law (the primacy of law over the state) was considered a product of the weakness and decay of democracy. But such an omnipotent and omnipresent state was rather an ideal than a reality, precisely in the most believing Catholic, still then officially monarchical Italy. Hitler succeeded in this direction more than Mussolini, but he was far from achieving the ideal in precisely two most important areas - in spiritual life and in creating a totalitarian, that is, nationalized economic system. What both Hitler (to a greater extent) and Mussolini (to a lesser extent) succeeded in was the establishment of a mono-party dictatorship over the organs of state administration, but without destroying the old state machine. Over time, this mono-party dictatorship established its total control over society, but only control was total, not leadership. Only the communists achieved total leadership.

Summarizing Western definitions of totalitarianism, we can say that it includes at least the following elements:

1) total state control over society; 2) a system of police terrorist control over citizens;

3) the only ruling party; 4) unification and regulation of political, social and spiritual life;

4) stake on the renewal of society;

5) stake on one's race (racial theory and practice of the Nazis, genocide by the Bolsheviks of the Caucasian peoples, Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Kalmyks during the war, the doctrine of "Soviet patriotism", racial factors in the dispute between Moscow and Beijing, Soviet anti-Semitism under the guise of anti-Zionism) .

The communist regime has the original right to all these elements, except for the last one ("Nazism" Stalin borrowed from Hitler). However, by themselves they do not yet make the totalitarian form of government exceptional - for to one degree or another such features are or were worn by all autocratic or tyrannical regimes known to us from history. What makes communist power a special, new form (or type) of government - partocracy - lies in the very source and nature of this power: in the will of one party. Hence, the organs of the party become legislative and administrative organs above the state. The very will of the party, the "will to power" and the power of the will, almost according to Kant's "categorical imperative" (but without its moral substance!), is declared the absolute law of the state and the pattern of social development.

If we wanted to demonstrate the difference between Leninist partocracy, democratic government and a fascist system, then we could say that if for Lincoln "the government of the people exists through the people and for the people", if for Mussolini the people from the state exist "through the state and for the state", then for Lenin both the government, and the people, and the state exist through the party, on behalf of the party and for the party. Hence, everywhere and in everything - the "cult of the party" (Lenin: "The party is the mind, honor and conscience of our era").

This party itself is not an ordinary party. It is a "party of a new type", according to the fair definition of the communists themselves. Its novelty lies again in the uniqueness of its historical mission as a substitute for the state and the state apparatus, and in the originality of its internal structure. On the one hand, it is a closed hierarchical organization with a personnel apparatus; on the other hand, it is an open mass party with a membership of many millions. Therefore, the elite of the party, the asset, as it were, represents a "party within the party."

The Communist Party is not just the only ruling

a state party, it is not even a state within a state, it is "and the state itself, but" a state of a new type, "according to the teachings of the same communists. Its novelty lies in the fact that the hierarchy of official state legislative bodies is only an executive-administrative



an apparatus for carrying out the decisions and instructions of a parallel hierarchy of formally executive party bodies. The modern communist state can exist without its official state apparatus, but it cannot exist without the party apparatus. The relationship between the party apparatus and the state apparatus is not a relationship of coordination, but of subordination, thereby eliminating dualism in government. Hitler and Mussolini did not smash the old state machine of Germany and Italy, but filled it with their own cadres. Lenin smashed the old state machine of Russia to replace it with a new party machine. This machine was the partocracy system.

The parallel existence of the newly created formal state machine in the person of the Soviets served technically - to help the party apparatus in managing the state, politically - to create a "popular" facade for the party-cratic regime.

The police character of Western totalitarian regimes comes down mainly to the establishment of a general political investigation in the liquidation of all civil liberties, to the supranational role of the political police and to the right of arbitrariness of its punitive bodies against dissident citizens of the country. In a word, the political police, as an apparatus of intelligence and counterintelligence, trial and execution, was isolated from the state and existed as a self-sufficient force. On the contrary, in a partocratic state, the whole machine, every cog in it, all its "drives", its ideology and technology of power are organically saturated with the all-embracing and omnipresent spirit of Chekism. Therefore, here the political police is only a functional entity that performs the professional administrative functions of one of the cogs in the partyocratic machine. Yes, Western totalitarian regimes have unified, regulated and controlled political, social and spiritual life. But in a partocratic state, no life exists not only outside control and regulation, but also outside leadership. The fact that the Western totalitarians had the ideal of total control, the communists had and have

fact of total leadership. Even their starting positions are different - the Western totalitarians retained, as indicated, the old state machine, having accordingly fascisized it, the communists destroyed it and created their own supra-state party machine; the Western totalitarians preserved the old propertied classes, while the communists completely destroyed them, not only economically, but also physically; Western totalitarians banned political parties and dissolved them, the communists liquidated them not only politically, but also physically. However, the main distinguishing feature of communism from Western totalitarianism was, of course, a radical social revolution - the destruction of the old society with its economic structure and economic principles and the creation of a new social community based on a new economy, new ruling classes and new economic principles. This social revolution, begun by Lenin, interrupted by the forced NEP, continued by Stalin in the late twenties, made the Communist Party the monopoly master of the entire Russian national economy. The nationalization of industry and land, the nationalization of worker and peasant labor as a consequence of the nationalization of the economy, the monopoly of foreign and domestic trade, the nationalization of the means of communication, the nationalization of spiritual life and its institutions - all this was also a "new type" of nationalization. Its novelty consisted in the fact that the party monopoly on the ownership of the national economy, unprecedented in history, was legalized, with

which is not the people, not the state in general, but a small part of the people, that is, the party monopoly plans, controls, manages and distributes the wealth of the country. From this followed extremely important consequences. Having made the basis of his economic policy Marx's "being

determines consciousness", Leninist - "politics is a concentrated economy" and Stalinist - "what are the conditions for the material LIFE of society, these are its ideas", - the communists began their experiment

world historical significance. The main goal of the experiment is to remake the social, spiritual and moral nature of man. The party's monopoly on the country's wealth is regarded by the party itself not as an end in itself, not as a source of well-being and enrichment for individual party members, but as an instrument, as a factory for the voluntary or forced transformation of the old and the creation of new communist people. Principle

distribution of the material wealth of Soviet society, which states that each member of society is rewarded according to the work he expended for the benefit of society, is applied in practice in such a way as to contribute to the success of a new experiment. Other things being equal, compensation for work and your place in the social hierarchy of society depend on your attitude towards communist ideology and on the effectiveness of your personal efforts in putting it into practice.

The main Marxist thesis - the "basis" determines the "superstructure", the economy determines politics, "the mode of production of material life determines the social, political and spiritual processes of life in general" \*), is placed at the basis of not only the technique of ruling, but also the basis of the communist doctrine of creation new, communist man. However, this doctrine rests not only on the party monopoly of the economy, but also on the party monopoly of politics. Lenin even emphasizes, in contrast to Marx, the primacy of politics over economics, arguing that politics cannot but have a per-

\*) Marx, "On the practice of political economy", M., 1949, p. 7.

primacy over the economy. \*) This means, in relation to the doctrine of the creation of the "new man", that while the economy in the hands of the party is a more or less passive factor of indirect influence, then politics, that is, power, is an active factor of direct influence. Therefore, a Soviet lawyer is quite right when he writes on this issue that in Soviet society party law (politics) "possesses such an enormous power of influence on life, on the process of social development, on people's relations, which could not have been in all previous history" \*\* ) and that "the state under socialism is not limited to external, formal regulation, it directly organizes the economic and cultural life of society, delves into the very essence of life, into its deep processes" \*\*\*).

As a result of such a role of the political institutions of the party and its auxiliary state bodies, the partyocracy regime has achieved that it does not just control, at least totally, political, social and spiritual life, as Western totalitarian regimes did. He goes further - he directly controls politics, economics, culture,

thought, taste and feelings of people. There is no possibility here

\*) Lenin, vol. 32, p. 62, 4th edition. \*\*) M. A. Arzhanov "State and law in their relationship", M., 1960, p. 12. \*\*\*) Ibid., p. 14.

consider an interesting problem - how organically and deeply the new regime controls its people in terms of psychological, but in organizational terms, we can say that it controls them only with the help of a gigantic machine of physical and spiritual terror. This is the secret of the strength and longevity of the partocracy.

We said that the regime not only governs politics and the economy, but also governs the thoughts and feelings of the Soviet people. This does not mean at all that the communists have spiritually taken possession of the people. They own the apparatus of the spiritual administration of the people; moreover, they created the communist elite of spiritual life, they created communist works, but they did not create either a new culture or new spiritual values. Much is said about the progress of Soviet science and technology. And that's right. The exact sciences made great progress in the USSR, but the humanities, without exception, stuck at the level of 1917. Why did the social sciences, the humanities, not develop, while the exact sciences made such prominent progress?

The answer is very simple: mathematicians and physicists, chemists and astronomers enjoyed the freedom of scientific research in the interests of the Soviet military machine (nuclear physics, electronics, rocket technology, etc.), while scientists in the humanities could write only such research that was in the interests of strengthening the Soviet party machine. For the social sciences, the leading Leninist principle was and remains indispensable: "partisanship of science." This means that only such a work in the field of social sciences can be published in the USSR, which is not only written by the method of historical materialism, but is also placed at the service of the general line of the party today.

This means further that in the USSR only such a work from the social sciences can be published, the conclusions of which are predetermined in favor of communism even before the work itself is written. Instead of painstaking analysis - a ready-made Marxist scheme, instead of a scientific

working hypothesis - the duty truth from Marx, Engels, Lenin, instead of the discovery of new philosophical, sociological or economic systems and concepts - a declaration of the inviolability of the old, already dilapidated Marxist dogma. Therefore, it is quite natural that in the USSR the social sciences basically exist only in name. Since Marxism-Leninism is "the pinnacle of all sciences", and a critical approach to it is considered a state crime, the researchers of our atomic, electronic and space age are busy propagating and popularizing what Marx and Lenin wrote even under the "kerosene lamp".

The party not only exercises total control over spiritual life, not only directs it, but it determines both the subject matter and the method of spiritual creativity, called the method of "socialist

realism." The essence of this method is that the past, present and future are seen through the eyes and heard by the ears of communist obscurantists in the name of the party and its current policy.

A novel or an opera, a canvas or a sculpture, a motion picture or a circus, each with its specific means and "artistic" images, must propagate the wisdom of the party and the greatness of communism. Works outside this predetermined party line will not see the light of day, and if they do, they will be declared "formalist" and "decadent" and withdrawn from circulation, sometimes even with their authors.

Thus, the control of Western totalitarianism over society was total only in the field of political and conditionally total - in spiritual life, while the Soviet system of power - partocracy - exercises not only absolute total control, but also absolute total leadership in all areas of political, economic and spiritual life. life and work of the Soviet people. Communist activity surpassed Mussolini's dreams of the total state conquest of man, with the only difference being that the Soviet state itself turned out to be totally subjugated by the party. The leaders of Bolshevism had every reason, opposing their power not only to other totalitarian systems, but also to democratic systems, to declare: "In the world there is not and never has been such a powerful power as ours, Soviet power, in the world there is not and has never been such a powerful party, like our Communist Party", \*) communist power is "a gigantic machine, which has not yet been seen

mankind in any epoch of its existence"\*\*)).

The uniqueness of this machine does not allow putting it on a par with its weak and far from complete copies. Thus, partocracy is a hierarchical system of absolute political, economic and ideological power and dominance of the "party within the party" - the apparatus of the CPSU, in which the legislative, judicial-control, managerial and property functions are merged and concentrated in the central apparatus of the party, and the organs of administration and distribution are dualistic: the governing bodies are in the hierarchy of the party apparatus, the executive bodies are in the hierarchy of the state apparatus. For those and other bodies, the Constitution of the USSR has a formal, while the changing will of the apparatus has absolute force.

Even the very "constitution of the party" - the charter of the party - also has only a formal meaning for them. The regime of such tyranny as partocracy cannot be based on any written laws. Lenin also wrote about the Bolshevik dictatorship: "The scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing more than not limited by anything, by any laws, not constrained by any absolutely rules, based directly on violence.

\*) Stalin, vol. 13, p. 231. \*\*) N. Bukharin, Izvestia, 30.3.1934.

power" Lenin, vol. XXV, p. 441). This does not mean, of course, that improvisation prevails in the administrations of the partocracy. On the contrary, there is a whole system of unwritten norms and laws that precisely, in detail, determine the functions of each cog and drive of the gigantic partocratic machine. These norms and laws of the unwritten "party apparatus law" (as opposed to the written "statutory law") do not

changing in substance, they vary depending on the head of the regime - if the oligarchic dictatorship (Lenin) is at the head of the partocracy, then the party apparatus shares legislative power with the party through its congresses, but if the one-man dictator (Stalin) is at the head of the partocracy, then not only the party, but the Central Committee itself, together with the Politburo and the Secretariat, use only the prerogatives of advisory boards and exercise executive power under a one-man dictator.

The Soviet form of government - partocracy - appeared and remained

an invariable party-state model for all newly formed communist regimes in Europe, Asia and America (Cuba). Real or imaginary disagreements between the USSR, China, Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, Cuba concerned everything, but not one thing: the partocratic essence of these regimes (the exception was Dubcek's Czechoslovakia). "Revisionists" and "orthodox" argued and argue not about the revision of the system of partocracy, although it is of Soviet origin, but about hegemony, on the one hand, and about "partocratic sovereignty" - on the other.

P. Aims and sources of this study

The history of the origin of the partocracy is the history of the Leninist Central Committee.

Over the past decade, Lenin's Complete Works has been published in the USSR, old protocols of party congresses have been republished, and a number of valuable archival materials from the history of the party and revolutions have been published, which make it possible to correctly illuminate and re-evaluate the internal conflicts in the Central Committee and Lenin's position. It should be noted that Soviet historians from their own archival publications do not draw the conclusions that follow quite clearly from them, or, on the contrary, often draw conclusions that are in obvious contradiction to them. "Lenin never makes mistakes, the Central Committee always and in everything follows Lenin, except for a few professional traitors," such is the primitive official concept of party historiography. However, an objective analysis of the Soviet documents themselves shows that the history of Bolshevism is a permanent struggle between the Central Committee and Lenin for hegemony in the party.

Not to belittle the importance and place of Lenin in his own party, but to restore the historical truth both about his real role and about the nature of internal conflicts in the Central Committee - such is my only goal.

Until the October Revolution, Lenin headed the extreme left wing of Bolshevism (although there were exceptions), and after coming to power, he headed its extreme right wing. In the revolution, Lenin fought people whom he contemptuously called "old Bolsheviks", thus emphasizing their conservatism, and while in power, Lenin fights against "left childishness", with those who fell ill with the "infantile disease of leftism in communism." Even the spiritual and physical heir of Lenin - Stalin

continued the same Right-Bolshevik Leninist line while fighting Trotsky's "Left Opposition" and the "New Opposition" of Zinoviev and Kamenev in alliance with Bukharin's Right-wing group.

Of all the conflicts with the Central Committee, Lenin ultimately came out

a winner, because he was not just a Bolshevik, but an extraordinary Bolshevik who held Marx in one hand, Nietzsche in the other, and Machiavelli in his head.

However, the Leninist party itself and its Central Committee did not long outlive their founder. Bedridden for more than a year by a serious illness, but continuing to take a keen interest in the state and future fate of the party, Lenin witnessed the beginning of a fierce struggle of his students and comrades-in-arms for his political legacy - for power. With some unerring inner instinct of a shrewd politician, he prophetically foresaw in this struggle the future grave-digger of his party - Stalin. Hence the "Testament" - a letter from Lenin to the KhP Congress (1923) about the removal of Stalin from the post of "genesque" and a personal letter to Stalin himself about breaking off relations with him. However, the "Guards of Lenin" on their own head preferred the dying teacher to the living "genesk". To try to reveal the inner mechanics of the dramatic vicissitudes of the internecine struggle of the Diadochi for the throne of Lenin - this is my second goal. History does not know of any other revolutionary party that would have achieved its strategic goal - the seizure of power - with such a brilliant triumph - like the Bolshevik party, but it also does not know any other political party, which, having established itself in power, would end its life so carelessly and tragically, like the Bolshevik party. Lenin gave birth to her, killed Stalin, but killed with the help of weapons inherited from Lenin. As a tactician and strategist of the revolution, Stalin is no match not only with Lenin, but also with Trotsky, but as a master of power, he surpasses both of them put together. The clue to Stalin's amazing successes on the path to his personal dictatorship I find, among other things, in the fact that he mastered the surgical instruments of Leninism better than their inventor. Stalin did not add a single new weapon to Lenin's arsenal, but in the improvement and use of Lenin's weapons, he opened a new era in the history of Bolshevism by introducing really

a new component: the criminal method of ascending to personal power and the criminal regime of its management. The Leninist dictatorship of the party oligarchy, controlled by the Central Committee as the highest authority, which also stood above Lenin, was replaced by the Stalinist tyranny that controls and manages the Central Committee itself. This happened through the political assassination of the Leninist Central Committee and in a relatively short historical period after the death of Lenin - in five years (1924-1929). Actually, it cannot even be called a murder, it was rather a suicide, and then not immediately, but in parts, not by Stalin, but by these parts of each other, until "horns and legs" remained from the Leninist Central Committee, but, alas, these "horns Yes, a knife," was Stalin himself. But Stalin controlled the "suicides", in which they did not give themselves an account. Paying tribute to historical facts, it must be admitted that in the "hybridization" of criminal art with politics, Stalin achieved such outstanding successes precisely during this period that made his claims to the Leninist inheritance quite natural, especially since he went to this inheritance under the orthodox Leninist banner. Of course, psychologically, Lenin - a hereditary Russian nobleman and a child of Western political culture - was made of a different material than Stalin - the son of a degraded shoemaker and a child of Asianism - but the same Lenin always entrusted crimes that he was not personally capable of committing to Stalin as before. revolutions - in the Caucasus ("exes"), and in the civil war (leadership of group murders, for example, in Tsaritsyn in 1918).

Lenin, although he denied any universal "non-class" morality in the political struggle, but due to his origin ("being determines consciousness"!) Personally, he was not free from a significant burden of "bourgeois-noble prejudices", such as the concepts of personal honor, duty and loyalty, sometimes even to their political enemies (Martov, Plekhanov, Prince Kropotkin). Stalin's insidious immorality in politics was absolute in relation to everyone, from his party comrades to his own students. Lenin, who admired Stalin's immorality while Stalin shot "enemies of the people" on the fronts of the civil war, began to ponder his actions when Stalin began to apply Lenin's "class morality" in internal party affairs. Lenin, according to his wife Krupskaya, once said: Stalin "is deprived of the most elementary, most simple

human honesty" (T.. Tgozku, Zbayp, p. 375), and he not only said, but also drew his own conclusions from this ("Testament", article "On Autonomization", Lenin's letter to Stalin in March 1923 on the rupture of personal relations).

This is the absolute dishonesty of Stalin and led to his victory over Lenin, using his own "moral code" (Lenin's Central Committee did not fulfill the will of his teacher to remove Stalin as "disloyal" from the post of "general secretary"), and over his honest rivals in the struggle for the throne Lenin. Even if the historian had nothing else at his disposal, the official documents of the 20th and 20th Congresses of the CPSU would suffice to say that Stalin was a political criminal of genius, whose state crimes were legitimized by the state itself. From the amalgam of criminality with politics, a unique one was born: Stalinism.

The most fundamental conclusion I have come to after many years of studying the history, ideology and organization of Bolshevism is this: old, despotic, but political Bolshevism died with Lenin. With Stalin begins the era of a new, tyrannical, but criminal Bolshevism.

To try to show the spiritual origins, the historical formation and legitimacy of the triumph of Stalinist criminal Bolshevism in the USSR - this is my third goal. No matter how sophisticated party historians and theorists may be in their efforts to prove that Stalin and the Stalinist inquisition did not grow out of the mono-party system itself and that the practice of Stalin's "personality cult" is allegedly the result of a "perversion" of "Leninist norms", a careful study of the theory of Leninism and practice Stalin led this author to the conclusion: the origins of Stalinism must be sought, firstly, in the totalitarian "philosophy of power" of Lenin in the form of his doctrine of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as a "new type" of state; secondly, in the tyrannical system of organization of this dictatorship, which, according to Lenin, can be carried out directly not by the "proletariat" itself, but only by its "vanguard" - the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks (the system that I called in another book "partocracy"); thirdly, in the criminal origin of the Stalinist wing of Bolshevism (the famous Caucasian "military squad" of "ex" - terrorists to kill "enemies" and rob banks, shops, post offices, led by Koba-Stalin and Kamo-Ter-Petrosyan in 1905-1912 years); and, finally, fourthly, in the criminal way of thinking of Stalin himself. Lenin taught and Stalin learned well the following guiding principle

Lenin's "philosophy of power" in relation to the communist dictatorship: "The scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing more than nothing limited, no laws, no absolute rules, no

power based directly on violence" (Lenin, vol. XXV, p. 441, third ed.). Even the dictatorship of one man, one "leader" was suggested to Stalin by Lenin. When the German Left Communists began to criticize their official party leadership for dreaming of establishing a "dictatorship of leaders" instead of "the dictatorship of the masses," Lenin replied: same, p. 189). As early as 1924, Stalin made both of these principles of Lenin the basis of his interpretation of Leninism (see Questions of Leninism, pp. 116, 128). It is very characteristic that the third leading principle of Leninism, formulated by Lenin in 1920, Stalin bypassed complete silence in all his writings so as not to betray his innermost intention. Here is what the principle says:

"Soviet socialist centralism does not in the least contradict individualism and dictatorship, that the will of a class is sometimes carried out by a dictator, who sometimes alone does more and is often more necessary" (Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 119, italics mine. - A. A.).

Through the same Lenin, Stalin borrowed Marx's idea of the destruction of the old state machine and applied it precisely to the Leninist party-state machine - to the destruction of the Leninist Central Committee. Stalin correctly calculated that the path to the one-man rule indicated by Lenin, to the dictatorship of one leader, lay through the liquidation of the thinking ideological part of the party and the physical destruction of all other Bolshevik leaders.

In achieving this goal, an exceptional role in the hands of Stalin was played by Lenin's resolution at the Tenth Congress on the introduction of a "state of siege" in the party, called "Unity of the Party." But here, too, Stalin, advocating the exact implementation of "Lenin's norms" prohibiting dissent in the party, nevertheless surpassed the teacher in methods of action and the scale of arbitrariness. Stalin found that the imitators of Bolshevism - the German National Socialists and the Italian fascists - were much more logical than Lenin when they made mass terror the basis of government not only over the people, but also over their own party. Dissent had to be warned before it took shape or even came to light. From here

Stalin's concept of the growth of the army of potential "enemies of the people" during the "victorious" ascent to communism, hence his preventive terror against these potential "enemies of the people".

It was here that Hitler gave Stalin an objective lesson and suggested an invaluable idea by killing not only opposition figures (gen. Schleicher), but also his close associates, led by Rem, for a "conspiracy", which, of course, was never conceived by anyone. Five months later, with the assassination of his close friend and old Bolshevik Kirov, Stalin set about organizing a whole series of "conspiracies" of the old Bolsheviks and civil war commanders for their physical destruction. But here, too, Stalin surpassed Hitler in that he managed to force his victims to slander themselves, to confess to organizing imaginary conspiracies, murders, espionage, sabotage, sabotage, with such fantastic details - which should have justified Stalin's reprisal in the eyes of the outside world. with Lenin's party as a party of conspirators, murderers and spies.

Thus, by the end of the thirties, Stalinist Bolshevism, German Nazism and Italian fascism had become so close to each other in ideology (anti-capitalism, anti-democratism, "National Socialism" and



"socialism in one country", great-power chauvinism, atheism, the cult of the "leader", "Führer" and "Duce") and in terms of management methods (totalitarian police dictatorship under permanent physical terror), which gave the leaders of fascism and communism the full right to declare the identity of their worldview in the fight against the democratic West and stop all ideological struggle among themselves.

The logical end of this historical process of the degeneration of Bolshevism into fascism was the conclusion of the pact between Stalin and Hitler in August 1939. It was no coincidence that Hitler's Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, after a banquet arranged for him by the Politburo headed by Stalin and Molotov, declared, according to the Italian Foreign Minister Ciano, that during this banquet he "felt like in the Kremlin, as if among old party comrades" (A. Bo\$\$1, Wis\$an-Cerman AShapse 1939-1941, Veasop Prez\$, Bo\$fop, 1957, p. 71). Ribbentrop triumphantly reported to Hitler on the second day after this banquet that Stalin had made a toast that was not even included in the protocol. Stalin said: "I know how deeply the German people love

your leader! Therefore, I would like to drink to his health" ("Ma71-Solmef Veiops \$ 1939-1941, Rositeschz Kosh Fe ArsShuez oyo Fe Segtap Geodp Oyose", pp. 6-7). This was not the usual diplomatic courtesy toast of the head of government for the head of another government, for Stalin was not heading the Soviet government at that time. It was the toast of the "leader of the peoples of the USSR" to the "leader of the German people", the toast of the head of Soviet fascism to the head of German fascism.

The mutual amnesty of the two types of fascism went so far that Stalin put the following truly "historical" words into the mouth of his faithful robot, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Molotov:

"The ideology of Hitlerism, like any other ideological system, can be recognized or denied ... But any person will understand that ideology cannot be destroyed by force, it is impossible to end it with a war, therefore it is not only senseless, but also criminal to wage war as a war of annihilation Hitlerism" ("Pravda", November 1, 1939).

After all this, we may well believe such an expert in fascism as Mussolini, who in October 1939 categorically stated:

"Bolshevism in Russia has disappeared and the Slavic type of fascism has taken its place" (A. Voz\$1, op. pr., p. 77).

We know that it was not Stalin who betrayed the Stalin-Hitler alliance, but Hitler. Stalin, who believed so deeply in his organic kinship with Hitler, rightly called Hitler's attack on himself just the word that must be taken literally: "treacherous"! Hitler undeservedly broke Stalin's faith in him.

But was Stalin inevitable? The answer must be sought in another question: was Lenin inevitable, and therefore, was the October Revolution inevitable? With regard to the accidental addition of objective factors, which made the impossible victory of the Bolsheviks inevitable, is discussed in detail in the corresponding chapter. In this regard, we will only point out the coincidence of the opinions of Lenin, Stalin and their enemies that if the Provisional Government had withdrawn from the war and immediately announced radical land reforms with the confiscation of landowners' land in

favor of the peasantry, the Bolsheviks would not have been in power. In this case, only narrow specialists in the history of Russian social democracy would know about Lenin, and no one would know anything at all about the existence of Stalin.

However, here I want to raise the question of the subjective factor - of the Leninist party machine in the revolution - on the plane of advancing one psychological hypothesis.

Politics is an equation with many unknowns. If these unknowns could be deciphered in advance, then human history, although harmonious, but devoid of internal drama, would be incredibly boring: thousands of kings, rulers, tyrants, in order to die a natural death, would have renounced the throne even before they ascended on him; hundreds of wars would remain undeclared; to avoid their own catastrophe, dozens of organized revolutions would not take place at all, lest they "devour their children." I dare say that the October Revolution also

would not have taken place if its organizers had been given to know what awaits them as a result of victory. Indeed, let us take a quick look at the fate of the "fathers and children" of October:

Of the 29 members and candidates of the Central Committee who led the October Revolution: 3 people were killed by enemies (P. A. Dzhaparidze, M. S. Uritsky, S. G. Shaumyan), 5 people died a natural death before the Stalinist dictatorship (Lenin, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, V. P. Nogin, Ya. M. Sverdlov, F. A. Sergeev Artem), 2 people committed suicide because of Stalin (A. A. Ioffe, N. A. Skripnik), 3 people fell into disgrace (M. K. Muranov, E. D. Stasova, A. M. Kollontai), 15 people were shot by Stalin (Ya. A. Berzin, N. I. Bukharin, A. S. Bubnov, G. E. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev, A. S. Kiselev, N. N. Krestinsky, G. I. Lomov, V. P. Milyutin, E. A. Preobrazhensky, A. I. Rykov, I. T. Smilga, G. Ya Sokolnikov, L. D. Trotsky - killed by Stalin's agent; V. N. Yakovleva), Stalin himself was twenty-ninth.

Of the 30 leaders of the Military Revolutionary Committee under the Petrograd Soviet (except members of the Central Committee) - this highest body of military leadership of the October uprising - 7 people died or were killed before Stalin's dictatorship (Avanesov, Gusev, Eremeev, Lazimir, Sadovsky, Sklyansky, Chudnovsky), 1 person committed suicide because of Stalin (Lashevich), 2 people fell into disgrace (Podvoisky, Samoilov), 18 people were shot by Stalin (Antonov-Ovseenko, Antselovich, Boky, Goloshchekin, Dybenko, Zalutsky, Karakhan, Kedrov, Krylenko, Latsis, Mekhonoshin, Nevsky, Pavlunovsky, Peter, Pozern, Unshlikht, Chubar, Yurenev), 2 people were left alive (Manuilsky, Molotov).

Of the 16 members of the first Bolshevik government, 4 died before Stalin's dictatorship (Lenin, Nogin, Lunacharsky, Skvortsov-Stepanov), and 12 people were shot by Stalin (Avilov, Dybenko, Kamenev - chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, P. A. Kobozev, Krylenko, Lomov, Milyutin, Ovseenko, Rykov, Teodorovich, Trotsky, Shlyapnikov).

Of the 16 front commanders of the Red Army in the Civil War - 3 people died a natural death (V.N. Egoriev, P.P. Lebedev, A.A. Samoilov), 1 was killed by the Bolsheviks (Left Social Revolutionary M.A. Muravyov), the fate of one unknown (V. V. Yakovlev), one died from an operation that Stalin proposed to do against the will of the patient (Zinoviev Frunze), and 10 people were shot by Stalin (Antonov-Ovseenko, R. I. Berzin, V. M. Gittis, A. AND).

Egorov, N. N. Petin, M. S. Svechnikov, P. P. Sytin, M. N. Tukhachevsky, V. I. Shorin, I. E. Yakir - commander of a group of troops).

Of the three commanders-in-chief of all the armed forces of Soviet Russia, two were shot by Stalin (N.V. Krylenko, I.I. Vatsetis), and the third was declared an "enemy of the people" posthumously (S.S. Kamenev).

Even from the thrice-cleansed Central Committee of 1934, Stalin shot 98 people of the old Bolsheviks (70% of the entire membership and candidate composition of the Central Committee).

Now, if all these organizers of the October Revolution and the commanders of the Red Army in the civil war would have known in advance that as a result of their victory, not only would they themselves be killed by the regime created by them, but this regime would degenerate into an unprecedented tyranny of one of them, then it is simply ridiculous to think that they would have taken the path of revolution in general. Two very striking examples can be cited against this assertion: L. D. Trotsky wrote in his "Testament" in February 1940 that if he had to start his life over again, he would repeat it the way he had real life, adding that he was and will die a revolutionary, a Marxist, a communist. In an addendum to the "Testament" of March 1940, Trotsky writes that he reserves the right to determine the time of his own death by suicide, but, as if anticipating that Stalin could determine the time of his death, Trotsky immediately adds: "Under what whatever the circumstances, I die, I will die with an unshakable faith in the communist future" (Trotsky's Plague w ExCe, p. 166, Naguaga Chshuegyu Pres\$, 1958).

Another example: June 11, 1937, the legendary red commander

I. Yakir before his execution shouted: "Long live Comrade Stalin!"

Of course, such a person as Trotsky could not only write differently, but also think differently, especially since he did not know what fate awaited him ahead. But if it were possible to pose a question to Trotsky on October 24, 1917: the power that you seize will pass to your executioner from your own party, he will establish a regime of permanent inquisition in the country, kill your sons, shoot all your like-minded people along with the entire "Leninist guards", finally, will crush your head with an Alpine pickaxe in overseas exile - do you agree even under such conditions to make a revolution and take this power? To think that Trotsky would have given a positive answer to such a question on October 24, 1917, is to admit that he was a clearly insane person.

As for Yakir, there is no psychological riddle here: "Long live Comrade Stalin!" in his mouth meant only one thing - "I am absolutely not to blame even before Stalin, therefore, Stalin is my killer." Stalin understood Yakir in this way when, according to Khrushchev at the 20th Congress, after listening to the report of the KGB executioner about these dying words of Yakir, he swore at him.

Now about the sources of this work.

My main sources are Soviet party documents: protocols of party congresses, works of the founders of Bolshevism, documents of the Central Committee and numerous oppositions, various archival publications on the history of the revolution, official and opposition press, individual studies of party historians. All my main conclusions are based on these

party documents. I use Western literature (American, English, German, émigré) only in those cases when the relevant documents of the party and party leaders are not published in the USSR, but in the West they have long been put into scientific circulation. The same applies to the documents of the German Foreign Office on subsidizing the Bolshevik revolution. Least of all I used the official textbooks on the history of the CPSU. The ideologists of the CPSU have never written and never will write a scientifically objective history of their party. If before Stalin's letter to the editors of the journal Proletarian Revolution in 1931, there were still some valuable works on the history of the party, as well as memoirs of the old Bolsheviks, then with this letter Stalin simply liquidated the history of the CPSU as a science.

Declaring all the old books on the history of the party and the revolution "Trotskyist contraband", including even those about which Lenin himself spoke very highly (for example, John Reed's book "Ten Days That Shook the World" with a foreword by Lenin), Stalin decided to write party history. As a result, the notorious "Short Course" appeared, the scientific and literary helplessness of which is surpassed only by the rampant historical falsification. Declared by an official decision of the Central Committee in 1938 "an encyclopedia of Marxism-Leninism" and "the pinnacle of historical science," Stalin's "Short Course" played the role of a communist bible in the USSR for almost 20 years. At the Twentieth Congress, the same Central Committee, in almost the same composition as in 1938, but without Stalin, admitted that the "Short Course" was not an "encyclopedia" at all, but a deliberate "falsification of the history of the party" and the "pinnacle" of the cult of Stalin.

After the debunking of Stalin, the so-called "historical-party science" was restored in its rights, the subject of which is the history of the CPSU and the three Russian revolutions. However, the methodological principles of this science remained the same as under Stalin. Therefore, it is impossible to imagine more ignorant people precisely in the field of the history of the party and Russian revolutions, such as candidates and doctors of "historical party science." This is not because they are incapable people; on the contrary, there are many talented and even outstanding people among them, but what they are taught is not science, but a mixture of scientific quackery with party shamanism; the sources by which they study history are not authentic documents of the era, but their falsified surrogate. Even this surrogate is composed in such a way that future party historians do not know in the original the political works of the founders of Russian Marxism - Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov, Potresov.

Moreover, for party historians, the works of the founders of Bolshevism from the "Leninist guard", such as Zinoviev, Kamenev,

Bukharin, Rykov, not to mention Trotsky and Radek. A party of fifteen million hears these names every day in classes in party schools as the names of "heretics", but no one - neither the students nor their teachers - knows why Lenin's comrades-in-arms and personal friends became Stalin's "heretics" and Hitler's "spies", does not even know their biographies (in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia there are no biographies of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin, but there are biographies of Hitler and

Mussolini, those ideological twins of Stalin). The only source of party historians is Lenin, but even from Lenin they take only what fits into the framework of the current policy of the party apparatus, and what contradicts it, they hush up.

At the KhPGU congress, Zinoviev told how the Stalinists took away places that were objectionable to them from the writings of Lenin with the help of this argument:

"You shouldn't quote Vladimir Ilyich too much ... Why quote Lenin, you can find anything from him, like Uncle Yakov - all kinds of goods" ("Pravda", 23. KhP. 1925).

It often happens that Lenin is interpreted with a deliberate distortion of his thought (the last but classic examples of the distortion of Lenin's thought and desire are the crude anti-Leninist interpretation of the "Letter to the Congress", that is, Lenin's "Testament" and his article "On the Question of Nationalities or on autonomization" both in Ponomarev's textbooks "History of the CPSU" and in the "six volumes" "History of the CPSU" edited by Pospelov).

Their other source is Stalin, but without frequent references to Stalin himself. The methodology of party historians is based on the Leninist principle of "party spirit in science" - in the Stalinist interpretation. The essence of this interpretation boils down to the fact that all things, categories, phenomena, events and persons themselves are considered and evaluated from the point of view of the interests of the "general line of the party" at the current stage of its policy. Therefore, for Bolshevik historians, "history is politics overturned into the past," according to the definition of the patriarch of Soviet historical science, Pokrovsky. Therefore, as the French historian Guizot said about his time, "the events of the present illuminate the facts of the past." But not all the events of the present among Bolshevik historians illuminate the facts of the past. Other major events and major facts of history are simply declared not to have been for the sake of the same principle of "party spirit in science".

In general, the "default figure" is the most common device of party historians. If the facts and events are so glaring that it is impossible to keep silent, then to explain them they resort to the most gross falsification. For example, it is impossible not to name Trotsky in connection with the October Revolution and the Civil War. It's called, but what? Here is the most recent example. Soviet academician, Stalin's former secretary for the "History of the Civil War in the USSR", I. Mintz in his fundamental work

Veliky Oktyabr writes about Trotsky's role in October:

"Although Trotsky voted for the resolution on the uprising, he practically did not prepare it and did not take any part in the development of the uprising plan" (vol. P, 1967, p. 954.).

But Mintz's teacher, Stalin, on the day of the first anniversary of October, wrote in Pravda:

"All work on the practical organization of the uprising took place under the direct supervision of the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky. It can be said with certainty that the Party owes the quick transition of the garrison to the side of the Soviet and the skillful organization of the work of the Military Revolutionary Committee, first of all and mainly to Comrade Trotsky" ("Pravda", 7. KhG. 1918).

Regarding Trotsky's role in leading the Red Army in the Civil War, all Soviet history books say the same thing: Trotsky systematically changed, betrayed, and sabotaged the victory of the Red Army. At the same time, party historians are not at all embarrassed by the

they lack the simplest political logic - how could the "all-seeing and all-knowing genius" - Lenin, at the head of the Red Army, tolerate such a "traitor", "traitor" and "saboteur"?

The very method of researching party historians is also anti-scientific. Before embarking on the study of a particular problem, the researcher usually draws up a working hypothesis, or a series of hypotheses, conscientiously collects all the data not only in favor of his own hypothesis, but also against it, systematizes and classifies them - only after To do this, he sets himself specific goals and proceeds to the very process of writing the work. And a work appears, the conclusions of which can be directly opposite to the original hypothesis.

Nothing of the kind is allowed by the method of historical mathematics and the principle of "partisanship in science." The Party historian knows the answer to the problem posed by him even before he has begun to study it. Och simply takes the necessary quotation from Lenin, or from the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and collects only such facts that confirm this quotation.

Such are the studies on the history of KISS that came out after Stalin. The exceptions were the valuable works of Professor Budzhalov on the history of the Central Committee for March 1917 and Professor Kuzmin on Stalin's role in the civil war. During Khrushchev's rule, starting from the 20th Congress,

also, as has been said, many valuable documents on the history of the Party have come out. With the overthrow of Khrushchev, such publications almost ceased.

The monumental, apparently six-volume "History of the CPSU" published under the new leadership is in fact the same Stalinist "Short Course", only stretched into six volumes in eight thick books. You read the "six-volume book" and all the time catch yourself thinking that you are reading a long-familiar thing, and then, when you start digging into your memory, it turns out that you are simply reading the unquoted Stalin. Not only the concept, but even the argumentation, the authors of the "six volumes" borrow or simply rewrite from the "Short Course" and "Works" of Stalin. I did not find a single important new document, not a single original thought in the "six volumes", which I would not have read from Stalin before. It would seem that in such a solidly conceived history of the CPSU, the minutes of the plenums of the Central Committee of forty or at least fifty years ago (1919-1930 ...) would be introduced into scientific circulation, but nothing like this happened. Why do these protocols still remain a closely guarded state secret of the Kremlin?

Due to my party rank, I had access to the verbatim minutes of the plenums of the Central Committee of the twenties and thirties (they were printed in a limited number of copies in the printing house of the Central Committee, I sent out the "Secretariat of Comrade Stalin" to party activists at the level of secretaries of the regional committees, including here and listeners of the IKP, after reading them you need was to be returned to the Central Committee). Therefore, I can testify that there are no long-range state secrets in the minutes of the Central Committee of that time. But they contain facts and evidence from various oppositions about the monstrous criminal practice of Stalin and the Stalinist apparatus in fabricating artificial cases to destroy the old Leninist party - the RCP (b) and to create a new Stalinist party - the CPSU. It is natural, therefore, that the present party does not want the peoples of the USSR to learn from these protocols of the Central Committee of its criminal origin.

The post-Khrushchev Politburo of the Central Committee, which yesterday, together with Khrushchev

unanimously condemned Stalin as a criminal, and today, without Khrushchev, unanimously rehabilitates him as an "outstanding Leninist", one could be accused of unscrupulousness if such behavior of Stalin's disciples did not have its own internal logic - experience has shown them that the existing system of oligarchic dictatorship is not allows a different al

alternatives of ruling, just like Stalin's rule, even if modernized. Rehabilitating the former "father"-criminal, the Stalinist epigones take upon themselves the historical responsibility for the atrocities of Stalin and openly admit their spiritual Stalinist ancestry.

True, this does not testify to the political wisdom of the supreme partocrats, but it greatly simplifies the task of the historian: he no longer has to prove, as was the case under Khrushchev, that the 20th and 20th Congresses were deeply mistaken in artificially opposing Stalin to Lenin. Stalin was and will remain in history Lenin, brought to his logical end. That is why the disciples of Stalin from the Politburo were right when they constantly repeated until the 20th Congress: "Stalin is Lenin today." The evolution in this slogan boils down to the fact that now they only talk about Lenin, but think about Stalin.

To the sources mentioned above, one more source must be added, which to some extent has been invisibly present in this work since the mid-twenties - this is my personal experience. I joined the party, having added a few years to myself, quite young back in those years when Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsy plus Stalin sat in its Politburo. Having made a fairly quick career as a party worker, I had the opportunity to observe from the inside the struggle of various oppositions against the Stalinist faction. During the struggle between Trotsky and Stalin, my sympathy was on the side of Stalin, but during the struggle between Stalin and Bukharin, on the side of Bukharin. This was reflected in my article in the Pravda newspaper against the theses of the Politburo to XY! congress on two issues: I criticized the Stalinist national policy of the Central Committee, opposing it to the Leninist one, and averted the course towards collectivization in the national republics, as the course was also clearly not Leninist. For the first question, I wrote:

"The current pace of our cultural and economic construction in the national regions does not ensure the implementation of the very clear and practical directives of the Tenth-XII Congresses (1921-1923) of the Party, not only for this five-year period, but also for the next five-year periods ... It is necessary (to carry out) practical, more than an accelerated elimination of the actual inequality of nationalities ... It cannot be argued that everything that is economically inexpedient and inefficient at a given time, the proletarian revolution does not do.

On the second question, based on the fact that the anti-collective farm uprisings in

1929 - 1930 were "on a larger scale in the national regions than in the Russians", I rejected the point in the theses of the Politburo, which stated that "in the national regions of the East, the partnership for the social cultivation of the land will for the first time become widespread, as a transitional form to the artel" ( "CPSU in resolutions", part P, pp. 595-6, 1953).

In response to this, my article stated:

"We think that this preparatory work for the mass collective farm

and the Tozov movement should start from the very beginning - with land management. If we started preparations with tozes, it would not be Leninist ... We need to start with the simplest and so far unresolved - with land management.

And, as proof of my correctness, I referred to the decision of the previous, XY, congress, which said:

"To carry out land management of the poor and weak strata of the peasantry at the expense of the state. The implementation of land management should be closely linked with other measures (agricultural assistance, credit, land reclamation, machine supply, etc.) ... Recognize as urgent the establishment of the basic principles of land management and land use on an all-Union scale "( CPSU in Res. ", ibid. , p. 365).

On both questions, I gave many examples of how the words of the Central Committee differ from the practice of its local bodies (see the newspaper Pravda, June 22, 1930, A. Avtorkhanov "For the fulfillment of the party's directives on the national question").

The article sparked a whole discussion, which I have detailed elsewhere (see my book The Technology of Power). Here I will confine myself to a quotation from an article by one of my critics, which vividly characterizes not so much me as a dying party, in which from now on any criticism of the Stalinist Central Committee is considered a "betrayal":

"What happens if you follow the path proposed by Comrade. Avtorkhanov? This means the removal in earnest and for a long time of the slogan of complete collectivization in the national regions ... since this land management will be the land management of individual peasant farms ... Comrade. Avtorkhanov definitely fell ill with a right-wing opportunist disease. He does not see what is in the national regions, and "it is impossible not to recognize what is, - it will force itself to be recognized" (Lenin). Why do we object so sharply to Comrade. Avtorkhanov? Yes, if only because "the time is more difficult, the question is

a million times more important, getting sick at such a time means risking the death of the revolution "(Lenin, from a speech at the US Party Congress against Comrade Bukharin). The treacherous ears of the master of right deeds stick out from Avtorkhanov's reasoning about ways to collectivize the national outskirts" (the newspaper "Pravda", June 30, 1930, L. Gottfried "On Comrade Avtorkhanov's Correct and Right Opportunist Proposals").

I was given a great honor - I was put in direct contact with Bukharin and warned by the words of Lenin that because of me, an unknown student of the Institute of Red Professors, an entire revolution could perish!

The discussion continued, I "brave" with reference to the decision of the Tenth Congress on land management, until Stalin put an end to the discussion with a brief phrase in his report at the already opened Tenth] Congress:

"The Central Committee revised the method of land management in favor of the collective farms" (Stalin, Soch. vol. 12, p. 286).

After this directive "reference" from Stalin, I decided to save both the "revolution" and my party card by the then usual method: I made a repentant statement (Pravda, July 4, 1930).

My article benefited only myself - since then I have become



critically reevaluate what has already happened, and critically observe what happens next. Very soon it became clear that our ideals are fictions, promises are deceit, hopes are self-deception. When, as if to complete my Marxist education, after graduating from the Institute of Red Professors in 1937, the Stalinists put me in the basement of the NKVD that same year, declaring me an "enemy of the people," then, I must admit, this Chekist "university" for five years gave me something that no professorship can give: now only for the first time I saw Stalin naked in politics, and his already "naked sword of the revolution" - the Chekist machine - in action.

About all this, of course, I do not write anything, but such personal experience has the advantage that you better understand not only the Pharisaic language of documents, but also the hidden background of the events themselves.

There is also a serious danger in this advantage, which I constantly take into account, namely: lest my personal, emotional, leave its mark on the research to the detriment of its scientific objectivity. It doesn't take a lot of imagination to anticipate a reaction.

party ideologists on this work is its total suppression, if it does not fall into the orbit of the ubiquitous, truly free voice of the peoples of the USSR - Samizdat, declaring it "slandorous", if it finds its way there. The Soviet gendarmes from science will not enter into polemics on the substance of the content of the work itself. After all, their function and competence do not include scientific disputes, as happens in any legal state, their profession is "to drag and not let go," as befits a totalitarian police regime. In addition, it is much easier to declare the author a "slanderer" than to refute his conclusions based on an analysis of exclusively Soviet official sources. Everything that party historians both under Stalin and after him deliberately kept silent when using these sources, I pulled into the light of God; I revised their pro-Stalinist interpretations of Lenin's works in the spirit of Lenin; from the shorthand records of the Central Committee and party congresses, party historians quote only those speakers who spoke about the wisdom of Lenin, and I quote also those old Bolsheviks who doubted this; Bolshevik leaders expelled from the history of the party and revolution according to the notorious formula "Lenin, Stalin, Sverdlov, etc." - these "and others." I restored the party to their true role; to the Bolshevik leaders from various oppositions, who are branded in party textbooks as "traitors to the revolution", depriving them of the opportunity to speak about their real position, I returned the "freedom of speech" to present their arguments. The result was a picture that, in my opinion, is close to the actual history of the Leninist Central Committee, but far from the one drawn by government historiography.

The author has no illusions about the imperfection of his work. A perfect and complete history of the Central Committee can only be written by future historians when the secret archives of the Central Committee and the Soviet political police are opened. This will not happen until the existing neo-Stalinist regime leaves the political scene. Therefore, the author's task was more modest: to recreate the documented history of the "triumph and death of the Leninist Central Committee" based on an analysis of already known Soviet official sources. How well he coped with this task is not for him to judge, but for a conscientious critic and an inquisitive reader.

A. Avtorkhanov

P5. While working on the material, I had to quote

collected works of Lenin in three editions. At the same time, there were

the following designations, varying in the title and in the numbering of volumes (in Roman or Arabic numerals): "Lenin, vol. XXY" - third edition, "Lenin, Soch., vol. 25" - fourth edition, "Lenin, PSS, vol. 25" - the fifth edition.

A. A.

Chapter 1

## THE RISE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY

History, like nature, loves contrasts and quirks. The history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is also full of them: the first congress of the RSDLP is considered in the USSR the official date of the formation of the CPSU, but its organizer was the implacable enemy of Bolshevism - the "Pan-Jewish Workers' Union in Russia and Poland" (Bund); of the nine delegates to the congress, eight people later became anti-Bolsheviks, and the ninth was destroyed by Stalin during the great purge with the entire elite of Bolshevism; The first program document of the Russian proletariat is considered to be the Manifesto of the 2nd Congress, but its author was P. Struve, the ideologist of the Russian bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, it is precisely in the history of Bolshevism that the Third Congress is really of exceptional importance precisely because it was the first to create that famous institution that would later make an era: the Central Committee.

The T Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) took place on March 1-3, 1898 under the guise of a party on the occasion of the name day of the wife of one of the Social Democrats. A small wooden house on the outskirts of Minsk, in which the congress met, was located on a narrow street directly opposite the building of the mounted gendarmerie (History of the CPSU, vol. 1, Moscow, 1964, pp. 260-265). Sitting under the noses of the police was considered the best way to conspire.

Delegates to the congress were elected from the Unions of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kyiv, Yekaterinoslav, the editors of Rabochaya Gazeta (Kyiv) and the Bund. The leaders of the Petersburg "Union" V. I. Ulyanov (Lenin) and Yu. O. Zederbaum (Martov) were absent, as they were in exile. The first Central Committee consisted of three members. They were A. I. Kremer (leader of the Bund, created in 1897), S. I. Radchenko (departed from Bolshevism in 1907), B. L. Eidelman (died in a Stalinist prison in 1942).

The resolution of the congress on the role and place of the Central Committee in the party says the following:

"The executive body of the party is the Central Committee, elected by the party congress, to which it gives an account of its activities."

The congress also determined the specific duties of the Central Committee. These responsibilities include:

"a) concern for the planned activities of the party (distribution of forces and means,

setting and carrying out uniform requirements, etc.) ..;

b) creation and delivery of literature to local committees;

c) the organization of such enterprises that are of common importance for the whole of Russia (the celebration of May 1, the publication of leaflets, assistance to strikers, etc.) ("CPSU in resolutions", part 1, Moscow; 1953, p. 14).

If a particularly important question arises before the Central Committee within the competence of the Party Congress, the Central Committee may adopt a unanimous decision, provided that the decision taken is reported to the next Congress. The Central Committee is given the right to co-opt new members. He represents the party in relations with other revolutionary organizations.

A characteristic feature of the first Party Rules, which distinguishes it from subsequent Leninist Rules, is its guiding idea of the Party's sovereignty over its executive body. This idea is very clearly expressed in the following, seventh paragraph of the decision of the congress:

"The local committees carry out the decisions of the Central Committee in whatever form they find most suitable for local conditions. In exceptional cases, committees are given the right to refuse to fulfill the requirements of the Central Committee, notifying it of the reason for the refusal. In all other respects the local committees act quite independently, being guided only by the program of the party" (ibid., p. 15).

The following, ninth, paragraph of the decision once again emphasizes the idea of party sovereignty over the Central Committee:

"The highest body of the party is the congress of representatives of local committees" (ibid., p. 15).

The Central Committee disposed of the party's funds, which

were made up of voluntary periodic deductions from local committees and from special fees in favor of the party (ibid., p. 14).

Most of the delegates (5 out of 9) were arrested immediately after the congress. The remaining members of the Central Committee - Kremer and Radchenko - organized the compilation and publication of the Manifesto of the Third Congress, the author of which was the aforementioned P. B. Struve. The Manifesto, drawn up with great pathos, said:

"The farther to the east of Europe, the politically weaker, more cowardly and meaner the bourgeoisie becomes, the greater cultural and political tasks fall to the lot of the proletariat. On its strong shoulders, the Russian working class must endure and will endure the cause of winning political freedom... The Russian proletariat will cast off the yoke of autocracy in order to continue the struggle against capitalism and the bourgeoisie with greater energy until the complete victory of socialism... The Russian Social-Democratic Party continues the work and traditions of the entire preceding revolutionary movement in Russia; By making the winning of political freedom the most important of the immediate tasks of the Party as a whole, Social Democracy is advancing towards the goal clearly outlined by the glorious leaders of the old People's Party.

will." But the means and paths chosen by the Social Democracy are different" (ibid., p. 13).

This Manifesto in the era of Stalin was interpreted as politically unsustainable. In the official

The publication of the Central Committee of the KISS "CPSU in Resolutions" says the following about him:

"The published Manifesto suffered from significant shortcomings: it contained

the task of conquest of political power by the proletariat has been omitted, nothing has been said about the hegemony of the proletariat, the question of the allies of the proletariat has been omitted..." (ibid., p. 11).

These accusations are unfounded. The official historians of Stalin demanded from the Manifesto ideas that Lenin himself did not have at that time - the hegemony of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasantry as an ally of the proletariat. Lenin arrived at these ideas in the period 1900-1905.

As for the Manifesto, Lenin wrote:

"We ... fully share the main ideas of the Manifesto and attach great importance to it" (ibid., p. 18).

However, the groundlessness of such accusations was so obvious that the new fundamental "History of the CPSU" essentially dissociated itself from the old concept. It says:

"Although Struve was far from revolutionary Marxism, he could not carry out his reformist views in the Manifesto" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 1, pp. 265-266).

And in fact, Struve's Manifesto was far more revolutionary and radical than Lenin's own early writings (The Tasks of the Russian Social Democrats, Who are the Friends of the People). As regards the Rules of the Party, especially the role and place of the Central Committee in the Party itself, the decisions [of the Third Congress really are in deep contradiction with the future organizational teaching of Leninism. However, at that time, Lenin himself, although already then a well-known party leader and publicist, did not yet have an idea about his future "organizational plan" for creating a party of revolution, which he developed in his famous book What Is To Be Done? (1902). But what interested Lenin from the very first steps of his revolutionary activity was the ideological straightforwardness and the orthodox purity of the movement. A monolith, not a conglomeration of opinions, is the ideal of the Leninist party. Therefore, in an editorial in the first issue of Iskra (December 1900), he writes:

"Before uniting, and in order to unite, we must first resolutely and definitely disengage ... It is clear, therefore, that we do not intend to make our body a mere storehouse of diverse views. We will conduct it, on the contrary, in the spirit of a strictly defined direction. This trend can be expressed in a word: Marxism..." ("CPSU in Resolutions", Part 1, p. 19).

An integral doctrine on the organization of a new type of party was developed by Lenin in the aforementioned book What Is To Be Done? Lenin expressed the quintessence of his doctrine in the following thesis:

"Give us an organization of revolutionaries - and we will turn Russia over!" (Lenin, Vol. GU, p. 458, 3rd ed.).

"Organization" is the alpha and omega of Lenin's plan for the revolution. "The proletariat has no other weapon in its struggle for power than organization..." (Lenin, On Party Building, p. 288, Moscow, 1956). He remains true to this principle throughout his life.

Lenin, an educated Marxist, had little interest in Marxism as a scientific theory, he needed it as a means, as an ideological weapon for political purposes - to create an "organization of revolutionaries." And here, too, Lenin remains true to "dialectics": he passes the European spiritual product - Marxism - through the filter of Russian specifics, discarding everything utopian and sublime from it, utilizing everything practical and dynamic. Already in one of his early works, Lenin

proposed from Marxism "to work out the most suitable form of organization for our conditions for spreading social democracy and rallying the workers into a political force" (Lenin, vol. 1, p. 302).

However, by "organization" Lenin means something bigger than an ordinary political party, union or association.

In view of the exceptional, decisive importance of this issue in the military arsenal of both historical Bolshevism and modern communism, let us dwell on it in more detail. The "organization of revolutionaries", according to Lenin, is not just an organization, but a system of organizations with two networks: a vertical network of party organizations themselves with the strictest hierarchical charter and with the same strict subordination, and a horizontal network of auxiliary organizations that are formally non-partisan, and in fact - the executive bodies of the will of the vertical network.

First of all, and before anything else, a higher, but very narrow, organization of party leaders is created, which Lenin calls the "organization of professional revolutionaries." A concise but very convex description of this organization is given by Lenin in the following words:

"Without a dozen talented, experienced, professionally trained and long-term school-trained leaders, who perfectly mellowed each other, a steadfast struggle of not a single class is possible in modern society ... And so I affirm: 1) That

neither

one revolutionary movement cannot be stable without a stable and continuum organization of leaders; 2) that the wider the mass spontaneously drawn into the struggle, constituting the basis of the movement and participating in it, the more urgent is the need for such an organization and the stronger this organization should be; 3) that such an organization should consist mainly of people professionally engaged in revolutionary activities; 4) that in an autocratic country, the more we narrow down the composition of such an organization to the participation in it of only such members who are professionally engaged in revolutionary activities and have received professional training in the art of combating

political police, the more difficult it will be to "catch" such an organization, and 5) - the wider will be the composition of persons both from the working class and from the rest of the classes of society who will have the opportunity to participate in the movement and actively work in it" (Lenin, vol. GU, pp. 454-456).

Under the conditions of the police regime, such an "organization of professional revolutionaries" should be created, the secret technique of which successfully competes with the same technique of the political police. This Leninist organization must be both intelligence and counterintelligence in relation to the technique of revolutionary work, a "brain trust" and propaganda headquarters in the overall leadership of the revolutionary underground. Lenin says this:

"A dozen experienced, professionally trained revolutionaries no less than our police centralize all the secret aspects of the matter, the preparation of leaflets, the development of an approximate plan, the appointment of a detachment of leaders for each district of the city, for each factory quarter, for each educational institution, etc." (Lenin, vol. TU, p. 457).

Lenin dismisses the demand for the democratic principle of building a party organization under the conditions of a police system as naive and ridiculous. The organization must be built on strictly conspiratorial principles and under dictatorial leadership. Under conditions of autocracy, says Lenin, there can be no democracy, for democracy "in the darkness of autocracy, under the rule of gendarmes

there is only an empty and harmful toy ... for in fact, no revolutionary organization has ever carried out and cannot carry out democracy ... (by it) only wide failures are facilitated by the police ... The only serious principle for the activity of our movement should be: the strictest secrecy, the strictest choice of members, the training of professional revolutionaries "(Lenin, vol. GU, pp. 468-469).

After a four-year break since the liquidation of the Central Committee of the T party congress and after two years of very fruitful work by the editors of the Iskra newspaper (Plekhanov, Lenin, Martov, Axelrod, Vera Zasulich, Potresov) in preparing a new party congress, the ideological, political and organizational prerequisites were created for restoration of the RSDLP. Among the members of the editorial board of Iskra, as organizers and party theoreticians, two friend-enemies, Lenin and Martov, were especially distinguished. Under their leadership, a widely ramified, superbly functioning conspiratorial network of agents and organizations of the Iskra newspaper was created in Russia. This made it possible already in November 1902 to create in a revolutionary manner a new center of the party called the "Organizing Committee for the Convocation of the Second Congress of the RSDLP". "OK", as the Organizing Committee was called for short, was created not abroad, like Iskra, but in Russia itself - in Pskov.

The very fact of its creation under the conditions of the tsarist autocracy spoke of the fact that Russian Marxist socialism began to turn from the theory of emigre publicists into the practice of the Russian labor movement. The composition of the OK initially included practitioners-organizers of the party - V. N. Krasnukha (from the St. Petersburg Committee),

E. Ya. Levin (from the Yuzhny Rabochy group) and I. I. Radchenko (from the Iskra organization). Later, the following were co-opted into the OK: G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, F. V. Lengnik, Sh. A. Krasikov, I. N. Lepeshinsky (all of them later became important Bolsheviks), K. Portnoy (from the Bund), R. S. Halbergstadt, E. M. Aleksandrova, V. N. Rozanov (from the "Southern Worker") and A. M. Stopani (from the "Northern Union") (Lenin, *Sobr. soch.* Vol. U, p. 415).

The OK acted on the rights of the Central Committee and at its plenum in February 1903 (Oryol) developed a charter for convening a new, II, party congress.

The OK issued a "Notice" about its education, about its goals and objectives. The Notice stated:

"...at present, Russian Social Democracy is faced with an enormous task, which is beyond the capacity of any local committees ... It can be carried out only by the collective forces of all Russian Social Democrats, rallied into one centralized, disciplined army" (Lenin, *there same*, p. 226).

The OK stated that it set itself the goal of creating just such a party, and that therefore, until the restoration of the central organization of the party, the Organizing Committee assumed the performance of certain general functions (issuing all-Russian leaflets, general transport and equipment, establishing links between the committees, etc.) (Lenin, *ibid.*).

Commenting on this Notice, Lenin wrote in the newspaper Iskra:

"The statement of the newly formed Organizing Committee clearly speaks for itself... what we need is not the unification of a few handfuls of revolutionary-minded intellectuals, but the unification of all the leaders of the working-class movement, which has raised an entire wide class of the population to independent life and struggle. We need unification on the basis of strictly principled unity, to which all or the vast majority of committees, organizations and groups, intellectuals and workers must consciously and firmly arrive ... "(Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 227).

The main thesis of the "Appeal" - the party as "one centralized, disciplined army" - was Lenin's thesis from "What is to be done?" than to unite, it is necessary to disengage. It was for such a party that Lenin fought at the 2nd Party Congress.

A year after the publication of Lenin's book *What Is to Be Done?* The Second Congress of the RSDLP (1903) was convened, which met first in Brussels, and then in London. At this congress, for the first time, two points of view on the organizational question clashed among the "Iskrists" themselves (supporters of the foreign Social Democratic newspaper *Iskra* (1900), which was led by the above-named editorial "six"). The *Iskra* organization, which has hitherto acted as a single, united social-democratic organization against the right wing in the party - against the so-called "economists" (Martynov, Akimov, etc.), split at the congress into two groups with different doctrines.

on the organizational (and not programmatic) issue, which laid the foundation for the split of the party into two factions - the Bolshevik faction and the Menshevik faction. The split emerged over the first paragraph of the party's rules and ended by the end of the congress during the elections of the central institutions of the party. The Bolshevik faction was led by Lenin, who was supported by the chairman of the congress, Plekhanov. The Menshevik faction was led by Martov, who was supported by the rest of the *Iskra* editorial board.

It is even difficult for an inexperienced person to understand what, in fact, is the subject of the dispute. Indeed, let us compare two editions of 81, one of which belongs to Lenin, the other to Martov.

Martov's editorial: "A member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party is considered to be anyone who accepts its program, supports the party with material resources and provides it with regular personal assistance under the leadership of one of its organizations" ("CPSU in Resolutions", Part 1, 7th ed. ., p. 45).

Lenin's editorial: "A member of the Party is anyone who recognizes its program and supports the Party both with material means and with personal participation in one of the Party organizations" (ibid., p. 43).

Outwardly, both editions of Article 81 of the Rules look almost the same, but this "almost" was the fundamental and organically irreconcilable contradiction between Lenin and Martov. With Martov, anyone who works "under the control of the Party" can be a member of the Party; with Lenin, only one who himself is "in one of the Party organizations." Martov expands the boundaries of the party, Lenin narrows them down. Martov is guided by a thinking party, Lenin - by a disciplined party. Martov needs an amateur party capable of controlling its center, Lenin needs a hierarchical network controlled and led by the autocratic center.

Martov said at the congress: "The more widely the name of a Party member is spread, the better. A conspiratorial organization makes sense to me only insofar as it is clothed by a broad Social-Democratic Party" ("Second RSDLP Congress, minutes, p. 263).

Lenin replied: "We need the most diverse organizations of all types, ranks, and shades, ranging from the extremely narrow and conspiratorial to the very broad, free, 105e Ordnancenien. A necessary sign of a party organization is its approval by the Central Committee" (ibid., p. 265). Lenin went even further, establishing "mutual responsibility" in the party: "Every member of the party is responsible for the party and the party is responsible for the member of the party," he added (there

same, p. 277).

Summing up the results of the Second Congress, Lenin noted:

"Essentially, the entire position of the opportunists on the organizational question began to emerge already in the disputes over 81: both their defense of a vague, not firmly united party organization, and their hostility to the idea of building the party from top to bottom" (Lenin, "On Party Building", M., 1956, p. 142).

Lenin reminded his opponents that the newspaper *Iskra* had once approved his plan to create a party. He wrote that the main ideas that *Iskra* strove to lay as the basis of party organizations boiled down, in essence, to the following: "First, the idea of centralism... The first idea must pervade the entire Rules..." (ibid., p. 153).

The debate around 81 at the congress was heated and lengthy. They occupied several meetings of the congress. Delegate Akimov, expressing the opinion of the opponents of Lenin's wording, declared that Lenin was striving to "introduce a purely Arakcheev spirit into our Rules" ("Second RSDLP Congress, minutes", p. 296).

Plekhanov, who had kept a long silence and whose speech was expected with the greatest impatience, was one of the last to speak. He said:

"The more that was said about this subject and the more attentively I thought about it in the speeches of the speakers, the stronger was my conviction that the truth was on Lenin's side" (ibid., p. 271).

As for the argument of those who assert that Lenin's project closes the way to the party of the intelligentsia, in particular to professors, Plekhanov quoted Engels: "... when dealing with a professor, one must prepare in advance for the worst" (ibid., p. 271).

It was not only on this question that Plekhanov supported Lenin. He also supported him against the attacks of delegate Martynov, when the latter, referring to the numerous statements of Marx and Engels, quite reasonably began to prove the anti-Marxist essence of Lenin's theory of "consciousness and spontaneity", in particular the theory of introducing "socialist consciousness from outside" into the labor movement. Plekhanov accused Martynov of overexposure, compared him with the censor who once said: "Give me the *Our Father* and let me tear out one sentence from there - and I will prove to you that its author should have been hanged" (ibid., p. 108 ).

However, this Leninist theory of an active vanguard and a passive proletariat has already found its way into the party program worked out by *Iskra* and approved at this congress with complete unanimity between Lenin, Martov and Plekhanov. The "Economist" Akimov, with some kind of ingenious instinct, anticipates where not only the charter, but also the party program is leading, when he declares:

"The struggle to improve the condition of the proletariat becomes an outside matter for the party and interests it only as a conjuncture in which it operates. Thus, at this point in the program, there was a tendency to separate our party and its interests from the proletariat and its interests. This was shown even more clearly in the paragraph on the tasks of the Party. There are concepts - the party and the proletariat -

completely isolated and opposed, the first as an actively acting collective entity, the second as a passive environment, which is influenced by the party. Therefore, in the draft proposals, the name of the party appears everywhere as the subject, and the name of the proletariat as the complement (laughter)" (ibid., p. 127).



The subsequent history of Bolshevism shows the full depth of this foresight,

although it was accompanied by the ironic laughter of those who, alas, would themselves later become the first victims of their ill-luck.

The historically established terminology "Bolsheviks" and "Mensheviks" does not quite correctly reproduce the original alignment of forces and the first split at the 2nd Congress. According to the main and fateful dispute - about what the future socialist party of Russia should be - social democratic or social dictatorial, Lenin turned out to be in the minority, that is, the "Menshevik", and Martov in the majority, that is, the "Bolshevik". Of the 51 decisive votes for Lenin's draft, 23 votes were cast against 28; for Martov's draft, 28 votes against 22 (one abstention).

Lenin accepted his defeat in silence, without dramatizing the events, without provoking a deepening of the split. He sticks to his favorite saying: "Broken armies learn well" (Lenin, On Party Building, p. 358). And Lenin immediately, on the move, at the congress itself, "learns" how to defeat the enemy. He skillfully applies the tactics of a roundabout strike, the tactics of disintegrating, firstly, the forces of the enemy, and secondly, their

collisions among themselves. He easily succeeds, especially since Martov's "majority" was not a compact mass - it consisted of three different groups of delegates: 1) from the group of Martov himself, 2) from members of the foreign union of the RSDLP and the editorial board of Rabocheye Dyelo, who opposed himself to the Iskra organization and 3) from the delegates of the Jewish socialist union Bund, who demanded independence within the framework of the RSDLP, to which both Lenin and Martov objected.

Lenin and his supporters conducted matters at the congress in such a way that both of these last groups eventually left the congress. It was then that Lenin turned from the leader of the Mensheviks into the leader of the Bolsheviks. This happened during the elections of the Central Committee and the editors of the Central Organ (CO) and the editors of Iskra. The main disagreements came to light during the election of the Central Organ.

Martov proposed to the congress that the entire composition of the old editorial board be re-elected - Plekhanov, Lenin, Martov, Axelrod, Zasulich, Potresov. Lenin proposed to elect only the first "troika" - Plekhanov, Lenin, Martov.

Martov's motive: the old six have fully justified themselves, they have prepared the convocation of this congress, they have earned the trust of the party, and discrimination against any of this "six" is personally unacceptable to him.

Lenin's motive: the "six" did not justify itself in editorial and literary terms, it

too cumbersome for fast, efficient work, and in such a case "sentimentalism is unacceptable."

In fact, Lenin was guided by something else. In the old Six, as the congress showed, the balance of power was four against two in favor of Martov. Only Plekhanov walked with Lenin to the end of the congress. If the "troika" is chosen, the balance of forces will be (two against one) in favor of Lenin.

To give the congress delegates complete freedom of discussion, the entire old "six" was asked to leave the meeting. It was then that the fruits of the labor first appeared.

Lenin to create an "organization of professional revolutionaries" - Lenin's supporters supported the proposal with a compact and disciplined majority

Lenin. The "Six" was returned to the vote. Martov once again warned the congress that if a "troika" were elected, he would refuse to enter it. However, the congress accepted by a majority of votes Lenin's proposal for an editorial troika (Plekhanov received 23 votes, Martov 22, Lenin 20) ("The Second Congress of the RSDLP ...", p. 375).

Then Martov made a statement that turned out to be historic:

"Since, despite my declaration that I refuse the candidacy, I was nevertheless elected, then I must declare that I refuse the honor offered to me ... I cannot take responsibility for the policy of the group of three, which according to the adopted charter, should have a decisive influence on the course of affairs in Russia. I don't want to be the "third" in an institution, of which the Central Committee will be a mere appendage ... In fact, all party power is transferred into the hands of two persons, and I value the title of editor too little to agree to be with them as a third" ("The Second Congress of the RSDLP ...", p. 375).

This statement by Martov marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Russian socialism - the RSDLP finally split at the congress into two factions: the faction of democratic socialism, headed by Martov, and the faction of "revolutionary socialism" headed by Lenin. The first faction was called the "Menshevik" faction, the second - the "Bolshevik" faction because of the number of votes that each of them received during the elections of the Central Organ and the Central Committee.

The Central Committee also included some supporters of Lenin, and according to the charter of the Central Committee, the right to co-opt was granted. The Party Council was also elected as the central judicial and control body, which was composed of five persons - two representatives each

from

Central Committee and Central Organ, and the fifth person, the Chairman of the Council, was elected at the congress itself. They elected Plekhanov. Lenin's triumph was complete.

However, soon after the congress, Plekhanov became unbearable with Lenin. He probably only now began to think about where his own ill-luck had led him. The outstanding theoretician and brilliant polemicist Plekhanov had a kind of organic aversion to black plebeian work in the party. For this he was too aristocratic spirit. Lenin, on the contrary, had an equally deep contempt for abstract theorizing, for the brilliance of the word, the noise of the phrase, being at the same time a workhorse and a restless rider of the gray, daily work of organizing the party. Plekhanov is a theoretician, Lenin is a practical one - in this respect they complemented each other brilliantly. Plekhanov's alliance with Lenin at first looked exactly like a marriage of convenience. When Akimov, quoted above, reminded Plekhanov of the full danger of his political marriage to Lenin, Plekhanov escaped with historical anecdotes:

"Napoleon had a passion for breeding his marshals with their wives; some marshals yielded to him, although they loved their wives. Comrade Akimov is like Napoleon in this respect - he wants to divorce me from Lenin at all costs. But I

I will show more character than the Napoleonic marshals; I will not divorce Lenin and I hope that he does not intend to divorce me either. At this point, the protocol entry notes: "Comrade Lenin, laughing, shakes his head negatively" ("Second Congress of the RSDLP ...", p. 137).

However, the "divorce" still had to. Under pressure from the rank and file members of the party and wishing to prevent a final split, Plekhanov proposed to Lenin that the old members of the Iskra editorial board return to the editorial board. Lenin left the editorial office in protest. Plekhanov now had no choice but to invite (co-opt) Martov and the other three editors back to the editorial office. Those accepted

invitation. This is how the "new" Iskra arose, called by the Bolsheviks the "Menshevik" Iskra, although it was headed by the "Bolshevik" and chairman of the Party Council, Plekhanov.

Since then, the RSDLP has actually split into two parties. Since then, organizational disagreements between these two parties have gradually developed into tactical and ideological disagreements. After the congress and after the Mensheviks had regained control of the leading organs of the party (the Central Organ, the Party Council, but the Central Committee is still in the hands of the Bolsheviks, where Lenin will soon offer to co-opt himself), Lenin came out with a new work - "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back" (1904), in which he defended his organizational plan, arguing that the creation of a single party was a "step forward", and the coming of the "Mensheviks" to power in the party was "two steps back". Lenin wrote:

"One step forward, two steps back ... this happens both in the life of individuals and in the history of nations, and in the development of parties. It would be criminal cowardice to doubt even for a moment the inevitable, complete triumph of the principles of revolutionary social democracy, proletarian organization and party discipline" (Lenin, On Party Building, p. 287).

However, Lenin said that at the second congress and now after it, the disagreements between the two factions were not of a programmatic or even tactical, but of an organizational nature. He's writing:

"Differences ... do not boil down to questions of program or tactics, but only to questions of organization... The position of the new Iskra is opportunism on organizational questions... In fact, the whole position of the opportunists in organizational question... Their enmity towards building the party from top to bottom" (ibid., p. 124).

He called on his supporters to fight harshly against "organizational opportunists", instilling in them a sense of ruthlessness towards the enemy: "in politics, sacrifices are not given for nothing, but are taken from battle," he wrote (ibid., p. 286).

Lenin also speaks of the kinship of Menshevik opportunism on the organizational question with the opportunism of international Social Democracy. He's writing:

"The fundamental features of opportunism I have indicated (autonomism, aristocratic or intellectual anarchism, tailism and Girondism) are observed (with

corresponding change) in all social democratic parties throughout the world" (ibid., pp. 273-274).

The leitmotif of the Leninist plan was unraveled in the words of a man who, before the congress, was considered "Lenin's club", and at the congress departed from him - in the words of Trotsky.

Lenin writes that Trotsky correctly characterized the Party Rules when he stated: "Our Rules represent organized distrust on the part of the Party in all its parts, that is, control over all local, regional and national organizations" (ibid., p. 161).

But what then is a party according to Lenin? To this the old revolutionary Vera Zasulich replied:

"The party for Lenin is his "plan", his will, guiding the implementation of the plan. This is the idea of Ludovic HGU." "The state is me", "the party is me, Lenin" ("Iskra" June 25, 1904, No. 70, I quote from Lenin - Vol. UT, p. 431).

Martov wrote about the "hypertrophy of centralism" of Lenin's plan, and Axelrod described it as "a system of autocratic-bureaucratic management of the party" (Lenin, "On Party Building", pp. 155; 245). Lenin responds to all these accusations calmly and consistently in his own way. To him, he says, "our party must be a hierarchy not only of organizations of revolutionaries, but also of the mass of workers' organizations" (ibid., p. 147).

Even more. Lenin felt flattered when Martov called on the party to start "an uprising against Leninism." Lenin says that all those offended at the 2nd Congress now "rushed into each other's arms with a sob and raised the banner of 'rebellion against Leninism'" — Lenin puts these words of Martov in quotation marks and adds:

"Martov waited until the time when he was on his heels in order to raise an uprising against me alone. Martov is arguing unskillfully: he wants to destroy his opponent by giving him the greatest compliments" (ibid., p. 147).

Not being himself greedy for compliments, Lenin knew only one compliment for his opponents - savory abuse.

Immediately after the congress, Lenin began the practical implementation of his plan to create a system of party organizations in the localities. In a circular letter to his like-minded people, entitled "Letter to a comrade on our organizational tasks," Lenin concretized his plan. He proposes using the best comrades from the Social Democratic underground not only in committees, but also in special, very important functions for the cause (printing house, transport of literature, traveling agitators, passport bureaus, leaders of military groups, as well as "teams to combat spies" ). Lenin gives instructions:

1) "We must inspire the workers that the killing of spies, and provocateurs, and traitors can, of course, sometimes be an absolute necessity ..."; 2) "Combat mugs are also needed, utilizing those who served in military service

or especially strong and dexterous workers in case of demonstrations, liberation from

prisons, etc.";

3) "According to the type of branch offices of the committee ... all the various groups serving the movement should be organized - both groups of student and gymnasium youth, and groups, say, assisting officials and transport, printing, passport groups, groups for setting up safe houses, groups for tracking (surveillance - A. A.) for spies, military groups, groups for the supply of weapons, groups for organizing, for example, a "profitable financial enterprise", etc. The whole art of a conspiratorial organization should consist in to use everything and everything, "to give work to everyone and everyone", while at the same time maintaining leadership of the entire movement" (Lenin, vol. U, pp. 184-187, 3rd ed.).

To the objections of party comrades that Lenin's excessively centralist organization fraught with great danger if an incapable person or even an agent of the political police turned out to be in the center (the Bolshevik deputy [At the State Duma Malinovsky turned out to be such an agent in the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks in 1912), Lenin replied by pointing to that "a remedy against this cannot be election and decentralization, which is absolutely unacceptable and even harmful in revolutionary work under autocracy" (ibid.).

Particular importance was attached to work in factories and plants. But even there, the party network is built according to the generally accepted hierarchical charter:

"Each plant should be our fortress. And for this, the factory workers' organization must be just as conspiratorial within itself, just as "branched" on the outside, sticking its tentacles in the most diverse directions, like any revolutionary organization ... The factory committee must consist of a very small number of revolutionaries who receive directly from the committee (superior committee - A. A.) instructions. All members of the factory committee should look upon themselves as agents of the committee (higher committee - A.A.), obliged to obey all its orders, obliged to observe all the "laws and customs" of that "active army" into which they joined and from which they in wartime, they have no right to leave without the permission of their superiors" (ibid., pp. 185-186).

Lenin also gives a popular interpretation of what he means by "centralization of leadership" when he compares the center to the conductor and the party to the orchestra. He's writing:

"In order for the center to really conduct an orchestra, it is necessary for it to be known exactly who, where and what violin is playing, where and how what instrument was and is being trained, who, where and why is out of tune and whom, how and where it is necessary to correct translate dissonance, etc." (ibid., p. 190).

Absolutist centralism would later be presented by Lenin and the Bolsheviks as "democratic centralism." Lenin ends with the following important conclusion:

"The movement should be led by the smallest possible number, as homogeneous as possible, of professional revolutionaries tempted by experience. Participate in the movement must be as many as possible

diverse and heterogeneous groups of the proletariat (and other classes of the people)" (Lenin, Vol. 1, p. 189).

Briefly, lapidarily, Lenin expresses the relationship between the center and the party periphery by the formula: "centralization of leadership and decentralization of responsibility" (ibid., p. 188), a formula that Bolshevism is still guided by today. (A. A\ztrogkVapou, TVe Sottipp15+ Rau Arragai1\$, SSHsado, Vedpetu, 1966, pp. 7-16).

Still, Lenin's leading idea - a hierarchical party with centralized leadership - did not fully find an adequate embodiment in the organizational norms of the draft Party Charter, which Lenin presented it to the Second Congress for approval. The Leninist Rules clearly suffer from the same disease that he attributed to his opponents: opportunism in the organizational question. In other words, Lenin was not yet a Bolshevik in the organizational question; in paying tribute to the pressure and influence of the democratic wing of the party (Martov's group), he also accepted his organizational scheme for building the highest organs of the party. Thus, in the draft Rules of Lenin there is a clearly anti-Leninist idea of the "polycentricity" of the party. Instead of one leading center, Lenin proposes the creation of three independent and not subordinate to each other centers: the Central Committee, the Party Council and the Central Organ of the Party. This requirement is set out in 8 4 of his draft. It says: "The Party Congress appoints the Central Committee, the editors of the Central Organ and the Council of the Party" ("CPSU in Resolutions", part 1, p. 43). The following paragraphs define the competences of each of these bodies:

"5. The Central Committee unites and directs all the practical activities of the Party and manages the Central Party Treasury, as well as all general Party technical institutions. He analyzes conflicts both between different organizations and

Party institutions and within them.

b. The editors of the Central Organ direct the party ideologically...

6. The Party Council is appointed by the congress from among the members of the Central Committee and the Central Organ, consisting of 5 persons. The Council resolves cases of disputes and disagreements between the editors of the Central Organ and the Central Committee in the area of general organizational and tactical issues. The Party Council renews the Central Committee in the event of its complete failure" (ibid., pp. 43-44).

OT 8 stated that new committees and unions of committees were approved by the Central Committee, but they were obliged to equally obey the decisions of both the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ (ibid.).

Martov wrote that the struggle at the congress over the first paragraph of the Rules had "the most fundamental direction" (Martov, "History of Russian Social Democracy", M.-P., 1923, p. 75), but added that "the significance of this defeat (according to

8 1

Charter) was, however, reduced to zero for Lenin by the adoption of the remaining clauses of the Charter" (ibid., p. 76).

The significance of the adopted Rules for Lenin lay in the fact that even though it contained the idea of a "polycentric", he still managed to give the Central Committee such a practical significance that it actually placed it above the other two bodies. An autocratic Central Committee - such was Lenin's ultimate ideal. L. Trotsky told in the pamphlet "Pin Congress

RSDLP" that Lenin, during one of his speeches at the congress regarding how powerful and strong the Central Committee should be, showed the congress as a symbol of that - the "fist" (M. A. Gapach-A1 Chapou, Gepshe, Par5\$, p. 63 ; A. I. Spiridovich, "History of Bolshevism in Russia", Paris, 1922, p. 75).

Lenin himself, summing up the congress debate on the Rules, wrote: "The strength and power of the Central Committee, the firmness and purity of the party - that is the essence" (Lenin, Poln. sobr. sobr., vol. 7, p. 430).

But not every strong Central Committee was needed by Lenin. He was in favor of a Central Committee over which he alone dominates, and Lenin wanted to institutionalize this domination in the Rule itself in the form of a reformed Central Organ. When Martov accused Lenin of just such an attempt, Lenin openly admitted: yes, this is precisely his goal. Lenin said:

"To what extent we disagree politically with Comrade Martov here is evident from the fact that he blames me for this desire to influence the Central Committee, and I take credit for the fact that I have striven and strive to consolidate this influence by organizational means. It turns out that we even spoke different languages. What would be the point of all our work, all our efforts, if their culmination were the same old struggle for influence, and

incomplete acquisition and consolidation of influence" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 7, p. 307).

The congress elected the editors of the Central Organ, which included the Bolsheviks Lenin and Plekhanov and the Menshevik Martov. He also elected a Central Committee consisting of three people, which included only the Bolsheviks - G. Krzhizhanovsky, F. Lengnik, V. Noskov. When Plekhanov raised the question of the return to the Central Organ of all its former members, Lenin left the editorial board of the Central Organ, but he, as indicated, was co-opted into the Central Committee. A fifth member, Galperin, was also co-opted there. Thus the Central Organ became Menshevik and the Central Committee became Bolshevik.

In July 1903, the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee was created in Kyiv, headed by Krzhizhanovsky (L. Knipovich was the secretary, then E. Stasova replaced her). IN

In Geneva, a foreign department of the Central Committee was formed, headed by Lengnik (his assistants: foreign agents of the Central Committee - M. Lyadov, P. Lepeshinsky, V. Bonch-Bruevich) ("History of the CPSU", vol. 1, 1964, pp. 482-3. In September 1903 were additionally co-opted into

Central Committee F. Gusarov, R. Zemlyachka, L. Krasin and M. Essen. Groups were created in the Central Committee: organizational, technical, financial-commissary and military. An Executive Commission was also created to coordinate all the work of the Central Committee (ibid., p. 483).

Now, after the reorganization of the Central Organ, the Party Council consisted of 5 people: three Mensheviks - Martov, Axelrod and Plekhanov, who had gone over to the side of the Mensheviks, and two Bolsheviks - Lenin and Lengnik. When the Party Council demanded that representatives from the Mensheviks be co-opted to the Central Committee, Lenin resolutely opposed the decision of the Council - this highest institution of the party - and addressed a letter to the Central Committee: "There is only one salvation - the congress"; he proposed to the Central Committee: to send all forces, everything and everything to the committees and to the detours" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 46, p. 329).

The Central Committee created three very important strongholds of Bolshevism in Russia - Severnoye

Bureau of the Central Committee (it directed the work of the Moscow, St. Petersburg, Tver, Nizhny Novgorod, Northern and Riga committees) Southern Bureau of the Central Committee (Odessa, Yekaterinoslav and Nikolaev committees), Eastern Bureau of the PC (committees of Siberia, the Urals and the Volga region). The function of the Bureau of the Central Committee in the Caucasus was performed by the Caucasian Union Committee.

The official historian states: "The creation of the regional bureaus of the Central Committee was a major step forward towards strengthening the Bolshevik forces in Russia. The regional bureaus paved the way for the formation of independent Bolshevik centers" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 1, 1964, p. 497). The struggle between Bolshevism and Menshevism becomes a struggle between two radically opposed doctrines: Martov fights for the party of democratic rule, and Lenin for the party of absolute centralism. On the pages of the new Iskra, it was written that Lenin wanted a party that would be a huge factory headed by a director in the form of a Central Committee, and turn the members of the party into "wheels and cogs" (ibid., p. 502). Lenin is heading for the convocation of the 3rd Party Congress. However, the Party Council rejected Lenin's proposal to convene it. Then Lenin began to demand from the Central Committee that it take over the function of convening a congress (according to the Rules, it belongs to the Party Council). But the Bolshevik Central Committee does not succumb to Lenin's persistent persuasion. An angry Lenin writes:

"I think that we really have bureaucrats and formalists in the Central Committee, and not revolutionaries. The Martovites spit in their faces, but they wipe themselves off and teach me: "It is useless to fight" ... "(Lenin, ibid., vol. 46, p. 355).

Nevertheless, in February 1904, Lenin managed to force the Russian part of the Central Committee to meet to discuss his proposal to convene a congress. But the decision of the Central Committee deeply disappointed Lenin - with five votes (Galperin, Krzhizhanovsky, Noskov, Gusarov and Krasin), with one vote against (Zemlyachka), the Bolshevik Central Committee rejected Lenin's demand to convene a congress ("History of the CPSU" vol. 1, p. 509). Foreign members of the Central Committee Lengnik and Essen supported Lenin. Even so, Lenin did not have a majority (5:4 against the congress).

Soon new changes took place in the Central Committee: sent by Lenin to Russia to fight for the congress - Lengnik and Essen were arrested, Zemlyachka was removed from the Central Committee (since she was also a member of the St. Petersburg Committee), Krzhizhanovsky resigned and left the Central Committee, Gusarov himself retired from work. Three members remained in the Central Committee: Noskov, Halperin and Krasin. This troika, at a meeting of the Central Committee at the end of July 1904, adopted a resolution called the "July Declaration" on reconciliation with the Mensheviks, on the restoration of a single party. The Central Committee further decided to recognize the legitimacy of Plekhanov's co-optation of the old members of the Iskra editorial board, and also

endorsed the newspaper's political line. At the same time, the Central Committee issued two other resolutions: to deprive Lenin of the mandate of a foreign representative of the Central Committee and to appoint censorship of his works ("the publication of his works each time takes place with the consent of the Central Committee collegium" - *ibid.*, p. 509). Any agitation for a Party Congress was prohibited. All the technical work of the party abroad was taken away from the supporter

Lenin Bonch-Bruевич and passed to Noskov, another supporter of Lenin | - Lyadov - had to hand over the party fund. Three more members of the Bolshevik direction were introduced to the Central Committee, but not Leninists: A. Lyubimov, L. Karpov and I. Dubrovsky. All these members of the Bolshevik Central Committee Lenin dubbed "conciliators", which was only a synonym for "opportunists". Lenin declared a no less cruel struggle against them than against the Menshevik opportunists.

When three representatives of the Mensheviks were soon included in the Central Committee, the Bolshevik Central Committee finally became anti-Leninist. The official historian of the party writes: "It seemed that the Mensheviks could celebrate victory: all the central party institutions passed into their hands. But the Mensheviks won the institutions, not the party" (*ibid.*, p. 510).

Lenin would not have been Lenin if he had not found a way out of the situation. Lenin did not recognize an absolutely hopeless situation in politics at all. As a party tactician and political schemer, he had no competitors. He declares the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks "a foreign circle that has disgraced our party" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 9, p. 147). Lenin said that "The new Central Committee, being wholly in the hands of co-opted pretenders, sets itself the task of disorganizing and splitting all local

committees of the majority. Let the comrades have no illusions about this: the Central Committee has no other goal" (*ibid.*, pp. 147-148).

Lenin considers it his task to isolate the Bolshevik Central Committee from the Russian Bolshevik committees. At a private "conference of 22 Bolsheviks" he called near Geneva, he raises the question of creating new Bolshevik centers: the "Bureau of Committees of the Majority" instead of the existing legal Central Committee and the editors of the Central Organ of the Vperyod party instead of the legally existing Iskra.

Immediately after the end of the conference, Lenin sent his supporters to Russia to formalize and approve these decisions in the local committees. At the same time, the meeting issues an appeal "To the Party" criticizing the old Central Committee and outlining the tasks of creating new central organs of the party and the need for the speedy convening of the Third Congress. Of the 20 local committees with the right to vote, 12 voted in favor of convening this congress (History of the CPSU, vol. 1, p. 512). In Russia, in September-December 1904, three regional conferences were held, with the participation of thirteen

committees, at which the Bureau of Majority Committees was formed, which included Lenin, R. Zemlyachka, A. Bogdanov, M. Lyadov, G. Gusev, M. Litvinov, P. Rumyantsev (*ibid.*, pp. 514-515). The Bureau was supposed to operate in Russia. Abroad, in November-December 1904, the editorial board of Vperyod was also formalized, which included Lenin, V. Vorovsky, A. Lunacharsky, M. Olminsky, and the editorial secretary, N. Krupskaya (*ibid.*, p. 515).

With this detour, an offensive from the rear, Lenin paralyzes every effort of the Central Committee to reunite the two factions fighting among themselves.

The Mensheviks, in turn, respond to Lenin in kind. They intensify their actions against Lenin: abroad - more successfully, inside the country - less successfully. Abroad, the Mensheviks enjoy the sympathy of the Social Democratic

parties of the P International, especially its most important party - the German social



democracy. Some of the leaders of Menyshevism think of eliminating Lenin's influence by unleashing Marxist authorities from the German Social Democracy on him. Thus, Potresov wrote (May 14, 1904) to Axelrod:

"... I hasten to inform you that I have just received a letter from Kautsky authorizing us to publish his reply to Lidin (Lyadov, a supporter of Lenin) in Iskra. So, the first bomb is cast, and - with God's help - Lenin will fly into the air. I would attach great importance to working out a general plan for the campaign against Lenin - to blow him up in such a way, to blow him up to the end, methodically and systematically. How to beat Lenin - that's the question. First of all, I think, authorities should be released on him - Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg and Parvus" ("The Social Democratic Movement in Russia. Materials", vol. 1, M.-L., 1928, pp. 124-125).

It is quite natural that the sympathy of the leaders of the German Social Democracy was on the side of the democratic wing of the RSDLP—on the side of the Mensheviks. In the above-mentioned reply to Lyadov, Kautsky wrote:

"... if at your congress I had to choose between Martov and Lenin, then on the basis of all the experience of our activities in Germany, I would decisively speak for Martov" (Iskra, No. 66, May 15, 1904).

Nevertheless, it was precisely the German Social Democracy that more than once made an attempt to reconcile the warring factions. The leader of the German Social Democrats, August Bebel, who enjoyed a certain respect with Lenin, wrote to him, offering the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks his mediation for their reconciliation. The leadership of the Second International entrusted Bebel with the duties of chairman of the arbitration tribunal. However, Lenin was inexorable. For Lenin, a different party, as created according to his organizational plan, a different doctrine, like the doctrine of Bolshevism about the revolution, a different leadership, like his own, were absolutely unacceptable. Despite his greatest tactical resourcefulness in politics, in the fundamental questions of the struggle for power, he was as unbending as steel. "A principled policy is the most correct policy," he said.

As indicated, in the summer of 1904 the Central Committee, which had lost several of its members as a result of arrests, co-opted into its membership, contrary to Lenin, several Mensheviks. For this, the Mensheviks handed over the transport of their literature to the Central Committee, formally subordinating their local committees to it as well. Menshevik influence now predominated in the Central Committee. This also explains the Central Committee's decision to recognize the legitimacy of Plekhanov's co-optation of members of the old editorial board of the Central Organ.

The Mensheviks were not averse to restoring peace with Lenin now. So, Lenin was asked to rejoin the editorial board. Lenin not only rejected this proposal, but, accusing his former Central Committee collaborators of conciliationism, he organized the two new party organs mentioned above: the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority as the new Bolshevik Central Committee and the newspaper Vperyod as the new Bolshevik Central Organ.

The struggle between Bolshevism and Menshevism for hegemony in the RSDLP entered into

new phase.

## Chapter 2

### Bolshevik Central Committee and Menshevik OK

Beaten at the 2nd Congress, the Mensheviks even then tried to take revenge in the party organizations abroad, where they had predominated from the very beginning. A congress was convened by the foreign organization of the RSDLP - the "League

Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy," who, after condemning Lenin's "bureaucratic centralism," took the standpoint of the Mensheviks on all the fundamental controversial questions of the 2nd Party Congress. In response to this, the representative of the Bolshevik Central Committee dissolved the congress and, guided by the statutory rights of the Central Committee, annulled its decisions. In the meantime, the Central Committee convened (March 2-6, 1905) in Geneva a constituent congress of those foreign organizations of the RSDLP that stood for the Bolsheviks. The Committee of Foreign Organizations (KZO) was elected and its Charter was approved.

According to controversial official sources, the balance of power in Russia itself was as follows: there were 32 Bolshevik committees and 35 groups, 23 Menshevik committees and 27 groups, 10 committees, and 43 groups were neutral or "occupied conciliatory positions" ("History of the CPSU", v. P, p. 39). Lenin believed that only the moral superiority was on the side of the Bolsheviks, while the material superiority was on the side of the Mensheviks. Therefore he said:

"We still need to turn our moral strength into material. The Mensheviks have more money, more literature, more transports, more agents, more "names", more employees. It would be unforgivable childishness not to see this" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 9, p. 246).

Of the 29 "legal organizations" approved by the Party Council, according to the Vperyod newspaper, 15 organizations spoke in favor of convening the 3rd Congress (Lenin, *ibid.*, pp. 335-336), but "The Council is tearing up the charter and deceitfully evades the convocation of the congress, which is obligatory for it (*ibid.*).

On January 21, 1905, the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority assumed the role of the Party Council and issued the Notice of the Convening of the 3rd Party Congress. The "Announcement" was accompanied by an article by Lenin in which he argued the legitimacy of the Bureau's actions, since the Menshevik Soviet and the conciliatory Central Committee were sabotaging the convocation of the congress. The reaction of Russian organizations to the "Announcement" testified that Lenin was working in the right direction.

The Menshevik Soviet decided to take advantage of the congress to discuss Bebel's proposal to restore the unity of the party. The Council issued a resolution (March 10, 1905) as "an appeal to the members of the 3rd Party Congress, convened by the Russian Bureau, with a proposal to the Congress to accept Bebel's mediation to restore the unity of the Party and with an expression of consent to send two representatives from the Council to the Congress for negotiations on the implementation of ideas arbitration" (Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 349). It would be impossible to invent a better service to Lenin than this resolution. By this decision, both in fact and in law, the Party Council recognized the legality of convening a congress of the Bureau of Majority Committees. At this stage of the struggle, Lenin needed nothing more. Only Lenin quite logically reproached the Soviet for inconsistency. He wrote:

"Why do you want to send only two representatives of the Foreign Council to the congress? Why not representatives of all party organizations. After all, the members of the Russian Bureau of Majority Committees invited everyone to the congress..." (*ibid.*, pp. 352-353).

The actual capitulation of the Party Council clearly raised the shares of the congress. At the beginning of 1905, out of 11 members of the Central Committee, 9 were arrested in Russia, and the remaining 2 members of the Central Committee, Krasin and Lyubimov, in February 1905, entered into negotiations with the Bureau to convene a congress. Negotiations are being conducted from the Central Committee - Krasin and from the Bureau - Gusev. Lenin is worried lest the Party Council, acting behind the back of the Central Committee, outwit him. Lenin writes to Gusev: "The Bureau has no right

yield to the Central Committee not one iota. Otherwise, we will start a revolt here, and all the hard-working committees will be with us" (Lenin, *ibid.*, vol. 47, p. 15).

However, Lenin's fears turned out to be in vain. If the Party Council capitulated conditionally, then the Party Central Committee capitulated unconditionally. The Central Committee and the Bureau decided to set up an Organizing Committee to convene the 3rd Congress. The appeal "To the Party" stated that "the congress is being convened to establish common party tactics and organizational unity of the party" ("The Third Congress of the RSDLP. Protocols", 1959, pp. 638-684).

Lenin celebrated a well-deserved victory. He wrote:

"So - we can celebrate a complete moral victory. Russia took over the foreigners. The Central Committee found in itself at the last minute enough civic courage to ... rise up against the foreign Soviet" (Lenin, *ibid.*, vol. 9, pp. 370-371).

Lenin's victory was almost total. By April 1905 out of 29

21 Russian organizations voted for the congress (the committees that arose a year before the congress and approved by the Central Committee enjoyed the right to participate in the congress).

All the main - tactical and organizational - documents of the future 3rd Congress were prepared by the editors of *Vperyod*.

On April 12 (25), the congress itself opened in London and continued until April 27 (May 10), 1905. There were 24 voting delegates and 14 non-voting delegates. 21 committees with a decisive vote were represented at the congress.

The congress recognized the Russian revolution of 1905 that had begun as a "bourgeois-democratic" revolution, in which the proletariat plays the role of hegemon and driving force, and the peasantry is recognized as its ally. In the future, the democratic revolution will grow into a socialist one. The only way to seize power is to go through mass political strikes to an armed uprising. It was this general scheme of Lenin's that the congress approved and approved as a directive of the Social-Democrats. committees in Russia.

The resolution of the congress states that "the task of organizing the proletariat for a direct struggle against the autocracy by means of an armed uprising is one of the most important and urgent tasks of the party at the present revolutionary moment" (Third Congress of the RSDLP, Protocols, pp. 450-451). As a result of this struggle, according to the same scheme of Lenin, a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" was to emerge, with a provisional revolutionary government at its head.

On the question of whether representatives of the RSDLP should be part of such a government, the opinions of the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks differed. Since the revolution was recognized as bourgeois-democratic, the Mensheviks ruled out the participation of the RSDLP in the government of such a revolution. Lenin considered these views of the Mensheviks "dogmatic". The congress wrote that "depending on the correlation of forces and other factors that are not amenable to precise preliminary determination, it is permissible for representatives of our parties to participate in the provisional revolutionary government" (*ibid.*, pp. 451-452).

In relation to the peasantry, the congress put forward a more radical

program than that contained in the decision of the Second Congress or in Lenin's writings up to now. Only under the influence of the beginning of the first Russian revolution, under the influence of the growth of peasant uprisings, Lenin for the first time

reveals that petty-bourgeois ally of the revolution, which, in the final analysis, will bring him to power in Russia - the Russian peasantry. If Lenin and the 2nd Congress used to talk about the return to the peasants of only those "segments" that had moved from the peasant allotments to the landowners when the peasants were liberated from serfdom in 1861, now the 3rd Congress demanded the confiscation of landlord, state, church, monastery and appanage lands and the creation of revolutionary peasant committees to carry out such a program (*ibid.*, p. 454).

On question (6), the congress proposed to the liberals "energetically oppose the attempts of bourgeois democracy to take the labor movement into their own hands", but "support the bourgeoisie in so far as it is revolutionary or oppositional in its struggle against tsarism" ("CPSU in Resolutions", Part 1, page 82).

The new Party Rules presented by Lenin to the Third Congress are already truly Leninist and break with the "polycentricity" of his old Rules.

First of all, the congress introduces the famous first paragraph into the Rules as amended by Lenin: "A member of the Party is considered to be anyone who accepts its program, supports the Party with material resources and participates in personal work in one of its organizations" ("CPSU in Res.", Part 1, p. 87).

Paragraphs of the Charter, annulling the "polycentricity" of the old Charter, read:

"5. The Central Committee represents the Party in relations with other parties, appoints an executive editor of the Central Organ from among itself, organizes committees, unions of committees, and other party institutions, and directs their activities" (*ibid.*, p. 88).

"8. ... All decisions of the Central Committee are obligatory for all party organizations, which are also obliged to give 20% of all their income to the central treasury (p. 89) ... "The local committee must be dissolved by the Central Committee if the Central Committee 2/3 and 2/3 of local workers belonging to Party organizations" (p. 89).

The new Rules go on to say that "the co-optation of members of the Central Committee is made unanimously," but in local committees the official candidates proposed by the Central Committee are co-opted by a simple majority (p. 89).

Thus, the Party Council is annulled, the Central Organ ceases to be independent and is appointed not by the congress, but by the Central Committee, and the local committees become mere branches of the Central Committee.

The congress also adopted a special resolution on the Mensheviks, calling them "a breakaway part of the party." The participation of the Mensheviks in the local Social-Democrats. organizations were allowed "under the necessary condition that, while recognizing party congresses and the party Rules, they were wholly subject to party discipline" (*ibid.*, p. 81).

The congress elected the Central Committee, which included Lenin, A. Bogdanov, L. Krasin, D. Postolovsky and A. Rykov. Bogdanov, Krasin, Rykov belonged to the "conciliators" wing. Lenin could not prevent their election. The congress announced that henceforth the newspaper Iskra ceased to be the Central Organ of the Party (since the editorial staff of Iskra did not appear at the congress, and its line diverged from the directives of the Third Congress). The congress instructed the Central Committee to organize a new newspaper of the party, calling it Proletarian.

Responsibilities were distributed among the members of the Central Committee as follows: Lenin - executive editor of the Central Organ and chairman of the Central Committee abroad (in addition, the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee was created, the secretary was Lenin's wife N. Krupskaya), A. Bogdanov - executive editor and organizer of the entire literary part in Russia; L. Krasin - responsible financier and transporter; A. Rykov and D. Postolovsky (Aleksandrov) - party-organizational work in Russia (communication with committees, distribution of forces, etc.). In case of failure of the members of the Central Committee, A. Essen, Central Party, was appointed as a candidate member of the Central Committee. Rumyantsev and S. Gusev (Lenin, *Sobr. soch.*, vol. UTC, p. 471).

Almost simultaneously with the Third Congress of the Bolsheviks, the "First All-Russian Conference of Party Workers" of the Mensheviks took place in Geneva. The conference was attended by delegates from 14 committees from Russia, which did not recognize the 3rd Congress as competent, they were joined by emigrant organizations of the Mensheviks. Although, according to the editors of Iskra, these delegates actually represented the majority of the members of the RSDLP, the leaders of the Mensheviks did not want to call their meeting a congress. Although the editors of the Central Organ and the highest organ of power of the party - the Party Council - were in the hands of the Mensheviks, the Mensheviks did not take advantage of them.

To the extent that the Bolsheviks unceremoniously violated any statutory legality, the Mensheviks scrupulously observed it. Therefore, they declared their de facto congress an advisory body -

"conference". But even the decisions of the conference itself bore the imprint of an internal split among the Mensheviks. "The resolutions adopted by the conference show signs of a deep division that has begun to take shape in the ranks of the Mensheviks," notes one of the Western authors ("Te Sotip1\$ Ratsbu oyo Te 5omeo Chshop", Bu G.. esWarlgo, Memh Wotk, 1959, p. 62 ).

Two tendencies fought at this conference: on the one hand, those who, following Axelrod, fought for a mass legal workers' party (their Lenin dubbed the "liquidators"), on the other hand, those who stood for the illegal cadre organization created by Iskra, saving her only from Lenin's extremes (Martov). Hence the duality of the decisions of the conference - next to the legal demands (the struggle for an 8-hour working day, for freedom to strike and for the right to form trade unions within the framework of the existing regime), revolutionary demands are put forward, which differ little from the decision of the Third Congress - the masses must be prepared to take part in the inevitable uprising, and the social democrats must be prepared to take control of the arbitrary revolutionary movement.

Although the Mensheviks deny the need for participation in a provisional revolutionary government, they allow the proletariat to take power if the Russian revolution serves as an impetus for revolution in other countries (*ibid.*, p. 63). Comparing the positions of both factions, the quoted historian writes: "Consequently, there was a lot of truth in the statements of many

Mensheviks that nothing separates the two factions except Lenin's intransigence and his determination to create a party subordinate to his own command" (ibid., p. 63).

Comparing the general tactical line of both factions in the revolution of 1905, one can state: the Bolsheviks were for the "left bloc" of the revolutionary forces, which they themselves led ("the hegemony of the proletariat"), while the Mensheviks were for the "national front" of all revolutionary and opposition forces, in which the RSDLP is only one of the participants. The strategic goal of both factions in this revolution: the Bolsheviks stand for the "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" as a transitional step to the dictatorship of the proletariat (that is, for the dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party), the Mensheviks stand for a democratic republic, which creates the conditions for a legal struggle for socialism.

The Menshevik Conference, bluntly conceding the honor of calling the highest organ of the party "Central Committee" to the Bolshevik Congress, chose its own organ, calling it the "Organizational Commission". The conference proposed restoring the unity of the Party, but starting from below, with the local committees, and then only restoring the united center of the Party. Plekhanov, who had refused to accept the invitation to attend the Third Congress, has now moved away from the Mensheviks as well. He blamed both factions for the aggravation of the split and began to publish his own personal organ, the Diary of a Social Democrat.

April 27 (May 10), 1905 - the day the Third Congress ended - a meeting of the newly elected Central Committee was held, at which, as already indicated, duties were distributed among the members of the Central Committee, and the password, cipher, nicknames for contacts were approved, financial, transport and technical issues. Candidates for members of the Central Committee were selected in case members of the Central Committee were arrested. The Central Committee decided, in addition, to send its representatives to various regions of Russia to report on the results of the Third Congress and to organize in Russia a group of party writers and propagandists.

Soon the Central Committee was divided into two parts, two bureaus of the Central Committee were created: one bureau of the Central Committee - for work abroad, the other bureau - for work in Russia. This second bureau was called the "Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSDLP" and was located in St. Petersburg. Its first members included A. Bogdanov, D. Postolovsky, L. Krasin and P. Rumyantsev co-opted to the Central Committee. Under the "Russian Bureau of the Central Committee" a secretariat of three people was created for the current work, in addition, a special agitation and propaganda group of 10-12 people was created. The Foreign Bureau, headed by Lenin, was the actual center of the party, although the Russian Bureau was considered the legal center. In addition to general management, the Foreign Bureau was in charge of publishing and transporting party literature. To do this, it had an economic commission, an expedition, a printing house and a cash desk ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, pp. 66-64).

During the revolution - on August 6, 1905 - the tsar's manifesto was issued on the convocation of the State Duma as a legislative body (called the Bulygin Duma after the author of the project - Minister of the Interior Bulygin). Elections to the Duma were limited and unequal, many segments of the population were generally deprived of the right to vote. But this was the first act of capitulation of the autocracy before the developing revolution. The Bolshevik Central Committee called for a boycott of this Duma and for

preparing for an armed uprising.

The strike movement that has begun in the country is assuming larger and larger dimensions. The government is trying to put an end to it with the use of armed forces.

The famous order of the Governor-General of St. Petersburg Trepov dated October 13 - "do not fire blank volleys, do not spare cartridges" - only further inflames the atmosphere. By mid-October, the general political strike involved about two million workers, employees and students. The tsar makes unheard-of and, it seemed, unlikely concessions: he publishes the "Manifesto of October 17", according to which:

1) all civil liberties were declared - freedom of conscience, speech, assembly and unions with the inviolability of the individual;

2) it was established "as an inviolable right, no law could accept force without the approval of the State Duma, and that the elected from the people should be provided with the opportunity to really participate in the supervision of the regularity of the actions of the authorities" (S. Oldenburg, The reign of Nicholas II, part P, Belgrade, 1939, p. 317).

The parties on the left recognized the Manifesto as a victory for the revolution, although not a final one. Milyukov said at a banquet on the evening of October 17: "Yes, this is a success, and a great success. But it's not the first. This is a new stage in the struggle" ("Fatal Years", "Russian Notes", 1939).

When the tsar, along with the Manifesto, gave Russia a new liberal chairman of the Council of Ministers, Count Witte, but left the reactionary Trepov as Minister of the Interior, L. Trotsky wrote in Izvestiya of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies:

"Dan Witte, but left Trepov. The proletariat wants neither the police hooligan Trepov, nor the liberal broker Witte, nor the wolf's mouth, nor the fox's tail. He does not want a whip wrapped in the parchment of the constitution" (S. Oldenburg, *ibid.*, p. 318).

Lenin wrote that "the concession of the tsar is indeed the greatest victory of the revolution, but this victory is far from deciding the fate of the whole cause of freedom. The tsar has not yet capitulated" and that it is necessary to "bring the revolution to real and complete victory" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 12, p. 27).

The Central Committee of the RSDLP issued an appeal "To the Russian people", which stated that "the people do not need paper promises, but really reliable guarantees: the immediate arming of the people, the removal of the military

provisions, the immediate convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the abolition of the estate system, the introduction of an eight-hour working day, an immediate and complete political amnesty for prisoners" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, p. 99).

On October 13, the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies arose. In mid-November it had 562 deputies from 147 plants, factories, 34 workshops and 16 trade unions (History of the CPSU, vol. 2, p. 117).

Just the October general strike and the elections to the Soviet showed that the popularity and influence of the Mensheviks among the workers of St. Petersburg and Moscow was much greater than the popularity of the Bolsheviks. The Menshevik G. S. Khrustalev-Nosar was elected chairman of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, who was arrested

On November 26, and on November 27, a new meeting of the Soviet takes place, at which, again, a Menshevik, L. D. Trotsky, is elected chairman, in the presence of Lenin. The Mensheviks, like the Bolsheviks, are heading for an armed insurrection. The official Bolshevik historian writes that at the meeting of the Soviet, which met after the arrest of Khrustalev, "with the participation of Lenin, Martov and others, it was decided, in response to a new government provocation, to continue mobilizing forces and preparing an uprising." ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, p. 125).

It is interesting to note that from the very beginning of the emergence of the Council of Workers' Deputies of St. Petersburg, the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee demanded that it accept the program of the RSDLP, threatening otherwise to leave the Council: "The Council of Workers' Deputies or the party?", the Bolsheviks demanded in one of the articles. The distrust of the Soviet is explained by the official historian by the fact that "the leadership of the Soviet immediately fell into the hands of the Mensheviks" (ibid., p. 104).

Knowing his business, Lenin corrected the Central Committee. He answered the question posed: "there must certainly be a solution both for the Soviet of Workers' Deputies and for the party" (Lenin. PSS, vol. 12, p. 61). Even then, Lenin saw in the soviets both the organ of the uprising and the germ of a new government.

Representatives of political parties - the Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Bund - officially entered the Soviet and its executive committee with an advisory vote. The Central Committee of the RSDLP delegated A. Bogdanov, D. Postolovsky to the Council, in addition, a member of the Central Committee L. Krasin was elected there, sometimes Lenin himself represented the Central Committee ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, p. 117).

How does Lenin think of the organizational structure of the party in conditions of democratic freedoms, in this case in Russia after the October 17 Manifesto?

Now, for the first time, Lenin puts forward a position that later became the guiding principle of all communist parties operating in democratic countries. This provision reads: the party must have two apparatuses - one for working legally, the other for working illegally. In party language, this is called "combining legal work with illegal work." Practically, this means this. At the head of the party and its individual organizations there are two committees - one committee is legal, its composition at each level is known to everyone, its members sit in parliament, in trade unions, in local governments, in open party institutions, in the editorial offices of the party press, etc. There is another, parallel committee of each level - its composition is strictly classified, its leaders are little known, many of them are even unknown as party members.

In the article "On the Reorganization of the Party," written a month after the publication of the Manifesto of October 17, Lenin sees the task of reorganization as follows: "So, the task is clear: to preserve for the time being the conspiratorial apparatus and develop a new, open one." But "the new cell must be less strictly formalized, more "free," "loose," organization" (Lenin, On Party Building, 1956, p. 341). As for the leading cadres, "professional revolutionaries," here Lenin did not deviate a single step from his doctrine, but emphasized "the gigantic significance of continuity in the cause of party development."



## Chapter 3 B

### MENSHEVIK-BOLSHEVIK CC

The course of the revolution in Russia overturned the tactics of Lenin and the 3rd Congress of isolating the leaders of the Mensheviks from the workers' and revolutionary movement. He also overturned the claims of the Bolsheviks to hegemony in the revolution.

Not only the Menshevik, but also the overwhelming majority of the Bolshevik committees condemned the narrow, essentially sectarian line of the 3rd Congress and demanded the restoration of party unity from top to bottom. On the ground, the party committees were already uniting. The Organizing Commission of the Mensheviks continued to

preach the decision of his Geneva Conference on the restoration of the unity of the RSDLP. The Central Committee of the RSDLP itself, in its overwhelming majority, adopted the same point of view. The successes of the Mensheviks both in organizing the strike movement and in creating broad trade unions, and most importantly, the decisive role played by the Mensheviks in the creation of the Petersburg Soviet, as well as other, local, soviets (more than 50) forced Lenin to capitulate to the Mensheviks for the first time, of course in the expectation that from this capitulation, in the end, he will come out victorious.

The official historian of the CPSU admits this, in essence, when he writes:

"A split in the Social Democracy is contrary to the interests of the revolution. During the period of its highest upsurge, beginning with the October days, unity of action from below, above all by the Social Democratic workers, became widespread in mass political strikes, in joint work in the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, trade unions and other organizations. This convinced the workers of the possibility and necessity of putting an end to the split in the party... The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, supported this demand, believing that in time the masses would be convinced by their own experience of the correctness of their policy. Ultimately, this was to lead to the isolation of the leaders of Menshevism, the conquest of the masses of the party by the Bolsheviks" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, pp. 128-129).

At the same time, Lenin, in a letter addressed to the Central Committee, categorically stipulated: "We agree to unite the two parts. Confuse two parts - never" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 47, p. 80). Lenin demanded that two congresses take place simultaneously and in the same place: one for the Bolsheviks, the other for the Mensheviks, so that they would discuss the plans prepared in advance for unification. But Lenin wants to preserve his faction in this association as an organic and autonomous whole. Therefore, in the same letter to the Central Committee, he demands: "to direct all efforts and thoughts towards unity, towards a better organization of our part of the party. This tactic seems "selfish", but it is the only reasonable one" (ibid.). On November 20, 1905, the Second All-Russian Conference of the Mensheviks met in St. Petersburg. The conference rejected Lenin's idea of convening two parallel congresses, and proposed that the Central Committee of the RSDLP and the OK be merged into one united Central Committee to convene a single unifying congress. She also proposed the creation of a unified Central Press Organ. The conference also made a conciliatory gesture towards the Bolsheviks by adopting the Leninist formulation of Article 81 of the Rules.

Following the Menshevik conference, the All-Russian Conference of the Bolsheviks took place in Tammerfors (Finland). It was chaired by Lenin from 12 to 17 December. This conference,

in essence, accepted all the conditions for unification that were put forward by the Menshevik Conference. Lenin, apprehensively and without enthusiasm, went for unification, but the Central Committee of the RSDLP, its speakers at the conference Krasin and Romyantsev, and delegates from local committees argued that unification from below was becoming a fact, and it must be sanctioned until this unification movement passed by the leaders of the Bolsheviks. Lenin only achieved that in the decision of the conference it was written:

"The congresses of both its parts must convene at the same time and in the same place and, having agreed among themselves on the order of work, merge into one congress on the condition that each side receives an equal number of decisive votes" ("CPSU in Res.", part 1, p. 96).

The elections to the congress frustrated this condition of Lenin, too, by giving the majority of the decisive votes to the Mensheviks.

The conference announced at the same time that the party would henceforth be built on the principles of "democratic centralism" with a broad elective beginning of all party bodies, which are replaceable and accountable to the party (ibid., p. 99). At the same conference, Lenin met for the first time with his future successor, I. Stalin.

Such was the situation in the party when, at the end of December 1905, the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Menshevik OK merged and created a united Central Committee (Krasin, I. Lalayants and I. Summer came from the Bolsheviks), which was supposed to convene a unification congress.

On February 7, 1906, the first issue of the united Central Organ of the party, "Party News", was published in St. Petersburg. The editorial staff consisted of six people - three Bolsheviks (Lenin, Luncharsky, V. Bazarov) and three Mensheviks (F. Dan, Yu. Martov, A. Martynov).

Elections for the unification congress began. If earlier these elections were held by a limited circle of professional revolutionaries in the person of committee members, now the delegates were elected on a democratic basis at the rate of one delegate per 300 party members (History of the CPSU, vol. 2, p. 175). The new electoral procedure showed that the Mensheviks emerged from the revolution of 1905 stronger than the Bolsheviks. She showed

at the same time, the fact that the broad masses of the party condemned Lenin's factional fanaticism.

When the PU Unity Congress opened in Stockholm on April 10 (23), 1906, it turned out that the overwhelming majority of the congress was Menshevik. The Mensheviks had 62 votes at it, the Bolsheviks - only 46. The congress was attended by 112 delegates with a decisive vote and 22 with an advisory vote, representing 62 organizations of the RSDLP (representatives of the national Social Democratic parties - Poland and Lithuania, the Latvian Territory, the Bund, Ukraine and Finland). Most of the programmatic, political and tactical decisions of the congress were adopted in the spirit of Menshevism.

Sharp debates at the congress were on the agrarian question. Lenin advocated the idea of nationalizing the land. The speaker from the Mensheviks defended the idea of municipalization (the transfer of landed estates to zemstvos - municipalities). Lenin was opposed not only by the Mensheviks, but also by a group of Bolsheviks (Suvorov, Bazarov, Stalin, and others), who stood on the point

view of the division of landlords' land between the peasants (they were called "dividers").

Plekhanov objected to Lenin especially sharply at the congress. He said: "Lenin's project is closely connected with the utopia of the seizure of power by the revolutionaries ..." ("GU Unity Congress of the RSDLP").

Protocols, p. 60). Plekhanov repeated this idea in another speech: "Blanquism or Marxism—that is the question we are deciding today. Tov. Lenin himself admitted that his agrarian project was closely connected with his idea of seizing power" (ibid., p. 139).

Plekhanov justified his demand for municipalization as follows:

"Our program must eliminate the economic basis of tsarism; the nationalization of the land during the revolutionary period does not eliminate this basis... Lenin argues as if the republic he aspires to, once established, will last forever... Municipalization is another matter. In the event of a restoration, it does not hand over the land into the hands of the political representatives of the old order... I repeat after Napoleon: the man who counts only on a favorable combination of circumstances is bad" (ibid., p. 61).

Stalin also spoke on this issue at the congress under the name

"Ivanovich". He opposed both Plekhanov and Lenin. Stalin ska  
hall:

"The starting point of our program should be the following proposition: since we are concluding a temporary revolutionary alliance with the struggling peasantry, since we cannot, therefore, disregard the demands of this peasantry, we must support these demands.

The peasants demand partition; so we must support total confiscation and partition. From this point of view, both nationalization and municipalization are equally unacceptable" (ibid., p. 79).

The congress adopted a program of municipalization.

On the eve of the congress, when discussing the question of their attitude towards the State Duma, the Bolsheviks, based on their position of an active boycott of the Duma (later Lenin recognized this position as erroneous - see Lenin, PSS, vol. 41, p. 18), put forward a resolution to the congress, in which said that "the RSDLP must resolutely refuse to participate in the State Duma" ("GU Unity Congress ...", p. 488).

At the congress itself, the Bolsheviks, in view of the failure of the boycott campaign, somewhat changed their position. The Bolsheviks now said that "the Social Democracy must use the State Duma and its clashes with the government or conflicts within it," but at the same time the Bolsheviks opposed the creation of a parliamentary Social-Democrat in the Duma. factions (ibid., p. 493). The congress, however, decided to create such a faction from those deputies who were members of the RSDLP. Then the Bolsheviks proposed that the Central Committee should be given precise "instructions" to ensure control of the party over its parliamentary faction. It said:

"The Central Committee informs all organizations of the Party:

a) whom exactly;

6) when exactly;

c) under what conditions he appointed the representatives of the party in the parliamentary group. The Central Committee also periodically informs all Party organizations of detailed reports on the activities of the parliamentary group" (ibid., p. 535).

The congress adopted a new party statute based on the notorious "democratic centralism". What does this principle mean?

then, and now no one really knew and no one knows. The Mensheviks emphasized the word "democratic", while the Bolsheviks emphasized "centralism". This fortunate discovery by Lenin temporarily reconciled the irreconcilable, gave each side a wide range of interpretations. Suffice it to say that Stalin, subsequently, every time he took another measure to absolutize his power, invariably referred to "democratic centralism."

Khrushchev, too, in eliminating Stalin's centralization, referred to the same principle. The people who liquidated Khrushchev's decentralization again referred to the same principle.

At the congress, a struggle broke out over the nature and relationship between the leading bodies of the party (monocentric or polycentric). The Menshevik Rapporteur on the Rules said:

"We insist that the congress itself elect both the Central Committee and the editors of the Central Organ separately. The comrades Bolsheviks considered this procedure to be more expedient: the congress elects the Central Committee, and the Central Committee appoints the editors of the Central Organ."

The speaker from the Bolsheviks substantiated his demand as follows:

"When the editorial board is elected by the congress, the old two-center system is obtained. In the end, the participation of the editorial board in the work of the Central Committee may become permanent. But this is not enough. In the proposed formulation of the question of the joint work of the Central Committee and the Central Organ, the two-center takes on the character of a three-center. In this joint conference one can see the features of the old Party Council" (ibid., pp. 461-463).

In the end, the Mensheviks' proposal for a two-center system passed, that is, the congress elected the Central Committee and the editors of the Central Organ separately.

In view of the preliminary agreement between the factions, the elections to the Central Committee and the Central Organ were held in a few minutes. The Central Committee included seven Mensheviks (V. Rozanov, L. Goldman, L. Radchenko, V. Krokmal, B. Bakhmetiev, P. Kolokolnikov and L. Khinchuk) and 3 Bolsheviks (V. Desnitsky Sosnovsky, L. Krasin, A. Rykov, who later, after his arrest, was replaced by A. Bogdanov).

Later, representatives of the Social-Democrats were introduced to the Central Committee. Poland and Lithuania A. Barsky and F. Dzerzhinsky (the future head of the Cheka), from the Latvians - K. Danishevsky, from the Bund - R. Abramovich and A. Kramer. The editorial board of the Central Organ "Social Democrat" included only Mensheviks: Martov, Martynov, Maslov,

Dan, Potresov (ibid., p. 639, see also History of the CPSU, vol. 2, p. 191).

Soon S.-D. Poland and Lithuania, the Latvian Territory, as well as the Bund became part of the RSDLP as territorial organizations. After the congress, Lenin issued an "Appeal to the Party of the Delegates of the Unity Congress, who belonged to the former "Bolshevik" faction."

In this "Appeal" Lenin subjected to extensive criticism all the main decisions or omissions of the congress. He wrote:

"We must and will fight ideologically against those decisions of the congress which we consider erroneous. But at the same time, we declare before the entire Party that we are against any split. We stand for obedience to the decisions of the congress. Denying the boycott of the Central Committee and appreciating joint work, we agreed to the admission of our like-minded people to the Central Committee, although they would be in an insignificant minority" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 12, p. 399).

In a word, on the one hand, we will fight against the decisions of the Congress, on the other hand, we will obey them. Such a "dialectical" formulation of the question made it possible not only to boycott the Central Committee, but also all its current practical work, based on the "erroneous decisions" of the congress. At the same time, Lenin reserved for himself the rights that followed from the decision of the congress in favor of the opposition of the minority. He wrote:

"We all agreed on the principle of democratic centralism, on ensuring the rights of every minority and every loyal opposition, on the autonomy of every party organization, on the recognition of the election, accountability and turnover of all party officials. In the observance in practice of these principles of organization, in their sincere and consistent implementation, we see a guarantee against splits, a guarantee that the ideological struggle in the Party can and must be fully compatible with strict organizational unity, with the subordination of all to the decisions of the general congress" (ibid., pp. 399-400).

So, taking advantage of all these privileges of the opposition of the minority (which, however, he never recognized as his opponents), Lenin launched between the PU and the U congress a large and effective activity in opposing the party membership and local party committees to the Menshevik Central Committee. The first practical step along this path was the creation of their own Bolshevik newspaper Proletary (August 1906). Since the Party Charter allowed only one Central Organ, the Bolsheviks called the newspaper the organ of the Petersburg and Moscow

committees. The editorial office of the Proletary newspaper became in fact the Bolshevik Central Committee.

The Bolsheviks believed that the revolution had not yet ended, it had only suffered a temporary defeat. Therefore, tactics should be designed not for participation in Duma work, but for the preparation of a new all-Russian armed uprising. In this regard, the Bolsheviks attached particular importance to the work of the party's military and combat organizations. About 50 party committees had special military organizations and groups called "military commissions" (short for "military commissions").

Significant successes in work among the military had two Bolshevik committees - the Petersburg Committee (published a soldier's

newspaper "Kazarma") and the Moscow Committee (published the newspaper "Soldier's Life") ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, p. 196). When on July 8, 1906, the tsar disbanded the first State Duma for its desire to discuss the agrarian question in favor of the peasantry, the Bolshevik members of the Central Committee suggested that the Central Committee turn to the workers and respond to the dissolution of the Duma with a general armed uprising. The Central Committee rejected this demand, but decided to participate, together with other leftist parties in the Duma, including the Cadets, in the drafting of the so-called "Vyborg Manifesto". The manifesto called for passive resistance to the government: to refuse to pay taxes, not to give recruits, not to recognize royal loans (ibid., p. 204).

Lenin, however, continues to head for an armed uprising. In the article "The Dissolution of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat," he demands the creation, along with the Soviets, of special "military organizations" to lead the uprising. He says:

"These organizations should have as their cell very small, loose unions, dozens, fives, and even, perhaps, threes. It is necessary to preach in the strongest terms that a battle is approaching, when every honest citizen is obliged to sacrifice himself ... These unions must be both party and non-party, bound by one immediate revolutionary task: an uprising against the government ... Free fighting unions, unions of combatants will bring gigantic benefits at the time of the explosion. A squad of those who know how to shoot will disarm the policeman, suddenly attack the patrol, get a weapon for themselves. A squad of those who do not know how to shoot will help build barricades, make reconnaissance, organize communications, ambush the enemy, set fire to a building, occupy apartments that can become a base for

rebels" (Lenin, PSS, Vol. 13, pp. 322-323).

To discredit the policy of the common Central Committee at any cost, in any place and by any means - such is Lenin's party tactics. The Central Committee can be sure in advance that any action planned by it, even in a completely Bolshevik spirit, will be criticized by the Bolsheviks. So, for example, when the Central Committee, in response to the dissolution of the Duma, called on the workers to protest by way of a demonstration strike, Lenin replied:

"They (strike-demonstrations) would have weakened the proletariat without any benefit, they would have helped to exercise the policemen and soldiers over the unarmed, grabbing and shooting them" (ibid., p. 315), but the same Lenin in the same article suggested: "strongly use precisely the dissolution of the Duma as a pretext for concentrated agitation calling for a popular uprising" (ibid., p. 318).

Lenin directed all his great political talent not against the government, or even against the liberal bourgeoisie so hated by him, but against his own Central Committee. Lenin is not limited to writings alone. Through a well-organized network of agents of the Bolshevik center in the person of Proletary, Lenin launched a campaign in local committees for distrust of the Central Committee and for the convening of a new party congress. The campaign is beginning to be successful. The Bolshevik St. Petersburg Committee is charged by Lenin with the duties of a legal center in this campaign. The Petersburg Committee issues an appeal in which it writes:

"At the head of the party is the Central Committee, which represents only one of the factions (the former minority) and by its last actions has clearly shown that it disagreed with the opinions and will of the majority of the party" ("Leaflets of Bolshevik organizations in the first Russian revolution").

revolutions of 1905-1907", part 3, p. 79). The Petersburg Committee demanded the convening of a new congress in order to elect a new Central Committee. Party organizations soon joined this demand: the Moscow, Ural, Nizhny Novgorod, Minsk, regional bureaus of the Social-Democrats. organizations of Central Russia, the conference of the Volga district organizations, the Main Directorate of the Social Democracy of Poland and Lithuania, the Central Committee of the Social-Democrats. Latvian Territory and others ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, p. 208).

When all attempts to raise a new all-Russian uprising turned out to be futile, and the State Duma began to gain more and more popularity among the general population, the Bolsheviks

abandoned the tactics of boycotting the Duma. They decided to take part in the elections of the second Duma, concluding electoral blocs at the highest level only with the Trudoviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries ("Party of Petty Bourgeois Democracy," in the terminology of the Bolsheviks). The Central Committee of the party allowed the possibility of an electoral bloc with the party of constitutional democrats ("cadets"), which consisted mainly of representatives of the Russian liberal intelligentsia (professors, lawyers, doctors, writers, liberal entrepreneurs). This party, while still not being republican, came out sharply against absolutism in favor of a parliamentary democracy of the British type. Concluding a bloc with the Cadets, the Central Committee of the RSDLP prevented the victory of the right-wing parties - the Octobrists ("Union of October 17" - this is how this party called itself, thereby emphasizing that its ideal and program is the "Manifesto of October 17", 1905) and frank monarchists - absolutists, for whom the Manifesto of October 17 itself was unacceptable as too revolutionary a document.

The dispute between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks was decided by a new all-Russian conference of the party in November 1906 in Tammerfors. The conference recognized the admissibility of a bloc with the Cadets and rejected the extremist demands of the Bolsheviks. In those committees where the Bolsheviks set the tone, they continued to boycott the bloc with the Cadets. This was the case in St. Petersburg, where the Social-Democrats the committee refused to accept the decision of the Tammerfors conference; The Petersburg organization again split into Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. The direct result of this was an unexpectedly great victory here for the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, a party essentially a peasant, not a workers' party.

The general results of the elections to the Second Duma (opened on February 20, 1907) confirmed the correctness of the electoral tactics of the pro-Menshevik Central Committee - if there were only 18 Social Democrats in the First Duma, then 65 Social Democratic deputies were elected by the RSDLP to the Second Duma, of which only 15 were Bolsheviks ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, p. 211), and the Duma itself turned out to be more left-wing than the first Duma, dispersed by the tsar for "leftism". The Bolsheviks continued in the Duma the tactics they had announced beforehand—the use of the Duma's legal platform to preach the slogans of the revolution.

Every effort of the majority of the Social-Democrats. faction (its chairman was the Menshevik Tsereteli) to introduce constructive proposals for discussion in the Duma

provisions to meet the urgent social needs of the people met with strong resistance from its Bolshevik minority. For Lenin and his supporters, it was not about meeting the needs of the people, but about using them to unleash new uprisings. Satisfied need ceased to be an argument in favor of the revolution. So nothing was

as harmful to the revolution as the successful constructive social legislation of the Duma. That is why Lenin is now concentrating all the Party's attention on criticizing the legislative work of its Duma faction. This simultaneously serves as a basis for criticism of the Central Committee itself. "Criticism of the activities of the Duma faction merged with criticism of the Menshevik Central Committee and served as one of the new arguments in favor of the urgent convocation of a party congress," writes the official historian (*ibid.*, p. 214).

The well-organized and widely organized campaign of the Bolsheviks against the "opportunism" of the Central Committee is bearing fruit. The largest party organizations, headed by St. Petersburg and Moscow, vote for Lenin's "platform of revolutionary social democracy" (that was the title of Lenin's article, which substantiated the resolutions of the Bolsheviks for the Congress).

The convention opened in London and worked in the premises of the Southgate Road Brotherhood Church (property of the Fabians), from April 30 to May 19 (May 13-June 1), 1907. This congress was attended by 303 delegates with a decisive vote and 39 with an advisory one from 150,000 party members from 145 party organizations. There were 177 delegates with a decisive vote from the RSDLP, among which there were 89 Bolsheviks and 88 Mensheviks, the remaining delegates - 45 people from Poland and Lithuania, 26 from Latvians and 55 from the Bund - ("Fifth (London) Congress of the RSDLP. Protocols", pp. 621-631). Among the Bolshevik delegates with a decisive vote were: Lenin, A. S. Bubnov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. G. Shaumyan, M. N. Pokrovsky, G. E. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev, among the delegates with a deliberative I. V. Stalin was the voice. The Polish-Lithuanian delegation was headed by the famous Rosa Luxembourg (she also acted as a representative of the German Social Democracy), Jan Tishka, Julian Markhlevsky. L. D. Trotsky was present as a non-factional Social Democrat. From the Mensheviks were present: G. V. Plekhanov, Yu. Martov, B. Axelrod, A. I. Martynov, N. Zhordania, and others. Maxim Gorky was present as a Bolshevik near the party.

The agenda of the congress was very broad - the report of the Central Committee; report of the Duma faction; attitude towards bourgeois parties; State. Thought; "working congress";

trade unions and the party; partisan actions; work in the army; organizational matters.

Martov delivered a report from the Central Committee, and Bogdanov delivered a report from the Bolsheviks. But essentially the co-report from the Bolsheviks was Lenin's speech. Lenin accused the Central Committee of moving away from the independent policy of the proletariat and making more and more concessions to the liberal bourgeoisie, pursuing an opportunist policy of conciliation with it. Lenin concluded:

"The bankruptcy of our Central Committee was first and foremost the bankruptcy of this policy of opportunism" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 15, p. 321).

Based on this assessment of the work of the Central Committee, the Bolsheviks proposed to the Congress to adopt the following resolution on the Central Committee's report:

Having reviewed the activities of the Central Committee over the past year, the congress recognizes:

1. The Central Committee deviated from the resolutions of the Unity Congress, which expressed itself:

a) proclaiming the slogan of a responsible ministry and struggle for the Duma as an organ of power;



b) in attempts to abandon the demand for confiscation of land without a ransom and replace it with a demand for the alienation of land (the alienation of land was a demand of the bourgeois Cadet Party);

c) in the tactics of reaching an agreement with the counter-revolutionary liberal monarchist bourgeoisie during the election campaign;

d) in the tactics of agreement with the same bourgeoisie in the State Duma and in the refusal to deepen conflicts in the Duma and outside the Duma.

2. In essence, the activities of the Central Committee did not correspond to the class interests of the proletariat, which was expressed:

a) in the above deviations from the resolutions of the Unity Congress...;

b) insufficient responsiveness of the Central Committee to the most important manifestations of the proletarian struggle;

c) in the fact that in its practical, organizational, informational and other activities, the Central Committee was not the highest practical center of the party, but only a representative of one part of it, the minority of the party ("CPSU in Res.", Part 1, pp. 156-157 ).

The heated debate around this resolution was put to an end by the proposal of the Bund and the Latvians, supported by Trotsky's "center",

which read:

"The Congress, after listening to the report of the Central Committee, passes through all the resolutions to the next business" ("CPSU in Res.", Part 1, p. 163). This resolution was adopted by a majority of 143 to 91, with 48 abstentions. The Bund and the Letts voted with the Mensheviks, while the Poles abstained.

But on the other hand, for them the equally important question of the Duma, the Bolsheviks won a complete victory.

The congress adopted a resolution of the Bolsheviks "On the State Duma". It said:

"1. The immediate political tasks of the Social Democracy in the Duma are:

a) explaining to the people the complete unsuitability of the Duma as a means of fulfilling the demands of the proletariat and peasantry;

b) explaining to the people the impossibility of exercising political freedom through parliamentary means, and explaining the inevitability of an open struggle of the masses of the people against the armed force of absolutism - the transfer of power into the hands of the masses of the people and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

2. The critical, propagandistic, agitational and organizational role of the Social Democratic Duma faction, as one of our party organizations, must be brought to the fore. It is to this, and not directly to legislative purposes, that the bills introduced by the Social-Democrats should serve. faction, the general character of the struggle in the Duma must be subordinated to the entire struggle of the proletariat outside the Duma" ("CPSU in Res.", Part 1, p.

161).

Parliament as a platform for preaching the revolution, work in parliament as work to blow up the entire state machine, and the parliamentary faction of the party as a party organization, and not as a popular representation - such is the concept of Bolshevism about the relationship of the party to parliament.

After the revolution of 1917, Lenin elevated this concept to the level of an unchanging dogma.

The resolution II of the Congress of the Comintern in 1920 speaks very clearly of this mission of the communist factions in parliaments in the following words written by Lenin:

"Communism denies parliamentarism as a form of future society; he denies the possibility of a long conquest of parliaments: he puts

its goal is the destruction of parliamentarism. Therefore, we can only talk about the use of bourgeois state institutions for the purpose of their destruction" (Lenin, Soch., vol. XXV, p. 581).

The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (1956), without formally declaring this resolution obsolete, nevertheless introduced the addition to it that the communists could come to power not only through an uprising, but also through the conquest of the parliamentary majority as a prerequisite for a communist revolution.

#### Chapter 4

#### Bolshevik-Menshevik Central Committee

At the Congress, Lenin again triumphed on a very important organizational question for him. The polycentricity of the Party (Party Council, Central Committee and Central Organ), proclaimed at the 2nd Party Congress, liquidated at the Bolshevik Congress of the Bolshevik Party, restored as a two-centric system at the TU Unity Congress (Central Committee and Central Organ), has now completely disappeared. The statute has been changed. The Central Committee again became the sole supreme organ of the party between congresses, and the editors of the Central Organ were appointed by the Central Committee and had to work under its control. The principle of co-optation was abolished. From now on, the retired members of the Central Committee were to be replaced by candidates elected at the congress.

The congress rejected the idea of convening a non-party "workers' congress" (Akselrod, Larin), which could lead "to the replacement of social democracy by non-party workers' organizations" ("CPSU in Resolutions", part 1, p. 165), condemned partisan actions and robberies ("expropriations" or "exes") practiced by the Bolsheviks (p. 169), and called on the party to establish its ideological leadership over the trade unions (p. 170).

The congress instructed the Central Committee to intensify work in the army and convene a conference of military organizations (p. 170). A Central Committee was elected, which included five Bolsheviks (I. P. Goldman, I. F. Dubrovinsky, N. A. Rozhkov, I. A. Teodorovich, V. P. Nogin), four Mensheviks (A. S. Martynov, N. N. Zhordania, I. A. Isuv, Nikifor), two Poles (A. S. Barsky and F. E. Dzerzhinsky) and one Latvian (K. Kh. Danishevsky). Three more members were to be delegated by the Bund and the Latvians (History of the CPSU, vol. 2, p. 226).

Although he had a formal majority in the new Central Committee, Lenin still did not trust him. Moreover, among the Bolshevik members of the Central Committee themselves

"conciliators" (Dubrovinsky, Nogin, Rozhkov) prevailed, one of whom (Rozhkov) later went over to the Mensheviks altogether. Lenin decided to surround the official center of the party - the Central Committee - with an illegal center of the Bolsheviks. At the end of the congress, Lenin called a private meeting of Bolshevik delegates and created the "Bolshevik Center". In addition to members of the Central Committee, the following were elected there: Krasin, Pokrovsky, Leitesen, Shantser, Taratuta, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov. The center was headed by Lenin himself (ibid., p. 227).

This once again proved how little Lenin believed in organic unity with the Menshevik leaders. Lenin's basic idea was quite sound - it was impossible to lead the revolution from an ideologically diverse and organizationally loose center. A strong-willed, sacrificial, obedient and ideologically monolithic center - that's what Lenin wanted. He had little faith that even the pro-Bolshevik Central Committee at the Congress could become such. Therefore, a legal-illegal "Bolshevik Center" was needed.

On June 3, 1907, a new stage in the history of revolutionary Russia begins - on this day the tsar dissolved the State Duma, arrested the Social Democratic faction and, without the consent of the Duma (that means violating the "Manifesto of October 17"), issued a new electoral law, ensuring in the new, III Duma, a right-wing majority. This act of the tsar is commonly called the "June 3rd coup d'état." Legally, the act of the tsar meant only the legalization of the actual situation - the first Russian revolution ended, the tsarist autocracy went from defense to the offensive, the era of reaction began. This era is associated with the name of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers P. A. Stolypin.

Stolypin had his own, rather coherent and quite logical conception of the causes of the revolution and the means to overcome it. Two ideas underlay this concept - revolutionary terror must be suppressed mercilessly (the practice of military courts), but the social causes that cause the revolution must be eliminated: basically, it is necessary to equip the peasant, turning him from a community member into a private owner (agrarian Stolypin's reforms).

In the implementation of the first idea, Stolypin succeeded well. According to Soviet, undoubtedly exaggerated, data, from 1907 to 1909 more than 26 thousand people were convicted on political charges, 170 thousand people were in prisons, 5086 people were sentenced to death ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, p. 239 ). However, when implementing the second

ideas - to separate the peasant from the community, to make him a private owner, sufficiently provided with land (cuts, farms or land on the outskirts of Russia) Stolypin met with equally stubborn resistance from the right (reactionary landowners) and from the left (Socialist-Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks).

Stolypin's success in resolving the agrarian question would mean only one thing: Stolypin would finally kill the Russian revolution, depriving the revolution of its main participant - the peasantry. A peasant, a wealthy landowner, would become a conservative, an anti-revolutionary. Then the whole doctrine of Lenin's revolution, based on the "alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry" in the struggle for power, collapsed.

Lenin had this in mind when he wrote: "I admit that Stolypin's policy is taking another step forward along the "Prussian" path (peaceful resolution of the agrarian question. - A. A.) and that on this path, at a certain stage, a dialectical turning point may occur, removing from the queue all hopes and views on the 'American' (ie, revolutionary. - AA) path. But I affirm that now this turning point has not yet come. "We are still fighting. One of the two agrarian paths has not yet won" (Lenin, *Sobr. soch.*, vol. XX, additional, part 1, ed. 1st, pp. 313 and 317; see also M.N.

Pokrovsky, "Russian history in the most concise outline", Partizdat, 1933, pp. 463-472).

The Third Duma, elected on the basis of the new electoral law, turned out to be clearly right-right monarchists made up 40% of the Duma deputies, Octobrists 25%, Cadets 23%, leftists 7%. The Social Democratic faction consisted of 19 deputies instead of 65 in the Second Duma. There were four Bolshevik deputies (Poletaev, Zakharov, Surkov and Kosorotov).

The wave of arrests that began led to the destruction of many social democratic organizations and their committees. Most of the leaders of the RSDLP fled abroad. In December, Lenin fled from Finland via Sweden to Switzerland and settled in Geneva. By the end of 1908, about 900 Social Democrats emigrated abroad (History of the CPSU, vol. 2, p. 248). The leading center of the party in Russia was the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, which included the Bolsheviks Dubrovinsky, Goldenberg and Nogin and the Mensheviks Zhordania and N. Ramishvili (candidate). The newspaper "Proletary" (1906-1909) continued to play the role of the actual Central Organ of the Bolshevik Center. In addition, the official organ of the Central Committee "Social Democrat" was published, the first issue of which was published in Russia, but from the second issue it began

go abroad (1909-1917). Although the Social Democrat was considered a general organ, Lenin and the Bolsheviks set the tone for it.

The years 1908-1909 were years of a very deep ideological and organizational crisis in the leadership of the RSDLP. This time the split took place among the "schismatics" - within the historically established factions - the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The crisis was caused by the fact that the main question of the time - how the party should work in the conditions of the decline of the revolution, in the conditions of the Duma, "parliamentary" Russia - party leaders gave different answers both in the Bolshevik faction and in the Menshevik faction. Among the Mensheviks began to dominate the trend that stood for the adaptation of the party to the legal conditions of Duma Russia, for the creation of a legal broad workers' party and the rejection of the old, secret organization of the party. It was the first, most influential trend (Axelrod, Dan, Martov). The second trend among the Mensheviks stood for the preservation of the underground party. It was numerically weaker and was led by Plekhanov. Lenin called the first trend "liquidationist" (it wants, allegedly, to "liquidate" the party) and declared the most merciless war on it. Lenin called the supporters of the second current "Party Mensheviks" and offered them an alliance in the fight against the liquidators.

Several groups also appeared in the Bolshevik faction - "otzovists", "ultimatists" and the so-called "God-seekers", who later united into one literary and ideological group "Vperyod". In their political physiognomy, the "otzovists" represented the extreme left wing of Bolshevism, orthodox and consistent Bolshevism. This trend arose in March-April 1908 in Moscow during the discussion

the work of S.-D. factions in the Third Duma. In May of the same year, a Moscow party conference was held, at which 14 out of 32 delegates introduced a resolution demanding that the Social-Democrats. the deputies resigned their mandates "in order to emphasize both the true character of the Duma itself and the revolutionary tactics of the RSDLP" (Lenin, *Sobr. soch.* t. KhM, p. 499). If the s.-d. deputies do not leave the Duma voluntarily, then simply recall them from there ("otzovists") or present them with an ultimatum to submit to the decisions of the party ("ultimatists").

The official commentator on Lenin's writings remarks:

"The otzovist trend has taken deep roots not only in Moscow, but in

In the spirit of otzovism, resolutions were adopted by the St. Petersburg, Ivanovo-Voznesensky, and other committees" (*ibid.*, p. 499).

The Moscow otzovists were led by Stanislav Volsky. The leaders of the ultimatumists were G. Aleksinsky and A. Bogdanov. Aleksinsky said that the Social-Democrats in the Duma it is necessary to raise "two ultimatum questions: 1) about the unconditional subordination of the Party and the Central Committee, 2) about work outside the Duma" (*ibid.*, p. 500).

The otzovists accused Lenin of betraying Bolshevism, of going over to the ideological positions of Menshevism. At a party conference, the leader of the Lesser Viks, Dan, on this occasion remarked, not without surprise: "Who does not know that Lenin is accused of Menshevism" or, as another Social Democrat stated, "Lenin is pursuing a Right-Bundist line" (Lenin, *PSS*, t 19, pp. 13, 15).

Lenin called the otzovists "liquidators inside out" or "liquidators on the left" and waged a broad campaign against them both in the party press and at meetings. Against these Left Bolsheviks, Lenin even formed a bloc with the Left Mensheviks, the Plekhanov group. When the interests of the cause demanded, Lenin made the sharpest turns in tactics.

During the described period, the structure of the Central Committee and its subsidiary bodies looked like this. From the general composition of the Central Committee, the so-called "Narrow composition of the Central Committee" was singled out from five people with the rights of the Central Committee (composition: 1 Bolshevik, 1 Menshevik, 1 Latvian, 1 Pole and one Bundist). The "narrow composition of the Central Committee" was supposed to be in Russia. There were three bureaus of the Central Committee and a number of commissions of the Central Committee abroad. There was a general bureau of the Central Committee, which acted as a liaison and information center. This bureau, headed by a foreign member of the Central Committee, was considered a subordinate organ of the "narrow composition of the Central Committee."

Another bureau was created, which was called the "Foreign Central Bureau of the Central Committee", of 10 people, headed by a member of the Central Committee with the right of veto. The Foreign Central Bureau was considered the coordinating body of the foreign Social-Democrats. organizations. It had the right to make decisions binding on foreign organizations, if the representative of the Central Committee did not impose his veto. The Foreign Central Bureau was also subordinate to the "Narrow composition of the Central Committee."

Under the Central Committee, there was also a military bureau, whose task was to develop illegal work in the army and navy (organization of cells, compiling and distributing leaflets, etc.). Under the Central Committee were created

various commissions: "Commission for trade union and cooperative

movement", "Cultural and educational commission for work among the proletariat", "Leaflet commission" (for compiling leaflets, appeals, proclamations, pamphlets on topical issues). Special persons were entrusted with work among young people, especially among students. The party obliged its members to lead the struggle of students and professors for university autonomy. All subsidiary bodies were headed by members of the Central Committee, accountable to the "narrow composition", but the entire party activists were involved in their work. A common Central Organ of the party, the Social Democrat, was created (at the same time, the Bolshevik organ Proletary, the editorial board: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Dubrovinsky, was also preserved).

In clarifying the functions of both the Central Committee as a whole and its subsidiary bodies separately, the August Plenum of the Central Committee in 1908 was of great importance. The plenum indicated that all power remains with the plenary session of the collegium; it is convened once every three months, an emergency meeting at the request of 6 members of the collegium or at the request of the majority of the "narrow composition of the Central Committee" working in Russia. The meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee is considered legal if 8 people have gathered.

In the intervals between plenary sessions, all current work in Russia is carried out by the "Narrow composition of the Central Committee". On the initiative of the "narrow composition of the Central Committee," questions that brook no delay can be resolved by questioning all members of the Collegium of the Central Committee. Tactical questions of a general nature are decided by the "narrow composition of the Central Committee" in case of extreme haste; if there is no such situation, then they postpone their decision until the convening of the plenum. The leadership of the Duma faction of the Social-Democrats. entrusted to the "narrow composition of the Central Committee". The resolution of the plenum explicitly states: that the Social-Democrats. the faction in the Duma "is one of the official bodies subordinate to the Party and its Central Committee" ("CPSU in Res.", Part 1, p. 198) and that "the Central Committee, in view of its responsibility to the Party for the work of the faction, must exercise its right without hesitation a veto on the decision of a faction in all those cases when these latter threaten to bring harm to the party" (ibid., p. 201).

In general, the "Narrow Composition of the Central Committee" acts on behalf of the Central Committee as a whole and acts in the same way as the "Central Committee of the RSDLP", vested with all its rights. At short intervals, the "narrow composition of the Central Committee" submits written reports on their activities to the Bureau abroad for information.

Regarding the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee, the resolution of the plenum says that this bureau "is the representative of the interests of the Central Committee abroad" (not to be confused with

border, Emigration Bureau of the Central Committee).

In practice, the Central Committee is a Russian five working in Russia ("CPSU in resolutions", part 1, pp. 188-189). Lenin was quite satisfied with this, since out of the five members of the "Narrow composition of the Central Committee" he had on

on their side, a majority of three (1 Bolshevik, 1 Pole, 1 Lett), against two (1 Menshevik and 1 Bundist).

A further step towards strengthening Lenin's position in the Central Committee was the All-Russian Conference of the Party. It took place from December 21 to 27 (January 3-9, 1909) in Paris. It was attended by 16 delegates: from the Bolshevik-Leninists - Lenin, Zinoviev, Taratuta (all from the Central Committee), member of the Duma Poletaev; from the otzovist Bolsheviks - Bogdanov (Maximov) and Denisov; from the Bolshevik ultimacists - Art. Volsky and Lyadov; from the Menshevik liquidators - Axelrod, Dan, Ramishvili (member of the Central Committee), and others ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, pp. 259-260). Representatives of the "national" Social-Democrats were also present.

The dominant trend at the conference was Leninist. This ensured the adoption of tactical decisions in the spirit of Leninist Bolshevism. Summing up the results of the conference, Lenin wrote:

"The year of collapse, the year of ideological and political confusion, the year of party impassability lies behind us... The crisis was undoubtedly not only organizational, but also ideological and political."

The way out of this crisis was indicated by the decisions of the conference approved by the Central Committee. Their essence, according to Lenin, was as follows:

"The new conditions of the moment require new forms; the use of the Duma rostrum seems to be an absolute necessity; the long work of educating and organizing the masses comes to the fore; the combination of illegal and legal organization puts forward special tasks for the party.

Despite the severity of the crisis, when only 20,000 Social Democrats in Russia survived from a party of 150,000, Lenin was still optimistic. Yes, he called the Russian people a "nation of slaves", but he highly valued the Russian proletariat. In the article cited, he wrote:

"The Russian proletariat can be proud that in 1905, under its leadership, the nation of slaves turned for the first time into an army of millions attacking tsarism, into an army of revolution. And the same proletariat will now be able to carry out the work of educating and training new cadres more powerful.

revolutionary force" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 17, pp. 354, 360, 361).

The conference condemned the "liquidators" (but passed over the "otzovists" in silence), instructed the Central Committee to "continue to protect the integrity and unity of the Party" and stated that "the completely successful work of the Central Committee is possible only if its minority (the Central Committee) is subject to party discipline, to work loyally within the framework of one institution" ("CPSU in Res.", part 1, p. 195).

The conference approved the decision of the Central Committee on the creation in Russia of a "reduced composition" ("narrow composition") of the Central Committee with the rights of the plenary composition of the Central Committee, but at the same time pointed out that "questions of principle and tactics", if possible, should be considered at the plenum of the Central Committee. A decision was also sanctioned to establish a Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee ("CPSU in Res.", Part 1, pp. 204-205).

Meanwhile, the factional struggle between the leaders of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks continued, sometimes taking on very sharp forms. Lenin's position was further complicated by the fact that a sub-faction had formed in his own faction that wanted to become more to the left of Lenin himself (the "Vperyodists"). The threatening situation on both sides compelled Lenin to resort to compromises which, in the depths of his soul, he despised and which he was going to abandon at the first opportunity. It was important for him to swallow the Menshevik faction with all its committees, but without its leaders. Lenin never believed in their Bolshevik degeneration. He also wanted to achieve the complete capitulation of the "Lefts".

In the meantime, the unification movement at the bottom of the Party grew more and more. Since the pro-Bolshevik Central Committee also advocated a real unification, Lenin had to maneuver very

carefully. In January 1910, in Paris, through the mediation of the non-factional group of L. Trotsky, who published the newspaper Pravda in Vienna, and the Bund, the so-called "Unification Plenum of the Central Committee" was convened. At the plenum of the Central Committee were present: from the Bolsheviks - Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Dubrovinsky, Nogin and Goldenberg; from the Menshevik liquidators - Martov, Martynov, Zhordania, Ramishvili, Gorev; from the "Vperyod" - Bogdanov and Shantser; from the Polish S.-D. - Tyshka and Barsky; from the Bundists - Koigen and Eisenstadt; from the Latvian S.-D. - Ozolin (Libavsky); from the Vienna "Pravda" -

Trotsky. Plekhanov did not appear (History of the CPSU, vol. 2, p. 298).

Lenin was against the convocation of a plenum, but there was no active struggle against it.

led, especially since he had little faith in his success. The most important decisions of the plenum were reduced to the following:

1) to elect the editorial board of the new Central Organ from five persons (from the Bolsheviks - Lenin and Zinoviev, from the Mensheviks - Martov and Dan, plus the Pole Barsky, who sympathized with the Bolsheviks);

2) stop the publication of the Bolshevik Proletary and the Menshevik Voice of the Social Democrat;

3) disband the Bolshevik Center;

4.) to elect a Russian collegium of the PC of seven people, consisting of two Bolsheviks (Nogin and Goldenberg), two Mensheviks (not named), plus Martynov, a member of the Bund Abramovich (Rhein) and a Latvian Libavsky;

5) to reorganize the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee, consisting of five people (from the Bolsheviks - Lyubimov, then Semashko, from the Mensheviks - Gorev);

6) transfer from the Bolshevik treasury to the general party treasury money in the amount of 500 thousand (this money was kept by the leaders of the German social democracy Kautsky, F. Mehring and Clara Zetkin);

7) subsidize Trotsky's newspaper Pravda, recognize it as a party organ, introduce one member of the Central Committee (Kamenev) into its editorial staff;

8) register the anti-Leninist Vperyod as a party literary group;

9) establish a party school of propagandists in Paris;

10) publish a "Discussion Collection" (editor - one representative from each trend and national organization);

11) work out a plan for organizing a party in Russia, creating groups in legal organizations, "cells" in illegal organizations, and merge the existing factions;

1.2) issue a legal body in Russia;

13) to convene an all-party conference with the participation of figures from both the illegal and legal movements (A. Spiridovich, History of Bolshevism in Russia, Paris, 1922, p. 208).



At the plenum, a special "Charter of the Central Committee of the RSDLP" was adopted. Its main paragraphs were as follows:

1) the seven-member collegium of members of the Central Committee operating in Russia ("Seven") enjoys all the rights of the Central Committee ("Seven": 2 Bolsheviks, 2 Mensheviks, 1 Bundist, 1 Pole, 1 lat);

2) each member of the Central Committee is obliged to perform this or that work;

3) the current Central Committee consists of members and candidates elected at the London Congress;

4.) in the event of the departure of any of the members of the "Seven", he is replaced by a candidate for the London Congress, in the absence of such, the "Seven" itself selects a candidate for membership in the "Seven";

5) the candidates chosen by the London Congress replace the retired members of the PC in the manner prescribed by the Charter;

1) The Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee, appointed by the Central Committee and consisting of 5 members of the Central Committee, operates abroad. The Bureau includes three representatives of the "national" Central Committees, who may not be members of the Central Committee (but they do not participate in the plenum of the Central Committee); this Bureau manages the Party's property, publishing and technical affairs, represents the Party abroad, unites foreign Party assistance groups and serves as an intermediary between them and the Central Committee operating in Russia;

6) the following are involved in the plenum (out of 15 people): 1) members of the "Seven", 2) members of the Foreign Bureau who are members of the Central Committee, 3) if both do not give the number 15, then candidates are involved in the work of the plenum; when replacing candidates, the proportionality of the currents is observed. The question of which of the candidates has the right to attend the plenum is decided by a member of the Central Committee of this trend. The charter was adopted unanimously (Lenin, *Sobr. soch.*, vol. KhT, pp. 472-473).

The official historian writes: "Despite Lenin's protest, the plenum decided to close the Proletary newspaper, to immediately transfer to the Central Committee of the RSDLP part of the money belonging to the Bolsheviks, and the rest within two years. The money was temporarily deposited with "Holders - representatives of the German Social Democracy Mehring, Zetkin and Kautsky" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, p. 300).

This comment of the official historian is completely inconsistent with the following document, which was signed by Lenin, among other Bolshevik participants in the plenum:

"We, the undersigned, fully meeting the urgent need for organizational unity of the Party, declare:

1) we are dissolving our factional centre;

2) we stop publishing the newspaper Proletary;

1)

3) ... (In these two paragraphs, we are talking about the immediate transfer by the Bolsheviks of part of their property to the Central Committee) (Lenin, *Sobr. soch.*, vol. KhM, p.

475).

But this decision of the plenum of the Central Committee and the Leninist Bolshevik Center was protested by the Bolsheviks from the Vperyod group. This group issued a special statement stating:

"To the Bolshevik comrades. You probably already know the statement of the Bolshevik Center adopted and announced by the Central Committee that the "Bolshevik Center" is recognized as dissolved, the "Proletary" is closed, the Bolshevik money is transferred to the Central Committee and Bolshevism, as an organizational ideological trend, is declared non-existent ...

Official leaders throughout the line have renounced Bolshevik traditions...

It wasn't just a change of heart. It was a completely conscious deception directed against the entire Bolshevik current... Over the past two years, not a single monetary report has been given to the organizations, hundreds of thousands have been spent... Thus, both in the ideological, and in the material, and in the organizational sense The Bolshevik Center became an uncontrolled arbiter of Bolshevik affairs, since they depended on foreign countries ... But then the Bolshevik Center considered itself entitled to take the last step - to officially liquidate the faction without asking the opinion of any of the Bolshevik organizations, and transfer its (faction) material resources to The Central Committee, having spoken out for itself a large share of them, - already as a private group of writers. The chain of deceit was completed by such an act, which combined all the measures of hypocrisy and usurpation: appropriation of someone else's name ("Bolshevik Center"), embezzlement of someone else's property, dissolution of someone else's organization ...

The ideological current must lead its leaders and representatives.

Only the decision of the local Bolshevik organizations can be considered a real solution to the problem. Until it took place, the resolution of the Bolshevik Center on the dissolution of the faction, the transfer of money to the Central Committee, etc. cannot have any power" (A. Spiridovich, *ibid.*, pp. 219-222).

In vain did the Left Bolsheviks worry. The unification of the warring factions at the January plenum of the Central Committee turned out to be illusory. On the contrary, it was only after this plenum that factional differences became even more acute.

Perhaps never before has the RSDLP presented such a motley picture of factions, groups and groupings as in the months and years that followed the January plenum.

In the camp of the Mensheviks, four factions were formed - the Potresov faction (the magazine *Nasha Zarya*), which stands on the very right flank of the RSDLP; Martov-Dan-Akselrod faction (Newspaper "Voice of the Social Democrat"); Trotsky's faction (the newspaper *Pravda*), which advocated reconciliation between the Bolsheviks and the Menipstsevs; Plekhanov's faction ("Party Mensheviks").

The Bolsheviks had three factions - the faction of Lenin-Zinoviev Kamenev, the faction of Bogdanov-Lunacharsky-Pokrovsky-Gorky (Vperyod group) and the faction of "conciliators", which actively sought to unite with the Menysheviks (members of the Central Committee Dubrovinsky, Nogin, Lyubimov, Goldenberg and others .).

Of the three centers of the party - the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee was in the hands of the "conciliators", the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee in the hands of the Mensheviks, the central organ "Social Democrat" in the hands of the Bolshevik-Leninists (although the editors included Martov and Dan, Lenin and Zinoviev, using the voice of the fifth member - a Pole, pursued their own line in the Central Organ and even rejected Martov's articles).

During this period, Lenin strenuously sought an alliance with Plekhanov's group. Together with her, at the end of 1910, he began publishing the legal party newspaper Zvezda in St. Petersburg. In addition, at the end of 1911, the Bolsheviks began to publish the legal journal Enlightenment in St. Petersburg.

Of exceptional importance in winning the Russian party organizations over to the side of Bolshevism was the party school in Longjumeau near Paris, which began operating in the spring of 1911. From this school came such convinced students of Lenin (Lenin gave 56 lectures there) as Ordzhonikidze, Belostotsky, Schwartz, Breslav, who, returning to Russia, prepared the convocation of the Prague Conference of 1912 and themselves became members of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party.

Thus, the January "unification" plenum of the Central Committee did not justify its appointment. In fact, the merger did not take place. His opponents were too strong, both from the right (Mensheviks-"liquidators") and from the left (Bolsheviks-"otzovists"). The Menshevik "liquidators" generally refused to join the new Central Committee and to recognize the decisions of the January plenum.

Golos Sotsial-Demokrata issued a Letter to Comrades, against the Bolshevik interpretation of the decisions of the plenum of the Central Committee (Lenin, Sobr. soch., XMH, pp. 476-480), and in Russia the Mensheviks began to publish the legal organ Nasha Zarya.

The Bolsheviks, who solemnly promised to dissolve their factional center and close its press organ, and transfer the money to the new composition of the Central Committee ("CPSU in Res.", Part 1, p. 242), formally recognized the decisions of the plenum, but in fact fought against them .

As for party money, the Bolshevik Center actually disposed of them. The subsidy to Trotsky was also stopped, withdrew from

editors of his newspaper sent there Kamenev, a member of the Central Committee. In opposition to Trotsky's newspaper, the Central Committee organized its own organ, the Workers' Newspaper. The "discussion collection", created by the January plenum, also fell apart - representatives of the "Voice of the Social-Democrats" and the left-Bolshevik "Forward" left from there. Further decomposition of the Central Committee was prevented by the Russian police - in April 1910, the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee was arrested, and after that, the leading board of the Central Committee, just elected at the January plenum, "Seven".

Therefore, the actual power of the Central Committee was concentrated in the hands of the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee, where the influence of the Mensheviks prevailed. Lenin decided to invite the Bolsheviks and Poles to leave from there in order to liquidate this bureau itself (which was done: the Bolshevik representative Semashko, taking the cash desk and papers, left the Bureau).

After that, Lenin suggested that the only member of the "Seven" who survived the arrest, convene a new meeting of the Central Committee. This meeting took place in Paris from May 28 (June 10) to June 4 (17). From the Bolsheviks, Lenin, Zinoviev and Rykov participated in the meeting. There were also

representatives of the "Voice of the Social Democrat", Poles, Latvians and the Bund. Representatives of the "Voice of the Social Democrat" and the Bund left the meeting when they learned the goals of its organizer - Lenin. After that, the remaining members of the Central Committee decided to convene the All-Russian Conference. The Foreign Organizing Commission for its convocation (ZOK) was created. The foreign organizing commission was to organize a Russian collegium of local people to prepare the conference. A Technical Commission (TC) was also created to "perform a number of technical functions in connection with party publishing, transport, etc." ("CPSU in

res., Part 1, p. 248).

In the "Notice" of the meeting of the members of the Central Committee, the inevitable charge was averted in advance that the Bolsheviks had illegally seized all power over the Central Committee. It said: "It is not about the 'seizure of power', but about the fulfillment of an elementary party obligation" (ibid., p. 246).

But it was precisely as a seizure of power that the Mensheviks interpreted the decision of the Central Committee meeting. Martov and Dan left the editorial board of the Social Democrat, which made this organ of the Central Committee a purely Bolshevik one. Everyone (except the "liquidators"), Plekhanov's group, Trotsky's group (Pravda), Bogdanov's group (Vperyod), the Bund, and the Lettish Social Democracy (ibid., p. 249) were invited to the future conference. Lenin explained why, for example, he invites the Pravda and Vperyod groups to the conference with the following consideration:

"To address the Russian workers associated with Vperyod and Pravda through the heads of these groups against these groups - such is the policy that Bolshevism has led, is leading and will carry out through all obstacles" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 20, p. 350 ).

Even Machiavelli himself could not have come up with a better recipe.

ZOK appointed Orzhonikidze, Schwartz and Breslav as its representatives in Russia. On September 29, 1911, a meeting of a number of party organizations was held in Baku, at which the Russian Organizing Commission (ROC) was created to convene an all-Russian conference. It included the Bolsheviks Ordzhonikidze, Schwartz, Shaumyan, Spandaryan and one Plekhanovite, Sokolin ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, p. 349). Thus, Lenin created in fact a new Central Committee within Russia.

Thus Lenin completed his new coup in the Central Committee. Naturally, this caused a storm of indignation among both Right and Left Mensheviks. The Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee did not recognize its dissolution. It convened a response meeting in Bern (August 20, 1911) with the participation of the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee, the editors of Golos S.-D., the editors of Pravda, the Bund, the Latvian S.-D.

This meeting decided to create an "Organizing Committee" to convene a Russian party conference as a response and counterbalance to the Bolshevik "Organizing Commission" and "Technical Commission" (A. Spiridovich, ibid., pp. 231-232).

Bolshevism and Menshevism are rapidly moving towards a final and irreversible split, which will make them irreconcilable antipodes.

not only in tactics, but also in ideology.

## Chapter 5

### THE ORIGIN OF A CRIMINAL TREND IN BOLSHEVISM ("EXY")

In order to better understand the further development of Bolshevism - from the triumph of the Leninist Central Committee in the October Revolution to its death after the death of Lenin - in order to document the genealogy of the future Stalinist Bolshevism - we must dwell on the history of the emergence of a criminal trend in the Bolshevik Party - on the history of the Caucasian "expropriators", who were abbreviated as "exes" in party language. Here, for the first time in the history of political thought and political movements, we are present at the birth of a political-criminal "hybrid", when purely criminal methods (murder, robbery, arson, counterfeiting) are preached and used to achieve the political goal of the program (seizure of power). It was this hybrid that was born in the revolution of 1905 as "combat squads" of workers' self-defense. However, Lenin decided to keep them even after the defeat of the revolution for two purposes: 1) to raise money for the party by "expropriating the expropriators" and 2) to kill spies, "Black Hundreds" and "leaders of the police, army and navy."

Lenin translated Marx's formula that during the proletarian revolution only "the expropriation of the expropriators" into understandable Russian - "rob the loot" (a year after the establishment of Bolshevik power, Lenin reduced the essence of Bolshevism to this. Lenin said:

"The old Bolshevik was right when he explained to the Cossack what Bolshevism is. To the Cossack's question: "Is it true that you, the Bolsheviks, are robbing?", The old man replied: 2 Yes, we are robbing the loot ""), (Lenin, *Sobr. soch.*, vol. XXI, p. 251).

Does the end justify any means, is it permissible in the struggle against the autocracy to use the method of political banditry in order to "rob the loot" in favor of the party and kill opponents in order to unleash a new revolution? Both factions of the RSDLP answered these questions differently.

Martov and the Menysheviks rejected all criminal and immoral

means in the fight against the enemy, without denying in principle organized violence in the name of the party and the working class, if the country is in a period of revolution.

On the contrary, Lenin and some of the Bolsheviks already considered the mere presentation of the question of moral and immoral means, of methods and forms permissible and impermissible in politics, not only "opportunistic" but also criminal. Lenin subsequently summarized his view on this matter in the following words:

"The revolutionary class, in order to carry out its task, must be able to master all, without the slightest exception, the forms and aspects of social activity ... Everyone will agree that it would be unreasonable or even criminal for the behavior of an army that is not preparing to master all types of weapons, all means and methods of struggle ... This applies even more to politics than to military affairs "(Lenin, *Sobr. soch.*, vol. XXV, p. 232,

3rd ed.).

The question of "military squads", of "partisan warfare" (that is, of the "Ex") was discussed at two joint congresses of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. An analysis of the positions of the parties at these congresses on this issue sheds light not only on the further evolution of the criminal wing in the Bolshevik party itself, but also on the deep abyss that formed between Bolshevism and Menshevism precisely in the field of the "moral philosophy" of the revolution itself. Essentially, both factions proceeded from diametrically opposed ethical principles in the political struggle. Nothing so vividly and at the same time so documented characterizes the two ethics of the two factions of the RSDLP as a comparison of two draft resolutions of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks "On partisan actions" at the GU Congress, the decision of the congress itself on this issue against Lenin, and also Lenin's struggle with objectionable him by a decision in his body "Proletary".

Lenin presented a draft to the congress, which, proceeding from the fact that the revolution in Russia continues in the form of "partisan attacks on the enemy," proposed: admissible"; secondly, "military actions to seize funds are also permissible" ("The Fourth (Unification) Congress of the RSDLP. Protocols", 1959, pp. 481, 482).

The Mensheviks submitted a draft resolution which stated:

"Considering that the declassed sections of society, criminals and scum of the urban population have always used revolutionary unrest for their anti-social goals and the revolutionary people had to take severe measures against the orgy of theft and robbery; Finally, that the most important force of the revolution lies in its moral and political influence on the revolutionary masses, on society and on the entire army, that by disorganizing state power, it sets as its goal not social anarchy, but the organization of social forces, the congress decides:

a) to fight against the actions of individuals or groups with the aim of seizing money under the name or motto of the Social-Democrats. parties;

b) avoid violating the personal safety or private property of civilians;

c) destruction and damage to state buildings, railways and other structures, state and private, to be carried out only in cases where this is associated with a direct combat goal;

d) not to seize the capital of the State Bank, the Treasury and other government institutions, except in the case of the formation of organs of revolutionary power and on their instructions; at the same time, the confiscation of the people's money collected in state institutions must take place publicly and with full accountability. Weapons and ammunition belonging to the government should be seized at every opportunity" (ibid., p. 528).

At first, both projects were discussed at the congress committee. Much to Lenin's chagrin, the majority of the Bolshevik faction on the commission rejected Lenin's resolution "on partisan actions" and

joined the Menshevik project. The Menshevik N. Cherevanin reported on this to the congress:

"In presenting to the congress a draft resolution on "partisan actions", I must declare that the work of the commission on this issue has been greatly simplified, since the comrades from the majority (that is, from the Bolshevik faction. - A. A.) have come to an agreement with us" (ibid., p. 401).

The severity of Lenin's defeat in his own faction came to light in the voting. The congress was attended by 62 Menshevik and 46 Bolshevik delegates. The first important part of the Menshevik resolution before

paragraph "d" was adopted by 68 votes against four Bolsheviks, including Lenin, 20 people abstained from the vote (ibid., p. 462).

Of course, Lenin did not even think of submitting to this decision of the supreme organ of the party, despite the fact that on this issue he was disavowed by his own faction. Five months after the congress, Lenin wrote in *Proletary*:

"When I see Social Democrats proudly and self-satisfiedly declaring: we are not anarchists, we are not thieves, we are not robbers, we are above this, we reject guerrilla warfare, then I ask myself: do these people understand what they are saying? .." ( Lenin, Collected Works Vol. X, p. 86).

Lenin certainly did not "understand" this. He added:

"They say: guerrilla warfare brings the class-conscious proletariat closer to the degraded drunkards, tramps. It's right. But it only follows from this that the party of the proletariat can never consider guerrilla warfare the only or even the main means of struggle" (ibid., p. 86).

Finishing the article, Lenin, as if by accident, mentioned that the dispute here was, in fact, about the emergence of a new trend in his own faction, although he denied the fact of such a trend. Here are Lenin's words:

"We are far from thinking of seeing in a concrete assessment of this or that partisan action a question of direction in social democracy" (ibid., p. 88, highlighted by Lenin. - A. A. N).

That is the essence of the dispute, that under the spiritual leadership of Lenin, a new political-criminal direction began to emerge in the Bolshevik faction itself, over which he would soon lose all control while abroad.

When on August 15, 1906, by decision of the Polish Party of Socialists, a series of terrorist attacks were committed in a number of cities in Poland (in Warsaw, Lodz, Radom and Plock) and dozens of city and Russian soldiers were killed, which caused a protest of the Central Committee of the RSDLP against the actions of the Polish socialists, Lenin on this issue with a special article "On the events of the day." In it, Lenin wrote:

"Of course, the Central Committee of our Party is mistaken and profoundly mistaken when it declares: 'It goes without saying that the so-called 'partisan' fighting actions are still rejected by the Party.' This is not true ... We advise all the numerous battle groups of our party to stop

their inactivity and undertake a number of partisan actions on the exact basis of the decisions of the congress ... with the least "violation of the personal security" of civilians and with the greatest violation of the personal security of spies, active Black Hundreds, commanding officers of the police, troops, navy, and so on and so forth. "(Lenin, *Sobr. soch.* vol. X, 3rd ed., pp. 45-47, last words highlighted by Lenin. - A. A ..).

By the way, these words of Lenin decisively refute the legend contained in all textbooks that Lenin and Bolshevism, unlike the Narodniks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, allegedly opposed individual terror. A deputy of the Second State Duma from the Bolsheviks, at that time a close associate of Lenin - Grigory Aleksinsky - tells the story of the emergence of "expropriators":

"During the period 1906-1910, the Bolshevik faction was governed by a small committee, the existence of which was hidden not only from the eyes of the police, but also from the members of the party. This small committee, which included Lenin, Krasin and another person who now keeps aloof from politics (written in 1921, the third person was A. Bogdanov. - A. A.), was especially concerned with the finances of the party. In constant search for financial resources, the committee chose a simple means of replenishing the cash register. This is the same means that Bonnot used much later ... but Bonnot operated personally, while the Bolshevik "trinity" was limited to general leadership ... They robbed post offices, station ticket offices, trains, arranging preliminary wrecks (Ge Maisch, 9 *Zeretyuge*, 1921 ).

At the Fifth Party Congress (April-May 1907), where the Bolshevik faction had the majority of delegates, the question of "ex" was again discussed. The rapporteur of the Central Committee, Martov, reported to the congress:

"The so-called guerrilla terror and expropriations spread like a wide river... By intensifying the repressions of the government, terrorizing the bourgeois population and thereby pushing it towards reaction, terror and expropriations at the same time disorganized the revolutionary elements of the proletariat and the youth adjoining it, often introducing extreme demoralization in their ranks..."

("London Congress of the RSDLP. Full text of the minutes", 1909, p. 71).

After the revolution, the Bolshevik historian Em. Yaroslavsky authoritatively testified on this occasion:

"The attitude towards expropriations in the party was different. While,

just as the Bolsheviks recognized partial expropriation, the Mensheviks hypocritically declared that they were against expropriation... There was a danger that expropriations might degenerate and sometimes degenerated into anarchist actions and even banditry, when a group of ex-expropriators spent the funds obtained by the expropriation for their personal needs..." (Em. Yaroslavsky, "Essays on the history of the CPSU (6b)", Moscow, 1938, p. 194). For these reasons, the pro-Bolshevik congress, which adopted all the resolutions in the spirit of Lenin, adopted one resolution against Lenin as well: "on partisan actions." On this issue, the congress decided:

"At the present moment of comparative calm, partisan actions inevitably degenerate into purely anarchist methods of struggle ... Fighting squads that exist under party committees ...



inevitably turn into closed conspiratorial circles, demoralized, and bring disorganization into the ranks of the party—taking all this into account, the congress recognizes ... partisan actions are undesirable and the congress recommends an ideological struggle against them" ("CPSU in Rez.", 1953, p. 162). Naturally, Lenin ignored this decision of his own Bolshevik majority at the congress. Immediately after the congress, he set about preparing a new "expropriation", the most famous of all the Bolshevik "expropriations" before the revolution. Lenin entrusted the conduct of this "expropriation" to an unknown delegate at the congress, but a very well-known "militant" and "expropriator" in Tiflis - Koba-Soso Dzhughashvili, who, as a result of the fulfillment of this Leninist task, actually became Stalin.

Before proceeding to a presentation of the events connected with the fulfillment of Lenin's task, we will tell in the presentation of Stalin himself about his first acquaintance with Lenin and about the impression that Lenin made on Stalin. In a speech about Lenin at an evening of Kremlin cadets a week after Lenin's death, Stalin reported that his first correspondence meeting with Lenin took place in 1903. This date was not chosen by chance. It was known in the RSDLP that after the split of the party into Mensheviks and Bolsheviks in 1903, Stalin joined the Georgian Mensheviks until the end of 1904. If you look into his "Works" (vol. 1), then you will not find not only for 1903, but also for 1904 and 1905, not a single article or document signed by some pseudonym of Stalin, from which the position would be visible Stalin on the issue of split. There are two

"Letters from Kutaisi", marked September and October 1904, in which Stalin defends Lenin against Martov - and then a year later! But the reliability of these letters also has to be questioned, because, firstly, a note was made to these letters: "published for the first time", and secondly, they were put into "scientific circulation" by such famous "scientists" as Beria in his "To history of Bolshevik organizations in Transcaucasia". The Soviet journal Questions of History described Beria's "work" as follows: "Stalin's cult led to a direct distortion of historical truth," Beria's work was "built on stretches and outright falsifications" ("Questions of History", No. 3, 1956, p. 4. ).

Nevertheless, it must be considered probable that after carefully looking around and patiently studying the situation in the party for a whole year, Stalin discovered himself in Lenin and joined him towards the end of 1905 and the beginning of 1906. If we do not talk about the dubious "documents" of Beria attributed to Stalin, then the first article in the Georgian social democratic newspaper in Georgian, attributed to Stalin, appeared on March 8, 1906. In it, Stalin defends Lenin's tactics of boycotting the Duma against the Mensheviks.

Now let us return to the impression that Lenin made on Stalin. Stalin said at the aforementioned evening:

"For the first time I met Lenin in 1903 ... in the order of correspondence ... Acquaintance with the revolutionary activities of Lenin led me to the conviction that we have an extraordinary person in the person of Lenin ... When I compared him with the rest of the leaders of our party, I all the time it seemed that Lenin's comrades-in-arms - Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov - stood a whole head lower, that Lenin, in comparison with them, was not just a leader, but a leader of a higher type, a mountain eagle who knew no fear "(Demyan Bedny wrote that Stalin, as a resident of the Caucasus, compared Lenin with a "mountain eagle", but a resident of the north probably compared

to Lenin with the "Northern Lights").

Further, Stalin says that he wrote about this impression of Lenin to an emigrant, and the latter showed the letter to Lenin. It was then that Lenin wrote a programmatic letter to Stalin, in which "every phrase does not speak, but shoots." Stalin reports that, according to the habit of the old underground worker, he "burned Lenin's letter" (but, to the point of pedantry, accurate in written matters, Lenin also did not save copies of such

important letter).

The first personal meeting between Stalin and Lenin took place in December 1905 at a conference in Tammerfors. For the second and third time, Stalin saw and listened to Lenin at the TU and U party congresses, where Stalin was present as a delegate with an advisory vote from Tiflis. At the Congress, Stalin is present under the nickname "Ivanovich", but in the Caucasus he is known under the nickname "Koba". (Stalin took this nickname from the story "Paricide" by the Georgian classic Prince Kazbegi, whose main character, Koba, embodies not only fearless personal heroism, but also unparalleled loyalty to the ideals of humanism and friendship!)

However, the most important meeting that ultimately brought Stalin to the top floor of the party took place between Stalin and Lenin in 1907 in Berlin. Stalin's communist biographer Henri Barbusse writes about this meeting in his book Stalin. After a conversation with Lenin, Stalin left for Tiflis, but in the same year he came to Berlin again to meet with Lenin again. Stalin himself once mentioned in an interview with the German writer Ludwig that he had been to Berlin, but in Stalin's official biography it was never allowed to write about such an important fact of his two meetings with Lenin in Berlin, although Barbusse cites reports of these meetings from the words of Georgian old Bolsheviks. and with the knowledge of Stalin. What is the point then? If Stalin's meeting with Lenin in Berlin on the eve of or immediately after the Congress (the congress closed on May 19, 1907) can be considered a reliable fact, then the content of the conversation between them forever remained secret. This can only be explained by the fact that the subject of the conversation was precisely the question of organizing "expropriation," which the Congress had banned. The well-informed Trotsky wrote:

"If Lenin made a special trip to the German capital for such a meeting, then at least not for the sake of theoretical "talks". The meeting could have taken place either before or even more likely immediately after the Party Congress, and it is almost certain that it was devoted to the forthcoming expropriation, extraction of money, etc.

Why did the meeting take place not in London, but in Berlin? Trotsky asks. In answer to this question, Trotsky says that it is highly probable that Lenin did not want to meet with "Ivanovich" in front of the eyes of the tsarist and other spies who were present at the congress in London, moreover, it is possible that a third person was also present at the meeting, who did not have

nothing to do with the party congress (T.. Tgobzku, ebaPa, p. 108). Trotsky does not name him. But we know that this "third person" - Kamo - in a month will become famous throughout the world as the head of the most daring bandit raid in the history of Tsarist Russia.

The meeting between Lenin, Koba and Kamo took place, in all probability, after 19 May. A month later - June 26, 1907 - there was a

the famous Tiflis "expropriation".

First of all, who is Kamo? Kamo is a Georgian Armenian, his real name is Ter-Petrosyan. He, like Stalin, was born in Gori, almost his age (Kamo is only two years younger than Stalin). His official biography, which appeared in the TSB in 1937, says:

"Kamo is a Bolshevik, the most active Caucasian militant. Hero of partisan actions. Kamo is a disciple of Stalin ... Kamo organized a number of major expropriations ... In 1907, he took part in the famous

expropriations in Tiflis on Erivan Square. In connection with this expropriation, he was arrested on November 22, 1907 in Berlin ... "(BSE, vol. 31, 1st ed., 1937, p. 133).

However, in the second edition of the TSB, which was prepared for publication during Stalin's lifetime and came out in 1953, there is not a single word about "expropriations" in Kamo's biography, including such a famous one as the Tiflis one, although Kamo's biography itself is given twice as much space as in the first edition. In the new biography, as in the old one, it is indicated that Kamo's teacher is Stalin: Kamo "in 1901 met Stalin and under his leadership began illegal party work ..." (TSB, vol. 19, 2nd ed., 1953, p. 543). It is further stated that in March 1906, Kamo came to St. Petersburg, where he personally met Lenin, delivered weapons from St. Petersburg to the Caucasus, organized a bomb production workshop in Tiflis, "engaged in the formation, arming of combat groups and squads, participated in armed clashes with the tsarist troops, police and Black Hundreds ... In November 1907 he was arrested in Berlin, at the end of 1909 he was extradited to the tsarist authorities "(ibid., pp. 543-544.).

What was he arrested for, what was he extradited for? There is not a word about this in the second biography of Kamo. Why this is so, we will see later, but for now it is important to remember two things from Kamo's first biography: firstly, Kamo is a direct "student of Stalin", and secondly, Kamo's main revolutionary profession, which Stalin taught him since 1905, is "expropriations".

The most dangerous expropriation of all the "exes" of 1906 was the robbery in Chiaturi by the Koba-Kamo group of a mail train in November 1906; out of the 21,000 rubles plundered, the "exes" sent only 15,000 rubles to the Bolshevik center (Suvarine, ibid., p. 100). Significant money also went to Lenin from other "expropriations" - on the ship "Nikolai 1" and in the port of Baku.

Developing the doctrine of "guerrilla warfare", "military squads" and "expropriations", Lenin not without reason turned his eyes to the Caucasus, and from among his Caucasian students he singled out for this purpose two "militants" - Koba and Kamo. There were historical and personal reasons for this. Trotsky pointed out one of the historical reasons:

"In the Caucasus, with its romantic tradition of plunder and bloody civil strife, which is still alive today, guerrilla warfare found any number of fearless practitioners. More than a thousand terrorist acts of all kinds were committed in Transcaucasia during the first Russian revolution of 1905-1907 alone." (T .. TgozKu, ebaPyu, p. 96).

Personal reasons were no less important. Of all Caucasian

the Bolsheviks Koba and Kamo not only unquestioningly supported Lenin's doctrine of "exes", but this doctrine itself was born in Lenin's head as a result of practical experience in conducting a "series of expropriation" in the Caucasus by Kamo's "military squad" under the direct supervision of Koba, as his teacher, what is so emphasized in the TSB. The Tiflis "expropriation" of 1907 was the direct result of the Berlin meeting.

The author of the classic biography of Stalin, Boris Konstantinovich Suvarin, assessed the significance of the Tiflis "expropriation" in Koba's career as follows:

"The Tiflis 'ex', the most grandiose of all, was a kind of masterpiece, eclipsing all previous actions in its drama and absolute success. It was a confirmation of Stalin's fundamental right to select the leaders of the case. A little-known provincial militant, acting under the leadership of a mystical 'triumvirate' (Lenin Bogdanov-Krasin. - A.A.), a 'professional revolutionary' par excellence, unable to advance in the hierarchy of the party with the intellectual power of the mind, but ready to serve its cause, playing constantly increasing role, Koba found the circumstances under which he would show his steely character" (V.

S. Zotsuagshe, ZfaPsh, r. 94).

He showed him what we will see next. Stalin's student - Kamo (Ter Petrosyan, who knew little Russian, always pronounced the word "to whom" as "kamo", hence Stalin gave him the nickname "Kamo", which stuck with him forever) was an organic mixture of a social rebel, an outstanding adventurer and a heroic bandit with mind incomprehensible willpower. All these qualities of Kamo were reflected precisely in the Tiflis "expropriation". Briefly, her story is as follows.

Returning to Tiflis after a meeting with Lenin in Berlin, Koba created from the most daring "expropriators" something like a free gang, numbering, according to witnesses, about fifty people. The purpose of the gang is an armed attack and "expropriation" of money from the State Bank in Tiflis during their transportation. Koba appointed Kamo as the head of the gang, dressing him in the uniform of a brave officer, he was given "intelligence", in which two Georgian Bolsheviks also participated. The gang was divided into small groups and "stationed" around Erivan Square, where the attack was planned. Did Koba himself come to the square to personally direct the "operation"? Trotsky writes that "in party circles, Koba's personal participation in the Tiflis expropriation was considered indisputable" (T. TgoezKu, op. pr., p. 106). Trotsky adds that he, too, was of this opinion until 1932, but that further study of the matter convinces him that Stalin himself did not participate in the "expropriation", but was only Kamo's "adviser". Argument? References to a number of Soviet books in which there are no references to Stalin's personal involvement plus the silence of Stalin himself. But Trotsky's "persuasion" itself is not convincing. Stalin's participation in the Tiflis "expropriation" was never reported in the USSR only because Stalin himself forbade it. Having become the head of a great state, Stalin did not want to look like a "Caucasian bandit", even if it was heroic (former American ambassador to Moscow Bullitt: "Roosevelt thought that a gentleman was sitting in the Kremlin, but a former Caucasian bandit was sitting there"). Trotsky also has a certain personal "self-interest" here - he does not want to recognize a hero in Stalin, even a criminal one. For him, he is just a "kinto", and not Al Capone. The more objective Souvarine states that in Lenin's doctrine of "exes" "Stalin found use for his gift" (V. S. Zomuagshe, there

see p. 88), which of course includes personal courage.

Let us return to the Tiflis "expropriation". It happened around 11

noon on June 26, 1907, when Erivan Square was full of people. At this time, two carriages drove into the square, carrying a large amount of money from the State Bank, accompanied by an escort of Cossacks. A little earlier, two chaises were seen on the square - two women were sitting in one, and a man in an officer's uniform was sitting in the other. As soon as the carriages with the money appeared on the square, a person in an officer's uniform gave a command - how a gang of about fifty people grew out of the ground and bombs of enormous explosive force rained down on the carriages and on the Cossack escort, including from the cart on which the women were sitting. About ten bombs were thrown. Result: three people were killed, more than 50 people were injured. The bandits, having seized, according to one source, 340,000 rubles, according to others, 250,000 rubles, disappeared with the same lightning speed with which they had appeared.

Describing these details of the robbery, the Novoe Vremya newspaper ended its correspondence "Heroes of Bombs and Revolvers" with the exclamation: "Only the devil knows how this robbery of unheard-of audacity was committed."

Total mobilization of all troops, police forces, intelligence network, general searches, closing of borders, hundreds of arrests - but not a single bandit was caught either that day or after it, not a single penny of money was found either.

Where did the bandits go, where did the money end up? The bandits returned to "peaceful" work, which they so perfectly combined with their main profession (Lenin's "combination of legal work with illegal work"), and the money ended up under the sofa of the office of the director of the Tiflis Observatory, where Koba-Soso Dzhughashvili was also engaged in "peaceful work" as an observer. After a short time, the money ended up in the hands of Lenin.

It was this "expropriation" that Koba led. He was also accused of taking an indirect part in the murder of the Tiflis governor, General Gryaznov, Prince Chavchavadze, and even one of his associates in a Baku prison, which will be discussed later. After this Tiflis "expropriation" both - both Koba and Kamo - managed to make their way abroad, where they met with Lenin, presumably, to report on the operation. In the meantime, the foreign criminal police, informed by the Russian government, began arrests among the Bolshevik émigrés when they tried to exchange loot.

rubles for foreign currency. Such arrests were carried out in Paris, Munich, Stockholm and Geneva. Among those arrested were the future people's commissars Litvinov and Semashko. Only after these arrests did the party, including its Bolshevik faction, learn that the armed robbery in Tiflis was the work of Lenin's disciples, Koba and Kamo. Since every attempt to exchange rubles for currency ended in arrests, the Central Committee decided to burn the remaining amount of money.

At the demand of the Mensheviks, the Central Committee, in which the Bolsheviks predominated after the Congress, was forced to discuss the question of the Tiflis "expropriation" itself. A commission was set up headed by the future People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin (then a Menshevik), which should

was to conduct a detailed investigation. The Chicherin Commission very soon established that Lenin's disciples had not only organized a bloody robbery in Tiflis, but that Kamo was preparing to blow up the famous Mendelssohn bank in Berlin in order to expropriate foreign currency for Lenin this time. The Chicherin Commission also established that the Bolsheviks instructed their agents to purchase special paper for the production of counterfeit banknotes. A certain amount of such paper had already been sent through the expedition of the German Social Democratic newspaper Vorwärts (about which, of course, the leadership of the newspaper knew nothing) to Kuokkala (Finland), where Lenin and Zinoviev were then living illegally.

The courier handed the paper to the chairman of the "Technical Bureau of the Central Committee" Krasin (a member of the "triumvirate"), whom he recognized from the photograph shown to him.

Lenin, using his majority in the Central Committee, was able to put an end to these revelations by proposing to the Central Committee to transfer the case for further investigation by the Bureau of Foreign Relations. (Trotsky demanded that the 2nd International take up the whole matter, but this proposal was not accepted.) In addition, the Caucasian Allied Committee of the RSDLP also took up the study and investigation of the "expropriation" case in Tiflis. Having established that the "expropriation" was carried out, in violation of the decisions of the 1st and 2nd congresses, Koba and Kamo, the Caucasian Committee decided to expel them from the party, like all its other participants - the Social Democrats. The names were not given publicly so as not to give them out to the police (V. S. Zoyourshe, *ibid.*, pp. 99-100).

Already in Soviet Russia, in his Rabochaya Gazeta of March 18, 1918, Martov reminded Lenin that his government included "a certain citizen Stalin", well known for his participation in all sorts of dubious enterprises and expelled from the party for the Tiflis "expropriation" (TG. TgofzKku, *op. cit.*, p. 101). Soon the "Bureau of Foreign Relations" of the Central Committee "mothballed" its investigation, since the main executor of the Tiflis "expropriation" Kamo was arrested by the Berlin police on the denunciation of the prominent Bolshevik Zhitomirsky, who turned out to be an agent of the Russian police. Since the Kamo case could not only lead to the disclosure of the entire Caucasian network of "exes", but also have catastrophic political and criminal consequences for the entire Bolshevik leadership of the Central Committee, Krasin, through the German lawyer Kamo, suggested that Kamo play the role of a mentally ill person.

Kamo played this role so brilliantly that he surpassed the really mentally ill not only in terms of the symptoms of the disease itself, but also in the natural manifestation of its manifestation in actions. He stamps his feet, screams, sobs, rages, tears his clothes, refuses food, beats the guards, hits the wall... They put him in an ice chamber, but this does not make any impression on him. He is transferred to a special department of the hospital, where for four months he is subjected to various tests from subtle scientific to severe physical ones, but he does not give up. He again refuses food, then he is force-fed in a not very subtle way - during such feeding, several of his teeth are broken. He rages on, tears his hair, beats against the wall, and suddenly there is deathly silence: the surprised guards rush into the cell - they find him hanged, right in his death throes they remove him from the window bars and bring him to his senses. New "tests", new torments. He is not allowed to live, but he is not allowed to die either. He tries for the last time to "outsmart" both life and the German "psychoanalysts": with a pointed

with a piece of bone, he cuts his vein, and he is found unconscious in a pool of blood. He is brought back in. He does not give up, but the doctors do. Then he is transferred to an insane asylum, where the tests continue further, but this time with the help of exclusively physical torture, which a really normal person will never endure. To make sure that Kamo does not feign insensitivity, needles are stabbed under his nails, his body is burned with a red-hot iron - he endures all this stoically,

without any external reaction, as if he himself was made of iron.

The learned authorities of German medicine have testified that Kamo is not feigning, but a hopeless lunatic. It was then, at the end of 1909, that the German government handed him over to the Russian government, which sent him to the Tiflis prison (Metekhi Castle) to the scene of the crime. New trials began, new tortures, more cruel and less ceremonial than those of the German pedants. Certainly not methods so cruel that one could die from them, but, as Souvarine puts it, quite sufficient to "make a healthy person crazy." However, Kamo does not give up this time either. However, he is brought before a military court in Tiflis. At court hearings, he sits completely indifferently and calmly feeds a bird that he tamed in his cell with crumbs of bread. He convinced the court that it was as pointless to judge him as it was pointless to judge the bird he was feeding. The trial is canceled and he is transferred to the hospital, to the mental ward to continue the trial.

In August 1911, with the help of Kote Tsintsadze, a member of the "ex" group, he prepares an escape. Escape from the Metekhi castle was considered an absolutely hopeless affair. Kamo decided to prove the opposite. He sawed his shackles and window bars, climbed down a hastily woven thin rope into the Kura River, but the rope broke and Kamo fell onto a rock with such force that he lost consciousness. However, the long-term "hardening" of the "madman" had an effect, he quickly came to his senses, outwitting the chase, fled to Batum, and there he made his way to one of the steamers, climbed into the hold and "hare" sailed abroad. A week or two later he was Lenin's guest in Paris. Lenin fed him, changed clothes, instructed him and sent him to the Balkans to carry out a new task - to transport weapons from there to the Caucasus for new "expropriations". He is arrested in Constantinople, but due to the guarantee of the Georgian monks, he is released. Kamo moves to Sofia, but even there he was "caught", was arrested, but thanks to the help of the famous Bulgarian revolutionary and friend of Lenin Blagoev, he manages to escape. During the next "operation", the Turks detain him again on a small ship, all the luggage of which consisted of bombs of various calibers. But he again got out or paid off and moved to Greece. When the party fund began to empty, Lenin recalled Kamo from the Balkans and sent him to the Caucasus to organize a new "expropriation". Kamo safely arrives in Tiflis, gathers the old gang for a new business. IN

In September 1912, Kamo and his gang make a bold new attack on the money post office on the Kojar highway. The mail was accompanied by almost a whole squadron of Cossacks, a heated battle ensued, as a result of which seven Cossacks were killed, almost the entire gang was killed, and its leader Kamo, although he remained unharmed, again ended up in the same Metekhi castle. The military court sentenced him to death four times. He writes a note to his cellmate and colleague K. Tsintsadze that he will meet death absolutely calmly... "A few arshins of grass should have grown on my grave for a long time. No one can escape death, but I will try again my happiness. Try to organize by any means

the escape. Perhaps we will be able to laugh once more at our enemies. Act according to your own understanding. I'm ready for anything." (V. S. Zopuagte, *ibid.*, p. 103). The escape did not take place. But, as Souvarine notes, the authorities had a hidden sympathy for Kamo for his criminal exploits, unparalleled in courage, audacity and cunning, and therefore deliberately delayed the execution of the formalities associated with the execution of Kamo. It expected a general amnesty in connection with the forthcoming 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty in a year, in order to bring Kamo under this amnesty. That happened. Kamo was amnestied the following year, 1913, by commuting the death penalty to twenty years in a hard labor prison, from which he was released by the 1917 revolution.

But where was Koba during the last "expropriation"? Did he participate in its preparation? Koba, who had escaped from another exile, was free, made trips between St. Petersburg and Tiflis, kept close contact with his student Kamo. It would therefore be difficult to admit that a new "expropriation" took place without his knowledge. True, still little known in the party, but highly appreciated by Lenin for carrying out the Tiflis "expropriation", Koba was co-opted a member of the Central Committee in January 1912, recalled from the Caucasus and transferred to work in St. Petersburg, where he began his all-Russian career around the created in May 1912 of the legal newspaper Pravda. Therefore, there is reason to believe that the September "expropriation" of 1912 was carried out by Kamo without the direct supervision of Koba, which probably explains its failure.

Let's return to the biography of Stalin after the Tiflis robbery. Expelled from the party in Tiflis, where the Mensheviks predominated, Koba decided to make his way to Baku. He quickly came into contact with Baku

party committee, in which the Bolsheviks had much more influence than in Tiflis. Koba did not come here without a claim to a leading position in the local committee, but the "ex" and half-educated seminarian Koba found here the strongest competitor for leadership - this is the former student of the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Berlin, Armenian Stepan Shaumyan. (Ordzhonikidze: "Shaumyan is the heavy artillery of theoretical Marxism.") Therefore, from the very first days, an open struggle for leadership broke out between Koba and Shaumyan, in the midst of which Shaumyan was arrested. People who know Koba's character suspected him of denouncing Shaumyan to the police in order to remove a competitor. Talk in party circles about this became so widespread that one Georgian newspaper dared to openly accuse Koba of a denunciation (the newspaper Brozolis Kha), and the Baku Committee of the RSDLP even opened a case against Koba. When Koba himself was also arrested in March 1908, the case against him was dropped (V. S. Zoyourshe, *ibid.*, p. NO). There are very interesting memories of Koba's cellmate in the Bayil prison in Baku, Semyon Vereshchak, about Koba-Stalin's stay in prison. They were published in Kerensky's newspaper Dni on January 22 and 24, 1928, in Paris.

Since the Bolsheviks declare "slander" everything that the emigration writes about them, it would be possible not to quote Vereshchak's memoirs, but the fact is that on December 20, 1929, the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda itself published an article about Vereshchak's memoirs, as about the memoirs of the right divas. . Pravda's article in these memoirs is called just that: "True with the Genuine." True, the newspaper cites only those passages from Vereshchak's memoirs that appeal to it very much, but ignores passages that seemed very interesting to us. Let's take both of them. Here are the passages reprinted in Pravda:



"I was still very young when, in 1908, the Baku gendarme department put me in the Bailyov prison ... The prison, designed for 400 people, contained 1,500 people ... Once a newcomer appeared in the Bolshevik cell. And when I asked who this comrade was, they mysteriously told me: 'This is Koba...' Koba, under the surname Soso Dzhughashvili, as a member of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks), was admitted to the prison. - A. A.) Koba also stood out as a Marxist. In a blue satin shirt, with an open collar, without a belt or headress, with a hood thrown over his shoulder, always with a book ...

Koba did not take part in disputes and debates and always called everyone to an "organized discussion." These "organized discussions" were permanent. The agrarian question, tactics, philosophy alternated almost daily. Especially the agrarian question caused heated debates, sometimes reaching hand-to-hand fights. I will never forget one of Koba's "agrarian discussions" when his colleague Sergo Ordzhonikidze, defending Koba's position (as we have already seen, at the 1906 TU congress Koba was and remained "divided" and opposed both Lenin's "nationalization" and against Plekhanov's "municipalization" - A.A.), in conclusion he grabbed the Socialist-Revolutionary co-rapporteur Ilya Kartsevadze by the physiognomy, for which he was severely beaten by the Socialist-Revolutionaries ... Marxism was his element, in it he was invincible. There was no such force that would knock him out of his once occupied position. Under any phenomenon, he knew how to bring the appropriate formula of Marx. On young party members unenlightened in politics, such a person made a strong impression. In general, in Transcaucasia, Koba was known as the second Lenin. Hence his very special hatred of Menshevism (probably for the position of the Mensheviks in relation to the "exes." - A. A.) ... He always actively supported the instigators. This made him a good comrade in the eyes of the prison public. When in 1909, on the first day of Easter, the 1st company of the Salyan regiment passed through the ranks, beating, the entire political corps (prisons), Koba walked without bending his head, under blows from rifle butts, with a book in his hands "(soon in verse Soviet poets, this book turned into "Capital" by Karl Marx. - A. A ..).

Pravda liked this place so much that Demyan Bedny, a member of its editorial board, even wrote an enthusiastic ode:

"Is Stalin's passage not a plot for a heroic picture. I appeal to the writers - you do not have heroic themes? Nate!! .... But the Bolshevik lads are modest ... A strict Bolshevik doesn't gu-gu about himself, but we won't shush the enemy for telling the truth by accident "( " Pravda ", 20. 12. 1929 , D. Poor "It is true with the genuine", but the article was written on February 7, 1928).

However, even in the passages she cited, Pravda makes serious omissions that completely distort Vereshchak's portrait of Kob. Let's restore these places in the retelling. Vereshchak sat with Koba for eight months, enough time to study the character of a man who sharply and accurately manifests itself just in prison

environment. All revolutionaries remembered that when in 1899 Stalin was expelled from the Tiflis Theological Seminary for participating in an underground Marxist circle, he dragged all the other members of the circle with him, denouncing them to the seminary administration. Vereshchak writes that when the indignant seminarians began to shame Stalin for the denunciation, Stalin justified his action with the following argument: having lost the right to be priests, the seminarians would become "good revolutionaries." IN

In prison, there was an unwritten law of revolutionaries not to communicate with criminals, but Koba could always be seen in the company of murderers, robbers, blackmailers. He was impressed only by the people of the "business" that required dexterity. His rudeness in arguments and unpresentable personality made him an unsympathetic debater. His speeches lacked wit, they were dry, but his rote memory was amazing. His lack of principles and natural cunning made him a master of tactics. Against enemies, "all means are good," he said. It happened that when the whole prison began to get nervous on the night of the execution of the next death sentences in the courtyard of the prison, Koba slept peacefully or studied Esperanto, which, in his opinion, would be the future language of the International: He never protested against the unjust practices in the prison, did not incite to rebellion, but supported the instigators. Why Koba remained unknown in the Party for so long is explained by his ability to "secretly incite others while himself remaining on the sidelines." Koba managed to demonstrate this ability in prison as well. Vereshchak gives some examples. Once, a young Georgian was beaten half to death on charges that he was an "agent provocateur." No one knew anything about him or about the reasons for the charges against him. Then it turned out that this "case" was fabricated by Koba. On another occasion, the Bolshevik Mitka G. killed a young worker on charges of espionage. For a long time, this matter remained unresolved. In all revolutionary parties, there was a rule that spies could only be killed by the decision of a group or a court of honor, and not by the order of one person. Subsequently, Mitka confessed his mistake - he killed this worker at the instigation of Kob. Vereshchak reports that in many cases in the wild - in the well-known robberies of state money ("expropriations"), in the fabrication of counterfeit money - Kob's hand was always felt, and now he was in prison along with these robbers ("exes") and

counterfeiters, but the investigating authorities could not find a thread to him. And this is not surprising: Koba was not only a skilled conspirator, but his very caution was "active" caution. This is clear from Vereshchak's remark: while directing terror and "expropriations" himself, Koba loudly accused the Socialist-Revolutionaries of both!

Analyzing the career history of the early Koba, Souvarine finds that even then the following, striking features predominated in Stalin's character: 1. "will to power"; 2. narrow realism; 3. vulgar Marxism, perceived by Stalin as a catechism of elementary formulas; 4. Eastern dexterity in intrigue; 5. bad faith; 6. lack of sensitivity in personal relationships; 7. contempt for people and for human life (V. S. Bopuagshe, *ibid.*, p. 115).

Nevertheless, Souvarine, like Trotsky, thinks that Stalin of that period was a "professional revolutionary", while from the very beginning of his appearance on the Caucasian arena he was a person in whom the "professional revolutionary" organically coexisted as a professional "ex" bandit and an insensitive assassin-terrorist. As such, Stalin was the founder of the criminal trend in Bolshevism itself.

Although Lenin must be considered the spiritual father of the "exes", as we have already seen, he granted the "exes" partisans wide "autonomy". He wrote in the article "Guerrilla War" already cited by us:

"We have not the slightest pretension to impose on the practitioners any contrived form of struggle, or even to

decide from the cabinet on the role of various forms of guerrilla warfare" (Lenin, *Sobr. soch.*, vol. X, p. 88).

It was not the "forms of struggle" that mattered to Lenin, but the money that Koba and Kamo delivered to him for the cause of the revolution, Lenin will do exactly the same in the future, when millions of money will already flow to him for the same purpose without any robbery: German money. However, Lenin did not commit himself to the Germans in anything, except for what he did without them - the organization of the revolution in Russia, but he was obliged to Koba and Kamo for the maintenance of his headquarters and his publications in the most difficult years in the life of the party - 1905-1912 .

Lenin bore full political and moral responsibility for the Caucasian "exes", which he publicly declared. He was personally responsible for all actions - criminal and terrorist - of Koba and

Kamo in that blessing them for "feats", provided them with "autonomy". But Lenin's greatest responsibility before history and before his own party lies not so much in the fact that he got money through bandits, but in the fact that he introduced the supreme "ex" for these armed robberies to the legislative body of the party - to the Central Committee . The provocateur Malinovsky, who sat next to Stalin in the Central Committee of 1912, sent only a dozen Bolsheviks into free exile, and the "ex" Stalin subsequently killed the entire party of Lenin and, using the methods of the "ex", turned Soviet Russia into a country of permanent inquisition. The seeds of the degeneration of Lenin's political Bolshevism into Stalin's criminal Bolshevism after Lenin's death were sown by Lenin himself precisely during the years of "expropriation".

After the arrest of Kamo and the transfer of Kob to "shares" in St. Petersburg, the Caucasian "expropriations" ceased. Lenin began to look for other "forms" for making money. (In the twenties, one of the old Bolsheviks told the following story in the press: a certain member of the Bolshevik Party lived with a very rich Moscow merchant's wife, and this merchant's wife regularly contributed significant amounts of donations to the party's cash desk, but the "groom" on some trifling occasion quarreled with the merchant, left her and the donations stopped. When Lenin suggested that he return to the merchant's wife, the "groom" became stubborn, referring to moral considerations and asking Lenin if he himself would agree to raise money for the party in this way? But the imperturbable Lenin answered:

"I personally definitely couldn't, but you can, so kindly go back to her." I cite this story from memory, not having at hand the magazine, it seems, the Red Archive, in which it was published, but I vouch for the meaning of the story of the old Bolshevik.)

Even the liberal Russian bourgeoisie began to help the Bolsheviks, ranging from the well-known manufacturer Morozov to the little-known manufacturers V. A. Tikhomirnov (subsidized the publication of Pravda) and N. P. Schmidt (the latter bequeathed to the Bolshevik party about 280 thousand rubles, which the Bolsheviks received through his sisters - see E. Yaroslavsky, *op. cit.*, p. 195). The writer Maxim Gorky also made many contributions to the party's cash desk from his fee, he also made a big tour of America and gave the entire amount of money collected to the party. Since even "professional revolutionaries" in Russia received very small salaries from the Central Committee (according to

according to Yaroslavsky - 3, 5, 10, a maximum of 25-30 rubles a month), then the main part of the party's funds went to the maintenance of the Central Committee and its press organs for

border and within the country.

After the arrest and conviction of Kamo, Lenin lost all contact with the surviving "ex" in the Caucasus, but Koba met with Lenin two more times before the revolution. Both times the meetings took place during the meetings of the Central Committee in Krakow in November and December 1912. At the last meeting, Koba probably told Lenin that he wanted to change the profession of "ex" to "theorist", although on a very narrow, but very important issue for the future of Russia - on the "national question".

Be that as it may, but Koba really moves away from any kind of actions associated with "expropriations" and even refuses his nickname "Koba", under which he made his entire career up to membership in the Central Committee. Stalin had many revolutionary nicknames: "David", "Nizheradze", "Chizhikov", "Ivanovich", "Koba" and others. He also had many literary pseudonyms when he wrote in Georgian. His first pseudonym sounds almost symbolic "Besoshvili" (in Russian - "Besov"! ). The most frequent pseudonym is still "Koba", then "Kato". Since 1909, when he began to write in Russian, he intensely busy looking for an original, but Russian pseudonym. Already one listing of his alternating pseudonyms shows how difficult it was to find a pseudonym that met his "will to power": his articles of the end of 1909 are signed - "K. Stefin. His article in the newspaper "Zvezda" was signed on April 15, 1912: "K. Salin". Three days later, in the same newspaper, he signed as "K. Solin". a new and last pseudonym under the large correspondence "Elections in St. Petersburg": "K. Stalin" (see Stalin, "Works", vol. 2).

The desire of Koba, not yet Stalin, to become a theorist on the national question, apparently, Lenin approves: he instructs him to write the corresponding work, even gives him Bukharin as an assistant to select and translate quotations from the works on the national question of the Austro-Marxists (Karl Renner, Otto Bauer ). Stalin moves from Krakow to Vienna and sits down for his first serious literary work, The National Question and Social Democracy. About this in February 1913, Lenin wrote to M. Gorky:

"One wonderful Georgian has settled down with us and writes a large article for Enlightenment (a legal Bolshevik magazine in St. Petersburg. - A. A.),

having collected all the Austrian and other materials" (Stalin, *ibid.*, p. 403).

When the editors of the journal wanted to publish the article as a discussion article, Lenin objected:

"We are absolutely against it. The article is very good... We will not give up one iota of our principled position against the Bundist bastards" (*ibid.*, p. 403).

The article was published in three issues of Enlightenment signed by K. Stalin." Koba became Stalin. He proved to Lenin that he was not only an "ex", but also a "theorist". However, for Lenin, he still remained the "ex" of "Koba". When, on his return to St. Petersburg at the end of February 1913, Stalin was arrested, Lenin wrote: "We have serious arrests. Koba is taken..." (*ibid.*).

In conclusion, let us point out the fate of Stalin's disciple Kamo. As indicated, released by the February Revolution from the Kharkov hard labor prison, Kamo participates in the October Revolution and in the civil war. Recommending him to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Lenin

wrote that he knows Kamo personally "as a man of absolutely exceptional devotion, courage and energy" ("Leninsky collection", XXXU, 1945, p. 73). In another note to Sklyansky and Smilga, Lenin wrote that he knew Kamo "as a man of absolutely exceptional courage, especially with regard to explosions and bold raids" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 51, p. 42).

According to Lenin's commentator, "Kamo, with a group of militants, with weapons, ammunition and literature, was secretly sent from Moscow in the fall of 1919 for underground work in the Caucasus" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 54, p. 708).

Kamo was sent to organize explosions in independent Georgia recognized by Soviet Russia. The Soviet ambassador to Georgia - Sergei Kirov - in a report to Lenin in December 1919, disregarding the rules of secrecy and his position as "ambassador", openly wrote that Kamo still had not arrived at the place. Such frivolity of Kirov Lenin was so indignant ("diplomatic scandal!") that he gave an order to his secretary:

"It is necessary to send an encryption so that nowhere and never dare to use the nickname Kamo, but immediately replace it with a different, new one. The city where Kamo is called a cipher. Lenin" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 54, p. 421).

Meanwhile, Kamo arrived in Tiflis and, even less cautiously than Kirov, began to "blow up" Georgia. He was immediately arrested and in January 1920 expelled from Georgia. Kamo moved to Baku to continue the same

work against another independent Caucasian republic - Azerbaijan.

After the occupation of Georgia by the Red Army, Kamo began to serve in Tiflis in the People's Commissariat of Finance (after all, Kamo was a kind of "expert" in finance). Kamo continues to have a connection with Lenin during Lenin's illness. He asked for his personal protection during the alleged treatment of Lenin in the Caucasus, to which Lenin agreed, provided that the secretary of the Zakkraykom of the party, S. Ordzhonikidze, agreed with this (Lenin, *ibid.*, vol. 54, p. 230).

But soon Kamo brought disaster on himself, without suspecting it. Among Caucasians, heroism is not considered heroism if it is not in plain sight. In addition, aging people with a prosaic present begin to live in memories of a romantic past. The financial "expert" from Tiflis in every dukhan began to tell how he and the twice minister of Russia, now the all-powerful "general secretary" Koba, killed the "Black Hundreds", "expropriated the expropriators", what heroic fights there were, and most importantly, how he and Koba the stolen money was delivered to Lenin himself. He didn't just tell, but also showed documents, newspaper correspondence, letters ... According to the first biographer Kamo Bibineyshvili (he was shot by Beria), very soon some important emissary appeared in Tiflis, took all his archive from Kamo and departed back. Kamo heard nothing more about his archive or about this emissary. Quoting this passage from Bibineyshvili, Trotsky asks:

"Will it be a hasty conclusion to assume that Stalin, through one of his agents, seized certain evidence from Kamo, which for one reason or another he found disturbing" (T.. TgfzKu, op. pr., p. 109).

Yes, we will answer, this assumption is quite acceptable, but Trotsky's conclusion is erroneous: not because Stalin confiscated the Kamo archive, but because of this

The archive does not show the personal "heroic role" of Koba in the "exes", but vice versa, because it is too clearly visible and documented in them. Stalin was afraid that if the Kamo archive fell into the hands of enemies, the whole world would learn from it that a former professional bandit had become the general secretary of the Bolshevik Central Committee.

All Stalin's biographers complain that Stalin never acknowledged, although he did not deny, his participation in the "ex". These complaints are unfounded. Stalin recognized his leadership of all "expropriations" of Kamo by the fact that

declared him his personal disciple, as we have seen above. He just didn't advertise the "exes" as Kamo, because Kamo was sitting in a Tiflis dukhanchik and living with memories, while Stalin was sitting in the Kremlin and was no longer ruling the "exes", but a great state. It was the "state reason" that demanded that Kamo also shut up. And he fell silent. In the same year, 1922, in which the archive was confiscated from him, Kamo rode a bicycle along the streets of Tiflis. There was little traffic, because people still rode wagons, and in all of Tiflis at that time there were only four or five cars. But out of nowhere one of these cars ran into Kamo and crushed him to death. "Will this be a hasty conclusion" if we assume that the driver of this car was Stalin's agent?

## Chapter 6 2

### Bolshevik Central Committee

In December 1911, in Paris, Lenin convenes a meeting of foreign Bolshevik organizations, which makes two decisions: to recognize the ROK as the new center of the party and to help it create the Committee of Foreign Organizations (KZO). With the combined efforts of the foreign centers of the Bolsheviks and the ROC, the UT (Prague) All-Russian Party Conference was convened on January 18, 1912 in the presence of representatives from 20 party organizations.

All trends in the RSDLP, except for the "liquidators" ("Voice of the Social Democrat"), were invited, but they all refused to recognize the conference and participate in its work. The Bolshevik group Vperyod also refused to participate in the conference. The "Nationals" did not participate either. Gorky and Plekhanov, personally invited, refused to participate, but two Plekhanovites from Russia nevertheless participated. This gave reason to believe that the "bloc of Bolsheviks with the Mensheviks" that Lenin preached had formally been realized.

However, the representatives of Plekhanov's group at the conference (Zevin, Shvartsman) declared from the very beginning that they did not recognize the right of the conference to decide questions on behalf of the entire party (History of the CPSU, vol. 2, pp. 358-360).

The leaders of the ROK were very skeptical about all foreign groups of the party.

"Ordzhonikidze said that foreign groups are zeros" (ibid., p.

369). But such a formulation of the question directly hit Lenin. His group, after all, was also overseas. This became especially clear when the second head of the ROK, Spandaryan, spoke. He demanded the dissolution

foreign groups: "Let anyone who wants to work come to us in Russia," he declared (ibid., p. 369).

Lenin spoke out against such a demand by the leaders of the ROK. He defended the emigration, which "is connected with Russia by thousands of threads" (ibid., p. 370), and his assistant Semashko said bluntly: "By disbanding everything, you are killing the organization that was formed to help you, and at the same time time will not shut up either Martov or Pravda" (ibid., p. 370).

A new Central Committee of seven was elected (Lenin, Zinoviev, Goloshchekin, Ordzhonikidze, Spandaryan, Shvartsman and Malinovsky). The Central Committee was given the right to co-opt new members by a simple majority of votes. The election procedure was as follows: each delegate wrote down the names of candidates for the Central Committee and handed the note to Lenin. The results of the elections, for reasons of secrecy, were not announced at the conference. Only Lenin knew these results. After the conference, Lenin informed the elect ("History of the CPSU", p. 370),

In the new Central Committee, everyone was Bolshevik-Leninist, except for one - Shvartsman - a Menshevik party member.

Lenin and Plekhanov were elected representatives of the RSDLP to the International Socialist Bureau (Plekhanov did not recognize this decision). The conference elected the editors of the Central Organ - "Social Democrat" (Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev). After the conference, a plenum of the Central Committee was held, at which those Bolsheviks who were not elected at the conference (Belostotsky and Stalin) were co-opted as members of the Central Committee. Later, two more Bolsheviks (Petrovsky and Sverdlov) were co-opted to the Central Committee. In the event of the arrest of members of the Central Committee, five candidates were scheduled, all Bolsheviks (Bubnov, Kalinin, A.P. Smirnov, Stasov and Shaumyan).

To guide party work in Russia, the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee was created, which included Ordzhonikidze, Spandaryan, Goloshchekin, Stalin and Stasov - all Bolshevik-Leninists. The conference highly appreciated the work of the ROC:

"The Conference considers it its duty to note the tremendous importance of the work carried out by the Russian Organizing Commission to unite all Russian Party organizations without distinction of factions and

to recreate our party as an all-Russian organization. The activities of the ROC, in which the Bolsheviks and the Menshevik Party members worked together, are all the more commendable because the ROC had to work under unheard-of difficult police conditions" (ibid., pp. 268-269).

Lenin triumphed with good reason. In a letter to M. Gorky, he wrote about the results of the Prague Conference: "Finally, despite the liquidationist bastards, it was possible to revive the party and its Central Committee" (Lenin, *Sobr. soch.*, vol. XXX, p. 19).

Stalin's "History of the CPSU (6). A Short Course" (1938) gives the Prague Conference the significance of almost the Constituent Congress of the Party. She says that at this conference a "new party" was created (p. 134), or even "from a political group the Bolsheviks are being formed into an independent Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks). The Prague Conference marked the beginning of a new type of party, the party of Leninism, the Bolshevik party" ("History of the CPSU (6).

Short Course, p. 139). Since Stalin was co-opted to the Central Committee for the first time after this conference, it is quite understandable that Stalin's desire to see the party exist only from this conference (the Stalinist falsification in the named work is also curious in this connection - Stalin is indicated as elected to the Central Committee at the conference itself, while he was co-opted after the conference, and the elected members of the Central Committee Zinoviev, Goloshchekin, Shvartsman, Malinovsky are not listed at all) (ibid., p. 137).

The ten-year work of Lenin and his supporters to transform the Social Democratic Party into the Bolshevik Party and to seize power over this party ended in complete triumph. From now on, a Central Committee was created which, in the hands of Lenin, turned out to be the "core of professional revolutionaries" on the path to power already in Russia itself.

While the Menshevik leaders were endlessly debating at meetings abroad and in the emigre press about the unity of the party, Lenin and his disciples also seized power over their organization in Russia. Again, this was easy to do under the banner of a united, living and active party. Lenin did just that.

The historical significance of the Prague Conference for Bolshevism lay precisely in the fact that only now, in 1912, was the task of creating an "organization of professional

revolutionaries", which Lenin put in his book "What is to be done?" in 1902. Lenin finally created a Central Committee that consisted of pure-blooded Leninists. There was not a single "conciliator" in the new Central Committee, to say nothing of the Mensheviks. The only Menshevik-Plekhanovite was included in the Central Committee as an exception in order to lure Plekhanov to him. When these calculations did not come true, this Plekhanovite also disappeared.

On the same principle as the Central Committee, Lenin began to restructure the entire hierarchy of party committees in Russia. And at the same time, Lenin was guided by the slogan, which he later formulated in the words: "Better less, but better"! Better a small but disciplined, schooled, silent, sacrificial army of performers than a free-thinking, critical, reasoning mass party.

Sacrifice to the point of self-forgetfulness, devotion to the leader to the point of fanaticism, efficiency and diligence, cohesion and discipline, and, of course, vigilance to the point of scrupulousness - these are the qualities that, according to Lenin, the members of that cohort that was the Bolshevik Central Committee should have possessed.

The only random person in this Central Committee is Roman Malinovsky, a member of the PU of the Duma, and he turned out to be not only a tool of the Russian secret police, but - no less - a tool of Lenin. Whether he was a double agent with the knowledge of Lenin is still a mystery. In any case, Malinovsky's fiery Bolshevik speeches in the Duma, composed or edited by Lenin, ultimately harmed the police themselves. That is why the Police Department itself exposed its agent, informing Rodzianko, Chairman of the Duma PU, about his role. When Rodzianko suggested that Malinovsky get out of the Duma, Malinovsky fled abroad ... to Lenin! Lenin did not want to part with Malinovsky for a long time, despite the exposure of his role in the liberal (Burtsev) and Menshevik press (Martov and Dan), he was verbally exposed even by the Bolsheviks: Bukharin, Troyanovsky, E. Rozmirovich. In addition to all this, Lenin knew that before joining the Bolshevik Party, the biography of Malinovsky



it was "full of abominations" (See B. O. Moe, Tagee Jo Maae a Kewoynop, Mneem Work, Twa Pla! Pres\$, 1960, pp. 554-5).

Lenin also wrote articles in defense of Malinovsky (zh. "Prosveshchenie"). Leads to reflection and the further fate of Malinovsky. Having been captured by the Germans during the First World War, Malinovsky led among the Russians

prisoners of war passionate Bolshevik agitation and regularly received food and clothing parcels from Lenin's wife, secretary of the Central Committee, N. Krupskaya from Switzerland through the Red Cross. It must be assumed that Krupskaya did this not without the knowledge of her husband.

Speaking after the February Revolution of 1917 (and after the final exposure of Malinovsky by publishing the archive of the secret police - the Okhrana - at a meeting of the Extraordinary Commission of the Provisional Government, Lenin justified his defense of Malinovsky by the fact that Malinovsky helped him and the Central Committee more (working in Pravda and the Duma) than Okhrana.

The end of Malinovsky was also strange. Exactly one year after the Bolsheviks seized power - in November 1918 - he returned from abroad and directly appeared in Smolny, in Petrograd, demanding either a meeting with Lenin or arrest. Lenin preferred arrest, and then after three days of deliberation. Then he was judged. "During interrogations, Malinovsky was proud and defiant. Repeatedly he demanded that Lenin be summoned to court, but this request was refused" (VOshe, ibid., p. 555). One gets the impression that Lenin acted wisely. The court was closed. Malinovsky was shot.

After the Prague Conference, it finally became clear even to the most direct participants that the RSDLP was not one, but two parties, and that these two parties were not twins, but antipodes.

The deepest difference between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks was not in their declarative ultimate goal (socialism), but in what, firstly, is the "socialism" that they want to build, and secondly, what tools and methods should be used in its construction. The decisive superiority of the Bolsheviks over the Mensheviks also consisted in their having an integral, consistent, dynamic concept of achieving the set goal - the seizure of power as the main tool for building "socialism". The Bolsheviks called this concept Leninism. The Mensheviks did not have a single concept, they had as many concepts on this subject as they had leaders, but if you bring them all to the same denominator, it turned out that the RSDLP could not take power in Russia, since, according to Marxism, Russia must, after the overthrow of tsarism, go through a long period of development of capitalism and bourgeois democracy. For such a view, Lenin called them the dogmatists of Marxism. On February 28 (March 12), 1912, a meeting of all non-Leninist trends met in Paris

RSDLP dedicated to the Prague Conference of the Bolsheviks. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Voice of the Social Democrat, the Plekhanov group, the Vperyod group, the Bolshevik conciliators, the Trotsky group, and the Bund. The meeting accused the organizers of the Prague Conference of "a coup in the party and the usurpation of power." It called on local organizations to disobey the decisions of the conference. The Conference sent a protest against the Prague Conference to the International Socialist Bureau. A large article against the conference also appeared in the German Social-Democrats. newspaper "Vogmgag \$" (March 26, 1912) ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, pp. 370-377).

Trotsky thought that both the Mensheviks, with their disregard for the illegal party, and the Bolsheviks, who were usurping the rights belonging to the entire party, were to blame for the deepening split in the party. (See "Twe Sottipp15+ Rapu oESHE 5oteE lptop", Bu Geopaga Zsvarlgo, Mem Wotk, p. 126).

From August 25 to September 2, 1912, the "Conference of the Social-Democrats" took place in Vienna. organizations" (there were 18 delegates with a decisive vote, 16 delegates with an advisory vote). This conference was convened by Trotsky's group representing all Social-Democrats. currents dissatisfied with the Leninist coup. It was attended by a Bolshevik delegate from Moscow, who turned out to be a police agent, and the Bolshevik group Vperyod was also present. When Martov called the Leninists "political charlatans" at the conference, this caused a whole incident that was settled with difficulty (Spiridovich, op. cit., p. 242). This shows how, invisibly, the spirit of Lenin soared even over the conference of his opponents. The conference elected an "Organizing Committee" as a counterbalance to the Leninist Central Committee.

The years 1912-1913 pass under the sign of the creation of illegal Bolshevik party cells in factories and factories, the creation of illegal regional party centers, the establishment of a system of "trusted persons", and the strengthening of ties between them and the Central Committee. This was a purely illegal line in the work of the Central Committee. However, in accordance with Lenin's doctrine of combining illegal work with legal work, that is, with work in legal organizations, the Central Committee also activates the second line of the Central Committee to create and strengthen legal party bodies. Such was the work of the Central Committee in participating in the elections [At the Duma and in creating in Russia a legal Bolshevik daily newspaper Pravda (May 5, 1912) with a name borrowed from Trotsky (even before it from December 1910

the weekly newspaper Zvezda was published, where the Bolsheviks and the Menshevik Party members collaborated; until 1914, the legal organ of the Central Committee "Enlightenment" was also published).

The editors of Pravda included Bolsheviks Olminsky, Poletaev, Kamenev, Stalin, and Sverdlov. Molotov was the secretary (a wealthy student, a friend of Molotov, V. A. Tikhomirnov, who, together with Molotov, participated in an underground Bolshevik circle in Kazan, gave money for the organization of the newspaper).

The role of Pravda as a legal body was great. The Stalinist history of the party says: "The role of Pravda was exceptionally great. Pravda won over the broad masses of the working class to the side of Bolshevism (circulation 40,000 copies)... A legal newspaper could not directly call for the overthrow of tsarism. I had to write in hints"... When, for example, Pravda wrote about "complete and uncurtailed demands of the fifth year," the workers understood that "we are talking about the revolutionary slogans of the Bolsheviks - about the slogans for the overthrow of tsarism, for a democratic republic, for confiscation of landlords' land, for an 8-hour working day" ("History of the CPSU (6). Short course", pp. 144-145).

That the Bolsheviks knew how to be "legalists", "liquidators", "opportunists" when it was necessary in the interests of the cause, is shown by a letter to the editors of Pravda from Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev in November 1913. In it, they reprimand the newspaper for its excessive leftism, revolutionaryism and demand to lower the tone. The letter says:

"It is necessary at all costs to lower the tone fivefold, to become more legal, more humble. This can and should ... and appoint your own censorship. For God's sake, do it, otherwise you're ruining the cause in vain. (Lenin, PSS, vol. 48, pp. 217-218).

In January 1913, the first meeting of the Central Committee was held in Krakow, dedicated to combining legal work with illegal work (by this time, in order to be closer to Russia, Lenin had moved from Paris to Galicia). Accordingly, both members of the Central Committee and legal workers of the party, including deputies of the TU Duma, took part in the meeting. It was attended by Lenin, Krupskaya, Zinoviev, Stalin, Troyanovsky, Medvedev, V. Lobova, E. Rozmirovich, deputies of the TU Duma Malinovsky, Badaev and Petrovsky (in the PU Duma there was a social-democratic faction of 13 people - the so-called Bolshevik "Six" and the Menshevik "Seven").

For conspiratorial reasons, the January meeting of the Central Committee was

named "February". The "Notice" on behalf of the meeting stated:

"In February of this year, a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP with party workers was held. Members of the illegal party organizations of St. Petersburg, the Moscow region, the South, the Urals and the Caucasus were attracted to the conference... Almost all the participants in the conference took an outstanding part in various kinds of legal workers' societies and the so-called "legal opportunities". Thus, the composition of the meeting provided a correct picture of all Party work in all the main regions of Russia" ("CPSU in Resolutions", Part 1, p. 288).

In the name of which the Bolsheviks joined legal organizations, the meeting gave a completely unambiguous answer:

"Continuing its steady, persistent, systematic work to use all and sundry 'legal opportunities', from the rostrum of the Black Duma to any society of sobriety, the RSDLP does not forget for a minute that the high rank of party member is worthy only of those who work among the masses really leads in the spirit of party decisions, thought out and adopted from the point of view of the growing revolution ... Not to go with the current of legalism, but to use everything legal for the gradual grouping of all living things around an illegal party - our business ... Not empty phrases about "unity" in of the legal press... but the mere union in the localities, the actual merging into a single illegal organization of all the workers who are members of the RSDLP—this alone decides the question of unity" (ibid., pp. 289-290).

So Lenin created the illegal party as a hierarchical conspiratorial organization with a general staff headed by the Central Committee, which in its military operations relies on all sorts of legal institutions from the Duma faction of the Social-Democrats. to the sobriety society. Not only the "liquidators", but also the Menshevik Party members proved incapable of such work.

The resolution of the meeting states:

"The new revolution, the beginning of which we are experiencing, is the inevitable result of the bankruptcy of the June 3 policy of tsarism." The conference consciously places emphasis on illegal work, to which all legal actions must be subordinated: "The only correct type of organizational construction in the epoch we are passing through is: an illegal party, as the sum of party cells surrounded by a network of

legal and semi-legal workers' societies" (pp. 292-293).

Therefore, the main goal, contrary to the Menshevik liquidators, is the further building of an illegal party. The resolution on this issue states:

"The main immediate task is the creation in all factories and plants of purely party illegal committees ... the creation of one leading organization in each center from scattered local groups ... In order to establish close ties between local organizations and the Central Committee, as well as to direct and unification of party work. The Conference considers it urgently necessary to organize regional centers in the main areas of the working-class movement" ("CPSU in Res.," part 1, pp. 293-294).

In the resolution on the work of the Duma Social-Democrat. faction, it was said that "the Duma Social-Democrats. the faction is an organ subordinate to the party in the person of its central institutions" and that over its work "the control of the party is necessary" (ibid., p. 295).

The second meeting of the Central Committee was held in Poronin (near Krakow) on September 23 - October 1 (October 6-14), 1913 (for conspiratorial reasons, the meeting was called "August"). It was attended by Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, five members of the State Duma, ten delegates from Russian organizations and five Polish social democrats (including Ganetsky-Fürstenberg). Lenin presided, and Malinovsky was his deputy. The meeting lasted nine days. Of the 18 meetings, 5 were devoted to local reports and the report of the Central Committee. According to an official notice, questions were considered on the strike movement, on work in legal societies, on the party press and on the tasks of agitation, on the work of the Social-Democrats in the Duma, and on the Duma Social-Democrats. factions, about the populists (Socialist-Revolutionaries), the national question, the question of the party congress, which was scheduled for the summer of 1914.

All these questions were examined from the point of view of the inevitability of the beginning of a new revolution in the near future ("CPSU in Res.," Part 1, p. 302). Once again, the focus of the meeting was on the need to combine illegal work with legal work. The meeting recommended, and the Central Committee approved, that it is necessary to expand the network of "trusted persons" of the Central Committee (agents of the Central Committee) in the localities. In addition to the members of the Central Committee, 14 agents of the Central Committee were already working in Russia (History of the CPSU, vol. 2, p. 413). About these trusted agents of the Central Committee, the resolution says:

"The conference recognizes that a system of proxies attached to the Central Committee is absolutely necessary for unifying all-Russian work... To ensure that proxies are nominated at least in every major center of the labor movement and in the largest possible number" ("CPSU in Res.," Part 1, 310). Regarding the legal cells of the Party, it is said that it is necessary to intensify work in all legal workers' societies (trade unions, clubs, hospital insurance funds, cooperatives, etc.) and gradually bring them under the influence of the Party, "so that each of these institutions is a stronghold of the Party", and that it is necessary to "seek the election of supporters of the Party to all responsible posts" (ibid., p. 314).

The meeting noted that the small non-Russian peoples of Russia would play an important role in the forthcoming revolution. We must enlist their support in favor of the party. To this end, the meeting recommended, and the Central Committee approved as

the main slogan on the national question is the following proposition: recognition of "the right of the nations oppressed by the tsarist monarchy to self-determination, that is, to secession and the formation of an independent state" (ibid., pp. 315-316). Immediately, the Central Committee made a reservation nullifying the just declared right of nations to self-determination, saying that the right should not be confused with "expediency" and that the party would decide the national question every time concretely, in the "interests of the proletariat's class struggle for socialism" (ibid.). ).

With these two meetings, Lenin proved that the party did not have two centers (the Central Committee and the OK), but only one organ leading and practically operating in Russia - the Bolshevik Central Committee.

Power is the focal point of all the political passions of Bolshevism. In the Central Committee, Lenin discovered a weapon for achieving state power. The Central Committee seemed to feel the proximity of achieving this power when it wrote down the following truly prophetic words in the "Notification" of the Poronin Conference:

"The question of a new revolution dominates the entire political life of the country... The path has been marked. The Party has found the basic forms of work in the present period of transition... The most difficult time is behind us, comrades. New times are coming. Events of the greatest importance are approaching that will decide the fate of our country" ("CPSU in Res.", Part 1, pp. 302-308).

The Bureau of the Socialist International continued to take steps to reconcile the warring currents of the RSDLP (in connection with the campaign

elections to the [State Duma, then on the initiative of a member of the Bureau R. Luxembourg). A special meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International was held on December 14, 1913, at which futile attempts were made to reconcile the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.

The last such attempt took place on June 20, 1914 in Brussels. The leaders of the P International, Kautsky, Vandervelde, Huysmans, R. Luxemburg, convened a general meeting on this question. The meeting was attended by delegations of the Central Committee headed by Lenin, representatives of the Bund, Polish Social-Democrats, Latvian Social-Democratic editorial offices of Pravda and Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta, representatives from the Six and Seven, personally present Trotsky, Plekhanov, Aleksinsky.

In response to the proposal to unite, Lenin declared that, in fact, there was no one to unite with; 4/5 of the entire party stood behind his Central Committee. Lenin ended his speech with an ultimatum:

"Recognize the Central Committee of the RSDLP as the only leading center and destroy the Menshevik center of the OK" ("To the day of the 50th anniversary of V. I. Ulyanov (Lenin)", Moscow, 1920, p. 29).

Lenin's speech was met with harsh criticism by his opponents. Plekhanov even declared that Lenin did not want unification because he did not want to let go of party money, some of which, Plekhanov said, he seized "thieves' way" (for this expression, Plekhanov was stopped and deprived of the floor) (Spiridovich, cit. pr. ., p. 261).

What was the outcome? "Unification" with the Bolshevik-Leninists was not achieved. The meeting participants left. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin and his Central Committee, continued to rule in the party, which ... was

in the majority actually Bolshevik. For the small cadres who survived (from arrests), for a strong headquarters with a group of inveterate, fanatical leaders who had a well-thought-out plan of action and ready-made directives, only money and troops were missing "(Spiridovich, op. pr., p. 262).

The troops were given by the First World War, and the money was given by the German General Staff. Lenin masterfully used both.

#### CHAPTER 7 VO R OF THE CC IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

In order to understand the policy of Bolshevism in such a fateful question for Russia as victory or defeat in the First World War, it is necessary to clearly imagine Lenin's "philosophy of power". Lenin looked at all the phenomena of life - national or international - from one single point of view: how much this phenomenon brings him closer or removes him from power. Whether it was a famine epidemic, an economic strike, a war between states, or even natural disasters such as floods or earthquakes, Lenin looked at each of these phenomena through the prism of power, namely: how to use a given phenomenon or disaster in the interests of gaining power. If there is a conflict between the interests of the existence of the nation and the interests of the struggle for power, Bolshevism prefers the interests of the struggle for power. The nation exists for power, because the nation is only the sum of individuals, and the individual is nothing. If power over a nation can be won only at the cost of a general national-state catastrophe (for example, defeat in a war), then such a path to power is not only permissible, but also the shortest and most reliable path.

In full agreement with this "philosophy of power" was the "Manifesto of the Central Committee of the RSDLP" on the war in November 1914, published in the Social Democrat of November 1, 1914. It said:

"... Both groups of belligerent countries are in no way inferior to one another in plunder, atrocities and endless cruelties of war... Our party, the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, has already suffered and will continue to suffer enormous sacrifices in connection with the war. All our legal press has been destroyed. Most of the unions have been closed, many of our comrades have been arrested and exiled. Our parliamentary representation—the Social-Democrats, a faction in the Duma—considered it their unconditional socialist duty not to vote on war credits... For us Russian Social-Democrats, there can be no doubt that, from the point of view of the working class and the working masses of all of the peoples of Russia, the least evil would be the defeat of the tsarist monarchy... The transformation of the modern imperialist war into a civil war is the only correct slogan... preparatory work in this direction, once the war has become a fact" ("CPSU in Res.", Part 1, pp. 320, 323, 324).

And so, from the very first days of the war, Lenin and his Central Committee have been conducting "systematic, persistent, unswerving work" to use the horrors of the war and the plight of Russia in the interests of opening a "second front" of war - a civil war behind Russian lines.

On the eve and at the beginning of the war, members of the Central Committee, members of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, almost all were arrested (Spandaryan, Belostotsky, Shvartsman, Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Sverdlov, Goloshchekin). Many of the agents of the Central Committee were arrested and exiled. Lenin himself was arrested in Austria at the beginning of the war as a Russian "spy", but by the intervention of the leaders of the Austrian Social-Democrats. (with whom Lenin fought so cruelly) was released, after which he moved to Switzerland. Here he finally settled down until his return to Russia after the revolution.

Although not only the Bolshevik Central Committee, but also the Menshevik Organizing Committee stood on the point of view of the "defeatism" of Russia and internationalism against patriotism, nevertheless, a new unification between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks did not occur. Plekhanov's group (Plekhanov, Deutsch, Zasulich, and others) adopted a defensive point of view (the defense of Russia in the war against Germany). Aleksinsky, one of the leaders of the Bolshevik, but anti-Leninist Vperyod group, also joined the "defencists".

On February 14-19 (February 27-March 4), 1915, a conference of all foreign Bolshevik organizations and groups convened by the Central Committee and the Central Organ ("Social Democrat") took place in Bern. The conference was attended by 16 people, including Lenin, Krupskaya, Kamenev, Bukharin, Troyanovsky, his wife E. Rozmirovich, and others. The main topic of the conference was the same question of the war and the tasks of the Social-Democrats. The resolution of the conference confirmed the instructions of the "Manifesto of the Central Committee" on the defeat of Russia in the war. It said:

"In every country, the struggle against one's own government must not stop at the possibility of the defeat of one's own country as a result of revolutionary agitation... As applied to Russia, this proposition is especially true. The victory of Russia entails an intensification of world reaction... Because of this, the defeat of Russia under all conditions seems to be the lesser evil" (ibid., p. 329).

The meeting condemned all Menshevik currents, accusing them of Russian chauvinism and patriotism. The group of "liquidators" ("New Dawn"), including the Plekhanovites, was condemned. Even the internationalists from the Organizing Committee - Martov, Trotsky, Axelrod - were condemned. IN

The resolution on this matter stated:

"In fact, both the Organizing Committee and the Bund, in which Germanophile chauvinism predominates, stand on the side of chauvinism. And the elements grouping around Nashe Slovo (Trotskyists) vacillate between Platonic sympathy for internationalism and the striving for unity with Nasha Zarya and the Organizing Committee... The Social-Democrats also vacillate. the Chkheidze faction..." (ibid., p. 329).

The resolution added that "Temporary agreements are admissible only with those Social-Democrats who stand for a decisive organizational break with the OK, Nasha Zarya and the Bund" (ibid., p. 330).

The meeting devoted a special resolution to "opportunism and the collapse of the Second International." She noted that "the destructive influence of opportunism was most clearly manifested in the policy of the majority of official Social-Democrats. parties of the P International during the war. Voting credits, joining ministries, the policy of "civil peace", the rejection of an illegal organization at a time when legality has been taken away, means the disruption of the most important decisions of the International and a direct betrayal of socialism ... The RSDLP must support all kinds of international and revolutionary

mass actions of the proletariat, striving to bring together all the anti-chauvinist elements of the International" (ibid., p. 328).

The meeting elected the Committee for Foreign Organizations (CSO) as an auxiliary foreign body of the Central Committee.

Soon Lenin and his Central Committee took an outstanding part in the first international conference of socialists on October 9-12, 1915 in Zimmerwald (Switzerland). It was attended by representatives of the leftist trends of the socialist parties in Bulgaria, Holland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Romania, France, Sweden, Switzerland and Russia. Russia was represented by the Central Committee of the RSDLP (Lenin, Ryazanov), the OK (Akselrod, Martov, Martynov), the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (Chernov and Natanson), and the Bund (Lipnik). Representatives of the Social Democrats of Poland, Lithuania and the Latvian region were also present from the Russian side.

Lenin preached at the conference the principles set forth in the "Manifesto of the Central Committee of the RSDLP", substantiated and insisted on the adoption by the conference of his slogan "turning the imperialist war into a civil war." When the German delegate Ledebour reproached Lenin that it was easy to preach a civil war in Russia while in

safe Switzerland, Lenin replied that "when the time comes, he will be able to be at his post and will not evade the heavy duty to take power when winning the civil war" ("On the day of the 50th anniversary of Ulyanov (Lenin)", Moscow, 1920, page 32).

In view of the failure of almost all the members of the Central Committee and many of the agents of the Central Committee ("confidants"), the foreign part of the Central Committee decided as early as April 1914 to rebuild the conspiratorial network of the Central Committee. The role of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee was entrusted to the Bolshevik faction of the PU of the State Duma. For this purpose, members of the faction Petrovsky and Badaev were made members of the Central Committee, and members of the faction Muranov, Samoilov and Shagov were made proxies of the Central Committee. In addition, an "Organizational Department" of the Central Committee was created to direct illegal work. For camouflage, it was called the "Workers' Cooperative Commission." The "organizational department" was supposed to: 1. direct the work of the St. Petersburg Committee, 2. take care of the connection of work in all legal organizations, 3. find especially conspiratorial forms of covering up illegal connections and illegal enterprises, 4. unite work on an all-Russian scale, establishing correct relations and detours. The "organizational department" was appointed by the Russian collegium of the Central Committee, consisting of 3-5 people (Lenin, PSS, vol. 25, p. 55).

There is an indication that Lenin nominated M. Kalinin, A. Kiselev, as well as activists of the insurance movement to the "Organizational Department" of the Central Committee (ibid., p. 481), but this new organ of the Central Committee of the Party did not leave any documentary traces of the work.

The reaction of the Bolshevik faction of the Duma to the war, in general, was similar to that of Lenin. A member of the Bolshevik faction of the TU Duma, Badaev, made a statement to a journalist in St. Petersburg in which he said that "war on war is our slogan, we, real representatives of the working class, will fight for this slogan" (A.E. Badaev, "Bolsheviks in State Duma, 1954, p. 344).

On July 26, 1914, the entire Social-Democratic faction - Bolsheviks and Mensheviks together - made a general declaration in which they condemned the war and protested



against her. During the vote on war credits, the entire Social-Democratic the faction refused to vote for loans and left the Duma session hall in protest. The Bolshevik historian remarks:

"This joint performance of the faction was the first and the last.

The behavior of the Mensheviks was explained only by the fear of finally losing the trust of the masses" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, p. 490).

But members of the Bolshevik part of the faction, acting at the same time as the illegal Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, launched an anti-war campaign in factories and factories, speaking openly at revolutionary rallies. The tsarist police were powerless to do anything against them, in view of their inviolability as deputies of the Duma. The government soon put an end to this.

At a conference of the Bolsheviks on November 4, 1914, near Petrograd, at which the question of the attitude of the Social-Democrats was discussed. to war, five Social-Democrats. Bolshevik deputies and six more Bolshevik functionaries, including Rozenfeld (Kamenev), a member of the editorial board of the Central Organ and authorized by the Central Committee, were arrested.

On February 10 (23), 1915, they were tried on charges of participating in an organization that aims to overthrow the existing state system. The main accusatory material was Lenin's theses, "The Tasks of Revolutionary Social Democracy in the European War" found during their arrest, and the Manifesto of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, "War and Russian Social Democracy." The defendants faced the death penalty, but they, led by Kamenev, conducted their defense so skillfully that they convinced the court of their innocence in the anti-patriotic actions of the Central Committee and its illegal work in general. The defendants denied that they were on the standpoint of the defeat of Russia. Lenin was not pleased with the behavior at the trial of his like-minded people, especially Kamenev.

In the article "What was proved by the trial of the Social-Democrats? faction? Lenin wrote:

"He showed insufficient firmness at the trial of this advanced detachment of revolutionary social democracy in Russia ... trying to prove his solidarity with the social patriot Jordansky, as Comrade Rosenfeld did, or his disagreement with the Central Committee, is a wrong method and from the point of view of revolutionary social democrat is unacceptable" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 26, p. 168).

If the defendants had acted differently, then, according to Lenin himself, "in the first stage of the case, the deputies were threatened with a military court and the death penalty" (ibid., p. 171). The court sentenced the defendants to permanent settlement in Siberia.

After the closure of the legal newspaper Pravda on July 8 (21), 1914

the liquidation of the Bolshevik faction in the Duma was the heaviest blow to Lenin's doctrine and practice of combining legal work with illegal work. Lenin, not without reason, consoled himself with the fact that "about 40,000 workers bought Pravda; many more read it. Even if war, prison, Siberia, penal servitude will break them five times and even ten times. This stratum cannot be destroyed... This stratum must be worked on... in the direction of the social revolution" (ibid., pp. 175-176).

After all these arrests, the entire apparatus of the Central Committee in Russia was destroyed. Only the foreign part of the Central Committee remained - Lenin, Zinoviev, and since the autumn of 1915, A. Shlyapnikov, introduced to the Central Committee, who was the new authorized representative of the Central Committee for Russia. The secretary of the Central Committee was N. Krupskaya ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, p. 543). Only in the fall of 1915 was it possible to recreate the Russian Bureau of the PC. V. N. Zalezhsy, I. I. Fokin, G. I. Osipov, A. G. Shlyapnikov were co-opted into its composition, later K. S. Ereemeev and E. A. almost all were arrested. Since the autumn of 1916, the Russian Bureau was created in a new, third composition, which included P. A. Zalutsky, V. M. Molotov and A. G. Shlyapnikov (ibid., pp. 543-544).

The Russian Bureau of the Central Committee was assisted by the St. Petersburg Committee, established in the summer of 1916, the Moscow Regional Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, the Caucasian Bureau of the RSDLP, the Central Committee of the Social-Democrats. Party of the Latvian Territory (until May 1916), Bureau of the North Baltic Organization of the RSDLP (since January 1917). Other organizations collapsed or were inactive. The official historian admits:

"However, there were few district and regional organizations during the war years, they acted sporadically and did not have strong ties with the localities" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, p. 544). In addition, "at the beginning of the war there was a noticeable decrease in the size of the party" (ibid.).

In general, the size of the party in both capitals was small. In November 1914 there were 100-120 Social Democrats in Petrograd. But as the war continued and the difficulties in the country grew, so did the discontent among the workers. This also affected the growth of party members. So, by the beginning of 1917, the Petrograd organization numbered 2,000 people. These two thousand are the backbone that in ten months will carry out the October Revolution in the capital. In Moscow in the summer of 1915 there were 200 Bolsheviks, and by the autumn - about 500. In Kharkov in the spring of 1915 there were 15 party members, by the autumn - 85, and in the autumn of 1916 - 200, by the beginning of 1917 - 400 (ibid., p. 547-548).

After an almost year-long break, the Central Organ began to appear in Switzerland

"Social Democrat" - from November 1, 1914 to January 31, 1917, 26 of its issues were published. In limited quantities, the "Social Democrat" reached Russia. Literature was transported under the Central Committee by a special group through Stockholm using the routes on the Swedish-Russian and Norwegian-Russian borders. In Russia itself, more than 600 different leaflets were published in 80 cities with a circulation of about two million copies (History of the CPSU, vol. 2, pp. 550-551). Bolshevik groups in Russia also acted in various legal organizations - in trade unions, insurance companies, sickness funds, cooperatives. "Often legal organizations served as a cover for illegal activities," writes the official historian (ibid., p. 556).

From the very beginning of the war, the Bolsheviks tried by all means available to them to infiltrate the army, to the front. "The Bolsheviks knew that without enlisting the masses of soldiers on the side of the fighting proletariat, one could not count on the victory of the revolution," writes the same historian (ibid., p. 559).

The Bolsheviks created party groups in the army and supplied them with illegal literature. The success of such work was so obvious that in the middle of 1916 the Police Department reported:

"Revolutionary articles published by the Petrograd Committee of the RSDLP

appeals have received a very wide distribution outside of Petrograd and in significant numbers fall into the army and navy in the field" (ibid., p. 559).

Almost every party committee had its own military department; who conducted work among the rear units, sent literature to the front, organized campaign trips for his members in units, and created new party groups in these units. On the Northern Front and on the ships of the Baltic Fleet, 80, and on the Western Front, 30 military party organizations were created (ibid., p. 560). At that time such future military leaders of the Bolsheviks as Dybenko, Raskolnikov, Fabricius, Frunze, Myasnikov and others came to the fore in the military work of the party.

Things were much worse in the Menshevik organizations than in the Bolsheviks. In January 1916, in a letter to Axelrod, Martov was quite legitimately apprehensive when he wrote:

"In Russia, our affairs are bad ... Dan is afraid that all life will go to the Leninists" ("Letters from P. B. Axelrod and Yu. O. Martov, 1901-1916",

Berlin, 1924, p. 355).

So it really was. Lenin's doctrine of combining legal work with illegal work brilliantly passed the test precisely in the conditions of war. The legalist liquidators were easily caught by the tsarist police, for they did not have an illegal apparatus. The survivors of them, ironically, now found refuge in the illegal organizations of the Leninists, whom they had previously criticized so severely as conspiratorial organizations.

Such was the position of the Party when the February Revolution began. There are different points of view on the participation of political parties in the February Revolution of 1917 in the literature. A participant in the events and the first historian of the Russian revolution of 1917, the left Menshevik N. Sukhanov, who called himself a "half-Leninist," writes:

"No party was preparing for a great upheaval. Everyone dreamed, thought, foresaw, 'felt'... (N. Sukhanov, Notes on the Revolution, v. 1, Berlin-Petrograd-Moscow, 1922, p. 19).

This is more of an emotional assessment than a real analysis. There is no doubt that the February Revolution was the greatest of the spontaneous people's revolutions. There is also little doubt that it did not take place according to the schedules of political parties. However, being an act of spontaneous outburst of popular indignation, the February Revolution was by no means an accident. It was prepared by the entire previous historical development of Russia. In this historical preparation, the left-wing political parties of Russia - from the Kadets to the Bolsheviks - played their part. Systematic criticism of the mediocrity of the tsarist government by the leaders of the Cadet Party from the rostrum of the State Duma, frank exposure of the entire existing system with threats of revolution from the same rostrum by the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (Kerensky) and Mensheviks (Skobelev, Chkhaidze), revolutionary and corrupting work outside the Duma by the Bolsheviks, self-exposure dynasties due to Rasputin's swindler and ministerial leapfrog, plus the growing dissatisfaction with the war everywhere - all this created that tense atmosphere in which all that was needed was a pretext for the February explosion to occur.

Of course, the bourgeois parties were taken by surprise by the February Revolution. Of course, the top Mensheviks in the Duma had almost no contact with the revolutionary underground, but the Bolsheviks, after the defeat of their legal

organs (fractions in the Duma, the newspaper Pravda) threw all their forces into the underground. The Petrograd and Moscow underground is in fact the Bolshevik underground. The Bureau of the Central Committee and its agents working among the masses foresaw and informed the Bureau of the Central Committee abroad about the February events. Only in 1965 was the secret report of the head of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee A. Shlyapnikov published in the Central Committee of the RSDLP (to Lenin). From this extremely important document on the work of the Bureau of the Central Committee on the eve of February, we quote the following excerpt:

"Our organization is not bad, but it could be much better if there were people. Now we are successfully organizing the South, the Volga region, the Urals. The Moscow Regional Bureau was founded. We are waiting for news from the Caucasus. They demand people and literature. Setting up the production of the latter inside Russia is the next task of the Bureau of the Central Committee. The audience managed to pick up a good, solid and capable. Compared to how things are with others, ours is brilliant. It can be said that at the present time only we have the All-Russian Organization... The Mensheviks, the unitedists and other breakaways are again joining the ranks of the party... The political struggle is becoming more acute every day. Discontent rages across the country. From day to day a revolutionary hurricane may flare up... The mood is menacing" ("Questions of the history of the CPSU", No. 9, 1965, p. 81).

The "revolutionary hurricane" rose in a couple of weeks. Some historians write: for Lenin, the revolution of 1917 was a surprise. Indeed, the whole essence of Leninism lies in this, that any major war, especially a world war in the "epoch of imperialism", according to Lenin, is a source of revolution. Lenin did not doubt for a second that at the end of the First World War in Europe, including Russia in the first place (the "weak link"!) A revolution would definitely break out. As proof of this thesis, one can quote from Lenin not one, but thousands of quotations, and even the whole book Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (written in the spring of 1916, published in April 1917). There is no need for this. We will only quote from that report of Lenin in January 1917, to which these historians refer. There Lenin says: "We must not be deceived by the present deathly silence in Europe. Europe is fraught with revolution... The coming years, precisely in connection with this predatory war, will lead to popular uprisings in Europe." Then comes the passage that allegedly proves the "surprise" for Lenin of the revolution: "We old people, perhaps, will not live to see

decisive battles of this coming revolution" (Lenin, *Sobr. soch.*, 3rd ed., vol. XX, p. 357). In Lenin's understanding, we have not lived up to "decisive battles" even today, because by "decisive battles" Lenin meant the triumph of the European or even world revolution.

I will quote one more quotation from Lenin's article dated January 31, 1917, which is called "The Turn in World Politics". This article states categorically: "The revolutionary situation in Europe is evident" (*ibid.*, p. 385). Moreover, Lenin in the same article names politicians who will form a new revolutionary government if the tsar concludes a separate peace with the Kaiser. Lenin says that this government will be headed by "Milyukov and Guchkov, if not Milyukov and Kerensky" (*ibid.*, p. 381). When these politicians came to power without a separate peace, but as a result of a popular spontaneous revolution, Lenin included in his forecast

only one correction: "It turned out and-and: all three together. Premilo!" (ibid., vol. XX, pp. 5-6).

That such was Lenin's inner conviction was also testified to us by his wife, N. Krupskaya. She wrote: "It seems that Vladimir Ilyich has never been so uncompromisingly inclined as in the last months of 1916 and the first months of 1917. He was deeply convinced that a revolution was coming" (N. K. Krupskaya, *Memories of Lenin*, Moscow, Politizdat, 1957, p. 271).

Eyewitnesses describe the beginning of the revolution as follows:

"On Thursday, February 23, in the morning in Petrograd, strikes began at factories and immediately took on the character of street popular unrest. They arose spontaneously ... due to the fact that the queues at the shops did not have enough bread ... From the second day, red flags appeared in the crowd, shouts were heard. "Down with the war! Give me bread! Down with autocracy! Long live the democratic republic!" (D. Zaslavsky and VI. Kantorovich, *Chronicle of the February Revolution*, Moscow, 1923, vol. 1, pp. 18-19).

But the situation is getting worse every day. In a telegram from Duma chairman Rodzianko to the tsar dated February 25, it is characterized as follows:

"The situation is serious. Anarchy in the capital. "The government is paralyzed... there is indiscriminate shooting in the streets. Parts of the troops fire at each other. A person who enjoys the confidence of the country should immediately be instructed to form a new government. You can't delay. Any delay in death is like ... "

The telegram apparently did not impress the Tsar. Rodzianko sent a second telegram:

"The situation is getting worse. We must take immediate action, because tomorrow will be too late. The last hour has come when the fate of the motherland and dynasty is being decided" (ibid., pp. 25, 28).

The tsar responded by dissolving the Duma. But then the Duma itself actually revolted - the leaders of the Duma decided not to disperse and created the Provisional Duma Committee "in order to maintain relations with the authorities and institutions." The Provisional Committee consisted of 11 members. All Duma parties were represented, including the Socialist Revolutionaries (Kerensky) and the Social Democrat Mensheviks (Chkheidze). The members of the Provisional Committee, headed by Rodzianko, were, apart from two socialists, monarchists and staunch enemies of any revolution. But the stormy February days, against their will, imposed on them the role of the headquarters of the revolution. Contemporaries testify:

"While the members of the State Duma hesitated, events forced the Tauride Palace (Duma) into a leading role. Military units and crowds from all sides were heading here. Directives were demanded from Kerensky, Skobelev, Chkheidze. They brought the arrested... They brought weapons..." (ibid., p. 29).

The Provisional Committee still refused to take power into its own hands in the name of the revolution. He thought in a good way to persuade the workers to return to the factories, and the soldiers to the barracks. But it turned out to be absolutely hopeless. Monarchist Shulgin, a member of the Provisional Committee, described his impression of those days as follows:

"Machine guns - that's what I wanted, because I felt that only the language of machine guns is available to the street crowd and that only lead, can drive back into its lair a terrible beast that has escaped to freedom ... Alas, this beast was ... his majesty Russian people" ("History of the Civil War in the USSR", Moscow, 1935, pp. 70-71).

Along with the Provisional Committee, which will later become the basis of official power, on February 27 a new, unofficial revolutionary power is created - the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks immediately found themselves at the head of this Council, since it was not only their idea, but it was also created around their factions in the State Duma. In the same Tauride Palace, where the Duma was located, at 9 pm on February 27, under the chairmanship of Chkheidze, the first meeting of the Soviet of Workers

deputies. It elected an Executive Committee of 14 members and a presidium of 3 people. The Presidium included two Mensheviks (Chkheidze and Skobelev) and one Socialist-Revolutionary (Kerensky). Two Bolsheviks (members of the Central Committee Shlyapnikov and Zalutsky) were also elected to the executive committee. The Menshevik Sokolov, editor of the famous Order No. 1, was appointed secretary of the Executive Committee.

Later, the Executive Committee of Soviets was expanded by the introduction of official representatives from the socialist parties (Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trudoviks, People's Socialists, Bundists, Mezhrayontsy, Latvian Social Democrats). Stalin and Molotov were introduced from the Bolsheviks (D. Zaslavsky and VI. Kantorovich, op. cit., p. 30).

On February 28, the Soviet issued a "Proclamation", which stated that the Soviet was formed from elected representatives of plants and factories, rebellious military units, as well as democratic and socialist parties. The Council set as its main task "the organization of popular forces and the struggle for the final consolidation of political freedom and popular government in Russia. The Soviet appointed district commissars to establish people's power in the districts of Petrograd" (ibid., p. 284). The "Appeal" does not say a word about the republic, limiting itself to a reference to the future Constituent Assembly. But already on February 28, in the conditions of the final victory of the revolution in Petrograd, the Provisional Committee takes power into its own hands and immediately opens negotiations with the Executive Committee of Soviets on the formation of a coalition government.

The question of the nature, composition and program of the new government proved to be very difficult, and for the socialists, simply insoluble. On this question, three groups formed among the Party of Soviets: the small group of Kerensky, which was in favor of the Soviets officially participating in the Provisional Government, and an even smaller group of Bolsheviks, which proposed the creation of a "provisional revolutionary government" of the working class and the revolutionary army, but without the bourgeoisie. and finally the third majority group

The Council headed by the Mensheviks (Sukhanov, Steklov, Chkheidze) was against the participation of socialists, like the Soviets, in the Provisional Government.

The Mensheviks were guided by business motives (the party does not have the qualified forces to form a government) and motives that can be called dogmatic (the February revolution is a bourgeois revolution).

revolution, and therefore the government must be made up of bourgeois

parties). Therefore, the proposal to participate in the Provisional Government was rejected by the Executive Committee of Soviets by 13 votes to 7 (ibid., p. 43). The Executive Committee has worked out the conditions under which it recognizes the new government. In an effort to make its conditions acceptable to the Cadets, the Executive Committee excluded from these conditions the main questions of the revolution—about the form of power (the republic), about the land, about peace, about the 8-hour working day. These questions are assigned to the competence of the future Constituent Assembly, which, however, must be convened as soon as possible.

The new government faced the following immediate tasks: ensuring all civil liberties, democratizing the army, abolishing the police and replacing it with militia, immediately organizing democratic elections to local self-government bodies, and not withdrawing the Petrograd garrison from Petrograd. At a meeting between the Provisional Committee and representatives of the Soviets (Chkheidze and others), these conditions were basically accepted.

On March 2, the tsar abdicated the throne for himself and for the heir - his son Alexei - in favor of Grand Duke Michael. On March 3, Michael also abdicated. The Romanov dynasty ceased to exist. On the same March 3, the composition of the Provisional Government appointed by the Provisional Committee of the Duma was published, in which only one socialist participated - Kerensky, vice-chairman of the Soviet. At the same time, the "Appeal" of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was published, which welcomed the reforms outlined by the Provisional Government: amnesty, civil liberties, the abolition of religious and national restrictions, the immediate preparation for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the replacement of the police by the police, democratic elections to local governments, non-disarmament and the non-withdrawal of its garrison from Petrograd, while maintaining military discipline, the elimination of all restrictions on the use of public rights for soldiers.

The Council pledged support to the Provisional Government to the extent that it would carry out these reforms. This was the conditional support formula that the Bolsheviks also used until Lenin returned from abroad (ibid., pp. 288-289).

Bolshevik historians attribute to the Bolshevik Party such an outstanding role in the February Revolution, which does not confirm

Xia neither documents nor testimonies of contemporaries. The History of the Civil War in the USSR states:

"The Bolsheviks were in the vanguard of the barricade fighters, while the overwhelming majority of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries found themselves in the Soviets" (Vol. 1, p. 84).

The authors of the six-volume "History of the CPSU" write that "the Petrograd Bolsheviks used the International Day of the Worker, celebrated on February 23, to hold meetings and rallies ... February 23, when the militant mood of the masses resulted in powerful demonstrations that filled the streets and squares of the capital, was the first day of the revolution. .. The Bureau of the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee issued a directive to develop the movement that had begun as much as possible" (vol. 2, pp. 659, 660).

It turns out that the February Revolution began on the directive of the Bureau of the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee, although the authors do not cite this directive itself. The authors, on the other hand, bring leaflets from both these committees to the workers, urging them to continue the struggle. But these leaflets have already been issued in

the height of the revolution - 25 February. Starting from this day, the Bureau of the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee actively participate in the events. But already on the morning of February 26, almost the entire Petersburg Committee was arrested, and its functions were transferred to the Vyborg District Committee (ibid., p. 667). Bolshevik authors attribute not only strikes and demonstrations, but also the armed uprising that began spontaneously to the leadership of their Central Committee. They write:

"On the evening of February 26, the Vyborg Committee gathered at the Udelnaya station together with representatives of the Bureau of the Central Committee. The leading center of the Petrograd Bolsheviks decided to turn the strike into an armed uprising. A plan of action was outlined: fraternizing with the soldiers, disarming the police, seizing the arms depots, arming the workers, issuing a manifesto on behalf of the Central Committee of the RSDLP" (ibid., pp. 668-669).

This "plan of action" was drawn up retroactively almost 50 years after the events themselves, so the authors cannot confirm it with any documents, even of a memoir order. Only the last point of this imaginary plan took place: the release of the Manifesto of the Central Committee.

The manifesto was drawn up in the spirit of the well-known demands of the party: a democratic republic, an 8-hour working day, confiscation of landowners' lands, an end to the war, but it lacked Lenin's most important demand - a call for support for the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers.

deputies, - but the demand was put forward for the creation of a "Provisional revolutionary government", which Lenin did not put forward ("History of the Civil War in the USSR", vol. 1, p. 74). Meanwhile, Lenin himself believed that the Manifesto of the Central Committee referred to the Soviets when he analyzed this Manifesto as presented by foreign newspapers (Lenin, PSS, vol. 31, p. 34). But what Lenin's disciples bypassed was put forward as the central point in the appeal of the Organizing Committee of the RSDLP, that is, the Mensheviks, which says that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies will be the single organizing force that will bring "the popular revolution to its victorious end" (Zaslavsky and Kantorovich, op. cit., p. 286).

Why did the Mensheviks and not the Bolsheviks stand at the head of the Petrograd Soviet? The Bolshevik historian answers this question in the following way:

"A significant role here was played by the fact that the Mensheviks had the opportunity throughout the war to act legally, in plain sight, having such an important legal stronghold as the Duma faction. The Bolsheviks, driven into deep underground, were deprived of all this ... There was another reason. The Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, while devoting all its attention to the armed uprising, underestimated the question of power" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 2, pp. 676, 677). L. Trotsky also writes about the "helplessness and unscrupulousness" of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee - Shlyapnikov, Zalutsky, Molotov in the first days of the revolution (Trotsky, "The Revolution and Us", Moscow, 1967). To the question of who led the February Revolution, Trotsky answers - conscious workers, educated by the party of Lenin, but immediately adds: "This leadership turned out to be sufficient to ensure the victory of the uprising, but not enough to transfer the leadership of the revolution into the hands of the proletarian vanguard," i.e. into the hands of the Bolsheviks (ibid., p. 139).

Why the Bolshevik forces did not take power, Lenin explained very simply: "They did not take power because they were unorganized and unconscious" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 31, p. 106). The most interesting originality of the February



The revolution consisted, according to Lenin, in the fact that not one, but two powers arose at once, competing with each other: the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the famous "dual power".

The first chairman of the Provisional Government, Prince G. E. Lvov, later wrote that "The Provisional Government was power without power, while the Soviet of Workers' Deputies was power without power" ("History of the CPSU",

vol. 3, book. I, p. 4).

## Chapter 8

### CC IN THE REVOLUTION

Lenin's first response to the February Revolution was his telegram in French to Stockholm on March 6 (19), 1917. The telegram was addressed to "Bolsheviks Departing for Russia". In it, a tactical directive was given in a few words to the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee and the Bolshevik Party. Here is its content:

"Our tactics: complete distrust, no support for the new government; Kerensky is especially suspect; arming the proletariat is the only guarantee... No rapprochement with other parties. Telegraph this to Petrograd" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 31, p. 7).

This telegram was delivered to Petrograd, on March 13 (26) it was announced at a meeting of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee and - on the same day - at a meeting of the Executive Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee (ibid., pp. 502-503).

This directive of Lenin not only was not accepted by the leaders of the party in Russia, but it was not even understood by them. If the old composition of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee in February was more to the left and closer to the Leninist point of view in terms of deepening the revolution and seizing power ("create a provisional revolutionary government"), if the old Pravda, which began to appear on March 5 (edited by Olminsky, Kalinin, Eremeev, Molotov), declared the Provisional Government of Lvov-Kerensky counter-revolutionary, then the new composition of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee and the new editorial board of Pravda (Kamenev, Stalin, Sokolnikov) stood on anti-Leninist positions. Lenin wrote about the old composition of the Central Committee and the old editorial board: "We are for the Central Committee in Russia, for Pravda, for our party, for the proletarian militia preparing peace and socialism" (ibid., vol. 49, p. 410); Lenin writes nothing of the sort about the new composition of the Bureau of the Central Committee and the new edition of Pravda.

How much the new leadership of the Central Committee became in opposition to Lenin is also shown by the fact that Pravda agreed to publish only one of Lenin's four letters on tactics sent from Switzerland and intended for publication ("Letters from afar"). Even this letter was printed with great cuts. In the words of the Bolshevik commentator on the Works of Lenin, "the reductions concern, mainly

Thus, the characteristics of the leaders of the compromising parties, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are servile to the bourgeoisie ... as well as the monarchist and imperialist aspirations of the Provisional Government exposed by Lenin" (ibid., vol. 31, p. 504). It was precisely these two questions - the question of the attitude towards the Provisional Government and the question of relations between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks - that constituted the root of the disagreement between

Lenin and the new Central Committee. To understand the essence of the matter, it is necessary to tell about the changes in the composition of the Central Committee that took place in the first two weeks after the February Revolution.

Under Stalin, the minutes of the Central Committee of this period were kept in the strictest confidence. They were first published in 1962, at the height of the exposé campaign against Stalin. They make it possible to restore the real policy of the Central Committee before Lenin's return to Russia, and thereby understand the meaning of the first revolution in Russia that Lenin carried out against his own party, without which Lenin's second revolution, the October Revolution, would have been absolutely impossible.

In March, the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee meets daily or every other day or two. Its first extended meeting takes place on March 4 (17). Judging by the minutes, one might think that in addition to members of the Bureau of the Central Committee Shlyapnikov, Zalutsky and Molotov, former members of the Bureau of the Central Committee - Eremeev, Shvedchikov, Zalezhsy ("Questions of the History of the CPSU", No. 3, 1962, p. 136).

At this meeting, responsibilities were distributed among the members of the Bureau, as well as new people were involved in the work. It was decided to start resuming the publication of Pravda, the editors were appointed (Eremeev, Molotov and Kalinin), it was indicated that "all three editors are equally responsible, and issues are resolved by them unanimously", in case of disagreement - the supreme arbiter of the Bureau of the Central Committee. The economic part is entrusted to Shvedchikov. Relations with foreign countries were entrusted to S. M. Zaks, and with the provinces - to G. I. Boki. Shlyapnikov was entrusted with the responsibility of managing the finances of the party (ibid., pp. 136-137).

The most important decision of the March 4 meeting must be considered the adoption of a resolution on "tactical tasks." This resolution anticipates Lenin's characterization of the Provisional Government. It says: "The present Provisional Government is essentially counter-revolutionary, since it consists of representatives of the big bourgeoisie and the nobility, and therefore there can be no agreements with it" (ibid., p. 136).

Only in the second part, Lenin's not entirely "dialectical" students repeated the outdated formula of their teacher from the 1905 revolution: "The task of revolutionary democracy is to create a Provisional Revolutionary Government of a democratic character (dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry)" (ibid.).

For Lenin, the power of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was now a new form of "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry", which he did not quite clearly imagine in 1905.

The Petersburg Committee took a completely opposite, anti-Leninist point of view. On March 3, he decided to approve the decision of the Petrograd Soviet of March 2 (15) on conditional support for the Provisional Government. When the Bureau of the Central Committee wanted to rectify the situation and proposed to it for approval a resolution that rejected any support for the "counter-revolutionary Provisional Government", the Petersburg Committee

reaffirmed his old decision on March 13 (26) (ibid., p. 155).

In early March, old Bolsheviks, former members or agents of the Central Committee, began to return from Siberia. This led to a gradual expansion of

becoming the Central Committee.

Thus, on March 7 (20) the Bureau of the Central Committee decided to expand its membership by including former members of the Bureau of the Central Committee released from prisons and returned from exile - K. S. Ereemeev, V. N. Zalezhsy, and K. M. Shvedchikov, except In addition, the desire of the St. Petersburg Committee to include three of its representatives in the Bureau of the Central Committee - M. I. Kalinin, K. I. Shutko and Khakharev was satisfied. At the meeting of the Bureau of the Central Committee on March 8, the following persons were co-opted into the Bureau of the Central Committee: Olshansky, M. I. Ulyanova (Lenin's sister), A. I. Elizarova-Ulyanov (another sister of Lenin). At the same meeting, two important tactical resolutions were adopted: on the war and on the attitude towards the Provisional Government. The resolution on the war was drawn up in the spirit of the Central Committee's War Manifesto of November 1, 1914, with the indication that the war would remain imperialist even under the new government, and therefore the Party's slogan - "the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war" - remains in force even now. As for the attitude towards the Provisional Government, the protocol says:

"From the debate it became clear that all members of the Bureau consider it impossible to support the Provisional Government, however, and active opposition is not possible, just as it is impossible to take responsibility for the government" (ibid., p. 141).

The Bureau of the Central Committee, as it expanded, became more and more peaceful in relation to the Provisional Government, clearly departing from the Leninist line, if it is not about declarations (0 war), but about the practice of working in the Soviets.

Serious tensions arise between the Bureau of the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee, which in March included: N. K. Antipov, V. N. Zalezhsy, M. I. Kalinin, N. P. Komarov, I. I. Stuchka, N. G. Tolmachev, K. I. Shutko, N. I. Podvoisky and A. G. Shlyapnikov ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book I, p. 22). As we have seen above, the Petersburg Committee was from the very beginning even more peacefully disposed towards the Provisional Government than the Bureau of the Central Committee. In addition, he claimed an independent leadership role in the Petrograd Soviet, sometimes ignoring the directives of the Bureau of the Central Committee. This was discussed at the meeting of the Bureau of the Central Committee on March 12. The Petersburg Committee made a statement at this meeting that, unlike the Bureau of the Central Committee, "the speeches of the Petersburg Committee correspond directly to the present moment, the interests of the day, its resolutions are more specific ... The Petersburg Committee finds it necessary that the directives of the Bureau of the Central Committee be submitted for consideration by the Petersburg Committee to get acquainted with them, in order to put them into practice later. It was further stated that the Bureau. The Central Committee must reckon with the instructions of the Petersburg Committee, since the Petersburg Committee relies on the masses. It was pointed out that the Bureau of the Central Committee made a whole series of blunders in the Manifesto... With such facts, the Bureau of the Central Committee discredits Bolshevism. Further, the comrades drew attention to the emptiness of Pravda" ("Questions of the history of the CPSU", No. 3, 1962, p. 144).

Thus, a "dual power" was formed in the Bolshevik party itself in Petrograd - the Bureau of the Central Committee, as the legal highest party authority, and the St. Petersburg Committee, as the actual power over the party in the capital.

Since half of the members of the Bureau were at the same time members of the Executive Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee, the "dual power" is clearly

inclined towards the autocracy of the Petersburg Committee. An event has occurred

which hindered the development of the case in this direction. This event is the return from Siberia of the former members of the Central Committee Muranov and Stalin, as well as the former member of the editorial board of the Central Organ Kamenev. At the same meeting of the Central Committee on March 12, the question of including them in the Bureau of the Central Committee, as well as introducing Bokia into the Central Committee, was discussed. The discussion of this issue is preceded by a statement about which of the new faces and according to what criteria the Bureau of the Central Committee will co-opt into its composition. The statement says that the Bureau of the Central Committee draws into its membership all those persons whom it considers useful in its "political credo", as well as "valuable theoretical workers." Boky was included in the Bureau of the Central Committee, "since he takes the position of the Bureau of the PC. Next, the question of Comrade. Muranov, Stalin and Kamenev. The first is invited unanimously. Regarding Stalin, it was reported that he was an agent of the Central Committee in 1912 (error: Stalin was an agent of the Central Committee from 1910, and a member of the PC from 1912. - A. A.) and therefore would be desirable in the Bureau of the Central Committee, but in view of some personal traits inherent in him, the Bureau of the Central Committee spoke in the sense of inviting him with an advisory vote. As for Kamenev, in view of his behavior at the trial (1915) and the resolutions that were adopted regarding him by the Bolsheviks, it was decided to accept him among the employees of Pravda ... accept his articles as material, but do not issue his signature "(ibid., p. 143).

In addition, Kamenev was asked to give an explanation for his behavior at the trial of the deputies of the State Duma in 1915 (where Kamenev dissociated himself from the line of the Central Committee regarding the war). In discussing the question of Stalin and Kamenev, the Bureau of the Central Committee demonstrated its complete legal and political helplessness. Legal - because the members of the Central Committee (Stalin) and members of the Central Organ (Kamenev) did not lose their posts in the party due to the arrest, and after their release they automatically returned to their old position. Politically, because as leaders of the party they outnumbered all the members of the Bureau of the Central Committee put together.

In less than a few days, they proved this - since mid-March, Stalin and Kamenev have taken power over both the Central Committee and Pravda into their own hands. This puts an end to the "dual power" in

party leadership in Petrograd. But for now

the old Central Committee rules.

In view of the expansion of the Bureau of the Central Committee, the Presidium of the Bureau of the PC was elected. They included: Muranov, Molotov, Stasova, Olshansky, Shlyapnikov (Belenin)

and candidate Zalutsky (Petrov) (ibid., p. 145).

At a meeting of the Bureau of the Central Committee on March 13 (11 people were present, including Stalin, with an advisory vote), Lenin's telegram was read out, which contained the slogans "no support for the Provisional Government", "arming the proletariat", "no rapprochement with others, parties." Probably, this telegram was received far from friendly. It condemned the position of conditional support for the Provisional Government and rejected all agreements with the Mensheviks, that is, it condemned the policy which had hitherto been pursued by the majority of the Bureau of the Central Committee and the entire Petersburg Committee. This probably explains the fact that after the discussion of Lenin's telegram "the question was raised about the need for a discussion about tactics, because bare slogans alone are insufficient ...

It was decided that it was necessary to have a platform revealing the slogans issued by the Bureau of the Central Committee" (ibid., p. 145).

For this purpose, a commission was created, which included Stalin. It was reported that, for political and party reasons, Kamenev was refusing to give an account of his behavior at the trial "from now on

before negotiations with Lenin." The editorial office of Pravda was reorganized. This includes now: Olminsky, Stalin, Kalinin, Yermeev and Ulyanova (ibid., p. 146). At the same meeting, Molotov resigned from all posts in the Executive Committee of the Soviet, the Presidium of the Bureau of the Central Committee and the editorial board of Pravda, due to "insufficient experience."

It is clear from the minutes of the Bureau of the Central Committee that Kamenev and Stalin, not even being members of the Bureau of the Central Committee, actually began to determine the policy not only of the editorial board of Pravda, but also of the party itself, which caused dissatisfaction with the Bureau of the Central Committee. The Bureau of the Central Committee was especially dissatisfied with the editorial of Pravda "Without secret diplomacy" (Kamenev, Stalin) dated March 15, in which Stalin and Kamenev became more right than even the right-wing Central Committee and, in essence, supported the policy of the Provisional Government in the war. Regarding this article, the minutes of the Bureau of the Central Committee of March 15 say that it "is recognized as unsatisfactory by all members of the Bureau of the Central Committee and it was proposed to new visiting comrades to adhere to the resolutions of the Bureau of the Central Committee and the PC until the discussion" (Petrograd Committee. - A. A.) (ibid., p. 148).

The "new visiting comrades" were Kamenev and Stalin. At that

At the same meeting, they nevertheless achieved their first and serious success. The editorial board of Pravda was again reorganized, this time it included: Kamenev, Stalin, Molotov, Eremeev (ibid., p. 148).

Moreover: Stalin was elected to the presidium

Bureau of the Central Committee (its composition is now: Stalin, Shlyapnikov, Muranov, Stasova, Zalutsky). At the same time, it was decided to nominate Stalin and Kamenev to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies instead of Molotov and another Bolshevik (Vladimir) (ibid., p. 149). Thus, finally, Kamenev and Stalin took over the leadership of the Central Committee, Pravda, and the Bolshevik faction in the Soviet.

But resistance in the Central Committee against Kamenev continues. At the meeting of the Bureau of the Central Committee on March 17, a new decision was adopted not to introduce Kamenev either to the Bureau of the Central Committee or to the Council until the question of him was resolved at the party conference (ibid., p. 150).

At this meeting, the statement of the representative of the Menshevik-Internationalists (Martov's group) on unification with the Bolsheviks, as well as the statement on the same "Interdistrict Committee of United Social Democrats" was discussed. The "Interdistrict Organization" was created in St. Petersburg in November 1913 from various groups that had departed from both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. These included: Trotskyists, part of the Menshevik party members, Bolsheviks-Vperyodists, Bolshevik conciliators. Trotsky joined this group in May 1917, after his return to Russia. In addition to him, there were also such Bolshevik figures as Lunacharsky, Manuilsky, Uritsky, Volodarsky. The Bureau of the Central Committee expressed itself on this question in the sense that it "finds it desirable and welcomes" the merger of the inter-district organization with the Party, but

on this matter, transfers it to the Petrograd Committee ("The Petersburg Committee will be renamed the Petrograd Committee in order to avoid unnecessary suspicions of Germanophilism," *ibid.*, p. 146).

Lenin took the same point of view with regard to the "mezhduraiontsy" (Lenin, *Soch.*, 4th ed., vol. 24, p. 395).

But another decision was important, which says:

"As for the question of uniting with the Menshevik Internationalists, it should be brought up for discussion by the leading collectives of the Bureau of the Central Committee, the PC and the group of writers" ("Questions of the History of the CPSU", No. 53, 1962, p. 151).

The "group of writers" is the group of Lenin and Zinoviev from the Central Organ "Social Democrat", but the "group of writers" through Lenin's mouth has already declared: "no rapprochement with other parties." Speaking of Martov's group, Lenin set the condition for its inclusion in the party (and not for merging with it!) that this group publicly "break with the defencists" (Lenin, *ibid.*).

A sharp turn to the right in the policy of the Central Committee takes place at the meeting of March 22, when two very important political decisions were adopted: on the Provisional Government and on war and peace. These decisions were published in *Pravda* on March 26, 1917, as directive documents of the supreme organ of the party between congresses - the Central Committee. However, they were not included in the codification of party decisions - in the collections "CPSU in Resolutions". This means that the current Central Committee of the CPSU does not recognize them. What is the matter, it turns out from their cursory analysis. It also turns out that the Central Committee, like the entire Bolshevik Party, from the time of the return (March 13) from Siberia of Stalin, Kamenev, Sverdlov, Rykov, Ordzhonikidze and other members of the Central Committee until the return of Lenin from abroad (April 4), led an opportunist, compromising, anti-Leninist policy towards the Provisional Government. These resolutions say:

#### 1. About the Provisional Government:

"The Soviets must exercise the most resolute control over all the actions of the Provisional Government (Questions of the History of the CPSU, No. 3, 1962, p. 153).

Lenin's point of view: control over the Provisional Government is a most harmful illusion. All power must pass to the Soviets from top to bottom throughout the country.

#### p About war and peace:

"Force the Provisional Government not only to abandon all conquest plans, but to immediately and openly formulate the will of the peoples of Russia, to offer peace to all warring countries" (*ibid.*, p. 153).

Lenin's point of view: to think that it is possible to force the imperialist Provisional Government to conclude peace is to sow the most harmful illusion. Only the power of the Soviets can propose and conclude such a peace.

The official party historian consciously denies the anti-Leninist trend in the policy of the Central Committee of this period, although he admits the presence of important tactical errors in these resolutions. Here is his reasoning:

"The Bureau of the Central Committee, the majority of local organizations, the editorial board of Pravda, in assessing the ongoing war, stood on Leninist positions ... But they have not yet been able to determine the correct ways out of the war, since they did not put on the agenda the question of the transition from the first to the second, socialist stage of the revolution, they did not connect the question of war with the question of power" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book T, 1967, p. 36).

What is true is true - any question, whether it is great or small, whether it is philosophical or everyday - Lenin certainly connected with the question of power. In the entire Bolshevik Party in Russia, there was not a single person who could offer an alternative to the Provisional Government. Only one Lenin found it: Soviets. But in order to impose this alternative on the party, it was necessary, firstly, the physical presence of Lenin in Russia, and secondly, the "re-armament of Bolshevism." Both were preceded by another meeting of leading Bolsheviks - the All-Russian Conference of Party Workers on March 27-April 2, 1917.

The minutes of this Conference were also published after Stalin was exposed (Questions of the History of the CPSU, No. 5, 1962, pp. 106-125). Only after a careful analysis of the reports, debates and decisions of the Meeting, we will understand that Lenin, who returned from abroad, was actually faced with the task of not even "re-arming Bolshevism", to use the terminology of Sukhanov and Trotsky, but the direct task of creating a new communist party. Five days after his return - on April 9 - Lenin wrote in the Pravda newspaper in the article "On dual power": "Let's create a proletarian communist party; its elements have already been created by the best supporters of Bolshevism" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 31, pp. 147-148).

In other words, there is no such party in Russia yet, there are only "supporters" and "elements"!

It is precisely the analysis of the work of the said Conference that shows how profoundly right Lenin was. The All-Russian (March) Conference of Party workers was appointed by the Bureau of the Central Committee in connection with the upcoming All-Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on March 29, 1917. The Bolshevik deputies of this meeting, together with the Bureau of the Central Committee, were to discuss both the agreed tactics of the party at the Soviet meeting and the main questions of the party's policy at the present stage of the revolution. Based on this, an agenda was drawn up. It included the following questions: 1) about the attitude towards the war;

2) about the attitude towards the Provisional Government;

3) about uniting with the Mensheviks (some special issues were discussed in sections; sections were created: military, organizational, section on the labor issue, agrarian, food, section on local affairs). 70 party organizations were represented (of which 30 organizations were "united" with the Mensheviks), and all the delegates were over 120 people, that is, the entire elite of the party gathered ("Questions of the history of the CPSU", No. 5, 1962, pp. 106, 123) .

It can be seen from the minutes that at the Conference on the main issues discussed, three distinct currents were formed: the first trend is the "revolutionary defencists" (those who support the defensive line of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet). This current is represented by Voitinsky, Eliava, Sevruck and others. The second current is the opposite,

left. It is headed by Kollontai, Milyutin, Teodorovich, Molotov. The third trend is the "conditional defense" of the country and the "conditional support" of the Provisional Government. This current unites the overwhelming majority of the Conference participants. It is headed by Stalin and Kamenev. Krasikov stands apart, which we will talk about later.

At a meeting on March 29, Stalin made a report "On the attitude towards the Provisional Government." Regarding the assessment of the social nature of the Provisional Government, Stalin takes the Leninist point of view (bourgeois, imperialist government), but to the question of whether the Bolsheviks should support him, Stalin gave a very strange answer for a Bolshevik: "Insofar as the Provisional Government consolidates the steps of the revolution, insofar support" ("Questions of the history of the CPSU", No. 5, 1962, p.

112). Stalin announces the resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee, which says about the establishment of "the most decisive control over all the actions of the Provisional Government" through the soviets. Stalin says that he does not quite agree with the resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee, but would prefer the resolution adopted by the Krasnoyarsk Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Cossacks' Deputies. This resolution states that the obedience of the Provisional Government to the demands of the revolution "can be ensured only by the continuous pressure of the proletariat, the peasantry and the revolutionary army" and that "to support the Provisional Government in its activities insofar as

because it follows the path of satisfying these requirements (ibid., pp. 112, 113, 114).

Voitinsky, the co-speaker, basically agrees with Stalin, but only more consistently develops the point of view on the need to support the Provisional Government, stating that "The Provisional Government is the clerk of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies" and that "it is impossible to take power entirely into one's own hands under the bourgeois system" (ibid., pp. 114, 115). Krestinsky noticed the identity of the points of view of Stalin and Voitinsky: "There are no differences in practical steps between Stalin and Voitinsky" (ibid., p. 119).

In his opinion, quite in the spirit of Stalin, Voitinsky's resolution was drawn up that "certain revolutionary steps by the government should meet with support" (ibid., p. 120, 2nd note).

At the meeting of March 30, when discussing the question of introducing "amendments to the resolution of the Executive Committee on the war," one voice was finally heard, which sounded like complete dissonance in the entire work of the Conference. This speech was so unusual and unexpected that it aroused not only the indignation of the meeting, but even the deprivation of the speech of the speaker himself. Here is how the protocol recorded this episode:

"Krasikov: The point is not in the amendments, not in the demonstration of social democratic slogans, but in the current moment. If we recognize the Soviets of Deputies as bodies expressing the opinion of the people, then the question is not what specific measures have been taken on this or that issue. If we consider that now the time has come for the implementation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, then this is how the question should be put. Physical strength in the sense of seizing power is undoubtedly with us. I think that there will be enough physical strength both in Petrograd and in other cities (movement, voices: "wrong"). I attended...



Chairman: The question of the dictatorship of the proletariat is not being discussed.

Krasikov (continues): Since the question is not so, is it necessary to take steps towards the Provisional Government that ...

The chairman deprives him of the floor.

The former member of the Central Committee Krasikov (Pavlovich) turned out to be the only Leninist in this hall, because in the formula "dictatorship of the proletariat" as the main task of the current moment - the moment of transition from the first stage to the second, socialist

stage, that was the whole point of Lenin's "April Theses".

On March 30, a joint meeting of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks takes place on the question of the war. It turns out that the Mensheviks have a group close to the Bolsheviks (Yermansky), and the Bolsheviks have a group close to the Mensheviks (Voytinsky, Sevruck, Eliava, Yakhontov, Pozern, etc.).

Along this line - attitudes towards the war - there is a split in the Bolshevik Party. The entire group of "revolutionary defensists", except for Pozern, leaves a separate meeting of the Bolsheviks to join the Mensheviks. Then the meeting issues a special resolution on inviting them back ("Questions of the history of the CPSU", 1962, p. 135).

The resolution of the conference of the Bolsheviks on the war basically repeats what was said earlier at the meeting of the Bureau of the Central Committee: to force the Provisional Government to offer peace, but "up to this moment, we, rejecting the disorganization of the army and considering it necessary to preserve its power, call on all soldiers and the workers to remain at their posts and observe full organization" (ibid., p. 136).

The Bolshevik Conference proposed this resolution to the ongoing Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies as a draft of its future decision on the war. In order to make it easier for him to adopt such a resolution, the Bolshevik Conference once again praised the Manifesto to the Nations of the World, which the Soviet issued on March 14, 1917. Stalin at the same time in Pravda wrote about this manifesto that "it is impossible not to welcome the yesterday's appeal of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd to the peoples of the whole world with an appeal to force their own governments to stop the slaughter" (Stalin, Soch. vol. 3, p. 7). Lenin, on the contrary, said about this manifesto that it "is the greatest theoretical confusion, is the greatest political helplessness, is a condemnation of ourselves and all our policies ..." (Lenin, PSS, vol. 32, p. 278).

This "confusion" and "helplessness" were repeated once again. In this connection, one passage from Lenin's letter to Ganetsky on March 30 is interesting, in which he speaks of Kamenev's special responsibility: "Kamenev must understand that a world-historical responsibility falls on him" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 49, p. 423 ).

A great debate at the Bolshevik meeting was caused by the discussion of the question of the attitude towards the Provisional Government. March 31 meeting

was entirely devoted to this issue. Adopted earlier by the Bureau of the Central Committee for

Stalin's report and proposal, the formula of conditional support for the Provisional Government "in so far as" was criticized at the meeting. Under the influence of this criticism, Stalin and Kamenev have now sharply changed their attitude to this question. Kamenev said:

"The paragraph on support in the resolution is completely unacceptable. An expression of support, even as a hint, is unacceptable. We cannot support the government, because it is imperialist, despite its statements, it remains in alliance with the Anglo-French bourgeoisie" ("Questions of the history of the CPSU", No. 6, 1962, p. 137).

"Stalin proposes to issue a directive to the commission to change the item on support" (ibid., p. 138).

Kamenev and Stalin clearly began to speak a different language. One could feel the approach of the Leninist train to the Russian borders! By a majority against 4, the support clause is removed from the resolution. As a result, a resolution worked out by the commission (Milyutin, Kamenev, Stalin, Teodorovich) is adopted, in which there is no longer a formula for conditional support of the Provisional Government, but another anti-Leninist formula is still preserved: "vigilant control over the actions of the Provisional Government" (ibid., p. 141 ).

On the other hand, on another question—the unification of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks —the old line of Stalin-Kamenev about unification against the enemies of unification (Molotov, Skrypnik, Zalutsky, and others) is completely victorious. To the Menshevik leader Tsereteli's proposal for unification, Stalin replied: "We must go. It is necessary to define our proposals for the unification line. Unification along the lines of Zimmerwald Kienthal is possible" (ibid., p. 139).

When Molotov, Skrypnik and Zalutsky, speaking one after another, expressed doubts about the possibility of unification because of the fundamental differences between Bolshevism and Menshevism, Stalin replied: "We should not get ahead of ourselves and prevent differences. There is no Party life without disagreements..." (ibid., p. 140).

Stalin's proposal to unite with the Mensheviks is accepted by a majority of 14 to 13 votes. A commission is elected to conduct negotiations (Stalin, Kamenev, Nogin, Teodorovich). Stalin is instructed to make a report at a joint meeting of the Bolsheviks and less

wiki about the merger scheduled for April 4th. This great conspiracy of the Bolshevik leaders against Lenin had as its goal to present Lenin with a fait accompli: before the unification of Bolshevism and Menshevism had been accomplished. In this case, of course, Lenin, as the leader of the united RSDLP, fell away. Stalin-Kamenev-Martov-Tsereteli - that's who was supposed to lead the united party. Lenin literally in the last hours warned the conspirators.

## Chapter 9

### THE REVOLUTION OF LENIN IN THE CC

A general analysis of historical events and historical documents from February 23 to April 4, 1917 shows the following general pattern in the development of the party in the revolution: the higher up the hierarchy

Bolshevism, the less revolutionary fury, the more opportunist loyalty to the Provisional Government. At the same time, the very base of the revolution, cells in factories, factories, barracks, on which the party hierarchy relied, "pushes to the left" not only the Provisional Government, but also its headquarters: the Central Committee of the Party.

By this time, the party had also grown: by January 1917, the party had 23 thousand people (of which workers - 60.2%, employees - 25.8%, peasants - 7.6%, others - 6.4%, - "History of the CPSU", book G, vol. 3, p. 24), and as early as April, almost 60 thousand new members joined the party. It was part of that revolutionary vanguard that forced the tsar to abdicate, and the Duma (Provisional Duma Committee) to create the Provisional Government. There can be no doubt for a moment that the Bolshevik revolution would have taken place already at the end of February, if Lenin had been in Petrograd in those days. This avant-garde lacked precisely Lenin. The objections of the order that, after his return from abroad, it still took Lenin a whole seven months for a new revolution, disappear because he now had to create a new revolutionary situation, which was missed by the Central Committee of the party during the February Revolution due to physical limitations. forces of the old leadership in February (Shlyapnikov Zalutsky-Molotov), and in March because of the opportunism of the new leadership (Kamenev-Stalin-Sverdlov).

Therefore, before preparing a new revolution against

Provisional government, Lenin was supposed to carry out a revolution at the top of his party. Lenin's "April Theses" is a simultaneous declaration of war on three fronts: against the Central Committee of his own party, on the one hand, against the Provisional Government, on the other, against the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, on the third.

L. Trotsky was right when he wrote: "The April clash between Lenin and the General Staff of the Party was not the only one. In the entire history of Bolshevism, with the exception of individual episodes that only confirm the rule, all the leaders of the party, throughout the entire period of development, stood to the right of Lenin ... Against the old Bolsheviks, Lenin found support in another, already hardened, but with the mass connected stratum of the party. In the February Revolution, the Bolshevik workers played a decisive role. They took it for granted that the class that won the victory should take power. These workers violently protested against the course of Kamenev-Stalin, and the Vyborg Party District Committee even threatened to expel the "leaders" from the party. The same thing was observed in the provinces... Lenin was guided by these workers..." (T.. Trö7, "Cessche er ru\$15sVen Beuoan", Estsverve Verpach, 1967, \$. 359-360).

It must not be thought that the Central Committee intended to give in easily. He was already aware of the politics and tactics of the April Theses from Lenin's five Letters from Afar, of which Pravda published only one in March, and then with abbreviations, as already mentioned.

The Bureau of the Central Committee, the editors of Pravda and the PC of the party thought that they should not take the point of view of Lenin (in their opinion, emigre, backward and even non-Marxist), but Lenin should submit to the Central Committee and support the decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee and the All-Russian Conference that had just ended party workers. Moreover, Lenin's authority in the party was not absolute. Trotsky remarks: "The actual influence of Lenin in the party was undoubtedly very great, but it was by no means unlimited. It did not become even later, after October, neo-

limited" (ibid., p. 257).

We have already seen from history how Lenin's comrades-in-arms, the founders of Bolshevism, often disagreed with Lenin. In most cases, Lenin won, but there were cases when they also won. True, there has never been such a case that the entire general staff of Bolshevism revolted against Lenin, as now. The more reason the rebels had

expect to win. Although Lenin was going to fight "1 against 110", he was too real a politician not to see that alone, without his already existing army and its headquarters, he could not achieve his goal - seizing power in the near future. Here the interdependence was complete: a party without Lenin is a machine without a rudder, and Lenin without a party is a rudder without a machine. Sukhanov, a witness and participant in the events, whom Lenin called "the best representative of petty-bourgeois democracy," wrote:

"To be left without Lenin does not mean tearing the heart out of the body, tearing off the head? .. Apart from Lenin, there was no one and nothing in the party. Several major generals are nothing without Lenin, like several vast planets without the sun" (N. Sukhanov, Notes on the Revolution, book Sh, Berlin-Petersburg Moscow, 1922, pp. 54-55). Of course, even without Lenin the party would have existed as it did in March, but it would have been an ordinary leftist revolutionary-democratic party, a little more to the left of Menshevism, but much closer to Martov than to Lenin. Such a party would have ended by giving the parliamentary republic two or three Left ministers.

But it was not for parliament that Lenin created his party, but Lenin conceived his party as an instrument for the destruction of all parliamentarism. The dispute between Lenin and the Central Committee seems to be tactical, but in reality the point is that Lenin accuses his party that, being a prisoner of dogmatic schemes, it missed the power in February-March.

True, Lenin himself was the author of dogmatic schemes, when in Two Tactics (1905) he argued that, according to Marxism, first there is a "bourgeois-democratic" revolution and a democratic republic ("democratic dictatorship"), and then a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Russian Central Committee clung to this scheme. But just in connection with the war, Lenin revised it, putting forward a new doctrine about the victory of socialism in the "weak link" of imperialism.

This revision went unnoticed by his students because Lenin was deliberately vague so as not to be accused of openly revising Marxism on this cardinal issue. In the April Theses, Lenin was already specific; there, firstly, he explained the reason why the party did not seize power, and secondly, he set the task of seizing this power, even if belatedly. Here is the corresponding place of the "theses":

"The peculiarity of the current moment in Russia lies in the transition from the first stage of the revolution, which gave power to the bourgeoisie due to insufficient

consciousness and organization of the proletariat (emphasis mine. - A. A.), - to its second stage, which should give power into the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasantry" (Lenin, Soch., 4th ed., vol. 24, p. . 4).

This means that you, the leaders of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks in Russia, due to your "irresponsibility" and "disorganization", did not take power in February March, but you are obliged to take it now, you are even on the way to it. This

furthermore, it means that a "dictatorship of the proletariat" could exist in Russia and it had to be established immediately after the overthrow of the tsar, exactly according to Trotsky's famous slogan in 1905: "Without a tsar, but a workers' government." Trotsky remarks on the reaction of the Bolshevik leaders to the April Theses: "The prospect of a direct transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat came quite unexpectedly, contrary to tradition. It simply did not fit in the head... It is not surprising that Lenin's "April Theses" were denounced as Trotskyist (T.. Tro{7K1, ibid., p. 255).

Let's return to the chronology of events. On the second day after returning to Petrograd, April 4, Lenin spoke in the Tauride Palace at a meeting of the Bolsheviks - participants in the All-Russian Conference of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies with his "Theses". On the same day, he repeated this speech at a joint meeting of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, participants in the same All-Russian Conference. These theses provide an answer to the question of how, finally, the Bolsheviks can and must now take power into their own hands. What Lenin said did not fit not only into the Menshevik, but also into the Bolshevik heads. The main "theses":

1. no support for the Provisional Government, exposure of the "demand" that this government cease to be imperialist;

and: not the slightest concession to "revolutionary defensism", exposing it;

5: peace is impossible under the existing system, for peace it is necessary to take power into one's own hands;

4. not a parliamentary republic, but a republic of Soviets, to win a majority in the Soviets, exposing there the "petty-bourgeois opportunist parties" of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries;

5: change the party program and rename the party to

Communist Party in order to dissociate itself from the world social democracy and from the Russian Mensheviks (Lenin, ibid., pp. 4-6).

So, Lenin, in essence, declared three wars: 1. war on the Provisional Government, 2. war on the petty-bourgeois opportunist parties of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, 3. war on the entire leadership of the Bolshevik Party.

How did the Menshevik and Bolshevik leaders react to this?

About the reaction of the Plekhanov group, Lenin himself wrote as follows: "G. Plekhanov called my speech "delusional" in his newspaper. Very well, Mr. Plekhanov. But look how clumsy, awkward and slow-witted you are in your polemics. If I spoke a delusional speech for two hours, how did hundreds of listeners tolerate the delirium? Further. Why does your newspaper devote a whole column to the presentation of "nonsense"? (ibid., p. 7).

Sukhanov tells how the leader of the Mensheviks in the Duma, the future minister Skobelev, spoke of Lenin's speech: "The conversation turned to Lenin in general. Skobelev talked about his crazy ideas, estimating Lenin as a completely inveterate person, standing outside the movement. In general, I joined in the assessment of Lenin's ideas and said that Lenin in his present

form is so unacceptable to anyone that now it is absolutely not dangerous for my interlocutor Milyukov" (Sukhanov, *ibid.*, p. 48).

The same Sukhanov also cites the reaction of the Bolshevik leaders: "Five days after his arrival, Lenin called a meeting of the old Bolshevik generals ... Lenin called on his marshals not to convince them and argue with them: he only wanted to find out if they believed in his new truths... The marshals delivered a speech. Not one expressed the slightest sympathy" (*ibid.*, p. 50).

On April 7, Lenin's "Theses" were published in Pravda. On April 8, Pravda, the party's central organ, edited by Kamenev and Stalin, made the following editorial note to them: and counts on the immediate degeneration of this revolution into a socialist revolution.

Lenin himself noted that "the 'theses' and my report aroused disagreements among the Bolsheviks themselves and among the editors of Pravda" (Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 23). This was modestly said: not a single vote in favor of Lenin was heard in the Central Committee, the PC and the editorial board. Even Zinoviev's position was unclear,

came with Lenin. Lenin was supported only by three immigrant women close to him - Kollontai, Inessa Armand and his wife N. Krupskaya.

Lenin suggested to his rebellious party "marshals" that an open discussion be held in the party - who is right: the Central Committee or Lenin? Pravda or Lenin?

"After a number of meetings, we unanimously came to the conclusion that it would be most expedient to openly discuss these differences" (*ibid.*, p. 23).

But this already predetermined the total victory of Lenin. The April Theses only successfully formulated the idea of seizing power, which vaguely owned the lower Bolshevik masses. This idea was already once formulated in the Central Committee Manifesto of February 26 in the form of a slogan about the transfer of power to the "Provisional Revolutionary Government", but Kamenev, Stalin, Sverdlov, replacing Shlyapnikov, Zalutsky and Molotov in the leadership of the Central Committee, rejected this idea. Beginning on April 8, a discussion for and against Lenin's theses began in the main committees of the party and regional organizations. The lower down the ladder of the party hierarchy, the greater the support for Lenin. The party committees of Petrograd and Moscow are splitting—the upper classes are against it, the rank and file members are for Lenin. The district organizations are in the majority for Lenin, the local cells are all for it. Some local workers' and soldiers' meetings even demand an immediate transfer of power to the Soviets (History of the CPSU, vol. 3, book D, p. 63). The official historian notes: "It was among the workers that the theses found a warm response" (*ibid.*, p. 60). Lenin didn't need anything else.

Using the military terminology of Sukhanov, we can say that a situation has arisen when at the top of the party pyramid there is a commander who decides to give a general battle, below him is the General Staff, sabotaging battle plans, and at the base of the pyramid is the Bolshevik army, ready at any time on the orders of the commander move into battle. It was to this army, bypassing the General Staff, that Lenin, the commander, began to appeal from the very first day of his return. Lenin back in 1900

said that the newspaper is not only a collective propagandist, but also a collective organizer. Therefore, the first thing he cares about after returning is to take over the main editing of Pravda, ousting Stalin from its editorial board (he put him in the Central Committee to work on the national question), Kamenev (switched to the work of the chairman of the Bolshevik

faction in the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies).

Through Pravda, Lenin establishes direct contact with the rank and file of the Party. In order to win over the "officer corps" of the party, he writes for five days (from April 8 to 13) three works of exclusively tactical significance: "On Dual Power", "Letters on Tactics" and "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution". In them, Lenin finally buries the platform and tactics of the old Bureau of the Central Committee, the PC and the editorial board of Pravda. In them, Lenin gives a theoretical justification for the "reorientation", "re-equipment" of the party - Lenin proclaims a revision of the old classical Leninism of 1903-1905, which his students are now seizing on. The root of the revision: the revision of that point in the current program of the party, which speaks of the establishment of a "democratic republic" in Russia after the overthrow of tsarism, the revision of that point in Lenin's work "Two Tactics" (1905), which speaks of a democratic republic as an inevitable system on the way to socialism.

Lenin, as they say, directly takes the bull by the horns. He says: "The fundamental question of any revolution is the question of power" (Lenin, Soch. vol. 24, p. 19). So the question stood in February-March, but the Bolsheviks, due to a number of conditions, including the dogmatic order, missed this power. What to do now, in April, should the Provisional Government be immediately overthrown? Lenin: "I answer: 1) it must be overthrown, because it is oligarchic, bourgeois ... 2) it cannot be overthrown now, because it is maintained by direct and indirect ... agreement with the Soviets ... 3) it cannot be "overthrown" at all by ordinary way" (Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 21).

How to be? It is necessary for the Bolsheviks to win a majority in the Soviets, pushing the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries out of there, and as soon as this goal is achieved, overthrow the Provisional Government not in the "usual" way, but by an uprising (and this happened in October 1917). Lenin again and again raises the same question of power: you, workers and soldiers, overthrew the tsar, therefore, you, workers and soldiers, should have power. "All power to the Soviets," says Lenin. Lenin is not only successful among the rank and file, among the masses of the Party, but now, the closer to the All-Russian Party Conference, scheduled for the end of April, the more he wins over to his side the "party officers". This, in turn, affects the generals of the party. Here is what Sukhanov wrote about this process:

"The daring 'leftism' of Lenin, his reckless radicalism,

primitive demagoguery, not restrained by either science or common sense - subsequently ensured his success among the broadest proletarian peasant masses who knew no other training than the royal whip. But these same properties of Leninist propaganda also bribed the more backward elements of the party itself... The position of this mass could not fail to have a decisive effect on the fully conscious Bolshevik elements, on the Bolshevik generals. After all, after Lenin had won the "party officers", people like, for example, Kamenev, turned out to be completely isolated ... And Lenin won victory after victory" (Sukhanov, *ibid.*, pp. 57-58).

The period from the Petrograd City Conference (April 14) to the beginning of the All-Russian Party Conference (April 24) is a series of Lenin's victories over the old Central Committee. The main report "On the Current Situation" at the Petrograd City Conference was made by Lenin himself. There, Lenin once again substantiated Lenin's revision of the old Leninism. Speaking of "dual power" as a phenomenal fact, Lenin remarked: "This is where a revision of the old Bolshevism is needed... The bourgeois revolution in Russia is over, since power has fallen into the hands of the bourgeoisie. Here the old Bolsheviks refute: 'It is not finished - there is no dictatorship of the proletariat.' But the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is this dictatorship" (Lenin, Soch., vol. 24, p. 116). Lenin says that now it is precisely what must be fought for the autocracy of this Soviet, which will mean the transfer of power into the hands of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry, that is, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

At the front, bayonets should not be thrown either, they should only be turned inland. "Down with the war does not mean throwing down the bayonet. This means the transfer of power to another class," said Lenin (ibid., p. 119).

What does it mean? This means - "The government must be overthrown ... by winning a majority in the Soviets," he says (ibid., p. 120). In a word: "Old Bolshevism must be abandoned!" (ibid., p. 122).

Lenin also resolutely condemned the entire revolutionary phraseology of the March decisions of the Bureau of the Central Committee on the war and the Provisional Government:

"Revolutionary democracy is no good, this is a phrase ... To end the war pacifistically is a utopia ... It is impossible to control (the Provisional Government. - A. A.) without power ... unification with the parties, as whole, pursuing a policy of supporting the Provisional Government .... undoubtedly

impossible" (Lenin, ibid., pp. 123, 124, 131). All resolutions of the conference were adopted in this new-Leninist spirit. Petrograd set the tone for the province. Resolutions approving the "April Theses" began to arrive from the provinces. Lenin printed them neatly in Pravda. Lenin skillfully used the first crisis of the Provisional Government, connected with the note of Foreign Minister Milyukov to the governments of England and France (April 18). In this note, Milyukov wrote that Russia would honor its obligations in the war and believe in a victorious end to the war. This caused an outburst of indignation among the workers and soldiers of Petrograd. There was an armed demonstration and a meeting of soldiers (15 thousand people) in front of the residence of the Provisional Government - in front of the Mariinsky Palace. Slogans stood out: "Down with Milyukov", "Down with the Provisional Government". The Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary leaders managed to peacefully liquidate the incident, promising to discuss the issue in the Soviet. The Bolsheviks took advantage of the crisis to once again declare that the war could be ended only by the seizure of power by the Soviet (resolution of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (6) of April 21). Some of the leaders of the Petrograd Committee (Bogdatiev's group) even put forward a slogan for the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government. However, the Central Committee, at the suggestion of Lenin, condemned such a slogan. The resolution of the Central Committee of April 22, 1917 states:

"The slogan: 'Down with the Provisional Government' is not true now because without a strong (i.e., conscious and organized) majority of the people on the side of the revolutionary proletariat, such a slogan is either a phrase or objectively boils down to attempts of an adventurist nature. Only then will we be in favor of the transfer of power into the hands ... when the Soviets of workers and



soldiers' deputies will take the side of our policy" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 31, pp. 319-320).

As practical tasks for the Central Committee, Lenin put forward the slogans: 1. clarification of the Bolshevik policy of the "April Theses", 2. exposure and criticism of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Party in the Soviets, 3. propaganda and agitation "among every regiment, at every factory, especially among the most backward masses, servants, unskilled workers ...", 4. "organization, organization and once again organization of the proletariat: at every factory, in every district, in every quarter", 5. instead of opportunists, send to the Soviets "only such comrades who express the will of the majority (ibid., p. 320).

The Central Committee indicated to its party members that it, the Central Committee, was now against all armed demonstrations. Therefore, the Central Committee considers correct the decision of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies against such demonstrations and that it "is subject to unconditional implementation" (ibid., p. 320).

Thus, Lenin announced publicly that he was not playing in the dark, but was going to battle, creating solid prerequisites for victory. These days Lenin repeats many times: we are not Blanquists and not adventurers. Lenin is ready for a decisive battle only when the "majority" is on his side, but he does not mean the majority in the whole country and in the whole army, not even in the capital, but only the majority in the Petrograd factories and in the barracks, the majority - only in Petrograd streets.

Thus, in only two weeks, Lenin's work caused such a leftward movement in the Party that the mass of the Party in Petrograd and part of the Petrograd Committee made, in Lenin's words, "attempts to take our Central Committee 'a little more to the left'" (ibid., p. 337); but Lenin called on the party to discipline and to ensure that from each local organization there were "direct threads to the center, to the Central Committee"; these threads should be "constant, daily, hourly strengthened and tested", "so that the enemy could not take us by surprise" (ibid., p. 338). In other words, it is necessary to prepare for the seizure of power, but when this happens, this time it will be determined not by the masses from below, but by the Central Committee of the party - from above.

Such was the situation in the Party when the Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP(b) opened on April 24.

#### Chapter 10

#### CC BETWEEN APRIL AND JULY 1917

At the UP party conference (April 24-29, 1917) there were 151 delegates (133 with a decisive vote and 18 with an advisory vote). They represented 80,000 party members from 78 party organizations (History of the CPSU, vol. 3, book D, p. 70). Lenin was elected chairman of the conference, but Kamenev and Stalin did not even get into its presidium. At the conference, which brought together the entire elite of the party, the issues raised in the "April Theses" were discussed.

Namely: the war and the Provisional Government, the attitude towards the Soviets,

revision of the party program, the International and the tasks of the party, unite

opinion of social-democratic internationalist organizations, agrarian question, national question, Constituent Assembly, reports on regions, elections of a new Central Committee ("CPSU in Res.", part 1, pp. 333-353). All the main reports were made by Lenin. In addition, he spoke on various issues on the agenda about 30 times. A co-report was made by Kamenev, in which he defended the line of the old Central Committee already known to us.

Kamenev declared: "In my opinion, Comrade. Lenin when he says that the bourgeois-democratic revolution is over. I think that it has not ended, and this is our difference ... It is too early to say that bourgeois democracy has exhausted all its possibilities" ("The Seventh (April) Conference of the RSDLP (b) ... April 1917 Protocols. Moscow, 1958, p. 80).

Kamenev continued to offer pressure on the Provisional Government and control of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies over its actions. In addition, he thought that there was no need to break with the bloc of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Soviets (ibid., p. 81). To varying degrees and for various reasons, Rykov, Bubnov, Smidovich, Bogdatiev, Milyutin leaned towards him. Unlike Kamenev, Stalin appeared at the conference as a capitulator. Very sensibly and timely (from the point of view of his future career), Stalin, on all issues of the old policy of the Central Committee, capitulated to the "April Theses", which he called the "bare scheme" three weeks ago, and surrendered unconditionally to the mercy of Lenin. If the critic surrendered, then Lenin spared him. So it happened with Stalin. Lenin instructed him to make a report on the national question at the conference. True, the main theses of the report belonged to Lenin in the form of a draft conference resolution, but Stalin defended them quite skillfully (Stalin was considered the party's expert on the national question since 1913, when he wrote the famous work Marxism and the National Question).

As already noted, Lenin considered the national-colonial question as a matter of tactics, not a program. Therefore, the demand was put forward for the right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination up to secession. The purpose of the demand is to secure the support of the non-Russian peoples for the Bolshevik revolution. After the seizure of power, the question of the right of the peoples to secede from Russia was decided "from the point of view of the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat for socialism" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 31, p. 440). In other words, when

Socialism no longer had the right to secede.

Lenin and Stalin had to defend this "dialectical" truth at a conference against Pyatakov, Dzerzhinsky, Makharadze, Bukharin, who could not assimilate it in any way. Yes, Lenin won, but a section of the old Central Committee, headed by Kamenev, continued at the conference to fight against Lenin's "Theses" on almost all questions. The following voting data show the sharpness of the discussion ("CPSU in Res.", Part 1, pp. 332-353).

Questions For Against - Refusal to  
discuss Lenin Lenin was sorry 1. About the  
war 126 - 7

2. Relation to the Provisional

government 122 3 8

3. On the agrarian issue 122 - 11

4. Refusal to participate in the  
conference of the II  
International (Suggestion

140 - 8 5. National question 56 16 18 6.  
Participation in Zimmer

Waldian Conference 1 132 - (Lenin himself)

7. About the current moment 71 39 8

8. All about the Soviets - 3

At the end of the conference, elections were held for the Central Committee, the first time since the Prague Conference in 1912. 9 people were elected to the Central Committee: V. I. Lenin, G. E. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev, V. P. Milyutin, V. Ts. Nogin, Ya. M. Sverdlov, I. T. Smilga, I. V. Stalin, G. F. Fedorov ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book D, p. 80).

Apart from Smilga and Lenin himself, all the others belonged to the old opportunist Bureau of the Central Committee (Zinoviev's position was vague). Lenin's consent to lead such a Central Committee showed that after the decisions of the conference on all controversial issues in Lenin's favor, the party generals surrendered.

What is the secret of Lenin's victory?

Three prominent contemporaries of Lenin give three different answers. Sukhanov says:  
"The brilliant Lenin was a historical authority, this is one side of the matter. The other is that apart from Lenin there was no one and nothing in the party" (Sukhanov, Notes on the Revolution, v. 3, p. 55).

Trotsky does not agree with this: "In fact, Lenin's authority in the party was undoubtedly great, in no case was it unlimited. Even later, after October, it was not unlimited (T. Trö{7, Cescische aer g15515sBen Beuoa Chop, p. 257; it is interesting to immediately note the opinion of Lenin himself about the scale of his influence in the Central Committee: when A. A. Ioffe wrote to Lenin, in 1921, a letter that "the Central Committee is Lenin", then Lenin replied as follows: "You are mistaken in repeating (repeatedly) that" the Central Committee, it is I "... The old Central Committee (1919-1920) beat me on one of the gigantic important questions that you know from the discussion. On organizational and personal issues, there are countless cases when I was in the minority. You yourself have seen examples of when you were a member of the Central Committee. "- "Leninsky Collection", XXX, 1958, p. 208).

Trotsky thinks that the old Bolshevik Olminsky is closer to the truth. In other words, we were preparing for October, while we thought that we were preparing for the February Revolution" (T. Tri7K1, ibid., p. 258). Trotsky adds that the "old Bolsheviks" were "doomed

to defeat because they defended precisely that element of the party tradition that did not stand the test of history" (ibid., p. 259). Stalin emphasized the all-conquering power of Lenin's logic as a speaker. Stalin wrote, however, on a different occasion:

"I was captivated by that irresistible force in Lenin's speeches, which somewhat dryly, but thoroughly takes possession of the audience, gradually electrifies it and then captures it, as they say, without a trace. I remember how many of the delegates then said: "The logic in Lenin's speeches is some kind of omnipotent tentacles that grip you from all sides with pincers and from whose embrace there is no strength to escape: either give up or decide on a complete failure" "(Stalin, Op. 6, p. 55).

The subjective qualities of the Bolshevik leader, as well as his historical authority, of course, are of great importance. However, *ceteris paribus*, the influence of objective

factor - the operation of the hierarchical principle of subordination in such a unique organization as the Bolshevik Party. In this party the right to one's opinion is relative, the duty of obedience is absolute. Leninist democratic centralism, in the words of Lenin himself, means the centralization of leadership and the decentralization of responsibility. Moreover, speaking by analogy, the Bolshevik Party was a political firm created and invented by Lenin, in which he was the complete master. All these Kamenevs and Stalins were his workers. If it happened that the "workers" rebelled ("Vperyodists"), then he simply threw them away. Lenin considered himself indispensable by the mere right to own a firm. And he was. At the sharp turns of history, only that leader has a chance of success who has the gift of political foresight, only he masters his party who offers it the most convincing alternative on the path to power.

Lenin was like that. To all this, Lenin was a fanatic of power. Gradually, the thirst for power became the driving force behind his ideas, as well as the ideas of the party he created. Power is the "libido" of all the social passions of Bolshevism. Lenin's road to state power lay through victory over his own party. In April, Lenin won this victory. The Menshevik *Rabochaya Gazeta* (May 2, 1917) stated only the truth when, summing up the results of the April Conference, it wrote:

"The famous Leninist 'theses' ceased to be the product of Lenin's personal creativity, a commodity brought from abroad ... 140 delegates to the Bolshevik conference, almost as one person, adopted resolutions that set out in expanded form the main ideas of the same theses."

Having taken the reins of government of the party into his own hands, Lenin developed exceptional activity in disseminating and popularizing among the people the decisions of the April Conference. From April to July 4, 1917, 175 articles and notes by Lenin were published in 69 party press organs (History of the CPSU, vol. 3, book 1, pp. 85-86). They all hit the same target: not a single issue in the life of Russia can be resolved without the transfer of power to the Bolsheviks. The party press - 50 newspapers and magazines with a circulation of more than 500,000 copies - preaches the same idea. First and foremost, Lenin inspires the party activists, its officer corps, that the idea of seizing power is not a utopia or a dream, but the reality of literally days, weeks, maximum months, but not years.

In the interests of organizational preparations for the seizure of power, Lenin also restructures the work of the Central Committee. Under the PC, a new leading executive body is being created - the Secretariat of the Central Committee, headed by the professional revolutionary Ya. M. Sverdlov, with two auxiliary institutions: the Bureau of the Military Organization ("military") and the Bureau of the Press.

The secretariat of the Central Committee is launching a recruitment campaign for the party of workers and soldiers. This leads to the growth of the party. Three months after the April Conference, the party organization in Petrograd, Moscow, the Urals, the Donbass, and the Central Industrial Region more than doubled. At the same time there is a disengagement with the Mensheviks. According to the guidelines of the April Conference, those Mensheviks who do not recognize the decisions of this conference are expelled from the local Party organizations.

When publishing the decisions of the April Conference, Lenin accompanied them with the following explanation: "In order to take power ... to retain it ... organization, organization and organization is necessary" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 31, p. 456). Lenin develops this organization in the following way:

1. Among workers. Literally at every large plant cells or groups of the party are organized. Party factions are created in all trade unions (factory committees). On May 30-June 3, 1917, the First Conference of Factory and Plant Committees took place in Petrograd, at which Lenin and the Socialist Minister of Labor Skobelev made speeches. The minister spoke of government control over production, and Lenin proposed workers' control, "so that the majority of workers enter all responsible institutions and that the administration ... give an account to authoritative workers' organizations" (Lenin, *ibid.*, vol. 32, p. 240). In a word, the masters of production should not be the owners and not even the Provisional Government, but the working class with its control. Such propaganda was successful: when at the end of the conference 25 people were elected to the Central Council of Factory Committees, 19 of them turned out to be members of the Bolshevik Party. The official historian says:

"This allowed the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) through the Central Council of the FZK of Petrograd to influence the work of the factory committees of other cities," since it "until October 1917 actually performed the functions of an all-Russian center" ("History of the CPSU", Vol. 3, book 1, page 99).

2. Among the peasants. The weakest position of the Bolsheviks was in the countryside.

Suffice it to say that the Bolsheviks did not manage to create a single cell of the party in the countryside until the very seizure of power. The Russian countryside is the monopoly of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, those spiritual heirs of Narodism. It is all the more interesting to emphasize that the Bolsheviks politically killed the Socialist-Revolutionaries with one blow by not only accepting their agrarian program (transferring land to the peasants through peasant committees), but also discrediting the Socialist-Revolutionary leaders-ministers, putting forward the demand that the peasants seize the landed estates, without waiting for the ill-fated Constituent Assembly. Lenin justified this demand at the First All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Soviets. There were no Bolsheviks among the delegates. Only a small "non-party group" of 14 people sympathized with the Bolsheviks. In contrast to the attitudes of the Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, who declared that the solution of the agrarian question was the business of the future Constituent Assembly, Lenin put forward a different program. The effectiveness of Lenin's program was too obvious to be called demagogic. Lenin said that if we take the richest landowners of the whole

European Russia, it turns out that 30,000 people have about 70,000,000 acres of land, while 10,000,000 poor peasant households also have about 70-75 million acres of land, which means that each landowner there has over 2 thousand acres, and each peasant yard only 7 acres! Lenin concluded his speech: "We want the peasants now, without wasting a single month, not a single week, not a single day, to receive landowners' lands" (Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 174). This can be achieved, Lenin said, by declaring the land "the property of the whole people." Although the congress was a Socialist-Revolutionary, the protocol notes that Lenin was seen off with "applause." Moreover, the Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper *Zemlya i Volya* noted that "For the last two days the mood at the congress has been very tense. A significant part of the deputies insisted that the land be immediately declared public property ... The greatest tension was felt the next day after Lenin's report (May 23) ..." (Lenin, PSS, vol. 32, p. 490).

The ice of Bolshevism was also broken in the peasant ocean of Russia. The fourteen millionth Russian army - this was peasant Russia dressed in soldier's overcoats. The fate of Lenin's plan to seize power depended on how this Russia behaved. Into the growing agrarian movement in Russia (in March there were 50 peasant

May-June - 1600), the Bolsheviks throw out the then sensational slogan: "rob the loot." And the peasants rob, burn, seize the landowners' estates.

3. Among the soldiers. Lenin perfectly understood that in the struggle for power the proletariat alone was nothing if the army at the decisive moment was on the side of the government. The army had to be opposed to the Provisional Government, and for this it was necessary to issue slogans that were intelligible and accessible to the simple soldier's mind. Among such slogans, the first place was given to the slogan "immediate peace", to put an "end to the damned massacre" (Trotsky), to let the soldiers go home. The Central Committee of the RSDLP(b) issues directives on the creation of Bolshevik party cells in all regiments and on ships. By May, there were about 6,000 Bolsheviks in the Petrograd garrison, and there were cells in all regiments ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book 1, p. 120).

The Central Committee through the "Voyenka" and through a special newspaper of the Central Committee for the army - through "Soldatskaya Pravda" - creates a special network of propaganda and political service in the army. Communication between the party and the army is becoming regular. In June alone, more than 9,000 delegates from the front and rear garrisons turned to the Military Commission of the Central Committee for advice and instructions (*ibid.*, p. 120). The Military Bureau of the Moscow Party Committee united more than two thousand military communists from the Moscow garrison. In the Baltic Fleet, there were party organizations or groups on almost all large ships. By the summer of 1917, the number of communists there reached 3-4 thousand people (*ibid.*, p. 121). The military organization of the 12th army, stationed in the area of Latvia, was more than 3,500 people. She published the newspaper *Trench Pravda* (*ibid.*, p. 122).

On June 16-23, the Central Committee held an All-Russian military conference of front-line and rear organizations. 43 front-line and 17 rear organizations (26,000 party members) were represented there. Lenin made a report on the current situation. In a resolution on this report, the conference wrote: "To prepare the forces of the proletariat and the revolutionary army in the most energetic way for a new stage of the revolution" - that is, for the seizure of power ("CPSU in Res.", Part 1, p. 356). At the conference, the Charter of military party organizations was approved, in which

the structure of party organizations was established from the company cell, as an elementary unit, to the All-Russian Bureau of Military Organizations under the Central Committee, as the highest authority. To the All-Russian Bureau of Military Organizations

the future military leaders of the October coup were elected: Antonov-Ovseenko, Krylenko, Podvoisky, Kedrov, Mekhonoshin, Nevsky and others. Podvoisky was elected chairman ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book 1, pp. 125-126). 4. Among non-Russian peoples. In Russia, Lenin was the only politician who, on the eve of the First World War, directly and openly declared the right of the peoples of multinational Russia to self-determination, up to and including separation from the Russian state. To the surprise of his students and to the horror of his enemies, he recognized this right even for Ukraine. The dismemberment of Russia, of course, was not Lenin's goal, but he saw the way to the Bolshevik conquest of the peoples of Russia through the recognition of the right of independence. This recognition was supposed to provide him with the support of non-Russian peoples (about 47%!) on the path to power. It is the duty of the Russian Bolsheviks to recognize this right, the duty of the Bolsheviks among the non-Russian peoples of Russia to preach absence from Russia—such is Lenin's directive on the paths to October. This tactic paid off completely. Stalin was right when, summing up the results of these Leninist tactics, he wrote:

"The revolution in Russia would not have won and Kolchak and Denikin would not have been defeated if the Russian proletariat had not had the sympathy and support of the oppressed peoples of the former Russian Empire" (Stalin, Questions of Leninism, p. 51). With regard to those peoples who wish to remain part of Russia, the Bolsheviks proposed the autonomy of national regions. Only for the first time, at the Fifth Congress of Soviets in June 1917, did Lenin find the long-sought formula. Recognizing as before the right of peoples to self-determination, he proposed the creation of a new Russia as a federation of republics. He said: "Let Russia be a union of free republics" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 32, p. 286).

The flexibility of Lenin's tactics on the national question was demonstrated when the Finnish Seim and the Ukrainian Rada (the first "Universal") made demands for the autonomy of their countries, and the Provisional Government rejected these demands, referring to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. All the political parties of Russia, from the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, to the Cadets, not to mention the more right-wing groups, unanimously supported the Provisional Government in this conflict. Only Lenin and his party recognized their right to autonomy and even to secession from Russia. In particular, about the demand of Ukraine, Lenin wrote:

"Not a single democrat, let alone a socialist, would dare to deny

complete legitimacy of Ukrainian demands. No democrat can also deny the right of Ukraine to free secession from Russia" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 32, p. 351).

True, in January 1918, when the Ukrainian Rada declared the independence of Ukraine from Soviet Russia, Lenin declared: the Bolsheviks recognized the right to independence of the Ukrainian people, and not of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and landowners! The Bolsheviks linked both the solution of world problems and the improvement of public services invariably and everywhere with the same question - with the question of the transfer of power into their hands. Only their power could satisfy any demands. In one of the documents of the Central Committee of the party in May 1917, "it was especially emphasized that municipal (communal) issues can be resolved in the interests of the people only if

the transfer of power to the proletariat" (History of the CPSU, vol. 3, book 1, p. 107). Thus, linking big politics with the "little things" of everyday life, the Central Committee seeks to increase the number of Bolshevik deputies in the Soviets and city dumas. This tactic has had some, though not decisive, success. So, if in March 1917 there were only 40 Bolsheviks in the Petrograd Soviet, then in July there were 400 of them. In June, out of 625 deputies in the Moscow Soviet, there were 205 Bolsheviks (ibid., pp. 93, 94). In the elections to the district dumas in Petrograd in May, the Bolsheviks received 20% of all votes, and in the Moscow City Duma, 12% (ibid., p. 108). It was still far from the majority. At such a rate of growth in the influence of the Bolsheviks, it was far from the cherished goal - to the conquest of power by peaceful means through the Soviet majority, as was said in the April theses.

Lenin explained such an insignificant success of the Bolsheviks by the "bad instincts" ... of the proletariat! In an article dated May 6, he wrote:

"Proletarians and semi-proletarians also have bad instincts: for example, a slow liberation from the illusions of a petty-bourgeois character, a slow transition to the conviction that "power" must be taken into the hands of this particular class and only this class" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 32, page 35).

I. G. Tsereteli says in his "Memoirs of the February Revolution" that since May, Lenin, in fact, has been preparing his students for the forcible seizure of power. Tsereteli writes:

"In the circle of his collaborators, at closed meetings of the Bolshevik Central Committee, since May, Lenin has been zealously drumming these views into his supporters, and it was precisely with this consideration that he substantiated the need for an immediate

transition from propaganda to an armed struggle for power" (I. G. Tsereteli, Memories of the February Revolution, Prince P, Paris, 1963, p. 168).

That Lenin was ready to take power into his own hands, even being in an absolute minority in the Soviet, was shown by Lenin's remark and speeches at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in June 1917. 822 delegates were represented at this congress, of which 533 delegates belonged to the Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary bloc (285 Socialist-Revolutionaries and 248 Mensheviks), and only 105 delegates belonged to the Bolshevik faction (ibid., p. 165, see also History of the CPSU, vol. 3, book 1, p. 141).

In this regard, Tsereteli recalls his report at the congress and Lenin's remark (however, this episode is reflected in all Bolshevik writings about 1917):

"When I stated that at the moment there is no political party in Russia that would say: give power into our hands, leave, we will take your place. There is no such party in Russia. Lenin suddenly, unexpectedly for everyone, defiantly got up from his seat and shouted: "Yes!" This exclamation of Lenin caused a real sensation. For the first time since the February Revolution, a Bolshevik leader dared to declare that his party was ready to immediately take power into its own hands" (ibid., pp. 169-170).

Lenin repeated his "is" in his speech at the congress on June 4 (17): the Bolshevik Party "is ready to take full power every minute (applause - laughter). You can laugh as much as you like, but if the Citizen Minister puts us before this question alongside the Right Party, he will receive a proper answer" (Lenin, ibid., p. 267).



Substantiating the thesis that power can and should be taken into one's own hands if a good opportunity presents itself, Lenin wrote a little later, in September 1917:

"I continue to stand on the point of view that a political party ... would not have the right to exist, would be unworthy of being considered a party, would be a miserable zero in every sense if it renounced power, since there is a possibility to gain power" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, pp. 290-291).

Lenin's speech at the congress was, according to Tsereteli, the announcement of a new turn in the tactics of the Bolsheviks - the transition from the tactics of the peaceful conquest of power through the Soviet majority ("April Theses") to the tactics of the forcible seizure of power even before the victory of the named majority.

This policy was approved at a secret meeting of the Central Committee. The day of the uprising was also appointed - June 10, 1917. On this day, an armed demonstration was appointed, which was supposed to end in an uprising and the overthrow of the Provisional Government. This plan for the Bolshevik uprising was first published in the fourth book of Sukhanov's Notes on the Revolution in 1922. The Bolsheviks did not refute Sukhanov's data. Tsereteli does not doubt that the Bolsheviks had such a plan at that time. Paraphrasing Sukhanov, he writes:

"At a secret meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee, when discussing the question of the speech on June 10, Lenin and his closest supporters took, according to Sukhanov, the following position: "Lenin's group did not go straight to the seizure of power, but it was ready to take power under favorable conditions, which she took steps to create." Two members of the Central Committee, Stalin and Stasova, supported by one of the two main leaders of the Bolshevik military organization Nevsky, spoke out against this cautious tactic: they proposed to speed up the movement and bring it to the end, under any conditions. On the other hand, two members of the Central Committee, Zinoviev and Kamenev, spoke out against the speech. The majority of the Central Committee rejected both of these extreme proposals and adopted the following plan of action emanating from Lenin: "The shock point of the demonstration scheduled for June 10 was the Mariinsky Palace, the residence of the Provisional Government. Work detachments and regiments loyal to the Bolsheviks were to go there. Specially appointed persons should were to call members of the cabinet from the palace and ask them questions. Specially appointed groups were supposed to express "popular discontent" during ministerial speeches, cheer up the masses. At the right temperature of mood, the Provisional Government should have been immediately arrested "(Tsereteli, *ibid.*, p. 185).

Yes, Lenin suggested that. The appeal of the Central Committee to the soldiers and workers leaves no doubt about this. This appeal, which was distributed in factories, barracks and on the streets of Petrograd on June 9, 1917, said:

"Workers! Join the soldiers... Everyone out, comrades!

Soldiers! Stretch out your hands to the workers... Not a single regiment, not a single company should sit in the barracks today.

All out, comrades!

All power to the All-Russian Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies" (Tsereteli, *ibid.*, pp. 204-205).

At a meeting of the Central Committee and the PC, it was decided, under the guise of a peaceful demonstration, to begin the speech on June 10.

The task of the action: if the forces and the situation allow, then turn the action into an uprising, but if the circumstances are unfavorable, then confine oneself to an armed, but "peaceful" demonstration. However, this plan was thwarted by the T All-Russian Congress of Soviets itself, which categorically forbade any kind of demonstration. The official historian writes:

The Bolsheviks were placed in a rather difficult position. Holding a demonstration would oppose them to the congress ... which would give an excuse to accuse the Bolsheviks of a conspiracy and crack down on them ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book 1, p. 144).

Under massive pressure [of the Congress of the Soviet, the Executive Committee of Peasant Soviets and its own faction] [of the Congress of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks capitulated on the evening of June 9: it canceled the speech. When the 1st Congress itself called a peaceful demonstration for June 18, the Bolshevik Central Committee joined it under the same slogans that it had prepared for June 10: "Down with 10 capitalist ministers!" (the other 6 were socialists), "All power to the Soviets".

The information given by Sukhanov and Tsereteli about the meeting of the Central Committee is essentially confirmed by the Bolshevik official historian:

"On June 6, a meeting of members of the Central Committee, the military organization under the Central Committee of the Party and the Executive Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee was held. A report was made by Podvoisky, who reported on the decision of the military organization, on the influence of the Bolsheviks in the Petrograd garrison, and spoke in favor of a demonstration of workers and soldiers. During the discussion, two points of view emerged. Lenin considered it expedient to hold a joint demonstration of the workers and soldiers against the Provisional Government, demanding the transfer of power to the Soviets. This point of view was supported by members of the Central Committee Sverdlov and Stalin. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Nogin opposed the demonstration ... Nogin argued that Lenin "offers a revolution when we are in the minority in the country" (History of the CPSU, vol. 3, book 1, p. 143, see also, "Revolutionary movement in Russia", Documents and materials, Moscow, 1959, p. 485).

Thus the first attempt of the Bolsheviks to overthrow the Provisional

government and seize power.

Bolshevik historians do not at all regard the June 10 conspiracy as their failure. They write:

"The imperious demand of the revolutionary masses, 'All power to the Soviets! And although the June events did not cause the fall of the government, they took place in conditions of more acute class contradictions...' (*ibid.*, p. 147).

The meaning of the quote is clear: this time the Bolsheviks failed to overthrow the government, but they were convinced of the possibility of doing so in the near future.

If you look from the side, it seems that the central slogan of the Bolsheviks "All power to the Soviets!" means nothing more than "All power to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries." Indeed, even after [the Congress of Soviets] the Bolsheviks constituted an insignificant minority both in the capital and in the provincial soviets. So, in the highest Soviet body - in the Central Executive Committee, elected at the [congress, the parties were represented as follows: a total of 256 deputies, of which: 104 Mensheviks, 99 Socialist-Revolutionaries, 18 representatives of small groups close to them, and only 35 Bolsheviks ("History of the CPSU ", vol. Z, book 1, p. 142).

Therefore, the transfer of power into the hands of the Soviets was supposed to mean the creation of a government of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries without the participation of the bourgeois parties. Lenin promised conditional support to the Soviet government, but he promised, convinced that power would not pass into the hands of these Soviets, but into the hands of the Bolshevik Soviets, which would be created and re-elected in the course of a victorious uprising. Already at the April Conference, the slogan was put forward for recalling the Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary deputies from the Soviets and replacing them with new deputies.

The events after the 1st Congress of Soviets - the failure of the offensive at the front and the new crisis of the Provisional Government - led to an even greater aggravation of the situation. The army is disintegrating catastrophically. After initial success, the June offensive of the Russian army began to fizzle out. During this offensive on the Southwestern Front from June 18 to July 6, the army lost 56 thousand people killed and wounded. But the catastrophe was different: the order to go on the offensive companies, regiments, divisions refused. Commander-in-Chief of the Front Brusilov

explained the failure of the offensive by the fact that no one, from the company commander to the commander in chief, does not exercise power over the soldiers. Another general - Klembovsky - hopelessly asked himself - what to do? "Introduce the death penalty? But is it possible to execute entire divisions? Prosecution? But then half of the army would be sitting in Siberia...'

Such was the result of the work of the soldiers' committees in the army. Under these conditions, a new crisis of the Provisional Government is taking place: on July 3, the Cadets ministers A. A. Manuilov, V. N. Shakhovskoy and A. I. Shingarev announced their withdrawal from the government. The reason was the recognition by the delegation of the Provisional Government (Kerensky, Tsereteli, Nekrasov), who traveled to Kyiv, of the internal autonomy of Ukraine (the "Second Universal" of the Ukrainian Rada). This delegation presented a corresponding proposal to the Provisional Government, but the Cadets, led by their leader Milyukov, did not want to hear about any kind of autonomy, even cultural, for Ukraine. Socialists (Kerensky, Tsereteli) and even left-wing Cadets (Nekrasov, Efremov) found that in the interests of consolidating revolutionary democracy it was necessary to show elasticity on the national question in precisely such a multinational country as Russia.

A new crisis in the government and the failure of a new offensive at the front were the desired conditions for the Bolshevik Central Committee to try once again to raise an uprising under the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" As before, the tactics of the Central Committee are as follows: to organize an armed demonstration of soldiers, Red Guards and workers. The demonstration should not go to the Mariinsky Palace (the residence of the Provisional Government), as in April, but to the Taurida Palace (the residence of the Soviets), as in February 1917,

when the Duma was there. The demonstrators will propose to the Soviets - the Petrograd and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets - that they now take all power into their own hands. If during the demonstration it turns out that the balance of power has developed in favor of the Bolsheviks, and the Soviets capitulate to the ultimatum of the demonstrators, that is, the rebels, then the Bolsheviks take power. If the Soviets and the Provisional Government turn out to be masters of the situation, the Bolsheviks will dissolve the demonstration. But under all conditions, the demonstration must be called unorganized, spontaneous; the Bolsheviks, according to the Stalinist textbook, decided only to lead it in order to "give it

peaceful and organized character" ("History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Short course", 1946, p. 186).

The latest official "History of the CPSU" draws the matter a little differently. It says that the Central Committee and the PC at a special meeting "decided to hold a peaceful and organized demonstration on July 4 under the slogan 'All power to the Soviets!' The meeting rejected Kamenev's proposal to run away from the citywide demonstration, confining itself to rallies. Neither did Trotsky's proposal to go out into the streets unarmed" (ibid., vol. 3, book 1, p. 150). That the demonstration was not spontaneous and that the Bolsheviks intended to seize power, if possible, is proved by the very "appeal" of the Central Committee and the PC on the night of July 3-4:

"Comrade workers and soldiers of Petrograd!.. Let the All-Russian Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies take all power into its own hands. Such is the will of the revolutionary population of Petrograd... Yesterday the revolutionary garrison of Petrograd and the workers came out to proclaim this slogan: All power to the Soviets. We call for this movement, which has flared up in the regiments and factories, to be turned into a peaceful, organized uprising of the entire workers, soldiers and peasants of Petrograd" (I. Tsereteli, "Memoirs of the February Revolution", book P, p. 289).

From early morning, the Bolsheviks distributed this appeal to regiments and factories. It received a wide response.

Both the Soviets and the Provisional Government were well aware that not a spontaneous demonstration was being prepared, but a test of strength, and, if possible, the seizure of power by the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. The more the Bolsheviks emphasized the peaceful nature of the demonstration, the less they were believed. A very interesting episode, which I. Tsereteli related in this regard, is that Stalin came to one of the meetings of the Soviet to inform the Soviet that the masses of soldiers and workers of Petrograd were rushing to the streets, but that "the Bolshevik Party sent its agitators to regiments and factories, to keep them from going outside. Having made this statement in the most categorical form, Stalin turned to the chairman with a request that this statement of his be entered into the minutes and, together with his comrades, left the meeting ... Chkheidze said to me with a grin: "Now the situation is quite clear." I asked him in what sense he considered the position clear. "In the sense," replied Chkheidze, "that there is no need for peaceful people to record statements about their peaceful intentions in the minutes" (I. Tsereteli, ibid., p.

267).

Between the Central Committee of the party and the Petrograd and regional committees there was a correct and precise distribution of roles. The PC and district committees were called upon to organize a "spontaneous movement" of the masses, rushing into the streets, to an uprising, and the Central Committee of the Party was to play the role of "organizing" and

"deterrent" factor, while the probing of the strength and determination of the enemy was carried out. I. Tsereteli also notes this double role of the Central Committee (in order to create an alibi for himself in case of failure) when he writes:

"Typical was the behavior of the Bolshevik Central Committee, which, until 11 o'clock in the evening on July 3, maintained the role of opposing the march of the soldier and working masses into the streets. This highest organ of the Bolshevik Party sought to create the impression that the calls for action, launched by the party agitators at 4 pm and supported first by the district committees, and then by the Petrograd Party Committee, were made without its consent and under the pressure of a spontaneous movement of the masses "(ibid. , p. 298).

The conspiracy to create an alibi for the Central Committee was so strict that even Lenin was sent by the Central Committee under the guise of illness to Bonch-Bruевич's dacha near Petrograd, but on July 4 he returned to the residence of the Central Committee.

An armed demonstration began on July 4 of workers, soldiers and Kronstadt sailors. Bolshevik historians call the number of participants at 500 thousand people, I. Tsereteli speaks of only a few tens of thousands. Be that as it may, the demonstration turned out to be quite impressive, there were about 10 thousand armed sailors brought by the Bolsheviks from Kronstadt. The demonstration first went to the building of the Central Committee, which was located in the mansion of the artist Kshesinskaya. There, the demonstrators demanded Lenin's speech, but Lenin invited Lunacharsky to speak. The crowd was dissatisfied with his indefinite performance. Then Lenin himself came out. But Lenin, too, was deliberately ambiguous. On the one hand, Lenin told the crowd that they must show "restraint", and on the other hand, he demanded "fortitude" from them, but emphasized that under all conditions he must and will win the slogan "All power to the Soviets!". (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, p. 24).

After that, a crowd led by members of the Central Committee headed for the Tauride Palace (the residence of the Soviets) demanding that the Soviets immediately take all power into their own hands. However, even here the Bolshevik leaders show

duplicity. Tsereteli recalls:

"When the fierce crowds of demonstrators gathered in front of the Taurida Palace tried to move from words to actions and arrest the socialist ministers, in whom they saw the main opponents of the establishment of Soviet power, they saw that most of all such actions frightened their recognized leaders, representatives of the Bolshevik Party "(Tsereteli, ibid., p. 306).

The Minister of Agriculture, Socialist-Revolutionary Chernov, who went out to calm the crowd, was arrested by the sailors and put into a car, intending to take him away. Then, at the suggestion of Chkheidze, the representatives of the left in the Soviets - Trotsky, Kamenev, Lunacharsky and Martov - went out to the crowd to release Chernov. What happened then, L. Trotsky describes from the words of the head of the sailors Raskolnikov: "Lev Davidovich made a short speech, ending it with the question: "Who is for violence against Chernov, let him raise his hand?" "No one uttered a word of objection - citizen Chernov, you are free," Trotsky said solemnly.

Contrary to the expectations of the Bolsheviks, the leaders of the Soviets not only did not panic, but, on the contrary, showed determination to crush the uprising. From the very beginning it became clear that the Bolshevik Central Committee was counting on

capitulation of Soviet leaders under the influence of an impressive armed demonstration. Tsereteli recalls:

"July 4 was the climax of the July uprising, and the joint meeting of the executive committees of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies on that day was of decisive importance for the course of the uprising. The Bolshevik PC followed this meeting with particular attention, since Lenin and his supporters already quite definitely made the attempt to seize power that day conditional on whether or not the Soviet majority, under the influence of street demonstrations, would agree to the formation of a homogeneous purely Soviet government. The Bolsheviks clearly understood that if they managed to carry out the first stage of the seizure of power under the auspices of an agreement with the central organs of revolutionary democracy, then the main danger that threatened them - the arrival of troops in Petrograd to restore order - would be eliminated" (Tsereteli, *ibid.*, pp. 319-320).

Delegations after delegations passed through the meetings of the Soviets, demanding the seizure of all power by the Soviets, and Lenin and Trotsky, not participating in the debate, were present in the choirs and from there followed the debate. For the transfer of power to

Even the leader of the Menshevik-internationalists, Martov, who was in opposition to the official Menshevik leadership (OK), spoke out to the Soviets.

However, the majority of the Soviets passed from words to deeds: the troops of the Petrograd garrison, loyal to the Soviet and the Provisional Government, crushed the uprising. There were many dead and wounded on both sides. When the Bolshevik Central Committee became aware that a consolidated detachment was moving towards Petrograd from the front to restore order, then, on the instructions of the Central Committee, Zinoviev issued the following statement on the night of July 4:

"Our party has done everything to impart an organized character to the spontaneous movement, and at the moment our party is editing an appeal to the workers and soldiers of Petrograd: do not go out into the streets, stop the demonstrations (shouts: after the mountains of corpses!)" (Tsereteli, *ibid.*, p. 330).

With this statement, the Central Committee recognized its fiasco in its attempt to seize power. The Central Committee, however, did not admit its final defeat and did not lose hope in the future to repeat this attempt. In the appeal mentioned by Zinoviev, the Central Committee and the PC suggested that the workers and soldiers clear the streets, but at the same time pointed out: "The purpose of the demonstration has been achieved. The slogans of the vanguard of the working class and the army are displayed impressively and with dignity... We will continue to prepare our forces..." ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book 1, p. 152). Trotsky recalls Lenin's mood after the July uprising:

"July 5 in the morning I saw Lenin. The offensive of the masses had already been repulsed. "They will shoot us now," Lenin said, "the most opportune moment for them." But Lenin overestimated the enemy ... - not his anger, but his determination and ability to act" (L. Trotsky, *My Life*, part P, Berlin, 1930, p. 34).

Subsequently, Stalin admitted that the performance of July 3-4 was a "test of strength", calculated as the "first blow" of the uprising, if the enemy turned out to be weaker than the rebels. Here is his reasoning:

"Sometimes the party, having done the preparatory work for decisive action, and, having accumulated, as it seems to it, a sufficient amount of

zervs, considers it expedient to make a trial performance, to test the strength of the enemy, to check the combat readiness of their forces ... It ("test of strength") is something between a demonstration and an uprising ... Under favorable conditions, it can develop into a first blow (choice

moment), in an uprising (the action of our party at the end of October), under unfavorable conditions, it can put the party under the threat of direct defeat (demonstration on July 3-4, 1917). Therefore, it is most expedient to carry out a test of strength when the "fruit is ripe" ... Making a test of strength, the party must be ready for anything "(I. Stalin, Soch..., vol. 5, pp. 75-76).

Already this authoritative evidence is enough to draw a general conclusion: on July 3-4, the Central Committee of the Party made a "test of strength", a test of seizing power by means of an uprising, but this time it was defeated. The Provisional Government closed the Bolshevik newspapers and ordered the arrest of the leaders of the Central Committee for high treason and for organizing an armed uprising. Lenin and Zinoviev were accused of spying for Germany. On July 12, the death penalty was introduced at the front for desertion. On July 5, the Bolshevik faction of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets asked for the creation of a Soviet commission to investigate the accusation of Lenin and Zinoviev. On July 7, Lenin himself sent a letter to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, in which he agreed to his arrest if the government order was approved by the Central Executive Committee. Lenin wrote:

"In the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee. Only now, at 3 1/4 o'clock in the afternoon, July 7, I learned that my apartment was searched that night, carried out, despite the protests of my wife, by armed men who did not present a written order. I express my protest against this, I ask the CEC Bureau to investigate this direct violation of the laws. At the same time, I consider it my duty to officially and in writing confirm what, I am sure, not a single member of the CEC could doubt, namely: that if the government orders my arrest and the CEC approves this order, I will go to the place indicated to me by the CEC for arrest. Member of the Central Executive Committee Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (N. Lenin) Petrograd, 7 / UP 1917 "(Lenin, PSS, vol. 49, p. 445).

This letter from Lenin was a well thought out and plausible stunt. He needed time to hide. He received it.

In fact, already after the statement of the Bolshevik faction, the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets discussed it at its meeting on July 5. In full agreement with the statement of the Bolshevik faction, it decided:

"In connection with the accusations of N. Lenin and other political figures that have spread throughout the city and have penetrated into the press of receiving money from a dark German source, the executive committee brings to public notice,

what im on request

representatives of the Bolshevik faction, a commission was formed to investigate the case. In view of this, until the completion of the work of the commission, the Executive Committee proposes to refrain from disseminating shameful accusations and from expressing its attitude towards them, and considers any kind of speeches on this subject unacceptable.

This resolution was published in the organ of the Soviets - in Izvestia of July 6, 1917 (I. Tsereteli, ibid., p. 341).

It should be noted that the Soviet majority, its leaders (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Dan, Gotz, and others) did everything in their power to prevent the Minister of Justice Pereverzev's message about Lenin's connections with the German General Staff from getting into print. It was said that Lenin, through proxies, received large sums of money from the Germans. The confidants in Stockholm were the Bolshevik Ganetsky (Fürstenberg), an old friend and student of Lenin, Parvus (Dr. Gelfand), Trotsky's teacher and old friend, and in Petrograd the Bolshevik lawyer M. Yu. Kozlovsky and Ganetsky's relative Sumenson. The report said that "Military censorship established a continuous exchange of telegrams of a political and monetary nature between German agents and Bolshevik leaders" (Tsereteli, *ibid.*, p. 333).

The Bolshevik Central Committee sent the Georgian Stalin to the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Soviets, the Georgian Chkheidze, so that he and the Socialist Minister Tsereteli (also a Georgian) would take measures against the publication of this report by the newspapers. Tsereteli describes the result of Stalin's visit as follows:

"On behalf of the Central Committee, Stalin asked Chkheidze that he, in his own name, as chairman of the Soviet, and on behalf of Tsereteli, as a member of the government, appeal to all newspapers with a request not to publish this document. Chkheidze asked me if I agreed to this, and when I answered him in the affirmative, he immediately transmitted this request by telephone" (Tsereteli, *ibid.*, p. 334).

Still, one right-wing newspaper (Zhivoye Slovo) published this message, transmitted to it by the Bolshevik member of the Second Duma Aleksinsky and the former political prisoner Pankratov. On July 22, the newspapers published the prosecutor's report on the investigation into Lenin's case. Lenin's first reaction to this contained two deliberately false assertions, which are refuted by Lenin's own documents. They are next. In a letter to

To the editorial board of *Novaya Zhizn* on July 11, Lenin, speaking of the fact that he is "entangled in the commercial affairs" of Ganetsky and Kozlovsky, declares that "we generally do not have a penny of money from any of the named comrades either for ourselves personally or for the party did not receive" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, p. 7). Elsewhere, in the article "Answer" (July 22-26, 1917), Lenin wrote: "The prosecutor plays on the fact that Parvus is connected with Ganetsky, and Ganetsky is connected with Lenin! But this is a downright fraudulent device, for everyone knows that Ganetsky had money dealings with Parvus, while Ganetsky and I had none" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, p. 31). Thus, Lenin claimed that he had "no business" with Ganetsky... correspondence between him and Ganetsky. This became known only after Lenin and Ganetsky came to power. Ganetsky was a close collaborator and even friend of Lenin. From the Polish Bolsheviks, with the support of Lenin, he was included in the pro-Bolshevik Central Committee at the Congress of the RSDLP. Leaving for Russia in April, Lenin created in Stockholm the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (6), headed by Ganetsky, as an agent of the Central Committee, for whom Lenin openly interceded (Lenin, *ibid.*, vol. 49, p. 441). In addition, in the Works of Lenin, in volume 49, 8 personal letters and 7 telegrams from Lenin to Ganetsky are published. In these letters, Lenin did not call Ganetsky otherwise than "dear friend", "dear comrade" and once even in German: "Metzscheg Sepo\$5e". Their content is interesting and to the point. They leave no doubt that, since February 1917, Ganetsky was Lenin's main supplier of money, destined not for Lenin personally, but for the party. Here are some excerpts from those letters.



At the beginning of the war, Ya. S. Ganetsky, having no money himself, asked Lenin for it. Lenin replied on November 28, 1914:

"Dear friend! I could give you a loan if there was any possibility ... Victor firmly promised me to send money: I will immediately send it to you ... "(Lenin, PSS, vol. 49, pp. 7-8) .

On April 1, 1917, when Lenin was about to leave through Germany and Scandinavia to Russia, he telegraphed Ganetsky:

"Allocate two thousand, preferably three thousand, crowns for our trip" (ibid., p. 425).

After returning to Russia on April 12, Lenin wrote to Ganetsky and Radek in Stockholm:

"Dear friends! Until now, nothing, absolutely nothing: no letters, no packages, no money from you have not received ... Be arch-accurate and careful in your relations "(ibid., p. 437).

On April 21, 1917, Lenin wrote to Ganetsky:

"Two thousand money was received from Kozlovsky... In total, about 15 Bolshevik newspapers are published" (ibid., p. 438).\*)

The question is not at all whether the Bolshevik PC abroad, in the person of its leaders Lenin and Zinoviev, through the Central Committee agents Ganetsky, Karl Radek and Kozlovsky, received money from German

\*) These last two letters of Lenin, exposing his connection with the Germans through an employee of Parvus - Ganetsky, - Stalin proposed to publish, without the knowledge of the sick Lenin, back in 1923, when he learned that Lenin

wanted to politically bury him ("Lenin's testament") . Since Lenin, even after coming to power, continued to deny his connection with Parvus and the Germans through Ganetsky, the publication of these letters (magazine Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya, No. 9, 1923) produced the impression of an exploding bomb on the party. Stalin, by this act, as it were, reminded Lenin - look, don't be too brave when you yourself have a "stigma in the cannon"!

sources (funds of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff). The question is not even worth it - did Lenin personally know where huge sums of money flow into his cashier for organizing the revolution. Other questions to be considered unanswered are:

1. How much did the organization of anti-state and anti-war propaganda in Russia cost the German government?

Was the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee aware of the matter?

I what other revolutionary organizations in Russia, besides

Bolsheviks, subsidized by the German government?

In the matter of defeating democratic Russia, in the matter of organizing a civil war within Russia, in the matter of Russia's withdrawal from the war, in the matter of seizing power by an anti-war and anti-patriotic revolutionary party, the interests of the Kaiser and Lenin went hand in hand. Lenin would not have been a successful Bolshevik, but a miserable preacher of a sect of socialist fanatics, if he had refused to accept German help for any moral reasons. Even Machiavelli taught that politics and morality are contraindicated to each other and that all means are good to achieve the goal. In addition, Lenin himself said: "Any such morality,

taken from an inhuman concept, we deny ... We say that our morality is completely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat "(Lenin, PSS, vol. 41, p. 309).

Of all the important revelations about German money during Lenin's lifetime, it is necessary to highlight the speech of the well-known figure of the German Social Democrats Eduard Bernstein in the central organ of the SID "Voguet {"\$} dated January 14, 1921. Bernstein wrote: "Lenin and his comrades really received enormous amounts. I found out about this at the end of December 1917 ... We are talking about almost unbelievable amounts, in any case over 50 million gold marks - in other words, about such large sums that Lenin and his comrades could not have room for some idea what sources they came from. Of course, I know what great importance, from the point of view of the military policy of the tripartite alliance, was attached to the financing of the Bolshevik action. The same military officer who first told me about this case also conveyed to me the words told to him by a prominent member of the parliament of one of the countries allied (with Germany) that this financing is "Germany's masterstroke ..." One of the consequences of their actions in Brest-Litovsk was in this region, and the contemptuous arrogant behavior of the representatives of the German military command there, probably, has not yet been erased from the memory of Trotsky and Radek. General Hoffman, who negotiated with them, who had them in his hands in a double sense, made them feel this strongly ... If my information is correct, Lenin, to the accusations brought against him by the Entente in his time, allegedly replied that no one cares before where he got the money from. It doesn't matter at all what goals the money givers pursued, he, Lenin, used the money that came to him for the social revolution, and that's enough" (I quote from Tsereteli, *ibid.*, pp. 338-339).

Neither Lenin nor the Bolshevik Central Committee ever issued a refutation of this accusation, remaining invariably asserting that it was all slander. Lenin wrote in connection with this accusation at the end of July 1917:

"It goes without saying that for all decisive steps and measures taken by the Central Committee of our party, as well as our party as a whole, I take full and unconditional responsibility" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, p. 21).

Lenin preferred to answer outside the reach of the court, the prosecutor and even the commission of the Central Executive Committee, which was created at his own suggestion.

On ! At the Party Congress (July-August 1917) the question of the appearance of Lenin and Zinoviev for trial was specially discussed. A group of delegates (Volodarsky, Manuilsky, Lashevich) submitted to the congress a draft resolution in which

it was said that the congress allowed Lenin and Zinoviev to "surrender themselves into the hands of power" if a guarantee of their personal safety was given (History of the CPSU, vol. 3, book 1, p. 179). But the congress, at the request of those who were more in the know (Ordzhonikidze, Dzerzhinsky, Skrypnik, Schlichter), rejected this resolution.

Contemporaries, as well as historians from the camp hostile to Lenin, raised the question of Lenin too simply as an "agent of the German General Staff." Lenin was not one of those people who are recruited by intelligence, he was one of those who themselves recruit enemy intelligence. Therefore, in the broad political sense of the word, Lenin was not an agent of the German government, but, on the contrary, the German government became Lenin's financial agent for organizing the revolution in Russia. Therefore, not the German government, but the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, in the person of Lenin, also set the conditions for receiving money, namely: Lenin does with the money what he wants, as he wants and where he wants, and is responsible only to himself. That is why Lenin organizes propaganda with German money not only against the Russian government, but he organizes propaganda against the German government with the same German money! Lenin organically connects the organization of the communist revolution in Russia with the same organization of the communist revolution in Germany. The money givers know this for sure, but they think of outwitting Lenin. However, the trick failed. Lenin won in Russia. Under the influence of the Russian revolution, the German revolution swept away the German monarchy, although the German Lenin was warned (assassination of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg). "Nicholas P is just as much a robber as Kaiser Wilhelm," "The Provisional Government in Petrograd is just as much a robber imperialist government as the Kaiser's government in Berlin," these slogans are constantly present in all the writings of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. As regards the legal side of the "German money" case, this question has already been clarified in principle. In London in 1958, a collection of documents published by 7. A. V. Khetap was published by the publishing house OxRoga Otiuer Tsu Prezz. The collection is called "Segtapu ap fe Vewoshyaon sh Vasa 1915-1918" (documents from the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign

cases). Here are just two excerpts from those documents:

1. State Secretary of the German Foreign Office Kiptpapp writes on 29 September 1917:

"The Bolshevik movement would never have reached the scale or influence it has today without our continued support" (p. 70, Document No. 71).

I The same Kabppapp writes on December 3, 1917: "Russia seemed to be the weakest link in the enemy chain. Therefore, the task was to gradually untie it (the link), and, if possible, tear it off. Such was the purpose of the sabotage activities that we organized in the rear of Russia - primarily in the form of encouraging separatist tendencies and supporting the Bolsheviks. This did not happen until the Bolsheviks received ever-increasing funds from us through various channels and under various labels. In this way, they were able to develop their main organ, Pravda, organize energetic propaganda, and tangibly expand the initially narrow base of their party" (p. 44, Doc. No. 94).

The most surprising thing is that the Bolsheviks, even after coming to power, continued to take money from the Germans - for example, on November 10, 1917, the Bolsheviks

received 15 million marks for political propaganda, and after the signing of the separate Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the German ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Mirbach, on May 13, 1918, invited his government to continue supporting the Bolsheviks; Berlin responded by authorizing Mirbach to use 40 million marks for this support (ibid., documents nos. 75, 92, 124, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133, 135). Both Khetap and L. Shapiro believe, however, that since Mirbach was killed on July 6, 1918, the money did not reach Russia (Getap, op. cit., p. 137; G. \$ Ragu oYo Shche Zo\1ee Chop, p. 184). In the light of all this, it becomes clear that Lenin could not appear at the trial of the Provisional Government. Therefore, the Bolshevik historian is also quite right when he wrote "about Stalin's most serious mistake on the issue of Lenin's appearance at the reactionary court" ... Citing the then secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, he writes: "Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L.F. It was considered unacceptable for a person to write about Stalin's most serious mistake on the question of Lenin's appearance before the reactionary court in 1917. The Short Course unreasonably asserted that at the V] Congress Stalin "resolutely spoke out against Lenin's appearance at the court."

The author's conclusion is curious: "At the congress (T congress) there were delegates who, succumbing to the atmosphere of the Soviets, to constitutional illusions, naively believed that the trial of Lenin would turn into an exposure of the Aleksinskys, Tsereteli and company, that the party would emerge victorious from this process" (Zh. "Questions of the history of the CPSU", No. 4, 1962, pp. 46, 48). What's right is right. The party really could not emerge victorious from this process, for the facts were against it.

#### Chapter 11

### CC AFTER THE JULY UPRISING

After the July uprising, a new stage or, as Lenin puts it, a "new cycle" begins in the preparations for the Bolshevik revolution. Lenin characterizes the new stage as qualitatively different from the old stage in that Lenin's stake on the "peaceful" seizure of power through the Soviets ("All power to the Soviets!") was beaten, it turned out to be unrealistic in view of the anti-Bolshevik policy of the majority of the Soviets, in view of the participation of the Soviets in the suppression of the July uprisings. Therefore, Lenin states that the "dual power" is over, the new government of Kerensky (on July 8, Kerensky became chairman of the government instead of Lvov) is nothing but an instrument of the victorious counter-revolution, and the Soviets have become a "fig leaf" of this counter-revolution. From here Lenin removed the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" and declares: from now on, the path to power lies not through the Soviets, but through an armed uprising. In the article "The Political Situation" of July 10, 1917, Lenin says:

"All hopes for the peaceful development of the Russian revolution have completely disappeared ... The slogan of the transfer of all power to the Soviets was the slogan of the peaceful development of the revolution, possible in April, May, June, until July 5-9, that is, until the transfer of actual power into the hands of a military dictatorship . Now this slogan is wrong... no more illusions of a peaceful way. ... The goal of an armed uprising can only be the transfer of power into the hands of the proletariat, supported by the poorest peasantry for the implementation of the program of our party "(Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, p. 5).

But Lenin makes one serious warning to his party: the party "without abandoning legality, but not for a moment exaggerating it, must combine legal work with illegal work, as in 1912-1914"

(ibid.). In other words, we are not leaving the Soviets, but given their current composition, we no longer rely on them as an instrument for seizing power. The road to power lies through the complete isolation of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Subsequently, after the victory of the Bolsheviks, Lenin, in his work "Infantile Disease of Leftism in Communism", put forward a proposition that says that the way for the victory of the communist revolution in the West lies only through the isolation of the political and organizational influence of the social democratic parties in the working class. Lenin elevates this proposition to the immutable law of any communist revolution.

Having put forward new tasks and new slogans, Lenin, together with Zinoviev, hid from the authorities. At first they lived in a hut near Lake Razliv, then in August-September they made their way to Finland, where they were essentially in a semi-legal position.

The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, at the suggestion of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (Dan's resolution), condemned the behavior of Lenin and Zinoviev. The Central Executive Committee recognized itself as "interested in the trial of the Bolsheviks accused of rebellion and receiving German money" and until such a trial took place, the Central Executive Committee eliminated them from its membership. "The execution carried out by the Central Executive Committee on Lenin and Zinoviev was, in essence, quite fair, but this does not mean that it was politically permissible," Sukhanov says on this occasion (N. Sukhanov, "Notes on the Revolution", book. \ , page 50).

Kamenev, Lunacharsky, Krylenko, Mekhonoshin, Kollontai, Raskolnikov (the Bolshevik commissar in Kronstadt) were arrested. Trotsky published in the newspapers an open letter of challenge addressed to the Provisional Government, declaring that if Lenin was a German spy, then he, Trotsky, was also a German spy. Therefore, he demanded that the government extend the arrest warrant to him as well. Dan remarked (through deputy Bulat) that Trotsky nevertheless prudently kept his address silent in his letter to the government. However, the government soon found Trotsky's address and granted his request: Trotsky was also arrested.

But the Bolshevik faction of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, like the faction of the Petrograd Soviet, continued to exist and function legally. True, Stalin rarely showed up there, but Central Committee member Nogin, the Bolshevik leaders Rykov, Ryazanov, and the leader of the Menshevik internationalists, Martov, in full agreement with Lenin, sharply criticized at the meeting of the Soviets the policy of the Provisional Government,

and the leaders of the Soviets.

Although the Provisional Government closed the Bolshevik publications, occupied the Kshesinskaya house, issued an order for the arrest of Lenin and Zinoviev, arrested Kamenev and Trotsky, it nevertheless did not declare either the Bolshevik Party or its Central Committee to be criminal, rebellious organizations. It blamed individuals, not the organization. Because of this, the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, the Bolshevik factions in the Soviets, the Bolshevik party committees of Petrograd, Moscow, the provinces, the Bolshevik factory committees, and finally, the Military Organization of the Central Committee of the Party ("military") remained not only in full contact, but also politically and organizationally combat-ready. Lenin was absent only physically, but politically, with his endless notes and letters, and also through a constant contact (Shotman), he attended the meetings of the Central Committee. Actually, it is not even

the government was looking for, perhaps pleased that he himself had disappeared from the legal arena.

Therefore, the leading organs of the party continue their work on preparing a new uprising without hindrance. On July 13-14, an expanded meeting of the Central Committee takes place in Petrograd. Although Bolshevik historians point out that this meeting took place illegally, the wide circle of participants themselves speaks of the opposite. In addition to members of the Central Committee, it was attended by: representatives of the Petrograd Committee, the Military Organization, the Moscow Regional Bureau, the Moscow City Committee, the Moscow District Committee, plus service personnel.

The meeting of the Central Committee discussed the situation created for the party after the July uprising, but did not agree with Lenin on both a general assessment of the political situation and the removal of the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" The enlarged meeting of the Central Committee considered that it was not the military dictatorship of the counterrevolution that had been established, but the "dictatorship of Kerensky, Tsereteli, Efremov", that it was "representation of the petty peasant bourgeoisie, followed by a part of the workers", and that between this dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie and the right wing "the now bargaining" and that "the counter-revolution is moving from attacking the Bolsheviks to attacking the Soviets and the parties of the Soviet majority ... the role of the Soviets is declining" ("CPSU in Res.", part 1, p. 369).

The resolution of the meeting of the Central Committee called for the creation of a government that would give peace, land, workers' control. The resolution indicated that such power

can still only be obtained through Tips, namely these Tips. Contrary to Lenin, it said: "In striving for the concentration of all power in the hands of the revolutionary proletariat and peasant Soviets, we believe that only if the above program is carried out, this power can carry out the tasks of the revolution" (ibid., pp. 369-370).

After March-April (before the return of Lenin) for the second time, Stalin openly presented his claims to the role of party leader. In the March-April days, he shared these claims with Kamenev, but now Kamenev too has fallen away in view of his arrest. Among the members of the Central Committee who remained at liberty, Stalin had no competitors (Nogin, Milyutin, Sverdlov, Smilga, Fedorov). Therefore, all the work of the Central Committee took place under the direct leadership of Stalin.

Although the delegates had in their hands Lenin's theses "Political situation" quoted above, the meeting of the Central Committee adopted its own clearly anti-Leninist resolution proposed by Stalin. The Soviet party historian is inclined to underestimate the significance of this fact, although he is forced to note it:

"The resolution of the meeting did not give a clear answer to such questions of the current moment: in whose hands is power and how to relate to the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book 1, p. 167).

This is not true. The reader saw above that the resolution gave such answers, but only directly opposite to those given by Lenin, namely, that power is not in the hands of the military dictatorship of the counter-revolution, as Lenin wrote, but in the hands of the dictators, the Socialist-Revolutionary Kerensky, the Menshevik Tsereteli and the progressive Efremov, As for the slogan "All power to the Soviets!", the Central Committee and party activists do not consider it necessary to remove it. From here, throughout the whole of July and until the beginning of August, Lenin stubbornly and

systematically fights with his Central Committee for the straightening of the line of the Central Committee in the spirit of the theses "Political situation" and for the annulment of the resolution of the July enlarged meeting of the PC.

In the article "On Slogans," Lenin indirectly criticizes the resolution of the enlarged meeting of the Central Committee and explains why the Central Committee should withdraw the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" He's writing:

"It has happened too often that when history takes a sharp turn, even the advanced parties for a more or less long time cannot get used to the new situation, repeat the slogans that were correct yesterday, but

lost all meaning today, lost meaning "suddenly" as much as "suddenly" was a sharp turn of history. Something similar may be repeated, apparently, with the slogan of the transfer of all state power to the Soviets" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, p. 1.0).

Lenin openly fights against the Central Committee, which considers it wrong to withdraw the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" He says, objecting to the Central Committee: "The slogan of the transfer of power to the Soviets would now sound like quixotic or mockery" (ibid., p. 12).

Lenin demands that the Central Committee operate not with the old, pre-July categories, but with new ones: these Soviets have betrayed us, the petty bourgeoisie in the person of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have betrayed us, and therefore it is necessary to prepare an armed uprising not only against the Provisional Government, but also against these Soviets in the person of Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Dana, Chernova. Lenin is against any "moralization" in politics. He is not against the petty-bourgeois parties under all conditions. If, for example, they condemn their leaders and take the point of view of the "proletarian party", he is ready to support them. In the same article, he says so: "For the good of the cause, the proletariat always supports not only the vacillating petty bourgeoisie, but also the big bourgeoisie" (p. 13). But now the situation is different. One cycle of party political struggle from February 27 to July 4 has ended, "a new cycle is beginning, which includes not the old classes, not the old parties, not the old Soviets, but the renewed ones" (p. 17). From this Lenin draws the main conclusion: the road to power lies only through the discrediting and isolation of the parties of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, but the Soviets, purged of them, will be a new form of state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Throughout July, Lenin waged a struggle against the legal part of the Central Committee, headed by Stalin, Sverdlov and Nogin, in order to force the Central Committee to hold the upcoming Party Congress under the new slogans and guidelines put forward by him in the theses "Political situation". Although not in everything, but to a large extent, he succeeded. The legal leadership of the Central Committee was supposed to revise its own decisions taken at the July enlarged meeting of the Central Committee.

Ten years after the last united Bolshevik-Menshevik congress (1907), the UG congress opened as a congress of Bolsheviks together with a group of "mezhrayontsy" - with a group of L. Trotsky (it consisted, as indicated, of "non-factional" Menshevik-internationalists, Bolsheviks-"Vperyodists" and "conciliators"). The convention was legal though

all official historians speak of its illegal or "semi-legal" character (Em. Yaroslavsky, "Brief History of the VKP (6b)", 1930, p. 276; "History of the VKP (6). Short course", 1953, p. 187; History of the Civil War in the USSR, vol. 1, 1935, p. 179; History of the CPSU, vol. 3, book 1, p. 174). However, it is clear from the minutes of the UT congress that almost all delegates participate in the congress

under their own names or already well-known nicknames, and most importantly, reports on the progress of the congress appear daily in the Bolshevik newspaper Worker and Soldier. Even the Cadet newspaper Rech of July 28, 1917, published a note on the work of the congress. The congress delegate Skrypnik, indignant at this fact, said:

"I don't know who informs Rech. We work openly, but distortions and slander are not permissible," and at his suggestion it was written: "The Congress declares that the only verified and true reports on the work of the Congress are placed in the newspaper "Worker and Soldier" ("Sixth Congress of the RSDLP (6). Minutes", Moscow, 1958, pp. 67-68).

Yes, and could not be illegal congress, which participated together with the technical staff of more than 300 people. The provisional government was definitely aware of it, but did not ban it. The congress was attended by 1577 delegates with a decisive and 110 delegates with an advisory vote, representing 240 thousand members of the party,

thus, between the April conference and W! By the congress (that is, in three months) the party had tripled in size. It sat from 26 July to 3 August. The agenda of the congress was as follows:

1. report of the Organizational Bureau for the convocation of the congress (Sverdlov) (it consisted of 3 Bolsheviks and 2 Mezhrayontsy);

2. report of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (Stalin, Sverdlov and Smilga);

3. field reports;

4. current moment: a) war and international situation (Bukharin), 6)

political (Stalin) and economic situation (Milyutin);

. elections to the Constituent Assembly;

. International;

. revision of the program;

. party unification;

. elections;

10. miscellaneous.

The presidium of the congress was elected from five people: Sverdlov, Olmsky,

©oncho

Lomov, Yurenev (from Mezhrayonists) and Stalin. Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Kollontai and Lunacharsky were elected honorary chairmen of the congress. The report on the "current moment" instead of three speakers - Stalin, Bukharin and Milyutin - was supposed to be made by L. Trotsky.

Making a report of the Organizational Bureau, Sverdlov noted: "On the issue of speakers, the Orgburo did everything it could, but the congress will have to refuse. those speakers whose voice we are accustomed to listening to. IN



most recently, the speaker on the current situation, comrade Trotsky, was withdrawn ... "(The Sixth Congress of the RSDLP (6). Protocols, p. 8).

An interesting detail: the congress welcomed the Central Bureau of the Menshevik-Internationalists both orally (through Yu. Larin) and in writing (with the signatures of L. Martov and Astrov). Larin said at the congress: "As far as I know, the leader of the Menshevik internationalists, comrade Martov, will later appear at your congress and speak officially (applause)" (ibid., p. 69).

But Martov still did not appear, but sent a greeting. It said:

"We welcome the congress of your party, which has met at such a difficult time for it ... We have no doubt that these persecutions and persecutions will not be able to shake the influence of the ideas of internationalism on the part of the proletariat organized under the banner of your party, and we take this opportunity to express once again our profound indignation against the slanderous campaign which an entire trend in Russian Social-Democracy seeks to portray as agents of the German government" (ibid., p. 194).

Martov stated that between his trend and the Bolsheviks there was a "profound divergence on the question of the methods of the working-class movement and revolutionary struggle," which made unification impossible (ibid., p. 195).

Lenin and Zinoviev addressed the congress with a letter in which they reported that they evaded arrest because the case against them was created by the "counter-revolution" and that only "The Constituent Assembly will have the right to say its word on the order of the Provisional Government on our arrest" (ibid., p. 316).

It must be said that the question of the appearance or non-appearance of Lenin and Zinoviev for trial occupied a very prominent place in the work of the congress from the very beginning, although formally it was not included in the agenda. In Bolshevik textbooks on

history of the revolution, a legend roams from one book to another, completely distorting the whole character of the discussion of this question at the congress. Firstly, the very fact that the Central Committee and Lenin were against discussing this issue at the congress is hushed up; conditions were against the appearance of Lenin. Even the way Stalin raised the question of Lenin's non-appearance was un-Leninist. While Lenin and Zinoviev firmly decided not to appear in court, Stalin said at the congress: "If the court is democratically organized and a guarantee is given that they will not be torn to pieces ... If at the head there is a government that will have at least some honor they will appear" (ibid., pp. 27-28).

The congress delegates, who knew Lenin's opinion, resolutely objected to Stalin.

Skrypnik said: "In the resolution proposed by Stalin, there was a certain condition under which our comrades could go to a republican prison - this is a guarantee of security.

I think that the resolution should be based on other conditions..." (ibid., p. 31).

Volodarsky said: "One point of Comrade Stalin's resolution is unacceptable: an honest bourgeois court" (ibid., p. 32).

Bukharin, objecting to Stalin, said: Lenin and Zinoviev, we cannot stand on the ground of scholasticism. What does "honest bourgeois court" mean? Will not an honest bourgeois court seek to cut off our heads?" (ibid., p. 34). But Bukharin cited a more convincing motive about the impossibility of Lenin and Zinoviev appearing for trial. He said: "At this trial there will be a number of documents establishing a connection with Ganetsky, and Ganetsky with Parvus, and Parvus wrote about Lenin. Prove that Parvus is not a spy!" (ibid., p. 34).

Bukharin introduced a resolution which, under all conditions, rejected the appearance of Lenin and Zinoviev in court. The congress rejected Stalin's resolutions on the conditional appearance of Lenin. The congress also rejected the resolution of Volodarsky, Lashevich and Manuisky, which stated that Lenin and Zinoviev should appear in court if the following conditions were satisfied: 1) guarantee of personal security, 2) public conduct of the investigation, 3) participation of representatives of the Soviets in the investigation, 4) perhaps a faster analysis of the case in vowels

by a people's court - by a jury (ibid., p. 32).

The congress adopted Bukharin's resolution, which fundamentally rejected the appearance in court. It said that "there are absolutely no guarantees

not only impartial legal proceedings, but also the elementary security of those brought to trial" (ibid., p. 270). Since the leaders of both the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks in the Soviets openly declared, citing moral arguments, that they did not believe in Lenin's "betrayal" in favor of Germany, the UT congress decided to use the authority of these leaders in favor of Lenin and Zinoviev. Therefore, in the addendum to the resolution on Lenin's failure to appear, it was said: "At the same time, the Congress demands from the Central Executive Committee, in order to expose the vile slanderers, the formation of an investigative commission from representatives of all revolutionary parties, which the proletariat can only trust" (ibid., p. 270, note) .

Lenin, of course, did not agree to appear before such a commission. Lenin aimed only at one point: at the victory of his own revolution, knowing full well that the winners are not judged.

In the political report of the Central Committee, Stalin outlined the course of events from April to July 1917, repeating the party's well-known theses about the June events and the July uprising. In the final

word:

"To demand from the Central Committee that it not take any steps without first questioning the provinces means to demand that the Central Committee go not ahead, but behind the events and only ascertain in its revolutions the facts that have already taken place. But it would not be the Central Committee" (ibid., p. 27).

Both in this concluding speech and in the report on the political situation, Stalin disagreed with Lenin on three most important issues: 1) on the question of appearing in court (which we have already spoken about); 2) on the question of the nature of the power that was established after the July uprising (Lenin spoke of the complete victory of the counter-revolution, and Stalin declared: "At this

the moment it is still not clear in whose hands the power is"), - (ibid., pp. 27-28); 3) on the question of analyzing the driving forces of the February Revolution.

Stalin spoke of a "coalition" of four forces in the revolution: the working class, the peasantry, the liberal bourgeoisie and foreign capital (ibid., p. 110), whereas, according to Lenin, the February Revolution was made by

only two classes: the proletariat and the peasantry.

In the organizational report of the Central Committee, Sverdlov reported that if in April the party had only 78 organizations with 80,000 members, then in July the party had 162 organizations with 240,000 members, of which 26,000 were military members (ibid., p. 36). The party had 41 newspapers with a daily circulation of 320,000 copies. 27 newspapers were published in Russian, the rest in Georgian, Armenian, Latvian, Tatar, Polish and other languages ("History of the Civil War in the USSR", vol. 1, p. 177).

The rapporteur of the Central Committee on finance, Smilga, said that the existing composition of the Central Committee accepted money from the previous composition in the amount of 71,123 rubles. 02 kop.

Of this amount, 25,028 rubles are now in the cash register. 85 kop. (11,135 rubles were spent on the salaries of party workers). The Central Committee acquired its own printing house, paying 260,000 rubles for it. It is indicated that about 140,000 rubles. of which was collected by "workers", and 120,000 were taken from the money of Pravda (the report says that Pravda had these funds from subscription money, although it is known that Pravda never paid for itself). Pravda was published with a circulation of 85-90 thousand, having 8,000 subscribers in March, 13,000 in April, 18,000 in May and 21,000 in June ("Sixth Congress ...", pp. 38-41). Moreover, the obligatory 10% deductions from local organizations to the cash desk of the Central Committee amounted to only 4,104 rubles. 06 kop. (ibid., p. 38). (Let's say right away: not only before the seizure of power, but also after coming to power, the Central Committee keeps its budget in the strictest confidence, but this time for different reasons). The speaker himself admitted: "We have to live on fees and donations. They gave very little deductions" (ibid., p. 39). (German money, after all, was also a kind of "donation" in favor of the revolution.)

The congress as a whole treated the Soviets more cautiously than Lenin. While Lenin simultaneously declared war on both the Provisional Government and the Soviets, the Congress adopted an elastic, more pro-Soviet formula than pro-Leninist (definitely anti-Soviet). Even before the congress, Lenin wrote that Tsereteli and Chernov had turned the "Soviets into a fig leaf of counter-revolution" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, p. 2) and that "These Soviets failed, suffered a complete collapse because of the dominance of the Socialist-Revolutionary parties in them and the Mensheviks. At these moments, these Soviets are like sheep that are brought to the slaughterhouse, put under an ax and moaning plaintively" (ibid., p.

17). Hence Lenin's demand to remove the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" The congress does not put forward this slogan, but it does not withdraw it either. The Congress tacitly admits the suitability of this slogan even now, but the Soviets are no longer able to seize power by peaceful means. The relevant paragraph of the resolution reads:

"The Soviets are going through excruciating agony... The slogan of the transfer of power to the Soviets... was the slogan of the peaceful development of the revolution, the painless transfer of power... At the present time peaceful development and the painless transfer of power to the Soviets have become impossible... The correct slogan in

at the present time there can only be a complete liquidation of the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie..." ("Sixth Congress...", p. 256).

This formulation of the question admits that the Soviets may now (otherwise than before) be organs of a non-peaceful and "painful" transfer of power. Therefore, it is necessary to protect the Soviets, even such as Lenin paints them. The same resolution aims precisely at this point when it sets the Party's task: "To defend all mass organizations against counter-revolutionary attempts, and in the first place the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies" (ibid., p. 257). Many delegates openly objected to Lenin's demand, proposing to retain the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" without subjecting it to any revision (Yaroslavsky, Yurenev, Preobrazhensky, Dzhabaridze, and others).

With regard to the party program, the congress confirmed the decision of the April conference to revise it, but did not undertake such a revision, postponing it until the next congress. Resolutions were adopted: "The Current Moment and the War" (Bukharin), "Political Situation" (Stalin), "Economic Situation" (Milyutin), "Professional Movement" (Glebov-Avilov), "On Youth" (Kharitonov and Smilga), "On the unification of the party" (Yurenev), on the new Party Rules (Kharitonov).

When one reads the official history of Soviet historians, one gets the impression that each of these resolutions is based on Lenin's ready-made drafts. An analysis of the protocols of the Congress UT shows that each of these resolutions is the work of the corresponding speaker, together with the commission (section) that the congress elected for each report.

No documents from Lenin appeared at the congress, except for the already mentioned statement by Lenin and Zinoviev why they evaded arrest. Therefore, the following statement of official historians is completely unsubstantiated: "The most important documents of the congress were being prepared

Lenin ... Delegate Shumyatsky noted: Theses, projects, resolutions, directives - all this came from Ilyich "" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book 1, p. 174). In the minutes of the UJ Congress ("Sixth congress of the RSDLP (6. Protocols", Moscow, 1958) there are no traces of such documents, therefore official historians refer to a third-rate witness-memoirist to confirm their thesis.

Nevertheless, the spirit of Lenin hovered over the congress. The independence of the congress just speaks in favor of Lenin. Lenin created such a magnificent party machine that it is capable of operating even in the absence of its designer and chief driver.

At the same UT congress, L. Trotsky officially joined the Bolshevik Party with his "inter-district group", which, starting from 1913, operated in St. Petersburg and during the war became close to the Bolsheviks. Together with Trotsky, the leaders of the Bolshevik "Vperyodists" (Lunacharsky, Manuilsky and others) also returned to the party through the "inter-district group" (4,000 people).

The congress adopted a new party statute. The famous Leninist § 1 was now stated as follows: "A member of the Party is anyone who recognizes the program of the Party, is a member of one of its organizations, obeys all the decisions of the Party and pays membership dues" ("CPSU in Res.", Part 1, p. 384). The highlighted words were introduced for the first time in § 1 and they meant only one thing: party organizations at all levels are subject

decisions of their committees, and the party as a whole - to the decisions of the Central Committee. The Rules significantly clarified and expanded the rights of the Central Committee, and within the Central Committee itself, a so-called "Central Committee in the Central Committee" was created under the name "Narrow composition of the Central Committee" to guide current work. For the first time, an audit commission was also created to check the finances of the party and its enterprises. The annual congress of the party was declared the supreme organ of the party; the norms for representation at the congress were established by the Central Committee. The congress: 1) hears and approves the reports of the Central Committee, the audit commission and other central institutions; 2) revise and change the program of the Party; 3) determines the tactical line of the party; 4) elects the Central Committee and the audit commission.

The creation of an audit commission that does not politically affect the monocentricity of the party, apparently, was caused by the desire of the party to learn more about the origin of party money. Until now, the narrow leading head of the Central Committee, headed by Lenin, has not given an account of its finances either.

party, not even its full Central Committee. It was the revelations about "German money" that made the issue of creating a central audit commission, elected and accountable only to the party congress, relevant.

The paragraph on the Central Committee was formulated as follows: The Central Committee is elected annually at the congress. For the current work, the Central Committee singles out a narrow composition of the Central Committee from its midst. Plenary sessions of the Central Committee are held at least once every two months. The Central Committee represents the Party in relations with other parties and institutions, organizes the various institutions of the Party and directs their activities, appoints the editors of the Central Organ, working under its control, organizes and leads enterprises of general Party significance, distributes the forces and means of the Party, and manages the Central Treasury of the Party ( *ibid.*, pp. 384-385).

The Central Committee, elected \!] by the congress, was more than doubled in size. It consisted of: 21 members and 10 candidates elected by secret ballot. The congress decided that if it ends "normally" (that is, without arrests), then it will publish a list of members and candidates of the Central Committee. This decision of the congress was canceled after the elections of the Central Committee, although there were no arrests (the Provisional Government did not even try to impede the work of the congress). The congress only announced the names of the four members of the Central Committee who received the largest number of votes: Lenin - 133 votes out of 134, Zinoviev - 132, Kamenev - 131, Trotsky - 131 ("loud applause" - notes the protocol in this place - "Sixth Congress ..." , p. 252).

The entire composition of the Central Committee of the UT congress was as follows: members: Ya. A. Berzin, N. I. Bukharin, A. S. Bubnov, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, G. E. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev, A.

M. Kollontai, N. N. Krestinsky, V. I. Lenin, V. P. Milyutin, M. K. Muranov, V. P. Nogin, A. I. Rykov, Ya. M. Sverdlov, F. A. Sergeev (Artem), I. T. Smilga, G. Ya. Sokolnikov, I. V. Stalin, L. D. Trotsky, M. S. Uritsky, S. G. Shaumyan. Candidates: P. A. Dzhabaridze, A. A. Ioffe, A. S. Kiselev, A. Lomov, E. A. Preobrazhensky, N. A. Skrypnik, E. D. Stasova, V. N. Yakovleva. Soon Stasova, Lomov and Ioffe were transferred to the Central Committee. Thus, 24 people became members of the Central Committee ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book 1, p. 197).

At the first plenum of the Central Committee after the congress on August 5 (18), 1917, a "narrow composition" of the Central Committee was elected, which included: Stalin, Sokolnikov, Dzerzhinsky, Milyutin, Uritsky, Ioffe, Sverdlov, Muranov, Bubnov, Stasova, Shaumyan. The "narrow composition" of the Central Committee represented something like the future Politburo of the Central Committee. At the meeting of this "narrow composition" on August 6, the Secretariat of the PC was selected.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee included: Sverdlov (actually the first secretary of the Central Committee), Dzerzhinsky, Ioffe, Muranov and Stasova ("Protocols of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (6)", Moscow, 1958, pp. 6, 13).

Summing up the general results of the Congress, one fact of historical importance must be recorded: Stalin set the tone for the leader of the Party at the Congress. Of course, outwardly this became possible due to the absence of Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky (formally not yet a member of the party). However, it was the Party Congress that proved that of all the leaders of Bolshevism, only Stalin is the leader of Lenin's class and format. Meanwhile, Lenin underestimated him. Despite the fact that Stalin had been in the party since 1898, despite the fact that Stalin participated with Lenin at the Helsingfors conference in 1905, at the 1st and 1st congresses in 1906 and 1907, at the Poronin meeting in 1913 was co-opted a member of the Central Committee in 1912, not to mention the written communication between them, Lenin did not even know until almost 1917 the real name of Stalin. In a letter to Zinoviev in July 1915, Lenin asks: "Do you remember Koba's name?" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 49, p. 101). In November 1915, in a letter to V. A. Karpinsky, Lenin repeated this question: "A big request: find out the name of Koba (Joseph J?). We forgot. Very important!!" (ibid., p. 161). Alas, then not only Lenin, but also the history of the country will forever remember this name.

As already noted, the repressions of the Provisional Government after the July uprising were directed not against the party, not even against the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, but against individual leaders, mainly against Lenin. But a general search was not announced against Lenin either. They left him alone, as long as he didn't show up at the meetings. The Bolsheviks, in turn, used Lenin's flight from court as an act of martyrdom and persecution of the old revolutionary and "democrat" by the revolutionary democratic government.

Meanwhile, the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks is deploying a very intense propaganda of the Lenin cause. In July, the Central Committee and its local branches published 51 publications (this does not include Bolshevik newspapers published by the Soviets and trade unions). Of these, only 13 organs were banned after the July uprising, of which five (including the Central Organ) began to appear under new names and, in addition, five more new ones were added ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book 1, p. 183). The daily circulation of all Bolshevik newspapers and magazines was on the eve of the October

coup about 600 thousand copies (ibid., p. 253).

On U! The congress provided numerous data on the enormous organizational work in preparation for the revolution, which was carried out by agents of the Central Committee in the field. Four meetings of the UT of the congress were devoted to "reports from the field." Reported by the Military Organization under the Central Committee, the Military Organization under the Moscow Committee, the Military Organization of the 12th Army and the Romanian Front, civilian party organizations - Petrograd, Moscow, Donbass, Belarus, Kronstadt, the Urals, Central Siberia, the Baltic states, the Volga region, Grozny, Transcaucasia, Petrograd inter-district organization, etc. ("Sixth Congress ...", pp. 55-96). All the speakers unanimously stressed that after the July uprising, the local Bolshevik organizations were working even more intensively, most importantly, legally, without any harassment from the authorities. The UT congress convinced everyone, except, it seems, the Provisional Government and the SR-Menshevik leaders of the Soviets, that the Bolsheviks were seriously heading for an armed uprising in the very near future. It was not rhetoric when issued by the Central Committee from

name \! The Manifesto of the Congress (it was written by Bukharin) ended with the words: "... A new movement is coming and the hour of death of the old world is coming. Get ready for new battles, our comrades!" (ibid., p. 276).

The tragedy of free Russia was that it resolutely did not believe in this warning. The most widespread prejudice was that the Bolsheviks, even if they seized power, they would not cope with it and would not keep it. Against this prejudice, Lenin even wrote a special pamphlet: "Will the Bolsheviks retain state power?" And Lenin, without any generalizations and philosophical sophistication, answered this question as follows: if old Russia was ruled by 130,000 landowners, then new Russia can be ruled by 240,000 Bolsheviks. To the main argument of their opponents, that the Bolsheviks did not have "cultural cadres" to cope with the complex tasks of administration, to master the state machine, Lenin, in full agreement with Marx, answered: yes, we are not going to master it. We want to destroy it to the last screw, and we can do it. We will manage the new state through a new form of power - through the Soviets.

Immediately after the Congress, the Central Committee was confronted with a number of questions: how should the lifting of the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" be interpreted in practice? Does this mean shifting the center of gravity of the work from the legal organs of the party to its

illegal organs? Another question seemed even more delicate - which of the two capitals of the country to focus on as the future center of the uprising - Petrograd or Moscow? Finally, the following question was also put forward - whether agreements between the Bolsheviks and other Soviet parties against the counter-revolution from the right are permissible in principle.

The Central Committee answers the first and main question with the classic Leninist formula: to combine illegal work with legal work. Remain in the Soviets, but by all means discredit these Soviets and seek their re-elections. Even go to such a legal body as the Moscow State Conference (August 12-15), where the right-wing generals Kornilov and Kaledin gather with representatives of the State Duma of all four convocations, together with Milyukov, Kerensky, Tsereteli. Go to form a Bolshevik faction at the meeting, which is instructed to develop a declaration, "read it out before the start of the meeting and defiantly leave the meeting room as a sign of protest" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book 1, p. 210).

The Bolsheviks failed to do this, since the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, which officially participated in the Moscow Conference, expelled a group of Bolsheviks from its delegation, having guessed their plan. Then the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, taking advantage of the predominance of the Bolsheviks in the leadership of the Moscow trade unions, declared the day of the opening of the Moscow Conference the day of a general political strike.

The appeal of the Central Committee was followed by over 400,000 workers in Moscow and its environs (ibid., p. 211). This unexpectedly great revolutionary success in Moscow, which until now was considered more conservative than Petrograd (which is why the State Conference was convened here), forced even Lenin to reconsider (temporarily) his strategy for gaining power in relation to the main center of the uprising. On August 19, Lenin wrote:

"Moscow now, after the Moscow Conference, after the strike, after July 3-5, is acquiring or may acquire the significance of a center. In that

In the vast proletarian center, which is larger than Petrograd, it is quite possible that a movement like July 3-5, 1917 would grow up... On July 3-5, 1917, the slogan of seizing power in St. Petersburg would be wrong... Now it's not at all the same. Now in Moscow, if a spontaneous movement breaks out, the slogan should be precisely the seizure of power" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, pp. 77, 78).

With regard to temporary blocs and agreements with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Central Committee followed a different policy than Lenin. After July 3-5, Lenin already in principle denied any connection and any joint actions with these parties. On the contrary, the Central Committee and the Moscow Committee, on the contrary, just now, in connection with rumors about the preparation of Kornilov's speech, considered that such contacts were not only permissible, but also useful. At a meeting of the "Narrow composition" of the Central Committee on August 14, it was reported that a Provisional Revolutionary Committee of 7 people had been created in Moscow: two Bolsheviks, two Mensheviks, two Socialist-Revolutionaries and one from headquarters. At the same meeting, the "Central Committee decided to enter into information communication" with the Central Executive Committee, in which the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries created an "Information Bureau" from all Soviet parties in connection with rumors of a conspiracy from the right. The Information Bureau officially invited representatives of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks to its membership. The latter decided to send members of the Central Committee Sverdlov and Dzerzhinsky there ("Protocols of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b)", p. 21).

This behavior of the Central Committee provoked a sharp protest from Lenin. In the article "Rumors of a Conspiracy," he wrote about the behavior of the Central Committee and the Moscow Committee:

"... a clear awareness by the masses of the betrayal of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, a complete break with them, the same boycott of them by every revolutionary proletarian ..." Lenin demanded "to remove the members of the Central Committee or the Moscow Committee from work, if the fact of the bloc was confirmed, and to introduce a question about their formal removal before the congress at the very first plenum of the Central Committee. (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, p. 77).

The Central Committee ignored these demands of Lenin.

## Chapter 12

### CC AGAINST LENIN'S PLAN OF UPRISING

However, very soon, literally in a week, Lenin himself would reconsider his tactics on the question of the attitude towards the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, reconsider as sharply as the new events turned out to be - Kornilov's campaign against Petrograd. However, on the eve of Kornilov's campaign, between August 21 (the surrender of Riga to the Germans) and August 25 (the beginning of Kornilov's campaign), Lenin was not inclined to compromise. Just at that time, he forwarded to the Central Committee a Leaflet Concerning the Capture of Riga, in which he put forward the slogan "Down with the government of Kerensky." Lenin demands that the Central Committee practice the publication of such illegal leaflets with open

calling for the overthrow of the government. Lenin proposes that such leaflets be signed on behalf of a "group of persecuted Bolsheviks" so as not to endanger the closure of the legal newspapers of the Bolshevik Central Committee. Characteristic of Lenin's reservation. He's writing:

"I know that the inertia of our Bolsheviks is great and that it will cost a lot of work to get the publication of illegal leaflets" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, p. 86). But, as has been said, Kornilov's campaign dramatically changes both the general situation and Lenin's tactics.



Lenin's policy of this period is a masterpiece of tactical art.

The Kornilov campaign itself was not an adventure of the general, caused by ambition. Kornilov wanted to prevent a second Bolshevik uprising, for which Lenin began to call his Central Committee after the surrender of Riga (see above). Boik, which Kerensky requested to strengthen the Petrograd garrison, General Kornilov considered it useful to use in the fight against revolutionary extremism. Therefore, moving the third cavalry corps of Gen. Krymov, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Kornilov demanded for himself the fullness of military and civil power until complete order was restored in the rear. In the eyes of Kornilov, the entire Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies was undoubtedly a factor in disorder. In response to this demand, Kerensky removed Kornilov from the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief and turned to the Soviet for help, and the Soviet, in turn, turned to the Bolshevik Central Committee for help. That was a mistake, equal to which the history of Russia did not know. Lenin masterfully used it.

At first glance, the Bolsheviks were faced with a difficult dilemma: either, taking advantage of the Kornilov uprising, try to overthrow Kerensky, or support Kerensky, as a "lesser evil", against Kornilov? The dilemma left no room for a third solution. Least of all did the dilemma and the decision based on feeling allow. Not emotion, not a feeling of revenge for Kerensky, who arrested Trotsky and Kamenev and drove Lenin and Zinoviev underground, but a real calculation of the mind - this should be the Bolshevik approach to solving this problem of historical importance not only for the fate of Kerensky, but also for the fate of himself or Bolshevism. Trotsky wrote:

"Everyone understood that if Kornilov entered the city, then as a first duty he would slaughter the Bolsheviks arrested by Kerensky" (L. Trotsky, "My Life",

h, 2, p. 39).

Kerensky's own dilemma was more complex: either capitulation to Kornilov and then the triumph of the military dictatorship with the possible prospect of restoring the old order, or an open struggle against Kornilov, relying on the left revolutionary front, including the Bolsheviks, and then the likely defeat of Kornilov with the possible prospect of establishing Bolshevik dictatorship.

Both the Kerensky government and the Socialist-Revolutionary Menshevik Soviets overestimated the danger of the first prospect and underestimated the danger of the second. General Kornilov himself helped them in this. Sending General Krymov to Petrograd, Kornilov said that Krymov "would not think, if necessary, to hang the entire composition of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" ("Memoirs of General A. S. Lukomsky", vol. 1, Berlin, 1922, p. 228). "To hang the entire composition of the Soviet" meant to hang not only Lenin and Trotsky, but also Kerensky himself, together with Tsereteli and Chernov. This prospect did not smile at the leaders of the Soviets much more than the still problematic victory of the Bolsheviks. Lenin, as always, connected the question with the prospect of seizing power: is it permissible for the Bolsheviks to act against Kornilov and thereby indirectly support Kerensky from the point of view of gaining power? Does such an action of the Bolsheviks bring them closer or remove them from power? In a letter to the Central Committee of the RSDLP (6) dated August 30, Lenin gives the following tactical directive:

"We will fight, we are fighting Kornilov, just like Kerensky's troops, but we do not support Kerensky, but expose his weakness. This is one time. This is a rather subtle difference, but an essential one, and it must not be forgotten... We are changing the form of our struggle against Kerensky... Without abandoning the task of overthrowing Kerensky, we say: we must take into account the moment, we will not overthrow Kerensky now, we will approach the task of combating him ... now the main thing has become: intensifying agitation for a kind of "partial demand" on Kerensky: arrest Milyukov, arm the St. Petersburg workers ... legalize the transfer of landlord lands to the peasants, introduce workers' control ... It would be wrong to think that we have moved further away from the task of conquest of power by the proletariat. No. We came extremely close to it, but not directly, but from the side. And it is necessary to agitate this very minute not so much directly against Kerensky, but indirectly against him .... exactly: demand an active and most active truly revolutionary war

against Kornilov.

The development of this war alone can bring us to power and there is less need to talk about this in agitation" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, pp. 120-121).

It should be noted that the Central Committee, independently of Lenin, outlined and pursued approximately the same policy of "conditional support" for Kerensky, starting from the very first day of the crisis - August 25th. Therefore, in a postscript to his letter, Lenin states the complete coincidence of his views with the political articles of the last six issues (since the beginning of the crisis) of the Central Organ of the Central Committee (the newspaper Rabochy) (ibid., p. 121). True, there was a small group in the Central Committee that advocated support for the Provisional Government without any reservations, even for a bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries (ibid., p. 119), but after Lenin's letter, nothing more was heard about it.

When the SR-Menshevik Central Executive Committee of the Soviets formed the "Committee of the People's Struggle against the Counter-Revolution" and asked the Bolshevik Central Committee to join this Committee, the Central Committee of the RSDLP (6) sent its representatives there. To explain such a sharp turn in attitudes towards the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, on August 29 the Central Committee sent a telegram to the local party organizations, which said:

"In the name of repulsing the counter-revolution, we are working in technical and informational cooperation with the Soviet with complete independence of the political line" ("CPSU in the struggle for the victory of the great October socialist revolution," July 5-November 5, 1917, p. 44).

The Bolshevik Central Committee energetically took up the organization of workers' squads and the Red Guard in the working-class districts of Petrograd. They received weapons from government warehouses and even directly from factories (for example, the Putilov factory gave the Red Guard 100 artillery pieces) ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book 1, p. 220). The Bolsheviks allocated over 700 instructors for the military-political training of the Red Guard (ibid.). In these days the Military Organization of the Central Committee launched its work with might and main, this time with the official support of the government and the Soviets. Moreover. The Kornilov days and his temporary contact with the government and the Soviet of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks used to arm their supporters in all the key points of the country: in the regions of Moscow, the Central Industrial Region, the Urals, the Volga region, Ukraine, Transcaucasia, the Don, Siberia, Turkestan, the Baltic states - everywhere they created workers' squads and the Red Guard.

L. Trotsky was absolutely right when he wrote: "The army that rebelled against Kornilov was the future army of the October Revolution" (L. Trotsky, My Life, part 2, p. 39). Of course, the Provisional Government released all the arrested Bolsheviks, headed by Trotsky, Kamenev, Lunacharsky. The order of the Provisional Government to bring Lenin and Zinoviev to justice was not formally canceled, although, as before, no one was looking for them. Zinoviev even participated in the meetings of the Central Committee, which took place legally.

On August 30, Kornilov's campaign failed almost without a single shot being fired, and General Krymov, who had come for an audience with Kerensky, shot himself an hour after this audience. Kornilov was arrested, but armed detachments of workers and the Red Guard of the Bolsheviks remained. The one who armed them was no longer able to disarm them. The Bolsheviks fulfilled their dual task - the defeat of Kornilov in order to defeat Kerensky - only in relation to the first part. Now the fate of Kerensky himself was at stake. It is quite natural that the Bolshevik Central Committee tried to derive maximum political capital from its participation in the suppression of Kornilov's campaign against Petrograd. At the decisive point - on the question of changing the party composition of the capital's Soviets - this capital had already been extracted: in the re-elections of the Soviets in Petrograd and Moscow, the Bolsheviks, together with the Left SRs who sympathized with them, received a majority. By decision of the Central Committee of September 24, 1917, Trotsky was nominated Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet ("Protocols of the Central Committee", p. 69), whom the Council approved on September 25 (another member of the Central Committee, V. Nogin, was approved as Chairman of the Moscow Soviet). The Bolsheviks owed this victory to Kornilov's defeat.

However, no matter how important such a victory was in itself, it was difficult to use it to seize power while the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were at the head of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. Therefore, the Bolshevik Central Committee is looking for methods and ways to tear the Central Executive Committee of Soviets away from the Provisional Government and force it to form a purely Soviet government, even without the Bolsheviks. There was even an opportunity for such a turn of affairs. So, when, after the suppression of the "Kornilov uprising", the question arose of reorganizing the Provisional Government, which was to include three parties - the Cadets, the Menshevik and the Socialist-Revolutionaries - the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries declared that they would not enter the government together with the Cadets. The Bolshevik Central Committee decided to take advantage

situation, in order to offer the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries a compromise: the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries agree to form their own, purely Soviet, government, and the Bolsheviks agree to abandon the demand for the immediate transfer of power into the hands of the "proletariat and the poorest peasantry" (the dictatorship of the proletariat).

The Bolshevik Central Committee specifically discussed this issue at its meeting on August 31 (September 13), 1917. According to Kamenev's report, a resolution "On Power" was adopted, which was proposed by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets. The resolution made the following demands:

1. elimination of the Provisional Government and the creation of "the power of the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry";

e: Decree of a democratic republic;

in the transfer of landlords' land without redemption to the peasants;

4. introduction of workers' control;
5. declaring the secret treaties null and void and offering immediate peace;
6. cessation of repressions against the Bolsheviks;
7. the abolition of the death penalty at the front and the election of commissars;
9. exercise of the right of nations to self-determination (Finland, Ukraine);
9. dissolution of the State Council and the State Duma;
10. destruction of all class (noble) advantages (Minutes of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (6), pp. 37-38).

On September 1-3, Lenin wrote a special article about this compromise proposal of the Bolshevik Central Committee. This article was called: "On compromises." Lenin writes that the usual idea about the Bolsheviks is that the Bolsheviks do not accept any compromises. Lenin says that no matter how flattering such an idea of them may be for revolutionaries, it is still wrong. In the history of Bolshevism there were forced and voluntary compromises, but at the same time the Bolsheviks remained true to their principles. Lenin wrote:

"A compromise, on our part, is our return to the pre-July demand: all power to the Soviets, a government of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks responsible to the Soviets ... The compromise would consist in the fact that the Bolsheviks, without claiming to participate in the government ...

they would refuse to put forward an immediate demand for the transfer of power to the proletariat and the poorest peasants, from revolutionary methods of struggle for this demand" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, pp. 134-135). The resolution of the Central Committee "On power" was adopted at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet (279 in favor, 115 against, 50 deputies abstained). It was also adopted at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet (354 in favor, 252 against). However, at the previous meeting of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets on August 31, 1917, the resolution "On Power" of the Bolshevik Central Committee was rejected by the Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary bloc as a purely propaganda maneuver of the Bolsheviks (Minutes of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (6), p. 257).

When the Directory (Council of Five) headed by Kerensky was created, the majority of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets supported it. Then Lenin wrote:

"Even after the Kornilov revolt, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries did not accept our compromise, the peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets (in which we did not yet have a majority at that time), they again sank into the swamp of dirty and vile deals with the Cadets. Down with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Ruthless struggle against them" (Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 262).

The slogan "All power to the Soviets!" remained, but this slogan was now regarded as a slogan of insurrection. The Bolshevik Central Committee and Lenin decided that the time was already coming when the question of an uprising was on the order of the day.

Simultaneously with the growth of the influence of the Bolsheviks in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets, the membership of the party itself also grew. Next

official figures show this:

Time Number of party members

February 1917 23,000

April (late) 1917 80 - 100,000

August (beginning) 1917 240,000

October 1917 350,000

(Source: History of the CPSU, vol. 3, book 1, p. 244).

The geography of the distribution of the Bolsheviks was as follows:

Moscow and its region - 70,000 (20%);

Petrograd and the province - 70,000 (17%);

Ukraine, southwestern and Romanian fronts, Black Sea - 60,000 (17%)

Baltic States, Northern Front, Baltic Fleet, Russian troops in Finland - 30,000 (8.5%);

Belarus and the Western Front - 30,000 (8.5%); Volga region - 20,000 (5.5%);

Caucasus, Caucasian Front, Don 20,000 (5.5%);

Siberia and the Far East - 15,000 (4.5%); Others - 10,000 (3.5%)

(Source: *ibid.*, p. 247).

The Red Guard, led by the Military Organization of the Central Committee, also grew. Before the October coup, the Red Guard detachments numbered over 20 thousand fighters in Petrograd, about 10 thousand in Moscow, and there were thousands and hundreds of Red Guards in other cities. All Red Guard workers were 200,000 (*ibid.*, p. 264). The influence of the Bolsheviks in the army also grew rapidly. Of the 12th Army, the Central Committee of the Party reported: "The vast majority of the troops are on our side. Entire regiments are adjoining us," from the 5th Army they reported to the Central Committee: "The majority of the army trusts only the Bolsheviks. This is their last hope" (*ibid.*, p. 272). The official historian of the party, analyzing the growth of the influence of the Bolsheviks in the army, comes to the conclusion: "Even the commanders of the fronts and representatives of the Headquarters were forced to admit that the army was breaking out of obedience, did not want to continue the war, listened only to the Bolsheviks" (*ibid.*, p. 272).

Why is it so? The answer is very simple: the Bolshevik Party, using maximum legality and impunity, repeated the same thing every day, every hour: make peace at any cost, send the soldiers home, and until this happens, immediately abolish the death penalty at the front, and commissars and commanders not to appoint from above, but to elect by the votes of the rank and file soldiers themselves! The famous "Order No. 1" on the democratization of the army of March 1, 1917, drawn up by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, turned out to be, in the final analysis, a dynamic tool in the hands of the Bolsheviks to win over the army to their side.

Sukhanov vividly depicts the general situation that developed in Russia after the Kornilov speech: "There was no management, no organic work of the central government, and even more so local. The collapse of the government apparatus was complete and hopeless. And the country lived. And she demanded power, she demanded the work of the state machine ... There was no longer any talk of land policy now. Even talk of the land was stalled at the top, while the excitement of the bottom reached its extreme limits. There was not even a responsible person in the Winter Palace, there was no minister (of agriculture), and a wave of barbaric pogroms perpetrated by greedy and hungry peasants rolled across Russia. WITH

food affairs were no better. In St. Petersburg, we crossed the limits beyond which the famine began with all its consequences. But there was no way out in the future. Organic work was zero, but the political course gave a negative value. Not today - tomorrow the army was supposed to start a total flight from the front, for hunger is above all. Strikes did not stop in all industrial centers, in which, it seems, the entire Russian proletariat took part in turn. The situation on the railroads became threatening. The sap movement was growing because of the lack of coal... The entire press, from top to bottom, in different aspects, with different tendencies and conclusions, but equally loudly and stubbornly, yelled about the imminent economic catastrophe. The purely administrative devastation was also beyond measure. Where lively military revolutionary committees arose in the Kornilov region, there was no longer any question of legitimate authority acting in accordance with national norms and directives from the capital "(N. Sukhanov, Notes on the Revolution, book UT, pp. 73-75).

How can one not recall here what Lenin called "the fundamental law of the revolution"? Compare the above situation in Russia on the eve of October 1917 with what Lenin says about this law. In The Childhood Disease of Leftism in Communism, Lenin wrote:

"The basic law of the revolution, confirmed by all revolutions and, in particular, by all three Russian revolutions in the twentieth century. is this: it is not enough for a revolution that the exploited and oppressed masses recognize the impossibility of living in the old way and demand a change; for a revolution it is necessary that the exploiters cannot live and govern in the old way. Only when the "lower classes" do not want the old, and when the "tops" cannot continue in the old way, only then can the revolution win. Otherwise, this truth is expressed in words: a revolution is impossible without a nationwide crisis (affecting both the exploited and the exploiters)" (Lenin, 3rd ed., vol. XXY, p. 223).

Such were precisely the conditions in the country when Lenin, in four letters dated September 12-14, September 13-14, September 29 and October 24, persistently and categorically put before the Central Committee the question of an immediate seizure of power. These letters of Lenin, in addition to their fundamental significance, are also of great historical value, since they reveal the entire sharpness of Lenin's struggle against the Central Committee precisely on the question of the timeliness or untimeliness of the seizure of power. In connection with the question of the seizure of power in the Central Committee

three groups were formed:

1. Trotsky's group - to seize power, but to time the seizure itself with the opening of the II Congress of Soviets, scheduled for October 20, and then postponed to October 25 (the congress appointed the old Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary Central Executive Committee

Soviets);

I am Lenin's group - seize power immediately and without waiting for the opening of the congress; For the Zinoviev-Kamenev group - the seizure of power under these conditions

adventure, and therefore disastrous for the revolution.

In his first letter dated September 12-14, 1917 (on the eve of the opening of the Democratic Conference) to the Central Committee, Lenin writes:

"Having received a majority in both capital Soviets, the Bolsheviks can and must take state power into their own hands ... put on the order of the day an armed uprising in St. Petersburg and Moscow, the conquest of power, the overthrow of the government. Consider how to agitate for this without expressing it in the press" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, pp. 239-240).

Lenin's second letter to the Central Committee of September 13-14 is entitled: "Marxism and the uprising." This letter is, as it were, a condensed tactical and strategic treatise on the topic: how to successfully carry out an armed uprising. His central thought is that rebellion is an art. His practical proposals: "And in order to treat the uprising in a Marxist way, that is, as an art, at the same time, without wasting a minute, we must organize the headquarters of the insurgent detachments, distribute forces, move loyal regiments to the most important points, surround Aleksandrinka (the Democratic Conference is to open there on September 15. - A. A.), take Petropavlovka (a fortress on the Neva in the center of Petrograd. - A. A.), arrest the General Staff and the government ... immediately take the telegraph and telephone, place nat the headquarters of the uprising at the central telephone exchange, to connect all factories, all regiments, all points of armed struggle with it by telephone "(Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 247).

How did the Central Committee react to these letters from Lenin? This question is answered by the minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee of September 15, 1917. Out of 24 members of the PC, 16 were present at this meeting. Among those present were Trotsky, Kamenev, Rykov, Nogin, Stalin, Sverdlov, Dzerzhinsky, and others. The main and only item on the agenda was the discussion of the two letters of Lenin quoted above. It appears from the record that the Central Committee

actually rejected Lenin's proposal for an uprising. Lenin's letters gave the Central Committee only a pretext "in the near future to appoint a meeting of the Central Committee devoted to the discussion of tactical questions" (Minutes of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (6), Moscow, 1958, p. 55). Nor was Stalin's proposal "to send letters to the most important organizations and discuss them" (this was a pretext to evade a direct answer to Lenin altogether). Kamenev's proposal was also not accepted, who very sharply demanded that Lenin's letters be rejected. His proposal stated:

"The Central Committee, after discussing Lenin's letters, rejects the practical proposals contained in them, calls on all organizations to follow only the instructions of the Central Committee, and reaffirms that the Central Committee finds at the current moment absolutely unacceptable any street protests" (*ibid.*, p. 55). The Central Committee, however, adopts a resolution which rejects Lenin's guidelines and in its final part coincides with Kamenev's resolution. The resolution of the Central Committee says:

"Members of the Central Committee who work in the Military Organization and in the PC are instructed to take measures to ensure that there are no protests in the barracks and factories" (ibid., p. 55).

The meeting of the Central Committee further issues a resolution: to destroy all copies of Lenin's letters, except for one. This decision is adopted by 6 votes to 4, 6 abstained (ibid., p. 55).

Lenin considered it a mistake of the Central Committee and participation in the All-Russian Democratic Conference, which was convened by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries on behalf of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets (from September 14 to 22, 1917). At this meeting, in addition to the Soviet parties, city governments, zemstvos, cooperatives, trade unions, representatives of business circles, as well as the Soviets themselves, about 1,500 people in all, were represented. The issue of participation in this Democratic Conference, as well as in the work of the body that it created - in the Pre-Parliament (Provisional Council of the Republic) was discussed at many meetings of the Central Committee in September 1917. The Central Committee made a fundamental decision on participation in the Democratic Conference on September 3. In a circular letter to local organizations, he demanded "to make every effort to create the most significant and cohesive group possible from the participants in the meeting, members of our party" ("Correspondence of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (6) with local party organizations", March-October 1917, 1957, p. 35).

This decision was made without the consent of Lenin, who was forced to recognize it, although very conditionally. But since it so happened that the Central Committee decided to take part in the conference, Lenin suggested that the Central Committee read out a brief declaration at the Conference on behalf of the Bolshevik faction and then "we must send our entire faction to the factories and barracks: there is its place, there is the nerve of life. There we must explain our program and put the question in this way: either its full acceptance by the Conference, or insurrection. There is no middle. You can't wait" (Lenin, ibid., p. 247).

Lenin was, of course, categorically against the entry of the Bolsheviks into the Pre-Parliament. These demands of Lenin were discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of September 21, which was attended by 17 people, including Trotsky, Kamenev, Stalin, Sverdlov, Rykov, Bukharin and others. do not leave" ("Protocols of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (6)", p. 65). With regard to the Pre-Parliament, it was decided by 9 votes against 8 not to enter there, but since such a division of votes did not create a stable majority, the Central Committee decided to transfer the final decision on this issue to the Bolshevik faction itself at the Democratic Conference, singling out two speakers: for the boycott - Trotsky and against the boycott - Rykov. Further, the minutes of the Central Committee say: "At the meeting (of the faction), by 77 votes against 50, participation in the Pre-Parliament was adopted, which decision was approved by the Central Committee" (ibid., p. 65). Only Trotsky and the Trotskyists are for the Leninist boycott tactics: "Trotsky was for the boycott. Bravo, comrade Trotsky," writes Lenin (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, p. 262).

However, Lenin does not calm down. He continues to bombard the Central Committee, the PC, the Moscow Committee and individual leaders of the party with letters, notes, articles about the need to straighten the line of the Central Committee and refuse to participate in the Democratic Conference. In the article "The Mistakes of Our Party" (which, however, was not accepted by the Central Organ of the Party and was first published only in 1924), Lenin writes: "We should have boycotted the Democratic Conference, we all made a mistake in not doing this ... We must boycott the Pre-Parliament.



We must go to the Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies" (Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 262). Lenin sharply criticizes the Bolshevik faction for its decision to participate in the Pre-Parliament. Lenin also criticizes the vacillation of the Central Committee around this question. He says: "There can be no doubt

about the fact that in the "tops" of our party there are noticeable vacillations that can become disastrous" (*ibid.*, p. 263).

Lenin categorically raises the question of insurrection in almost all of his letters, beginning on September 12th.

However, all this does not make the proper impression on the Central Committee. Then Lenin turns to the Central Committee with a new letter dated September 29, which is essentially Lenin's ultimatum to the Central Committee: either the Central Committee will accept Lenin's proposal for an immediate insurrection or Lenin withdraws from the Central Committee. Here is the most important passage from that letter:

"If we hit immediately, suddenly, from three points, in St. Petersburg, Moscow and the Baltic Fleet, then ninety-nine hundredths for the fact that we will win with fewer casualties than on July 3-5 ... With such chances as now, not to take power, then all talk about the power of the Soviets turns into a lie ... Seeing that the Central Committee even left unanswered my insistence in this spirit from the beginning of the Democratic Conference, that the Central Organ (the newspaper of the Central Committee - Stalin. - A.A., crosses out from my articles pointing to such flagrant mistakes of the Bolsheviks as the shameful decision to participate in the Pre-Parliament, as giving the Mensheviks a seat in the Presidium of the Soviet (on September 25, at the suggestion of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet was elected as a "coalition presidium" consisting of 4 Bolsheviks, 2 Social Revolutionaries and 1 Menshevik. - A. A.), etc., etc., seeing this, I must see here a "subtle" hint of the Central Committee's unwillingness to even discuss this question, a subtle hint of holding my mouth and suggesting that I leave. a petition to leave the Central Committee, which I am doing and to reserve the freedom of agitation in the lower ranks of the party and at the party congress, for my extreme conviction is that if we "wait" for the congress of Soviets and miss the moment now, we will ruin the revolution "(Lenin, *ibid.*, pp. 282-283).

What was the reaction of the Central Committee to this ultimatum from Lenin? In the minutes of the Central Committee there is no mention either of this letter from Lenin, or of the acceptance or rejection by the Central Committee of Lenin's resignation. The official history of the party also passes over this episode in silence. The only thing that is available on this subject in the literature of the party are the memoirs of Bukharin, a member of the Central Committee. Even during Lenin's lifetime, at the evening of reminiscences for the fourth anniversary of the October Revolution, Bukharin said:

"The letter (of Lenin. - A.A.) was drawn up extremely resolutely and threatened us with all kinds of fines. We were all dumbfounded. No one has asked this question before. Maybe it was the only time

history of our party, when the Central Committee unanimously decided to burn Lenin's letter... Although we believed that we would certainly succeed in seizing power in Petrograd and Moscow, we thought that in the provinces we were still unable to achieve this (I quote from G.. Tgo {K1, "CessySche 4er gas1sBen Veyoaop," p. 601). Commenting on this statement by Bukharin, Trotsky says that the decision of the Central Committee to burn Lenin's letter was not unanimous, but here Trotsky makes a mistake, since he refers to the minutes of the Central Committee of September 15 ("Minutes of the Central Committee", p. 55), where the first two letters were discussed Lenin, and gives the results of voting on these letters (there it was decided to keep only one copy: for - 6, against - 4, abstained -

6). Bukharin, on the other hand, refers to the third letter of Lenin dated September 29 (as a postscript to the article "The crisis is ripe", the postscript was intended only for members of the Central Committee, PC, MK and Soviets. Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, pp. 280-283).

The letter of September 29 nevertheless had its effect. We will talk about this in the next chapter.

## Chapter 13

### Central Committee - ORGANIZER OF THE REVOLUTION

Lenin, relying on Trotsky (Lenin: "Trotsky was for the boycott. Bravo, comrade Trotsky!"), achieved the first and very serious tactical success: for the session of the Central Committee of October 5, 1917, he passes a resolution by all votes against one (probably Kamenev) leave the Pre-Parliament on the very first day of the opening of its session, having read out the corresponding declaration there ("Protocols of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (6b)", p. 76). On October 7, 1917, the Bolshevik faction, in accordance with this demand of the Central Committee, left the Pre-Parliament, announcing a reasoned declaration. The declaration contains the well-known demands of the Bolsheviks for power (Soviets), land, peace, etc. d.

The subtext of the declaration is clearer than its text - it is a boycott of democracy and a bet on the establishment of a dictatorship through an armed uprising.

On the same October 7, Lenin, by a special decision of the PC of October 3, 1917 ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...", p. 74), returns from his Finnish underground to Petrograd, so that, as the protocol says, "permanent and close communication was possible" (ibid., p. 74). From now on, Lenin takes direct leadership of the Central Committee.

Now he has the opportunity to meet with each of the members of the Central Committee

PC. His information has also become more complete. Just in case, Lenin took off his beard and mustache, put on make-up, and through the Central Committee and through the Bolshevik Smilga (Chairman of the Regional Committee of the Army, Navy and Workers of Finland) made a certificate for himself in the name of the worker Konstantin Petrovich Ivanov (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, p. 268). In the name of Ivanov, a pass was also issued to Lenin for the Smolny Institute, where the legal Bolshevik center was located. Although Lenin said that he needed a fake ID "just in case, because both a "conflict" and a "meeting" are possible" (ibid., p. 268), there was hardly any need for this. The Provisional Government has not been looking for Lenin for a long time, and as early as September 6, the Central Committee of the Party suggested to Lenin and Zinoviev ("Protocols of the PCK ...", p. 74), if they agreed, to raise the issue of releasing them from persecution on bail (bail was released and Trotsky on September 4, 1917) However, Lenin chose to remain "illegal".

Three days after Lenin's return, on October 10, 1917, that historic meeting of the Central Committee takes place with his participation, at which the question of an uprising was finally raised. This meeting took place at the apartment of the editor of the newspaper M. Gorky "New Life" Menshevik-Internationalist N. Sukhanov. How it happened that the apartment of the enemy of the October Revolution, Sukhanov, turned out to be the place of the historic meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, Sukhanov explains as follows:

"The fully Bolshevik Party Central Committee has assembled ... Oh, new jokes of the cheerful muse of history! This supreme and decisive meeting took place in my apartment, on Karpovka (house 32, apt. 31). But all this was without my

known. As before, I very often spent the night somewhere near the editorial office or Smolny, that is, eight versts from Karpovka. This time, special arrangements were made for my spending the night away from home: at least my wife inquired exactly about my intentions and gave me friendly, disinterested advice - not to bother myself with further travel after work. In any case, the high assembly was absolutely guaranteed against my invasion..." (N. Sukhanov, "Notes on the Revolution", book UP, 1923, p. 33).

Lenin appeared at the meeting in a wig with the mentioned certificate in the name of Ivanov, and Zinoviev - with a beard, but without hair, also with a fake certificate (Zinoviev, as mentioned, had participated in the meetings of the Central Committee without much risk since September, they even wanted to legalize him on bail, but the Central Committee did not agree to tear him away from Lenin). Sukhanov admits one

mistake and one omission in his presentation. The omission is that he does not say that his wife G. K. Sukhanova-Flakserman was a member of the Bolshevik Party and an employee of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book 1, p. 301). The official historian notes that it was precisely the fact that Flaxerman was Sukhanov's wife that made Sukhanov's apartment "very convenient from the point of view of conspiracy" (ibid., p. 301).

Sukhanov's mistake lies in the fact that he thought that the entire composition of the Central Committee had gathered. Meanwhile, the minutes of the Central Committee, published later than Sukhanov's memoirs, show the following picture: at the decisive meeting of the Central Committee of October 10, 1917, only 50% of all members of the Central Committee were present. As we have seen, 21 members of the Central Committee were elected at the sixth congress, and then three people from the candidates of the Central Committee were transferred to the members of the Central Committee. Thus, the membership of the Central Committee rose to 24 people. The minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee list those present in the following order: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Dzerzhinsky, Kollontai, Bubnov, Sokolnikov, Lomov (Oppokov). As usual, Sverdlov presides, whom Trotsky calls the "General Secretary of the October Revolution" (Sverdlov was the de facto first secretary of the Central Committee and leader of the entire party hierarchy).

The agenda of the meeting does not look "historical" at all:

Here it is: 1) Romanian front

2) Lithuanians

3) Minsk and Northern Front 4) Current moment

5) Regional Congress

6) Withdrawal of troops

All these practical and tactical questions are deliberately formulated in such a way as to better veil the main and decisive question about the fate of the entire revolution - the fourth question about the current moment. Lenin made a report on this question. He now had the opportunity to present his arguments for the uprising in person. His main idea: politically, the uprising is long overdue, but in the party "since the beginning of September, some kind of indifference to the question of the uprising has been noticed ... This is unacceptable ... The question is very acute and the decisive moment is near ... Absenteeism and indifference of the masses

can be explained by the fact that the masses are tired of words and resolutions...

Politically, the matter is completely ripe for the transfer of power ... We must talk about the technical side. That's the whole point. Meanwhile, we, following the defencists, are inclined to regard the systematic preparation of an uprising as something in the nature of a political sin. It is pointless to wait until the Constituent Assembly, which will obviously not be with us" ("Protocols of the PCC...", pp. 84-85).

Only three people spoke in the debate, and then not on the fundamental question of the uprising, but with information about the state of affairs on the ground (Lomov, Uritsky, Sverdlov). The resolution proposed by Lenin was voted to the effect that the entire external and internal situation "puts an armed uprising on the order of the day. Recognizing in this way that an armed uprising is inevitable and fully ripe, the Central Committee proposes to all organizations of the Party to be guided by this and from this point of view to discuss and resolve all practical questions" (ibid., pp. 85-86). 10 people vote for the resolution, two vote against (Kamenev and Zinoviev).

Thus, the decision on the Bolshevik uprising was taken by a minority of the Central Committee (10 for, 2 against, 12 missing). Of the absent important members of the PC, two - Rykov and Nogin (chairman of the Moscow Soviet) were definitely on the side of those who voted against, and another prominent member of the Central Committee, Milyutin, also joined them (see L. Trotsky, op. pr., p. 612). At the same meeting, Dzerzhinsky proposed "to create for the political leadership in the near future a Political Bureau of members of the Central Committee." The protocol says that such a Bureau was created from seven people: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov and Bubnov ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...", p. 86).

L. Trotsky says that this Politburo turned out to be unviable and never once met in the composition indicated (T.. Tro{7K1, Cesssche 4er guias- \$15cBen Beuoan, p. 616). At the meeting, the date for the start of the uprising was not written down, but Trotsky writes that it was verbally agreed: the uprising would begin on October 15 (Stalin disputed this, saying that the October uprising occurred exactly when it was scheduled - October 25) (T .. TgoK1, ibid., p. 616).

There is one very characteristic and essential moment in the resolution: why it is necessary to hasten the insurrection, the resolution of the Central Committee enumerates favorable prerequisites, and also names one negative prerequisite that could frustrate the insurrection. The resolution says this about it: "the threat of peace by the imperialists with the aim of strangling the revolution in Russia" ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...",

page 86). This "threat to peace" was complemented by another threat - the alleged

the provision of land to the peasants, on the project of which both the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and the Provisional Government worked. And these - peace and land - were just those two pillars on which the whole strategy of seizing power by the Bolsheviks was built.

On the second day after the decision of the Central Committee on the uprising, Zinoviev and Kamenev appealed to the "Petrograd, Moscow regional, Finnish regional committees of the RSDLP, the Bolshevik faction, the Petrograd Executive Committee of Soviets, the Bolshevik faction of the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region" with a statement against the uprising. They wrote: "They say: 1) the majority of the people in Russia is already for us, and 2) the majority of the international proletariat is for us. Alas! - neither one nor the other is true, and that is the whole point" (ibid., p. 88).

The statement of Zinoviev and Kamenev had no practical consequences. The Bolshevik machine of insurrection began to work methodically and systematically. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, unwillingly, themselves contributed to the creation of a very important, perhaps decisive legal body of this machine - the Military Revolutionary Committee. The day before the meeting of the Central Committee, on October 9, there was a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, in which the Bolsheviks were now in the majority. At this meeting, it was discussed the need to create, firstly, control over the actions of the Petrograd military headquarters (which was accused of wanting to withdraw the revolutionary garrison from Petrograd), and secondly, the organization of such an body that would mobilize the population for the defense of Petrograd - the Committee of the Revolutionary defense. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were at first against this, but then they themselves made proposals that read:

1. create a "board" of representatives of the Soviet under the commander of the troops of the Petrograd district, and any withdrawal of one or another part of the troops can be made only with the consent of this "board",
2. clear the command staff from the right,
3. create a committee for the revolutionary defense of Petrograd.

The Bolshevik Executive Committee of Soviets very willingly accepted these proposals (13 in favor, 12 against) (N. Sukhanov, op. cit., p. 38). On the same day, a plenum of the Soviet was held, at which it was found that the proposals of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were not radical enough. The Plenum of the Soviet wrote that power should pass into the hands of the Soviets, as for the "revolutionary defense committee" of Petrograd, which "concentrated

if in his hands all the data relating to the defense of Petrograd and the approaches to it," then it should be created (from the resolution).

Thus, with the participation of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the ground was prepared for the creation of a legal body of the uprising - the Revolutionary Military Council. It was officially created on October 12th. Only the Bolshevik members of the Soviet knew that this was an organ of insurrection; its Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary members believed that, in essence, the organ that they themselves proposed was being created. The Bolsheviks and Trotsky in particular did everything possible and impossible to reinforce them in this error. Even in the decision about the tasks of the committee, the Bolsheviks were able to cleverly disguise its true purpose. However, one would have to be very naive not to see this true purpose of the created body. In fact, this is what the Executive Committee's resolution said:

"The immediate tasks of the Military Revolutionary Committee are: determining the combat strength and auxiliary means necessary for the defense of the capital; then accounting and registration of the personnel of the garrison of Petrograd and its environs, as well as accounting for items of equipment and food, developing a plan of work for the defense of the city, measures to protect it from pogroms and desertion, maintaining revolutionary discipline among the working masses and soldiers. Under the Military Revolutionary Committee, a garrison conference is organized, which includes representatives of units of all types of weapons. The garrison conference will be an organ assisting the Military Revolutionary Committee in carrying out its activities, informing it about the situation on the ground and maintaining close contact between the committee and the units" (N. Sukhanov, *ibid.*, pp. 40-41).

The Left Socialist-Revolutionary P. E. Lazimir was placed at the head of the Military Revolutionary Committee, who, of course, did not know that he was heading the legal headquarters of the uprising of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party! On the other hand, he was surrounded by the Bolsheviks, who knew what the matter was: this was Trotsky himself, then Comrade Chairman Podvoisky (on the eve of the coup, he legally replaced Lazimir), secretary of the Antonov-Ovseenko committee, members - Nevsky, Yurenev, Mekhonoshin (Mensheviks and Right Social Revolutionaries refused to join this committee). The Bolshevik conspirators organized their committee so well that they created excellent auxiliary services under it. These were the departments of the committee: 1) defense, 2) supply, 3) communications, 4) information, 5) workers' militia, 6) reports, 7) commandant's office (Sukhanov, *ibid.*, p.

41). The committee was firmly supported by a garrison of 150,000 soldiers (History of the CPSU, p. 314).

In a word, Lenin, having now become more of a "defencist" than Kerensky himself, created legal and illegal power over Petrograd almost two weeks before he seized power over the whole country. Under these conditions, the inactivity of the Provisional Government was striking.

The second meeting of the Central Committee, devoted to the armed uprising, took place on October 16 (October 29), 1917 (if, as Trotsky claims, the armed uprising was scheduled for October 15, then this period was missed). This time the meeting was expanded - the Central Committee met jointly with the responsible leaders of the Executive Commission (Bureau) of the Petrograd Committee, the Military Organization, the Petrograd Soviet, the Trade Unions, railway workers, the Petrograd District Committee. The protocol does not list the names of those present, but it is clear from the vote that 25 people were present, including members of the Central Committee Lenin, Sverdlov, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Sokolnikov, Stalin, Skrypnik, Ioffe, Milyutin, Dzerzhinsky. (L. Trotsky did not participate in this meeting, since he led the plenum of the Petrograd Soviet, at which the Military Revolutionary Committee was approved on the same October 16.) The extended meeting took place on the outskirts of Petrograd, in the premises of the Lesnovsko-Udelninskaya District Duma, which was in the hands of the Bolsheviks (its chairman was M. I. Kalinin) ("History of the CPSU", p. 306).

At this meeting, Lenin substantiated the decision of October 10 on the uprising, and representatives of the Central Committee and the organizations named above reported on how and how successfully the technical preparations for the uprising were going. Here, in the general staff of the party, all the pluses and minuses of the ongoing preparations were weighed soberly, efficiently and without any false pathos. Already from the dry protocol statement it is clear that Lenin and his students approached the uprising as an art, which they mastered to perfection. Of course, there were also pessimistic notes of disbelief in the success of the cause, but they were drowned in a large chorus of convinced supporters of the uprising.

Lenin said nothing fundamentally new. He only noticed that now there is a dilemma - either a new Kornilovshchina, or the power of the Bolsheviks. He said that the masses demanded from the Bolsheviks not words, but deeds "in the fight against war and in the fight against ruin"; Lenin wished first to listen to reports from

seats from the Bolshevik centers before drawing further conclusions. At the same time, he pointedly added: "It is impossible to be guided by the mood of the masses, because it is changeable and cannot be taken into account" ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...", p. 94).

Sverdlov, who also chaired this meeting, reported that the party had grown to 400,000 people (these figures turned out to be exaggerated), and the influence of the Bolsheviks in the Soviets, as well as in the army and navy, was growing.

The head of the Petrograd Party Committee, Boki, reported on the state of affairs in the districts of the capital: Vasilevsky Island - there is no fighting mood, but combat training is underway.

Vyborgsky district - preparing for the uprising and the Military Council was formed.

1st urban area - the Red Guard is there, but the mood is difficult to take into account.

2nd city district - the mood is better.

Moskovsky district - they will come out at the call of the Council, but not the party.

Narva region - there is no desire to act, but the authority of the party does not fall.

Nevsky district - everyone will follow the Soviet.

Okhtensky district is a bad thing.

Petersburg district - expectant mood.

The Christmas area is the same.

Porohovsky district - the mood in favor of the Bolsheviks has improved.

Shlisselburg - mood in favor of the Bolsheviks.

Krylenko, reporting from the Bureau of the Military Organization of the Central Committee, stated that they had differences in the Bureau in assessing the situation in the garrison, but that he personally thought that the mood in the regiments was "all ours."

The representative of the Petrograd district organization, Stepanov, declared that in the district "the mood is fighting, they are preparing for action", the majority of the Bolshevik garrisons. Volodarsky, on behalf of the Petrograd Soviet, declared that "no one is rushing into the street, but at the call of the Soviet everyone will appear." The representative of the trade unions (500 thousand people) Schmidt said that "the influence of our party is predominant ... They demand all power to the Soviets."

Shlyapnikov, a representative of the Metal Workers' Union (a former member of the PC), noted that the influence of the Bolsheviks prevails among them, but "Bolshevik

performance is not popular; rumors about it even caused a panic."

The skrypnik from the factory committees states that people want people to move from words to deeds; leaders lagged behind the masses. Schmidt additionally says that the Petrograd and Moscow railway junctions are closer to the Bolsheviks; postal workers - the lowest employees - the Bolsheviks.

Sverdlov additionally informs that in Moscow, in connection with the resolution of the Central Committee, steps have been taken to clarify the situation on the possibility

uprisings ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...", pp. 93-97).

On the basis of these informational reports on the preparations for the uprising, a debate "On the current moment" unfolded. 21 people spoke in the debate, some of them spoke several times. Milyutin and Shotman declared that the party was not ready for an uprising and that it was too early to act now. Skalov declared that before the 2nd Congress of Soviets was convened, an uprising should not be staged, but power should be taken at the congress. Volodarsky also believed that the question of the seizure of power should be decided at the 2nd Congress. G. I. Boki was also pessimistic. Zinoviev and Kamenev repeated their old point of view and resolutely opposed the uprising, at least in the next few days. Zinoviev said: "We must tell ourselves frankly that in the next five days we are not organizing an uprising." Kamenev said that a week had passed since the adoption of the resolution and nothing had been done for the uprising. This week's conclusion is "we have no data for an uprising." In another speech, Kamenev indirectly confirmed Trotsky's instructions that the uprising was scheduled for October 15th. Kamenev said: "Earlier they said that the performance should be before 20, but now they are talking about a course towards revolution ... The purpose of the uprising is adventurism." Stalin, objecting to Kamenev and Zinoviev, declared that their wait-and-see tactics with the uprising only helped the counter-revolution to organize itself, but "the day of the uprising must be expedient." All other speakers also supported the course of an immediate uprising.

After the debate, two resolutions were put to the vote:

1. Lenin's resolution: "The meeting fully welcomes and fully supports the resolution of the Central Committee, calls on all organizations and all workers and soldiers to comprehensively and most intensively prepare for an armed uprising, to support the center created for this by the Central Committee and expresses full confidence that the Central Committee and the Soviet will promptly indicate favorable moment and expedient methods of attack";

2. Zinoviev's resolution: "Without postponing exploration,

preparatory steps, to consider that no speeches before the conference with the Bolshevik part of the Congress of Soviets are unacceptable.

Voted for Lenin's resolution: 19 in favor, 2 against, 4 abstained. Zinoviev's resolution was voted for: 6 in favor, 15 against, 3 abstained ("Protocols of the Central Committee...", pp. 97-104).

The most monstrous crime in the Bolshevik Party is the violation of the discipline of the Party, regardless of what weighty arguments the violator may bring. At the same time, the higher the violator of discipline is in the hierarchy of the party, the greater the responsibility.

Therefore, even Lenin, when he found himself in the minority in the highest organ of the party, conducted closed polemics, but never openly opposed the decision of the Bolshevik Central Committee. If it happened that Lenin intended to violate this principle of discipline, he threatened to leave the Central Committee in order, as an ordinary member of the party, to gain freedom of action against the Central Committee and its objectionable decisions.

Kamenev and Zinoviev, having voted against the uprising on October 10 and 16, speaking in the non-party newspaper Novaya Zhizn (Gorky and Sukhanov's organ) against the decision of the Central Committee, being its members, violated this iron law of Bolshevik discipline. On October 18, Kamenev wrote: "Not only myself and Comrade Zinoviev, but also a number of practical comrades find what to take upon themselves.



the initiative of an armed uprising at the present moment, given the balance of social forces, independently and a few days before the convocation of the Congress of Soviets, would be an unacceptable step, disastrous for the proletariat and the revolution" ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...", p. 116).

This speech provoked an outburst of indignation in Lenin. To the depths of his soul, apparently, Lenin was outraged by the speeches of Kamenev and Zinoviev in the Central Committee. Lenin wrote to the Central Committee: "Zinoviev has the shamelessness to assert that 'the Party has not been interrogated' and that such questions (an uprising) are not resolved by ten people" or: "Kamenev shamelessly shouted: 'The Central Committee has failed, because nothing has been done in a week' (to refute I couldn't, because it's impossible to say what exactly was done)", and Lenin categorically demanded from the Central Committee: "Kamenev and Zinoviev gave Rodzianko and Kerensky the decision of the Central Committee of their party on an armed uprising ... The answer to this can and should be one: immediate decision of the Central Committee: ... the Central Committee excludes both from the party. Lenin adds: "It is not easy for me to write about former close comrades, but I would consider hesitation here a crime ... Only one's own can become a traitor.

man" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, pp. 424-426). This letter from Lenin to the Central Committee, dated October 19, did not make much of an impression not only on Zinoviev and Kamenev, but even on the Central Committee as a whole. True, as early as October 16 (three days before Lenin's letter), in response to the Central Committee's new decision on the uprising, Kamenev filed an application for resignation from the Central Committee, but it had not yet been considered by the Central Committee.

On October 20, a new meeting of the Central Committee takes place. Present - Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov, Dzerzhinsky, Uritsky, Ioffe, Sverdlov, Milyutin, Kollontai. Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev are absent. But it is precisely Lenin's statement about Kamenev and Zinoviev that is being discussed. Here are some interesting excerpts from the debate:

Sverdlov: "The Central Committee has no right to expel him from the Party... Kamenev's resignation must be accepted."

Stalin: "Lenin's proposal should be resolved at the plenum and proposes not to decide at the moment."

Milyutin: "He joins the opinion of Comrade Stalin, but proves that nothing special happened at all."

Trotsky: "He thinks that Kamenev's resignation should be accepted."

Stalin (second time): "He believes that Kamenev and Zinoviev will obey the decisions of the Central Committee ... He believes that expulsion from the party is not a recipe, he proposes to leave it to the Central Committee."

As a result of the debate, Lenin's proposal to expel Kamenev and Zinoviev from the party is rejected, but the resignation of Kamenev, as a member of the Central Committee, is accepted (for - 5, against - 3) ("Minutes of the Central Committee ...", pp. 106-107).

However, this decision to dismiss Kamenev was later revised. At the last meeting of the Central Committee before the coup - October 24, 1917 - Kamenev took a leading part (ibid., p. 119).

Stalin's active defense of Kamenev and Zinoviev against Lenin was revealed not only in Stalin's speeches at meetings of the Central Committee, but also in the fact that he placed in the Central Organ of the Rabochy Put party without the knowledge of his co-editor Sokolnikov, firstly, a letter to the editors of Zinoviev, in which

Zinoviev says that "my actual views on the disputed question are very far from those disputed by Comrade Lenin" and suggested "postponing our dispute until more favorable circumstances"; secondly, Stalin made the following obviously anti-Leninist note from the editors to this statement: "We, in turn, express the hope that by the statement made by Comrade

Zinoviev (as well as Comrade Kamenev's statement to the Soviet), the question can be considered settled. The sharpness of the tone of Lenin's article does not change the fact that we basically remain like-minded" (ibid., pp. 114, 115). When at the meetings of the PC on October 20 it turned out that Stalin acted without authorization, and his co-editor Sokolnikov considered this action erroneous, like Lenin, Stalin announced his resignation from the editorial board, but the Central Committee did not accept his resignation (ibid., p. 108) .

The newspapers of Petrograd are full of information about the forthcoming uprising of the Bolsheviks. Not only from the speeches of Kamenev and Zinoviev, but from the very articles of Lenin in *Rabochy Put*, it is quite clear that the insurrection is a decided matter, they are only guessing about the date - when it will be appointed. Maxim Gorky, who was so close to Lenin, appeared in *Novaya Zhizn* on October 18 with the article "You must not be silent!". He wrote: "Rumors are spreading more and more insistently that on October 20th there will be a 'action of the Bolsheviks'." He warned against repeating the "disgusting scenes of July 3-5" and wrote: "All the dark instincts of the crowd, irritated by the devastation of life, the lies and dirt of politics, will flare up - people will kill each other, unable to destroy their bestial stupidity." He suggested that the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks refute the rumors of an uprising, if this Central Committee did not become "an instrument in the hands of the most shameless adventurers or mad fanatics." (N. Sukhanov, *Notes on the Revolution*, book UP, pp. 46-47). Gorky considered Lenin to be a "mad fanatic".

Meanwhile, the political and especially the technical preparations for the uprising were in full swing. On October 21, the Bolsheviks convened a meeting of regimental and company committees of all parts of the army and navy of the capital. Trotsky made a report on the "current situation" at the meeting. Result: "On October 21, the St. Petersburg garrison finally recognized the Soviet as the sole power, and the Military Revolutionary Committee as the direct commanding body" (Sukhanov, ibid., p. 86). Witness Sukhanov asserts: "Already on October 21, the Provisional Government was overthrown, and it did not exist on the territory of the capital ..." (ibid., p. 95). On October 22, the Petrograd Soviet documented that it was not Kerensky but Trotsky who was in power in the capital. On that day, the Soviet sent a telephonic message to all units of the garrison stating: "No orders regarding the garrison that have not been signed by the Military Revolutionary Committee are valid" (ibid., p. 101). Simultaneously Military

The revolutionary committee issues a proclamation to the population of Petrograd:

"In the interests of protecting the revolution ... we have appointed commissars at military units and especially important points in the capital and its environs. Orders and orders relating to these points are subject to execution only upon approval by our commissioners authorized by us. Commissars, as representatives of the Council, are inviolable" (ibid., p. 109).

This was already the beginning of an open uprising, led from room 18 of the Smolny Institute (the Bolshevik faction of the Soviet was located there).

Why did the government fail to act under these conditions? Maybe it took a lot of effort to isolate the inhabitants of room 18? Sukhanov confidently testifies: "A good detachment of five hundred men was absolutely sufficient to liquidate Smolny with all its contents" (ibid., p. 109). The Provisional Government, however, not only lacked the will to power, but even the will to live. Even its most faithful support, the Peter and Paul Fortress, which refused to accept and recognize Commissar Trotsky, after Trotsky's report at a meeting of the garrison went over to the side of the Bolsheviks. The garrison of Petropavlovsk almost unanimously adopted a resolution on Soviet power and on their readiness to revolt against the government. There were about 100 thousand rifles in the fortress. With a single speech by Trotsky, the Bolsheviks obtained these 100,000 rifles. Lenin was right. The revolution in Petrograd was not only ripe, but overripe.

The meeting of the Central Committee, which gave the last directives for the coup, took place on October 24, 1917. Lenin, Zinoviev, Stalin are absent, but Kamenev, Dzerzhinsky, Nogin, Lomov, Milyutin, Ioffe, Uritsky, Bubnov, Sverdlov, Trotsky, Berzin are present - only 11 members out of 24.

The minutes of this meeting begin with the statement: Kamenev proposes that today, without a special decision of the Central Committee, not a single member of the Central Committee could leave Smolny. Accepted" ("Protocols of the Central Committee...", p. 119). Thus, Kamenev, who voted against the uprising, now, when his fate is being decided, became together with Trotsky and Sverdlov at the head of the uprising. The reasons for the absence of Stalin (probably in the editorial office of the Central Organ) and Zinoviev are unknown. Lenin explained his non-attendance in a letter to Sverdlov dated October 23 as follows: "At the plenum, apparently, I will not be able to be, because I am being "caught" ("October armed uprising", Moscow, 1957, p. 66). On

meeting, the members of the Central Committee are distributed according to the main points and objects of the uprising. Assigned: Bubnov to the railways, Dzerzhinsky to the post office and telegraph, Milyutin to organize the food business, Sverdlov to oversee the Provisional Government, Lomov and Nogin to liaise with Moscow, Kamenev and Berzin to negotiate with the Left SRs. At the suggestion of Trotsky, it was decided to create a reserve headquarters for the uprising in the Peter and Paul Fortress (Sverdlov should maintain constant contact with the fortress). In this regard, it was decided to provide all members of the Central Committee with passes to enter the fortress ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...", pp. 119-121). The name and function of Stalin, as well as Zinoviev, are not mentioned in the Protocol.

On the same October 24, 1917, Lenin addressed his last letter before the coup to the Central Committee. In this letter he wrote:

"I am trying with all my might to convince my comrades that now everything hangs in the balance, that questions are in the queue that are not decided by conferences, not by congresses (even if only by congresses of Soviets), but exclusively by the peoples, by the masses, by the struggle of the armed masses... no matter what happens tonight, arrest the government tonight...can't wait!! You can lose everything!!.. The government hesitates. You have to get him no matter what. Delay in speaking out is like death" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, pp. 435-436).

This letter from Lenin was not discussed at the meeting of the Central Committee. Apparently, it was too late, since the Central Committee had already decided to start the uprising, as we have already seen above. Lenin appeared at Smolny already in the midst of preparations for the uprising. The official historian writes: "Until the late evening of October 24, Lenin was forced to stay in a safe house. Worried about the outcome

uprising, he sent letters to Fofanov three times ... to send them to the Central Committee ... Late in the evening, the Central Committee messenger Eino Rakhya arrived ... Lenin immediately decided to go to Smolny: he changed clothes, tied his cheek with a handkerchief, put on a wig, an old worn-out cap and left the last secret apartment late in the evening" ("History of the CPSU", *ibid.*, p. 322).

In the meantime, according to Trotsky, the Military Revolutionary Committee worked out a tactical scheme for the conquest of the capital. He says: "The city is divided into combat areas, subordinate to their nearest headquarters. The soldiers of the Red Guard are concentrated on the most important points. They have been brought into contact with troops in the neighborhood, where guard companies stand ready. The objectives of each individual operation and the forces required for this,

approved in advance" (Trotsky, *op. cit.*, p. 664).

How the uprising itself went, says the witness Sukhanov:

"There was no resistance. Beginning at two in the morning, small forces withdrawn from the barracks gradually occupied stations, bridges, lighting facilities, a telegraph office, and a telegraph agency. Groups of junkers could not and did not think to resist. In general, military operations were more like changing of the guards in the politically important centers of the city ... the decisive operations that began were completely bloodless; not a single victim was registered... The city was completely calm" (Sukhanov, *ibid.*, p. 160).

On the morning of October 25, Kerensky left for the Northern Front to bring units loyal to the government to Petrograd (the Bolsheviks write that Kerensky fled in a car with an American flag), but the uprising is developing successfully and without resistance. At 2:35 a.m., Lenin and Trotsky, at an emergency meeting of the Petrograd Soviet in Smolny, solemnly announce the transfer of power into the hands of the Soviets in the person of the Military Revolutionary Committee. Some ministers were arrested, others, led by the new "dictator", Kerensky's deputy M. N. Kishkin, settled in the Winter Palace and resisted. They are protected by cadets and a women's shock battalion. The Military Revolutionary Committee invites them to surrender without a fight, but they do not surrender. Then the famous cruiser "Aurora" makes its symbolic blank shot at 9:40 pm. This is an order from the Red Guard to storm the Winter Palace. A short battle ensued, as a result of which the Winter Palace capitulates. The Bolshevik October coup had taken place. Coup victims: 6 killed and 50 wounded ("History of the CPSU", *ibid.*, p. 328).

The question of the composition of the first Soviet government is being discussed in the Central Committee. Trotsky recalls: "We need to form a government. We are several members of the Central Committee."

Flying meeting in the corner of the room. "- How to name? - thinks aloud Lenin. Only not ministers: a vile, tattered name. Trotsky proposes that the ministers be called "People's Commissars" and the government the "Council of People's Commissars":

"- The Council of People's Commissars? - Lenin picks up, - this is excellent: it smells terribly of revolution.

Trotsky continues: "The next day, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party, Lenin

proposed to appoint me chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. I jumped up with a protest - to such an extent this proposal seemed to me unexpected and inappropriate.

"- Why? - Lenin insisted: - you stood at the head of the Petrograd Soviet, which took power, - I proposed to reject the proposal without debate. They did so" (L. Trotsky, "My Life", part P, Berlin, 1930, pp. 60-61).

Stalin did not allow the corresponding protocol of the Central Committee to be published, and it has not been published to this day, but the Central Committee has never refuted the above statement of Trotsky. That Trotsky was of all the members of the Central Committee the most consistent supporter of Lenin in the October Revolution is decisively confirmed by all the documents of the era. Even Stalin wrote on the first anniversary of the October Revolution:

"All work on the practical organization of the uprising took place under the direct supervision of the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky. It can be said with certainty that the Party owes the rapid transfer of the garrison to the side of the Soviet and the skillful organization of the work of the Military Revolutionary Committee, first of all and mainly, to Comrade Trotsky" (L. Trotsky, *ibid.*, p. 233).

John Reed in his famous book "10 Days That Shook the World" speaks only of Lenin and Trotsky as the leaders of October. He notes, in full agreement with the minutes of the Central Committee, that from the very beginning "of the intellectuals only Lenin and Trotsky stood for the uprising" (John Reed, "10 Days That Shook the World", Moscow, 1957, p. 53).

In the preface to this book, Lenin wrote that "it gives a truthful and unusually vivid account of events." Everything that is being argued here about Trotsky's role seems simply superfluous.

But in 1968, a book by Academician I. I. Mints in two volumes (2065 pages!) "History of the Great October" was published in the USSR, where on page 954 it is said about Trotsky: "Although Trotsky voted for the resolution on the uprising, he did not recognize its necessity, practically did not prepare it, did not take any part in the development of the uprising plan. This quotation alone quite clearly characterizes all the falsity and historical subjectivity of all Soviet historiography about the October Revolution, headed by Mintz.

However, with all that has been said, when analyzing the October Revolution, everything

still, one must not lose sight of the outstanding significance in the revolution of the party machine that he created! Bolsheviks. Sometimes this machine operates without Lenin and even through Lenin's head, not to mention Trotsky.

On October 25 (November 7), at 10:45 pm, the Second Congress of Soviets opened. It was opened by the Menshevik F. Dan, a member of the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets (Tsereteli and Chkheidze went on vacation to the Caucasus during the most crucial period of the revolution). The congress is attended by 670 delegates: 300 Bolsheviks, 193 Socialist-Revolutionaries (of which 169 are Leftists), 68 Mensheviks, 14 United Internationalists, 10 members of the Polish Party of Socialists (PPS) and the Polish Party of Social Democrats (PS-D), 49 other parties and 36 non-Party ("Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets", Guise, 1928, pp. 170, 171; see also Lenin, *Sobr. soch.*, 3rd ed. vol. KhP, p. 574).

A presidium is elected: 14 Bolsheviks, 7 Social Revolutionaries, 3 Mensheviks and 1 internationalist from Gorky's New Life group. John Reed writes:

"After this, the old Central Executive Committee leaves the podium and Trotsky, Kamenev, Lunacharsky, Kollontai, Nogin take its place ... The whole hall rises, thundering with applause. How high they have soared, these Bolsheviks - from an unrecognized and persecuted sect only four months ago to the greatest position of the helmsmen of great Russia "(John Reid, *ibid.*, p. 91).

Kamenev announces the agenda: 1. Organization of power, 2. Decree on peace, 3. Decree on land.

The Bolshevik leaders demanded that the congress sanction the coup that had taken place (Lenin was not present on the first day of the congress). In response to this, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (except for the Lefts), having announced a declaration of protest "against a military conspiracy and the seizure of power" by the Bolsheviks, left the congress. This immediately turned the Bolsheviks from a minority (300 out of 670 delegates) to an overwhelming majority (300 out of 578). Sukhanov was absolutely right when he wrote:

"The departure of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries from the congress greatly simplified and facilitated the position of Lenin and Trotsky. Now no opposition got in the way during the creation of a proletarian government" (Sukhanov, *ibid.*, p. 239).

That this was the case is shown by the results of voting on the decrees: the appeal for the transfer of power to the Soviets was adopted by all votes against 2, with 12 abstentions. The second and last meeting took place from 9

October 26 evening to 5:15 am October 27. At this meeting, Lenin made two reports - 1) on the world and 2) on the land. A "peace decree" was adopted, according to which the new government was obliged to appeal to all warring peoples to conclude an "immediate peace without annexations and indemnities", for which it was proposed to declare a three-month truce. On the question of land, a decree was adopted, completely rewritten from the program of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (the transfer of land without redemption to the peasants through local peasant committees) (Lenin, *Sobr. soch.*, 3rd ed. vol. KhP, pp. 13-23).

Sukhanov ironically: "And Lenin got it for this daytime robbery. The Socialist-Revolutionaries shouted: a good Marxist who poisoned us for 15 years for our petty-bourgeois and unscientific attitude from the height of his greatness and who carried out our program as soon as he seized power! And Lenin snapped: a good party that had to be driven out of power in order to carry out its program" (Sukhanov, *ibid.*, p. 257).

Accepting the Socialist-Revolutionary program on the land question, Lenin knew what he was doing. Russia was a peasant country (80% of the population were peasants). Only that political party had a chance to stay in power, which would proclaim precisely the Socialist-Revolutionary program as law (the Bolshevik agrarian program demanded the nationalization of the land, which was carried out later, when power was strengthened). Machiavellian to the core, Lenin was convinced that the end (power) justifies the means (plagiarism of the Socialist-Revolutionary program). However, Lenin himself referred to democracy. In a report on land, he stated:

"Voices are being heard here that the decree itself was drawn up by socialist revolutionaries. Let it be. Doesn't matter who made it, but how

democratic government, we cannot circumvent the decision of the popular lower classes (here we are talking about the mandate of the Peasant Congress of Soviets. - A. A.), even if we disagree with it "(Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 23).

The congress also decided "To form for the administration of the country, until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, a provisional workers' and peasants' government, which will be called the Council of People's Commissars" (Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 25). The word "Provisional" and the reference to the Constituent Assembly was a tactical tribute to the time - only in this way could the Bolsheviks count on the approval of their one-party government even by the 2nd Congress of Soviets, where they were in the majority. (Already in January 1918, at the 3rd Congress of Soviets, references to the "provisional" and the Constituent Assembly were

excluded (Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 575).

The government included members of the Bolshevik Central Committee - Lenin (chairman), Trotsky (people's commissar for foreign affairs), Rykov (people's commissar for internal affairs), Milyutin (agriculture), Nogin (trade and industry), Lomov (justice), Stalin (according to Affairs of Nationalities), former members of the Central Committee - Shlyapnikov (labor), Teodorovich (food), Glebov-Avilov (post and telegraph). For military and naval affairs, a committee was created consisting of three military workers of the Central Committee - Antonov-Ovseenko, Krylenko and Dybenko. A former inter-district member of the Bolsheviks - Lunacharsky - became the people's commissar of education.

Kamenev and Zinoviev were not included in the government, but received leadership positions: Kamenev became chairman of the Soviet parliament - the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, and Zinoviev became the editor-in-chief of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee - *Izvestia* (later Zinoviev became instead of Trotsky the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet).

The composition of the government on behalf of the Bolshevik faction was announced by Kamenev. Sukhanov, who was a member of Martov's group (which remained at the congress), was a participant in the October 26 meeting at which the members of the government were approved. He writes that of the announced faces, "only Lenin, Trotsky and Lunacharsky were familiar to the audience. She greets their names with loud applause" (Sukhanov, *ibid.*, p. 262).

The last issue was the election of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of the Soviets. The party composition of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets turned out to be as follows: in total, the members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee - 101 people; 62 Bolsheviks, 29 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, 6 Social Democrats Internationalists, 3 from the Ukrainian Socialist Party and 1 Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalist. It was decided that the All-Russian Central Executive Committee should be replenished with representatives of parties and groups that left the congress (Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), but this never happened (Lenin, *ibid.*, p. 575).

Summing up the results of the revolution, the following main question must be posed: the Bolsheviks assert that the October Revolution was carried out as a socialist revolution, in contrast to the February bourgeois revolution. Is it so? In other words, was the October Revolution in its declared program a socialist revolution? This question must be answered categorically: no! Take Lenin's April Theses, which is the program of the Bolshevik

revolution. What does it say about the "socialist revolution"? Not a word. It says that the originality of the current moment in Russia lies in

the transition from the first stage of the revolution, which gave power to the bourgeoisie, to the second stage, which will give power to the proletariat and the poorest peasantry. It does not say that the new government will set itself socialist tasks. The goals and objectives of the new "proletarian", "Soviet" government in the "April Theses" are reduced to the following points:

1. peace,
2. confiscation of landed estates in favor of the peasantry,
3. control of the Soviet state over production,
4. merger of all banks into one national bank and control over them.

All these demands fit perfectly into the framework of any radical bourgeois revolution. They could also be successfully carried out by the Provisional Government, relying on the Soviets (even control over production is a completely normal thing during a big war). Yes, and Lenin himself wrote in the same "April Theses":

"Not the 'introduction' of socialism, as our immediate task, but the transition immediately to Soviet control over social production and distribution of products" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 31, p. 116).

True, there are also two "socialist" points in the "Theses", which, however, remained unfulfilled even 52 years after the revolution. These paragraphs read:

1. "elimination of the police, army, bureaucracy",

I "pay all officials, with the election and turnover of all of them at any time, not higher than the average wage of a good worker" (ibid., p. 115).

Perhaps, if not Lenin, then the Bolshevik Central Committee preached "socialist revolution" and "socialism"? Here is Sukhanov's testimony: "The Bolsheviks said: 'The rich have a lot of everything, the poor have nothing. Everything will belong to the poor, everything will be divided among them. This is what your own workers' party says, the only party that fights the rich and their government for land, peace and bread...' But a delicate question arises: was there socialism in this 'platform'? Did I miss socialism? Did I notice the elephant?.. No, I state that the Bolsheviks directly

At that time they didn't repeat the form to the masses, and the masses, supporting the Bolsheviks, did not even think about socialism" (Sukhanov, ibid., p. 24).

All the documents of that era fully confirm Lenin's assertion and Sukhanov's testimony that socialism, as an immediate goal, is not purely absent from the program and propaganda of the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution. The October Revolution was organized and carried out under the slogan of a radical bourgeois-democratic revolution. The October Revolution turned out to have two faces - its one face, directed to the people, was democratic, its other face, veiled and turned to the party, was anti-democratic. The Soviets, on the other hand, were an external façade behind which the mono-party dictatorship was very successfully hidden. The people learned about the Soviet mask and the second face of the revolution only when



The Bolsheviks firmly seized power over the entire country.

Why did the Bolsheviks manage to seize state power so easily? If the Provisional Government had withdrawn from the war and announced a radical land reform in favor of the peasants, then the Bolshevik revolution would not have taken place in Russia. It would not have happened even in the absence of these measures if the Provisional Government had declared responsible for the July uprising and for receiving German money not individual leaders (Lenin, Zinoviev), but the entire party, headed by its Central Committee, with all the consequences that follow from this. It did neither. Under these conditions, the "will to power" of the Bolsheviks turned out to be stronger than the "will to live" of the existing government. Of course, there was another purely subjective factor that contributed to the victory of the Bolsheviks - this is their classic conspiratorial apparatus - the PC and its cells.

In the April Theses, Lenin wrote: "Russia is now the freest country in the world of all the warring countries" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 31, p. 114). This is the common cause of the historical catastrophe - democratic Russia perished because of the abundance of freedom, which led to the impunity of its enemies.

#### Chapter 14

#### THE FIRST CRISIS IN THE CC AFTER THE TAKING OF POWER

The Bolshevik coup met resistance from three sides:

1. Kerensky organized the campaign of the commander of the 3rd cavalry corps

General Krasnov to Petrograd, took Gatchina (October 27), Tsarskoye Selo (October 28), thus being on the outskirts of Petrograd. However, despite all the personal efforts of Kerensky, neither the army as a whole, nor the Cossacks (Sh Cavalry Corps) wanted to go further to Petrograd in order to overthrow the power of the Bolsheviks. According to General Krasnov, the Cossacks said: "We, Cossacks alone, cannot resist the whole of Russia. If all of Russia is with them (that is, with the Bolsheviks. - A. A.), what are we going to do? (P. N. Krasnov, On the Home Front, Archive of the Russian Revolution, vol. G, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1922, p. 171).

2. In Petrograd itself, a "Committee for the Salvation of the Motherland and the Revolution" was formed against the Bolsheviks, which included the Menshevik and Right Social Revolutionary factions of the 2nd Congress of Soviets, the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of the old convocation, representatives of the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Railway Trade Union (Vikzhel), the City Duma. The committee was headed by a prominent Socialist-Revolutionary leader God. The struggle of this committee against the Bolshevik seizure of power was limited to a series of platonic statements, without any attempt to offer armed resistance to the Bolsheviks. In general, it is extremely surprising how the famous "revolutionary democracy" behaves on the eve, during and immediately after the Bolshevik coup. Its leaders - Tsereteli and Chkheidze - as already mentioned, after the victory of the Bolsheviks in the elections to the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets, "washed their hands" and went to rest in their homeland - the Caucasus. F. Dan, who replaced them in the leadership of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, as the well-known biographer of Lenin David Shub states, "even the day before the Bolshevik uprising" headed the delegation of the Soviets, which "came to Kerensky and warned him that he should in no case dare to send Cossacks to suppress Bolshevik uprising", because this will lead to "civil

war in the ranks of the proletariat itself" (Journal Novy Zhurnal, No. 107, 1972, p. 184, - D. Shub, "From Old Years").

Another leader of the Mensheviks, but Menshevik internationalists, Martov, did not leave the 2nd Congress of Soviets, as the official leadership of the Menshevik Party did, but continued to actively participate in the meetings of the congress, which objectively meant recognition of the legitimacy of the Bolshevik coup. The Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party also remained at the congress, voting for all Lenin's decrees, although it did not agree to join the Leninist government (then, at the end of November, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries

joined the Council of People's Commissars).

The leader of the official Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Viktor Chernov, left for Headquarters on the eve of the coup. His reaction to the October coup must also be recognized as more than strange. On October 30, a delegation of Socialist-Revolutionaries from the city of Luga came to Chernov, in Gatchina, for advice: "Is the position they have taken correct? The day before, they adopted a resolution to maintain neutrality and to freely pass in both directions the echelons going both to help the government and at the call of the Bolsheviks. Chernov approved the resolution, and to Stankevich's statement that such a decision was a stab in the back of the government, he replied: USSR", vol. P, 1943, p. 376, see also - Krasnov, op. cit., p. 171).

True, the same Dan at the Fifth Congress of Soviets condemned the Bolshevik coup, but proposed the creation of a coalition government of Bolsheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, to which Trotsky, not without reason, replied: "We openly forged the will of the masses for an uprising. Our rebellion has won. Now we are offered: give up victory, conclude an agreement. With whom? You are miserable units, you are bankrupts, your role has been played, go where you should be from now on: into the weed basket of history" (L. Trotsky, My Life, part I, p. 49).

3. The most effective resistance to the Bolsheviks was provided by Vikzhel, who put forward a platform for the creation of a "homogeneous socialist government" from all Soviet parties in an ultimatum form (in case of refusal of the Bolsheviks, Vikzhel threatened with a general railway strike). Vikzhel's ultimatum caused a split in the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party and in the Soviet government.

Vikzhel's position threatened not only to paralyze the life of the country, but also to disrupt the sending of Bolshevik units from Petrograd against the advancing General Krasnov. In a telegram sent to "Everyone, everyone, everyone", Vikzhel wrote:

"There is no power in the country ... the Council of People's Commissars formed in Petrograd, as relying on only one party, cannot meet with recognition and support throughout the country. It is necessary to create a new government..." ("Protocols of the Central Committee...", p. 270). In this "new government" Vikzhel proposed to include representatives of all socialist parties from the Bolsheviks to the right "people's socialists" inclusive.

The situation became so threatening that the Bolshevik Central Committee decided to discuss Vikzhel's demands at a special meeting of the Central Committee, which was convened on October 29 (November 11), 1917. There were 11 members of the Central Committee headed by Rykov, Kamenev and Sverdlov. Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev and

For some reason, Stalin was absent. Regarding Vikzhel's demand for the creation of a government with the participation of all socialist (Soviet) parties, the minutes of the Central Committee say: "1) Put to a vote: the Central Committee recognizes the need to expand the base of the government and about a possible change in its composition (adopted unanimously)" (ibid., p. 122). Paragraph 5 of the Central Committee resolution says: "The proposal is being voted: we do not make an ultimatum from the entry into the government of all Soviet parties, including the People's Socialists. For 7, against - 3" (ibid., p. 122). Thus, in Lenin's absence and in spite of Lenin, the Bolshevik Central Committee accepts Vikzhel's ultimatum to set up a coalition government of all socialist parties "up to and including the People's Socialists."

Since the leaders of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries set the condition for their entry into the Soviet government to eliminate the perpetrators of the coup - Lenin and Trotsky - from the government, the Central Committee also discussed this issue. The note from the editors of the "Protocols of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (6b)" says the following about this: "In the original secretarial note, the following is the crossed out text: 'and agrees (the Central Committee) to refuse the candidacies of Trotsky and Lenin, if this is required (accepted)' (ibid., p. 122.) This supposedly 'crossed-out text' was in fact adopted in general wording in the following, sixth paragraph of the Central Committee resolution. It says: 'b. A motion is to be voted: the right of mutual rejection of party candidates is allowed. Adopted: 5 for, 1 against, 3 abstained' (ibid., p. 123). To participate in a meeting with Vikzhel on the organization of a new government, the Central Committee assigned Kamenev and Sokolnikov, and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, in turn, also assigned a delegation consisting of Sverdlov and Ryazanov for the same purpose. , Left Socialist-Revolutionary Sachs and others.

The Central Committee of the Bolsheviks continues to stand on the point of view of creating a coalition government, even at the cost of withdrawing from the government their leading leaders - Lenin and Trotsky. Control over the Central Committee passes for a time to the democratic wing represented by Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, Nogin, Milyutin. The official position of each of them (Kamenev - chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Zinoviev - chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, Nogin - chairman of the Moscow Soviet, Rykov and Milyutin - people's commissars) make them

extremely dangerous rivals of the dictatorial wing of Lenin and Trotsky. Moreover, the Bolshevik faction of the new parliament - the All-Russian Central Executive Committee - votes for the proposal of the Kamenev group "on the question of the numerical and personal representation of our party in the government." Then Lenin accused Kamenev's group of having achieved this decision of the Bolshevik faction of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in spite of and "behind the back of the Central Committee" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 35, p. 48). With all the more stubbornness, Lenin is working to declare the new majority in the Central Committee an "opposition" and isolate it from the leadership. For this, tried and tested methods are used: convening an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee at the top and party activists in the capitals, as well as in the major centers of the country, with a selected composition. So, on November 1, 1917, an expanded meeting of the Central Committee was convened, at which 23 people were present, of which 12 were members of the Central Committee, and 11 people were "active" (representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee, the Military Organization, trade unions, 3 members of the government, but not members Central Committee). At this meeting, Kamenev reports on the conditions of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries for the creation of a coalition government (instead of Lenin, they nominate the leader of the Right-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries Chernov or Avkseniev as prime minister, and instead of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, they create a "People's Council", to which the government is responsible).

Speaking on Kamenev's report, Trotsky declared:

"From the report it is only clear how the parties did not participate in the uprising.

those who accepted them want to wrest power from those who overthrew them ... It is clear that we cannot give the right of withdrawal, just as we cannot give up the presidency of Lenin; for refusal to do so is absolutely unacceptable" ("Protocols of the Central Committee...", p. 125).

Dzerzhinsky says that "we do not allow the withdrawal of Lenin and Trotsky." Uritsky says the same thing. In response to reproaches that he bargained with the anti-Bolshevik parties about the candidacies of Lenin and Trotsky, Kamenev announced the decision of the last meeting and proved that the delegation did not discuss the candidates, did not bargain, but only heard the opinion of others; there was nothing to tear (negotiations) on" (ibid., p. 125).

Lenin sharply declared: "Kamenev's policy must be stopped at the same moment. Now you don't have to talk to Vikzhel. Troops must be sent to Moscow" (ibid., p. 126). Lenin adds: "negotiations should be like a diplomatic cover for military operations" (ibid., p. 127).

Zinoviev does not connect the question of creating a coalition government with the names of Lenin and Trotsky. He says: "Two points are ultimatum for us: our program and the responsibility of the government to the CEC Council as a source of power" (ibid., p. 127).

Kamenev, Milyutin, Ryazanov are in favor of continuing the negotiations. After a wide debate, the Central Committee votes on a fundamental proposal: to interrupt the negotiations. "For" vote - 4, "against" - 10. In the protocol is written: "The Central Committee decides: to continue negotiations. To declare that the Program is an ultimatum for us" (ibid., pp. 129-130).

This means that the ultimatum is not Lenin and Trotsky, but the program of the party.

It is further seen from the minutes of the Central Committee that the meeting rejected Lenin's more decisive resolution on negotiations with Vikzhel (ibid., p. 129), adopting Trotsky's compromise resolution. It said:

"The Central Committee decides: to allow the members of our party, in view of the decision of the Central Executive Committee that has already taken place, to take part today in the last attempt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries to create a so-called homogeneous government with the aim of finally exposing the failure of this attempt and finally stopping further negotiations on coalition power" (ibid., p. 130).

Kamenev's group voted against this resolution, despite its compromise character. She believed that negotiations should be carried out for the actual creation of a coalition power, while Lenin and Trotsky considered them as a "diplomatic cover" for the preparation of hostilities.

On November 2 (according to the old style), Lenin called a new meeting of the Central Committee with the presence of 15 members of the Central Committee (out of 23). The minutes of this meeting have not been preserved, but the resolution adopted there and Lenin's notes on the results of voting on each point of the resolution have been preserved. The resolution is preceded by the following introductory words: "The Central Committee recognizes this meeting as having historical importance and therefore it is necessary to fix the two positions that have been revealed here" ("Minutes of the Central Committee ...", p. 131). Without waiting for the outcome of the negotiations with the Soviet parties, envisaged by the decision of the Central Committee of October 29 (November 11), Lenin, in essence, raises the question of revising this decision. Moreover. The former majority of the Central Committee skillful

by manoeuvring, he turns the minorities into opposition, especially since, under the personal pressure of Lenin and Trotsky, some of the former

supporters of Kamenev go over to the side of Lenin. Following this path, Lenin turns the very meeting of the Central Committee of November 2 into a trial of Kamenev's supporters. In Lenin's draft resolution of the Central Committee, the first three paragraphs are devoted to the opposition of the minority, that is, to the former majority of the Central Committee. These paragraphs say: "1) The Central Committee recognizes that the opposition that has developed within the Central Committee is completely departing from all the basic positions of Bolshevism ... 2) The Central Committee lays all responsibility ... for the presently criminal vacillations on this opposition ... 3) The Central Committee confirms that without betraying the slogan of Soviet power, a purely Bolshevik government cannot be abandoned..." (ibid., p. 131).

But just these three points were omitted in the resolution of the Central Committee, published in Pravda of November 4, 1917. Were they rejected by the Central Committee meeting as a compromise with the opposition? The available documents do not provide an answer to this question. In a note from the editors of Lenin's Complete Works on this issue, it is very succinctly stated: "The first three paragraphs of the resolution are crossed out in the manuscript" (Lenin, ibid., vol. 35, p. 452).

For the rest, the resolution of the Central Committee is sustained in compromise tones, and the sixth paragraph says: "The Central Committee confirms that, without excluding anyone from the 2nd Congress of Soviets, it is now quite ready to return those who have left and recognize a coalition of these who have left within the Soviets, which, therefore, are absolutely false. speeches that the Bolsheviks do not want to share power with anyone" (ibid., p. 45). Since the resolution was written by Lenin, it must be recognized as the purest tactical maneuver. Lenin was not going to share power with anyone, although he was ready to temporarily accept representatives of the Left SRs into the government, however, under the hegemony of the Bolsheviks.

On November 3, Lenin went on a decisive offensive, having learned that "Yesterday at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee, the Bolshevik faction, with the direct participation of members of the Central Committee from the minority, openly voted against the decision of the Central Committee (on the question of the numerical and personal representation of our party in the government)" (Lenin, ibid., p. 48). Indeed, the resolution of the Bolshevik faction of the Central Executive Committee, although it followed from the decision of the Central Committee of November 2, ran counter to the line of Lenin and Trotsky on the preservation of a purely Bolshevik government. The resolution of the Bolshevik faction of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee demanded the continuation of negotiations on coalition power with all the parties that are members of the Soviets. Resolution

it was talked about giving half the seats in the government to the Social Revolutionary Mensheviks, about expanding the All-Russian Central Executive Committee with the addition of another 245 representatives to its composition: from the provincial peasant committees (75 people), from the military committees (80), from the trade unions (40), from the Petrograd City Duma ( 50). This resolution was adopted by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (6 against and 1 abstained). The All-Russian Central Executive Committee created a commission consisting of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Ryazanov from the Bolsheviks and Karelin and Proshyan from the Left Social Revolutionaries to continue negotiations on the composition of a new government ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...", pp. 275-276).

All this infuriated Lenin. The power won by the uprising began to slip peacefully from his hands. Lenin single-handedly decided to present an ultimatum to the Central Committee, that is, to impose his will on the majority of the PC. Here is what the Bolshevik says about this

source:

"According to the testimony of Central Committee member Bubnov, on November 3 (16), Lenin, having drawn up the "Ultimatum of the majority of the Central Committee to the minority", invited to his room separately each member of the Central Committee from those who were in Petrograd during this period, acquainted with the text of the document and offered to sign it" ("PC protocols...", p. 275).

Together with Lenin, the following members of the Central Committee signed the ultimatum: Trotsky, Stalin, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Dzerzhinsky, Ioffe, Bubnov, Sokolnikov, Muranov. It said:

"Turning to the Central Committee minority, we demand a categorical answer in writing to the question whether the minority undertakes to submit to party discipline and to pursue the policy formulated in the resolution adopted by the Central Committee of Comrade Lenin. In the event of a negative and indefinite answer, we will turn to the PC, the Moscow Committee, the Bolshevik faction of the Central Executive Committee, to the emergency party congress with an alternative proposal: either the party should instruct the current opposition to form power ... Or - which we have no doubt - the party will approve the only possible revolutionary line expressed in yesterday's resolution of the Central Committee, and then the party must resolutely propose to the representatives of the opposition that they transfer their disorganization work beyond the boundaries of our party organization" ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...", p. 134).

The pressure of the party machine after this ultimatum on the opposition was so great that it was forced to make appropriate

organizational implications. On November 4, 1917, members of the Central Committee Kamenev, Rykov, Milyutin, Zinoviev and Nogin submitted an application for resignation from the Central Committee. The statement said:

"We cannot be held responsible for this disastrous policy of the Central Committee, which is being carried out against the will of a vast section of the proletariat and soldiers, who are thirsting for a speedy end to the bloodshed between the individual parts of the democracy. Therefore, we renounce the title of members of the Central Committee in order to have the right to openly express our opinion to the mass of workers and soldiers and call on them to support our cry: "Long live the government of the Soviet parties" (ibid., p. 135).

Four members of the Council of People's Commissars - Rykov, Milyutin, Teodorovich, Nogin simultaneously left the government, motivating their withdrawal by the fact that outside the coalition of Soviet parties there is only one way "to preserve a purely Bolshevik government by means of political terror" (ibid., p. 136 ).

Both the first and the second statement were published in the organ of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee - in Izvestia for November 5, 1917.

The announcement of the party's leading figures to withdraw from the Central Committee and from the government caused a very unfavorable echo for the dictatorial wing of the Central Committee. Just this crisis in the Central Committee and the government showed that Lenin's true goal was not Soviet power in general, as such, but Soviet power as a form of dictatorship of one party - the Bolshevik Party. But Lenin does not want, and indeed cannot, under the given conditions, openly declare this goal of his. However, what Lenin does not want and cannot do, the opposition does for him and in spite of him. The opposition from within the party, through the mouths of the most authoritative leaders of the party, exposes the whole party, the whole country

hidden dictatorial plans of Lenin. Therefore, it was important for Lenin not only to expel her from the Central Committee, but also to expel her from the party.

It must be said that in defending the need to preserve a homogeneous Bolshevik government, Lenin was right and consistent in his own way. Only now, for the first time since the revolution, having gained power, he started talking about socialism. In the same Central Committee resolution on the democratic wing of the party (Kamenev's group), Lenin wrote: "The Central Committee finally confirms that, despite all the difficulties, the victory of socialism both in Russia and in Europe is ensured by the continuation of the policy of the present government" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 35, p. 46).

And this victory can be achieved, according to Stalin's cynical admission, only by the dictatorship of one party and its methods of coercion in relation to 80% of the country's population, that is, the peasantry. Here is Stalin's confession in January 1921: "... that the peasants will not go to fight for socialism, that they can and should be forced to fight for socialism, using coercive methods" (Stalin, vol. 5, pp. 5-6).

With a coalition government with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, opponents of the dictatorship, it would be impossible to introduce this forced socialism in Russia. Through personal pressure on each member of the Central Committee, through the method of mobilizing "public opinion" of the party through the central and local assets of the party, as well as through the party press of the capital and provinces, the dictatorial wing of Lenin-Trotsky finally defeated the democratic wing of Kamenev-Rykov. In addition, disintegration and disagreements began among the supporters of the coalition government from all Soviet parties themselves. The first to capitulate was Zinoviev, who explained his capitulation in his Letter to Comrades by the fact that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries during the coalition negotiations showed no desire to reach an agreement with the Bolshevik Party ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...", p. 144). Zinoviev believed that the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, having laid the responsibility for the failure of the agreement on the Mensheviks, would enter the Soviet government (this was later confirmed). Zinoviev demanded that his supporters submit to discipline and "do the same as the Left Bolsheviks did when they remained in the minority on the question of participation in the Pre-Parliament and undertook to pursue the policy of the majority" (ibid., p. 145).

As we have seen from the previous presentation, these "Left Bolsheviks" from the minority in the Central Committee were Lenin and Trotsky. The difference between the two "disciplines" - the minority of Lenin (each time he was in the minority) and the majority of the Central Committee, always consisted in the fact that Lenin, through skillful manipulation of the opinion of the party and a combination of party forces standing outside the Central Committee (party asset) under all conditions he achieved his goal, that is, he turned his minority into a majority, and the former majority, having decomposed it into parts, declared the "opposition". Of course, Lenin's formal discipline in minor matters was impeccable, but when it came to the victory of his personal will in matters of principle, he broke any discipline. Lenin's insidiousness,

as a party strategist, in fact, it is only visible when, during periods of intra-party crises, being among the minority, he observed the formal discipline of subordination to the majority, knew how to bypass, and where this was impossible, break real discipline. His discipline, like other categories of organization and ideology, is subordinated to the interests of power.

This is what Lenin did in this case as well. He very cleverly disintegrated the majority of the Central Committee, the result of which was the capitulation of Zinoviev. At a meeting of the Central Committee on November 8, the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Kamenev, was removed from his post, replaced by Sverdlov. Three weeks later, he and three other members (Rykov, Milyutin, Nogin) filed an application for their submission to the "majority" and for their return to the Central Committee. This statement has not been preserved, but Lenin's speech at the meeting of the PC on November 29 shows that the authors of the statement believe that "the Central Committee made concessions." Lenin categorically denies this, suggesting that they answer in writing "that we are not accepting them back" ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...", pp. 154-155). Speaking on this issue, Uritsky proposed that they be accepted back to the Central Committee only if they give formal guarantees that "they will not act again in a disorganizing manner" (ibid., p. 155). The discussion ended without a definite decision. A commission of the Central Committee of three people, headed by Lenin, was supposed to decide the issue. What was this decision - from the party documents is unknown. Judging by the minutes of the Central Committee until the end of February 1918, only one of the "oppositionists" Zinoviev took part in its meetings (he capitulated on time!), and the names of the other four are not found in the minutes of the Central Committee. From this we can conclude that they were not again accepted as members of the Central Committee. Thus ended the first crisis in the Central Committee.

However, more formidable, full of dramatic tension, was the second crisis in the Central Committee, connected with the conclusion of a separate peace with Germany. Lenin, who found himself in a hopeless minority, announced his resignation from the post of head of government. If this resignation was not accepted and the Soviet regime was saved, then the Bolsheviks owe all this to the one they are, according to the behest of Stalin; they curse at all crossroads, - to L. D. Trotsky.

This second crisis will be discussed in the next chapter.

#### Chapter 15

### THE SECOND CRISIS IN THE BREST PEACE

From his constant difficulties at the meetings of the Central Committee and the bodies subordinate to it, Lenin drew some organizational conclusions. Lenin decided to reorganize the leading organs of the Party, the press, the Soviets and the trade unions in such a way as to create for himself a reliable support there in the event of a new crisis.

In the structure of the Central Committee and its subsidiary bodies, the following changes:

1) A "Bureau of the Central Committee" of four members was created to deal with urgent issues. It included: Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and Sverdlov. The CPC Bureau was the prototype of the future Politburo. About its tasks in the minutes of the Central Committee it is said only in general terms: "in view of the difficulty of convening a meeting of the Central Committee, this four is given to solve all urgent matters, with the obligatory involvement of all members of the Central Committee who are at that moment in Smolny" ("Minutes of the Central Committee ...", p. 155). Any political issue could be declared an "emergency".

2) The editorial board of Pravda was approved with a new composition: Stalin, Sokolnikov, Trotsky and Bukharin (ibid., p. 153).

3) Since the old presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee turned out to be anti-Leninist,



its new composition was outlined: Krestinsky, Lunacharsky, Menzhinsky, Lashevich, Zinoviev, Stalin, Smilga, Stuchka. Then this composition was changed and the final composition of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was as follows: Sverdlov, Muranov, Zinoviev, Avanesov, Lander, Okulov, Peterson, Volodarsky (ibid., pp. 165, 180).

4) At the same time, the Bureau of the Central Committee re-elected the old composition of the bureau of the Bolshevik faction in the Constituent Assembly, Bukharin and Sokolnikov were placed at the head of the bureau of the faction (having received less than 30% of the votes in the elections, Lenin dispersed the All-Russian Constituent Assembly by force of arms on January 19, 1918).

5) Party leadership is appointed from the Central Committee over the trade unions. Shlyapnikov was appointed chairman of the trade unions, Schmidt and Tomsy were appointed secretaries, and Glebov was appointed editor of the trade union body (ibid., pp. 160-161, 167-168).

6) General leadership over military organizations is carried out by Sverdlov, and Lashevich, Muranov and Ordzhonikidze are nominated to help him, as speakers from the Central Committee at army and front congresses (ibid., pp. 153-

154).

As already mentioned, the two demands of the Bolshevik platform - immediate peace and all land to the peasants - predetermined the relatively easy victory of the Bolsheviks in the revolution. It was not difficult to declare the land to be a peasant land, but the matter of concluding peace proved to be difficult. The Bolsheviks' hope that as soon as they announced Russia's immediate withdrawal from the war, the Germans would immediately agree to a "peace without annexations and indemnities" turned out to be illusory. The hope that if the Kaiser refuses to accept the Bolshevik peace, the proletariat of Germany will immediately rise up was also illusory. There was a long, fraught with grave consequences, bargaining about the terms of peace. The armistice agreement was signed by the Soviet government and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) on December 2 (15), 1917. Peace negotiations began in Brest-Litovsk on January 9 (22). The Soviet delegation was headed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Trotsky. He made a statement on behalf of the Soviet government that Soviet Russia stands for peace without annexations and indemnities, but recognizes the right of peoples to self-determination. The head of the German delegation, Kühlmann, easily figuring out the propaganda underlying the position of the Soviet government, said that the Soviet conditions could form the basis of the discussion if Russia's allies - the Entente powers - participated in peace negotiations. Based on the Soviet demand for the right of peoples to self-determination, Germany put forward the main conditions for peace: the independence of Ukraine (the delegation of the Ukrainian central Rada, recognized by the Soviet government, participated in the conference as an equal party), the withdrawal from Russia of Poland, Lithuania, part of Latvia, Estonia and Belarus. In response to this, the Soviet delegation, through the mouth of Trotsky, declared that Soviet Russia was not signing peace, that it was ending the war, and demobilizing the army. The Germans, taking this into account, on February 18, 1918 resumed the war and went on the offensive along the entire front.

In January-February, at almost uninterrupted sessions of the Central Committee, very stormy debates and disputes take place about the conclusion of peace or the continuation of the war. From the very beginning, the Central Committee split into three groups: 1) Lenin's group for the immediate conclusion of peace at any cost; 2) Bukharin's group for the continuation of the "revolutionary war"; 3) Trotsky's group for further maneuvering under the slogan "no war, no peace."

On January 7 (20), 1918, Lenin substantiated the need

conclusion of peace by the following reasoning: "There is no doubt that our army is at the moment absolutely unable to successfully repel the German offensive ... others" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 35, pp. 248-250). In other words, the continuation of the war under all conditions will lead to the death of Bolshevism in Russia, and then other parties will come to power (Lenin called Chernov's Socialist-Revolutionary Party). With these theses, Lenin spoke in Petrograd on January 8 (21) at a meeting of leading party leaders. When Lenin's theses were voted, the meeting split, like the Central Committee, into three groups: 15 people voted for making peace on German terms (Lenin's point of view), 32 people voted for the continuation of the revolutionary war (Bukharin's point of view), and ending the war without making peace (Trotsky's point of view) 16 people voted ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...", p. 168).

Lenin raised the question of peace in the most decisive manner at the meeting of the Central Committee on January 11 (24), 1918. It was attended by 17 members of the Central Committee. Lenin again repeated his theses on peace, emphasizing that "if war breaks out, our government will be swept away and peace will be made by another government" (ibid., p. 168). Lenin added that he did not lose faith in the future to wage a revolutionary war, but now Russia could not wage it. He concluded that "of course, we make a right turn, which leads through a very dirty barn, but we must make it" (ibid., p. 169).

The majority of those who spoke in the debate disagreed with Lenin's assessment, some even accused: "Lenin is doing in a covert way what Zinoviev and Kamenev did in October" (ibid., p. 172, speech by the head of the Cheka, Dzerzhinsky). Kosior declared on behalf of the Petrograd organization: "The Petrograd organization protests and will continue to protest, as long as it can, against the point of view of Comrade Lenin and considers only the position of a revolutionary war possible" (ibid., p. 172). The Moscow organization from the very beginning stood on the same point of view. Trotsky and Bukharin repeated their arguments against peace. Stalin and Zinoviev supported Lenin. However, the motives for their support were clearly anti-Leninist. Stalin justified the conclusion of peace by the fact that the Bolshevik strategy, designed for world revolution, had failed. He said: "In October (1917) we talked about

holy war, because we were told that one word "peace" would start a revolution in the West. But this did not materialize" (ibid., p. 171). Zinoviev, although he was for peace, warned that "by peace we will strengthen chauvinism in Germany and weaken the revolutionary movement in the West ... And then another perspective is seen - this is the death of the socialist republic" (ibid., p. 171).

Lenin resolutely rejected these motives of both his like-minded people. The minutes of the Central Committee say that Lenin did not agree with the assertion of Stalin and Zinoviev that there was no revolutionary movement in the West or that it would be weakened by the conclusion of peace. Lenin added that although there is no revolution in the West, there is a revolutionary movement there and that "if we were to change our tactics because of this, then we would be traitors to international socialism" (ibid., p. 172). At the same meeting, for the first time in the conditions of Soviet Russia, Lenin expressed a defeatist idea, in which he explained,

under what conditions did he agree to a "break" in the peace negotiations, namely - "If we believe that the German movement can develop immediately in the event of a break in the peace negotiations, then we must sacrifice ourselves, because the German revolution will be much stronger in strength ours" (ibid., p.

172), but since under the given conditions such an acceleration of the German revolution is problematic, Lenin comes to the conclusion: "if we do not at the moment say clearly that we agree to peace, then we will perish" (ibid., p. 172).

By the end of the Central Committee meeting, Lenin had changed his point of view. He abandoned the demand for the immediate conclusion of an annexationist peace and proposed that his new proposal be voted on: "we are delaying the signing of the peace in every possible way." 12 voted for it, 1 against.

Following this, Trotsky puts to a vote the following formula - "We are ending the war, we are not concluding peace, we are demobilizing the army." 9 people voted for, 7 people voted against (ibid., p. 173).

Thus, at this meeting of the Central Committee, Lenin was defeated. Trotsky's formula was adopted, to which Bukharin joined. Therefore, the Stalinist legend, which still circulates in Soviet literature, that Trotsky acted in Brest-Litovsk arbitrarily, treacherously, in defiance of the Central Committee, is an obvious historical falsification.

Two days after the meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks - January 13, 1918

a joint meeting of the members of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks and the Central Committee of the Left SRs (who were part of the Soviet government) took place. The same question of war and peace was discussed. This joint meeting, by a majority of votes, expressed itself in the sense of proposing to the forthcoming 3rd Congress of Soviets the formula:

"do not wage war, do not sign peace" (ibid., p. 283). And here the point of view of Trotsky against Lenin won out.

However, Lenin did not give up. At the 3rd Congress of Soviets on January 13 (26), Lenin, avoiding discussing the question of peace in essence, managed to get the congress to grant the Council of People's Commissars (the government) unlimited powers in the matter of conducting peace negotiations and concluding peace itself.

In the party itself, Lenin's point of view does not find support. The two leading metropolitan party organizations that set the tone for the entire party, Petrograd and Moscow, completely got out of Lenin's control. Both of them spoke out against Lenin's line on a separate peace with Germany. The statement of the Petrograd Committee of the Party of January 15, submitted to the Central Committee of the Party, said: "The vast majority spoke out against the point of view of Comrade Lenin, the most influential organizations of our Party - the Petrograd and Moscow regional - definitely speak out against the annexationist peace with Germany" (ibid., p. 182). The Petrograd Committee openly threatened to split the party. The resolution of the Moscow Committee of the Party of January 11 stated that the acceptance of German peace terms "could lead to one of the worst kinds of opportunism" (ibid., p. 185). It was said right to the address

Lenin.

Under these conditions, a new meeting of the Central Committee of January 19 is taking place,

devoted to the same question of the conclusion of peace. It is attended by 13 members of the Central Committee, including Lenin, Zinoviev, Stalin and Bukharin. Trotsky is absent as he leads the Soviet peace delegation in Brest-Litovsk. At this meeting, the representative of the Moscow party organization, Lomov (Oppokov), unequivocally accuses the leaders of the Central Committee that for them "a separate peace with the Germans is a foregone conclusion", and the party has not been questioned at all. He proposes that the Central Committee should listen to the Party, which "was silent for so long." For this, he says, a party conference must be convened (ibid., p. 175).

Lenin objected to the convening of a party conference, since it

decisions, according to the Rules, are not binding on the Central Committee. He suggested continuing the line of dragging out the negotiations in order to gain time, approaching Trotsky's point of view on this issue. The point of view of the absent Trotsky was defended by none other than Stalin. Stalin declared: "The whole strength of our party lay in the fact that we took a completely clear and definite position on all questions. There is no such clarity and certainty on the question of the world, since there are various currents. We need to put an end to this. The way out of the difficult situation was given to us by the middle point - Trotsky's position" (ibid., p. 178).

It must be said that not only Stalin thought so, but Lenin also thought so at first. As early as January 3 (16), in a conversation by direct wire with Trotsky, who was at the head of the Soviet peace delegation in Brest-Litovsk, Lenin, regarding Trotsky's formula "no war, no peace," declared: "Your plan seems to me debatable. Is it possible only to postpone its final holding somewhat, having made the final decision after a special meeting of the CEC here?" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 35, p. 225).

Trotsky gives the following explanation for this: "The struggle in the party flared up from day to day. Contrary to later legend, it was not between me and Lenin, but between Lenin and the overwhelming majority of the leading organizations of the Party. In the fundamental questions of this struggle: can we now wage a revolutionary war? and is it generally permissible for the revolutionary power to conclude agreements with the imperialists? - I was completely and completely on the side of Lenin, answering with him the first question in the negative, the second - positively. The first broader discussion of the differences took place on January 21 (January 8, according to the old style) at a meeting of active party workers. Three points of view emerged. Lenin was in favor of trying to drag out the negotiations even more, but in the event of an ultimatum, capitulate immediately. I considered it necessary to bring the negotiations to a break, even with the danger of a new German offensive, in order to capitulate - had to - if at all had to - already before the obvious use of force. Bukharin demanded war in order to expand the arena of the revolution ... The supporters of the war received 32 votes, Lenin - 15 votes, I - 16 votes ... In all the leading institutions of the party and the state, Lenin was in the minority ... At the decisive meeting of the Central Committee on January 22, my suggestion: drag out negotiations" (L. Trotsky, "My Life", part P, Berlin, 1930, pp. 110-111).

This tactic of "dragging out" the negotiations suited Lenin as well, but in the event of an ultimatum from the Germans, Lenin was ready to capitulate, while Trotsky hesitated. Nevertheless, Sverdlov, in full agreement with Lenin, introduced a resolution on February 14 on behalf of the Bolshevik faction of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which stated that, after hearing Trotsky's report, "The All-Russian Central Executive Committee fully approves the course of action of its representatives in Brest" (ibid., p. 114).

Subsequently, at the seventh emergency party congress on the conclusion of a separate peace, Lenin clarified his differences with Trotsky in the following way: agreed with Comrade Trotsky... Trotsky's tactics, insofar as they were dragging on, were correct: they became wrong when the state of war was declared to be terminated and peace was not signed" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 36, p. 30 ).

Let's return to the chronology of events.

A new conference of members of the Central Committee with active party workers on January 21 (February 3) on the question of peace once again confirmed that Lenin continues to be in a clear minority. At the meeting, this time, not three, as before, but four groups were revealed on the issue of war and peace: Lenin's group (6 people - Lenin, Stalin, Muranov, Artem-Sergeev, Sokolnikov, Zinoviev), Lomov's group (6 people), Osinsky group (2 people), Preobrazhensky group (3 people). Trotsky, while in Brest, did not participate in the meeting. On the main question: is it permissible now to sign a separate annexationist peace? - only Lenin's group voted in favor (five people, since Zinoviev was absent during the voting), all other groups voted against (nine people, since Bukharin and Uritsky were absent during the voting). Thus, by nine votes to five, and if we count those who were absent, by eleven votes to six, the meeting of the Central Committee voted against Lenin's proposal for surrender ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...", pp. 190-191).

In the light of this position of the highest organs of the party and the state, Trotsky's intractable tactics in Brest-Litovsk become quite understandable. We must also point out the important circumstance that not only the "Left Communists", but also other Soviet socialist parties represented in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries) and in the Soviet government (Left Socialist-Revolutionaries) were categorically against a separate peace with

Germany. This also strengthened the positions of Lenin's opponents.

On January 21 (February 3), the heads of the German (Kulman) and Austro-Hungarian (Chernin) peace delegations, in view of Trotsky's stubbornness, were asked to take a break and left for Berlin and Vienna for new instructions. On their return, on January 27 (February 9), they concluded a peace treaty with representatives of the Ukrainian People's Republic recognized by their powers. On the same day, the Germans issued an ultimatum to the Soviet delegation to accept their terms of peace. In response, Trotsky declared that Soviet Russia was not signing peace, that it was ending the war and demobilizing the army. On February 16, General Hoffmann from the German delegation notified the Soviet delegation that on February 18, at 12 noon, the truce ends and the state of war resumes ("History of the Civil War in the USSR", vol. 3, Moscow, 1957, p. 111). On the evening of February 17, the Central Committee met to discuss the German ultimatum. The fundamental "History of the Civil War in the USSR" misrepresents the decision of this meeting of the Central Committee. It says:

"On the evening of February 17, the Central Committee of the Party discussed the question of the German ultimatum. The majority of the members of the Central Committee recognized that in the event of a German offensive it was necessary to make peace" (ibid., p. 112).

The reverse took place - a decision was made by a majority of six against five rejecting new negotiations with the Germans. Behind

the rejection of the talks was voted by Bukharin, Trotsky, Lomov, Uritsky, Ioffe, Krestinsky. Lenin, Stalin, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov, Smilga voted for the opening of new negotiations ("Minutes of the Central Committee ...", pp. 194-195).

Of course, Lenin did not calm down on this. Amazing willpower, indomitable energy, tactical resourcefulness and unsurpassed skill in exploiting the base instincts of the political mob, all the qualities that Lenin demonstrated on the eve of the Bolshevik coup, again came to his aid. They added another quality of the new Lenin in power - the all-conquering instinct for the very preservation of power. He so skillfully and so ultimatum portrays capitulation to Germany as the only guarantee of the preservation of Bolshevik power, while at the same time continuing his usual intrigues against opponents, that a split has already appeared in the camp of the anti-Leninist majority in the Central Committee.

All day on February 18, the Central Committee sits and discusses the question of peace. At the morning session, "factional orators" speak (so it is said in

protocol) for the conclusion of peace - Lenin and Zinoviev, against - Trotsky and Bukharin. But the aspect ratio is still not in favor of Lenin. By a majority of seven votes to six, Lenin's proposal is rejected. On the afternoon of February 18, the Germans resumed hostilities and went on the offensive. Lenin demanded that a new evening meeting of the Central Committee be convened in order to discuss the latest information from the front, but in essence to revise the morning decision. At this meeting there is a supporter of capitulation, Stalin, who was absent from the morning meeting, and the opponent of peace, Dzerzhinsky, who was present at the morning meeting, is absent. This is in favor of Lenin. Already from the meager minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee it is clear that for Lenin the question of a separate peace was not a question of "to be or not to be Russia", but was a question of "to be or not to be Bolshevik power" over Russia. All Lenin's arguments in favor of peace strike at this point. Lenin said at this meeting that "the game has reached an impasse, that the collapse of the revolution is inevitable ... Now there is no way to wait ... Peace must be offered to the Germans." But Lenin adds: "If the Germans had said that they demanded the overthrow of the Bolshevik government, then, of course, we must fight" (ibid., p. 201).

Lenin agrees to give Poland, the Baltic States, Finland, even part of Belarus to the Germans and recognize the independence of Ukraine, but he does not agree to give up power. Power is everything to him. At least half of Russia, but that the power was Bolshevik. With it, he wants not so much to "make happy" his people, but to Bolshevize all of Europe. He was deeply convinced that this would happen at the end of this world war. Lenin supported Stalin, adding the argument that if the Germans "opened a hurricane of fire for five minutes, we would not have a single soldier left at the front" (ibid., p. 202). Bukharin repeated his arguments in favor of "revolutionary war" and "world revolution", at the same time accusing Lenin and his supporters of "panic and confusion" (ibid., pp. 202-203). Lenin answered him with the same argument of "panic and confusion." Lenin said: "A peasant will not go to a revolutionary war - and will throw off anyone who openly says this" (ibid., p. 203). Since Trotsky had already publicly declared at Brest-Litovsk that the Soviet government was demobilizing the army, Lenin considered that to withdraw this statement now would mean the death of Soviet power. That's what he said: "To say that demobilization has been stopped is to fly off" (ibid., p. 203).

At the end of a rather heated debate, the question is put to a vote,

which is designed to decide the fate of the regime. The minutes of the Central Committee say:

"The question is raised: should the German government immediately be approached with a proposal for an immediate conclusion of peace? For - 7: Lenin, Smilga, Stalin, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov, Trotsky, Zinoviev. Grotiv - 5: Uritsky, Ioffe, Lomov, Bukharin, Krestinsky (Dzerzhinsky joins). Refrains 1: Stasova" (ibid., p. 204). This decision is specified by indicating that the Soviet government is ready to sign the old terms of peace for the Germans, "but that there is no refusal to accept worse proposals" (ibid., p. 205). The drafting of the text of the proposal is entrusted to Lenin and Trotsky. It was decided at once to transmit the Soviet proposal to the Germans by radio. Lenin wants to cut off all lines of retreat for the Central Committee, mindful of his very weak majority.

For the final solution of the issue, the consent of the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, which, together with the Bolsheviks, constituted the Soviet coalition government, was still required. Therefore, on the night of February 19, a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks and the Central Committee of the Left SRs was scheduled. At this meeting, the "Left Communists" from the Bolshevik Central Committee, together with the Left Social Revolutionaries, again defeated Lenin. The information report on the results of this meeting said that it revealed two trends - one for the signing of peace, the other - for the continuation of the revolutionary war. The latter trend received the majority: "The majority stood on the point of view that the Russian revolution would stand the test; it was decided to resist to the last opportunity" (Gaz. "Social Democrat", February 20, 1918).

Although the decision of the Bolshevik Central Committee of February 18 (evening session) stated that the decision of the two Central Committees - the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks and the Central Committee of the Left SRs - would be taken as the decision of the government, Lenin went on a direct and open violation of the decision of his Central Committee.

Without waiting for the above-mentioned meeting with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, and therefore without waiting for the above-cited decision of both Central Committees, on the morning of February 19, Lenin transmitted by radio to the Germans a proposal to accept German peace conditions. There was a small "incident" with this proposal. Known for their pedantry, the Germans found that Lenin's radiogram was not an official document. General Hoffmann taught Lenin how to draw up official documents. Lenin must address the Germans not through the air, but in writing. The letter must be in official form, it must

to be Lenin personally signed, sealed with the appropriate seal and handed over at a distance into the hands of the German commandant of Dvinsk! Lenin was quick to reply that a Soviet courier with the official text of the Soviet surrender proposal was on its way.

The Germans did not immediately respond to the Soviet surrender. In the meantime, a proposal was received from France and England, allies of Russia, to provide military material assistance to Soviet Russia, subject to the continuation of the war with the Germans.

The meeting of the Central Committee of February 22 was wholly devoted to this question. The meeting was attended by 11 people. Lenin and Stalin were absent. The discussion of the issue caused a very heated debate. The left wing, led by Bukharin, believed that the Bolsheviks could not, in principle, use the help of "Anglo-French imperialism" in defending their "proletarian" power. Trotsky considered such a position, at least

naive. He said that "the state is forced to do what the party would not do." Therefore, if peace fails, the Soviet government must take advantage of any help from the capitalist countries. Trotsky's proposal was adopted by a majority of only one vote: 6 in favor and 5 against (ibid., p. 208). Absent Lenin sent a "Declaration to the Central Committee", in which political cynicism was carried to the point of exaggeration in order to teach leftist idealists to think in realistic terms in politics. Lenin wrote: "I ask you to add my vote for the seizure of potatoes and weapons from the robbers - Anglo-French imperialism" (ibid., p. 208).

At the same meeting, Trotsky announced his resignation from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Trotsky already spoke about this with Lenin:

"It seems to me," I said in a private conversation with Lenin, "that it would be politically expedient if I, as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, resigned.

- For what? We, I hope, will not start these parliamentary orders.

we will.

- But my resignation will mean a radical turn for the Germans

policy and increase their confidence in our willingness to sign this

once a peace treaty.

"Perhaps," said Lenin, thinking. - This is a serious political

argument" (Trotsky, "My Life", part P, pp. 117-118).

At the same Central Committee meeting on February 22, a group of Central Committee members filed an application to withdraw from the Central Committee in order to have freedom of action against the "suicide" policy of the "insignificant majority" of the Central Committee, which capitulates to German imperialism. It was signed by four members of the Central Committee - Bukharin, Uritsky, Lomov, Bubnov. Another group of Central Committee members - Ioffe, Krestinsky, Dzerzhinsky signed this statement with the proviso that they also condemn the decision of the Central Committee to surrender, but, so that there is no split in the party, they are not leaving the Central Committee now ("Protocols of the Central Committee ...", p. 209-210). Thus, on the issue of capitulation, the Central Committee again split in fact into two equal parts - 7 people for surrender, 7 people against.

On 23 February a German reply was received. The Germans, apparently, were convinced that Lenin decided to capitulate at any cost, except for the loss of power, which he came to not without their help. The German response contained new conditions, far worse than those rejected by Trotsky's delegation on January 28 (February 10). Under the new conditions, Russia was losing the entire territory of the Baltic States, part of Belarus, the cities of Kars, Batum and Ardagan. Russia was to cede to Turkey, it should immediately withdraw troops from Finland and Ukraine, conclude peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic (Rada), immediately begin full demobilization of the army, and even pay Germany six billion marks of indemnity ("Documents of foreign policy of the USSR", vol. I, Moscow, 1957, pp. 119-124, 446). Soviet Russia was to accept these conditions within 48 hours and immediately send a delegation to Brest-Litovsk to sign the peace within three days.



This was Berlin's new ultimatum. Lenin, recognizing that he concludes "a most obscene and humiliating peace", compared its conditions with the conditions of the Tilsit peace for the Prussians (1807), but the historical analogy did not hold water: in Tilsit, Russia saved the throne of the Prussian king and defended the preservation of Prussia as a state, she herself did not lose a single piece of her own territory, on the contrary, she acquired the Bialystok region, divided the spheres of influence in Europe between France and Russia, and now? Now the Prussian king and the German Kaiser set conditions for Russia that set Russia back 250 years in regard to her western territorial acquisitions. For a more or less politically minded person, it was clear that such unheard of

cruel demands for Russia became possible due to the complete disintegration of the Russian army by the same Bolsheviks using the same German money under the slogan of peace at any cost. Lenin could have been accused of conscious betrayal not only of Russia, but also of Bolshevism (his left colleagues accused him of the latter), if he had allowed the thought, even for one minute, that he would not break peace with Germany at the first unpunished opportunity. Lenin was terribly angered by the naivety of his Central Committee opponents, who thought of moral or legal obligations to respect the treaty, which could be broken when conditions changed.

The second stage of Lenin's struggle in the Central Committee for the adoption of a new German ultimatum began. The meeting of the Central Committee of February 28 is precisely devoted to the new German ultimatum. It is attended by 15 members of the Central Committee and 5 leading figures of the government with an advisory vote. The leftists, who submitted an application at the last meeting to withdraw from the Central Committee, are also present as members of the Central Committee, since their resignation has not yet been accepted. The atmosphere is extremely tense. The group struggle has gone so far that sometimes one gets the impression that not one, but two parties are represented in the Central Committee, not only with different tactics, but also with different programs: one party is a party

"peace in one country", "party of socialism in one country" (Lenin), another party - "party of war", "party of world revolution" (Bukharin). Dangling between them is another buffer group, which in mind is with Lenin, but in soul with Bukharin. This is Trotsky's group. Stalin goes with Lenin, reserving for himself the right to retreat. Therefore, he often maneuvers and never burns bridges to either Trotsky or Bukharin. Trotsky asked: "What was the position of Stalin? He, as always, had no position. He waited and combined. "The old man still hopes for peace," he nodded to me in the direction of Lenin, "he won't get peace." Then he would go to Lenin and probably make the same remarks about me" (Trotsky, "My Life", part P, p. 122). This is more than likely. After all, no one played politics so masterfully and at the same time different notes on two different instruments, as Stalin did.

Having exhausted all his arguments for the immediate conclusion of peace over the past two or three weeks, Lenin resorts to the last and most decisive means - an ultimatum, which he also resorted to on the eve of the October Revolution, demanding that the Central Committee start an uprising. In the minutes of the Central Committee

this ultimatum is stated as follows: "Comrade. Lenin considers that the policy of revolutionary phrase-mongering is over. If this policy continues now, he will leave both the government and the Central Committee" ("Protocols of the Central Committee...", p. 211).

There was a real threat of a split in the party, since Lenin made his statement in a form that leaves no doubt about his determination to take the path of creating a second Bolshevik party. It made a corresponding impression on Trotsky's group. Trotsky said that "we cannot wage a revolutionary war in the face of a split in the party... Maximum unanimity would be needed; since it is not there, I will not take upon myself the responsibility of voting for the war" (ibid., pp. 211-212).

This speech by Trotsky predetermined Lenin's victory, since the abstention of members of Trotsky's group automatically turned Lenin's group in the Central Committee into a majority in deciding the question of peace. Neither Lenin's ultimatum nor Trotsky's statement made any impression on Bukharin's group. Bukharin said that the conditions presented by the Germans did not in any way justify Lenin's old forecast, and Lomov, Bukharin's like-minded person, bluntly stated: "If Lenin threatens to resign, then they are in vain to be frightened. It is necessary to take power without V.I. (Lenin. - A.A.). We must go to the front and do our best" (ibid., pp. 213-214). But just when the general position in favor of Lenin began to emerge, one of his own group betrayed Lenin - it was Stalin. He directly and unequivocally stated: "You can not sign, but start peace negotiations" (ibid., p. 212).

This relapse of Stalin's "Trotskyism", when Trotsky himself opened the way to peace for Lenin, terribly outraged Lenin. Lenin saw that the victory of Stalin's position would mean the death of Soviet power. That is why Lenin, in his second speech, dealt the main blow to Stalin. Lenin said:

"Stalin is wrong when he says that it is possible not to sign. These terms must be signed. If you do not sign them, then you will sign the death warrant of the Soviet government in three weeks ... I am not putting an ultimatum in order to withdraw it" (ibid., p. 213).

Stalin returned to Lenin's camp, although not without reservations. Speaking for the second time, he remarked: "We believe that a German cannot do everything" (ibid., p. 213). After a long and lengthy debate (there were 21 speeches, some spoke two or three times), Lenin formulated the voting questions:

1) Should the German proposals be accepted immediately?

7 members of the Central Committee voted for (Lenin, Stasova, Zinoviev, Sverdlov, Stalin, Sokolnikov, Smilga); against - 4 members of the Central Committee (Bukharin, Lomov, Uritsky, Bubnov); abstained - 4 members of the Central Committee (Trotsky, Krestinsky, Dzerzhinsky, Ioffe).

2) Should we immediately prepare a revolutionary war?

All members of the Central Committee voted for it unanimously. ("Minutes of the Central Committee ...", p. 215)

Thus passed Lenin's proposal for the unconditional acceptance of the new German ultimatum. It was adopted by a minority of the available members of the Central Committee, since the abstaining members of the Central Committee (4 people) actually stood on the positions of the opponents of peace - on the positions of the Bukharin group. Bukharin's group drew the appropriate conclusions from their defeat - its members filed an application to withdraw from the Central Committee and from the government.

Justifying this statement on their own behalf and on behalf of Bukharin, Lomov, Bubnov, the candidate of the Central Committee Yakovleva, prominent workers of the Pyata-

kov and Smirnov, Uritsky wrote that since the decision taken is disastrous for the international and Russian revolution, "all the more so since this decision was taken by the Central Committee minority, since 4 abstentions are in our position," then they leave their posts, but with the fact that to conduct agitation against a separate peace, both within the party and outside the party (ibid., p. 216).

Members of the Central Committee Krestinsky, Ioffe and Dzerzhinsky also submitted an application to the Central Committee, in which they wrote that it was more dangerous to fight on three fronts at the same time - against German imperialism, against the Russian bourgeoisie and "part of the proletariat headed by Lenin" than making peace; therefore, not being able to vote for peace after all, they preferred to abstain (ibid., p. 216). Trotsky motivated his abstention by saying that he wanted to help find a way out of the impasse and not to prevent Lenin from obtaining a majority vote to establish a single line (ibid., p. 216).

In the future, the struggle in the Central Committee is already around the question - to accept or reject the resignation of members of the Central Committee from the Bukharin group. Lenin clearly saw that the departure from the Central Committee of the Bukharinites, who played such a prominent role in the party, could logically lead to a split in the party, which under the given conditions would lead to catastrophic consequences. Lenin, deep down, was even with them, but unlike them, he did not see any opportunities to continue the war.

Now. However, together with them, he wanted to prepare for it and break the peace treaty now being concluded at the very moment when Soviet Russia would be ready to wage a revolutionary war. That is why he and his supporters voted in the Central Committee with Bukharin for the preparation of such a war.

Lenin could not drum into the dogmatic brains of the "revolutionaries of the phrase" (as he called the "left communists" from Bukharin's group) that elementary truth of the Bolshevik philosophy of law and morality, that treaties are concluded not for their observance, but to gain time, for a "breather" to rebuild their ranks, build up new forces and start a new war again. This new war will then take place under conditions of maximum demobilization of the enemy in the confidence that the Bolsheviks will adhere to the concluded treaty, under the conditions of reorganization of the old and accumulation of new Bolshevik forces for delivering a mortal blow to the enemy. Only notorious dogmatists or hopelessly stupid people in politics could not understand him, thought Lenin, when at the UP party congress, justifying the need to conclude peace now, he said:

"You should never be bound by formal considerations in a war. It's ridiculous not to know that... a treaty is a means of gathering strength... Some definitely, like children, think: signed a treaty, it means that you sold yourself to Satan, went to hell. It's simply ridiculous... signing a treaty in the event of a defeat is a means of gathering strength... Clenching your teeth, don't brag, but prepare your strength. The revolutionary war will come, we have no disagreements on this... In the interests of the revolutionary war, we must retreat physically, giving up the country in order to gain time. Strategy and policy prescribe the most heinous peace treaty" (Lenin, Works, 3rd ed., vol. KhKhPI, pp. 334, 335, 336).

In the interests of this strategy, Lenin recognizes for members of the Bukharin group the right to freely agitate for their views against the official policy of the Central Committee, which he never recognized and does not recognize in other conditions. At this price, he tries to keep them in the Central Committee. Not understanding the essence of Lenin's tactics, or perhaps not sharing it at all, Stalin began

to threaten the rebels with expulsion from the party (Stalin: "does not leaving posts mean actual leaving the party", p. 217). Such a statement of the question only added fuel to the fire. She clearly smelled of provocation. Therefore, Lenin hastened to dissociate himself from Stalin. Lenin answered him "that leaving the Central Committee does not mean leaving the Party" (p. 217).

At the next meeting of the Central Committee on February 24, Stalin so abruptly changes his position on this issue, and considers the members of the Bukharin group so indispensable in the Central Committee, that he provokes an ironic remark from the latter. This Stalinist metamorphosis was reflected in the minutes of the Central Committee. It says:

"Tov. Stalin does not offer anything, but speaks of the pain that he feels in relation to his comrades ... They know very well that there is no one to replace them, and raises the question of why they are doing this "(ibid., p. 224).

But further on in the protocol it follows: "Uritsky expresses surprise at Stalin's words... Yesterday Stalin suggested that they leave the Party, but they do not think of leaving the Party" (ibid., p. 224).

At a meeting of the Central Committee on February 24, which was attended by 12 members of the Central Committee and three invitees, it was decided to send a new delegation to sign the peace - Sokolnikov (chairman), Petrovsky, Karakhan, Chicherin. The chairman of the previous (after Trotsky) delegation - Ioffe - was, against his will, but at the insistence of Lenin, appointed consultant to the delegation, since of all the members of the Central Committee he was considered the most competent in matters related to the conclusion of peace. At the same meeting, the statements of the opponents of peace and Trotsky about their resignation from the government were discussed. Justifying his resignation, Trotsky said that "there are now two very sharply separated wings in the party. If you look from the parliamentary point of view, then we have two parties, and in the parliamentary sense it would be necessary to yield to the minority, but we don't have this, since we have a struggle of groups" (ibid., p. 224). Trotsky assessed the situation as a "crisis of power." Stalin joined this assessment with the proviso that Trotsky still remain in the government. The protocol says:

"Tov. Stalin says that he does not make a shadow of a reproach to Trotsky, he also assesses the moment as a crisis of power, but still asks him to wait a couple of days "(ibid., p. 224).

Lenin assessed Trotsky's and Stalin's assertion of a "crisis of power" as erroneous. Lenin pointed out that there is a change in policy towards the conclusion of peace (unconditional acceptance of the German ultimatum), but there is no crisis of power. He still insists that the members of the government who have submitted their resignations (Trotsky, Lomov, Smirnov, Uritsky, Pyatakov, Bogolepov, Spunde), just like those who have previously submitted

statements about leaving the Central Committee, remained in their posts, at least until the upcoming emergency party congress. Lenin immediately made a second proposal, guaranteeing the right of the opponents of peace to publish their respective statements of disagreement with the policy of the Central Committee on the pages of the newspaper Pravda.

These proposals of Lenin, as not sufficiently guaranteeing the rights of the minority, were rejected (only 5 members of the Central Committee voted for them). A more definite proposal by Krestinsky and Trotsky was accepted:

The Central Committee invites the comrades who have submitted an application to remain in their posts without incurring political responsibility, with complete freedom to defend their point of view in the Party, in the press, and at meetings (ibid., pp. 223, 226, 227). All members of the Central Committee voted for this proposal, including those who submitted their resignations. Lenin avoided a split at the price of recognizing freedom of groups and freedom of speech for the opposition, which was contrary to his whole doctrine of the party.

On the night of February 24, the Bolshevik faction urgently submitted to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee a resolution accepting German peace conditions and sending a peace delegation to Brest-Litovsk. This resolution was adopted by a majority of 116 votes to 85, with 26 abstentions. The Mensheviks, the Right and Left Social Revolutionaries, and a number of non-party members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee voted against.

On the same February 24, Lenin and Trotsky telegraph to Berlin that the Soviet government accepts the terms of peace and sends a delegation to Brest-Litovsk. Lenin was in such a hurry to accept the German ultimatum, as if he feared that if he continued to delay, as Stalin demanded, the Germans might additionally present the only condition that he really could not accept: the Bolsheviks would leave power. The subsequent development of events showed that this fear of Lenin was in vain. No other political party in Russia, except the Bolsheviks, was ready to capitulate to the Germans. The Germans, more than Lenin himself, who were accurately informed on this score, were interested in maintaining the power of the Bolsheviks. It is amazing why Lenin did not use this trump card of his against Wilhelm. Or maybe he used it. We just don't know.

On the same February 24, Lenin, on behalf of the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party, wrote an appeal to the Party, in which he explained why it was necessary to accept the German ultimatum. It was published in Pravda

dated 28 February. In this address, Lenin and the Central Committee publicly declare not only to friends, but also to enemies, that the military triumph of the Germans is inevitable under all conditions. Lenin and the Central Committee, as it were, are suggesting to the Germans what is the shortest road to their victory. This was monstrous and unheard of, because history knows no example of a country defending itself in a deadly battle with the enemy so recklessly informing the enemy of its impotence, as Lenin and the Central Committee did. Here are the relevant passages from this appeal of the Central Committee:

"The unconditional necessity of signing peace is caused primarily by the fact that we do not have an army, that we cannot defend ourselves ... Russia is now defenseless and will be defeated even by the insignificant forces of the Germans, who only need to cut the main railway lines to take Petrograd and Moscow by starvation" (Lenin, Soch., vol. KhP, pp. 294-295).

It is difficult to explain such frankness, which would be recognized as a betrayal in the mouths of ordinary mortals.

After such a public official statement by Lenin and the Central Committee, the Germans know that any conditions can be imposed on Russia, up to the demand that Russian troops be deployed against Russian allies on the Western front, as Napoleon did with Russian allies against the Russians (Austria and Prussia supported Napoleon against Russia in the War of 1812). However, the Germans do not. At a new meeting, which lasted in the same Brest-Litovsk from March 1 to March 3, the Germans simply repeat their ultimatum, and the Soviet delegation led by Sokolnikov, without reading, according to the instructions, signs the text of a separate peace. He was now subject

ratification within two weeks by both the Party Congress and the Congress of Soviets.

It is not the purpose of this work to whitewash Trotsky. He stands on a par with Lenin and Stalin, inferior to the first as a master of revolution, and the second as a master of power. However, at the time described, the position of Trotsky, and not Stalin, decided the fate of the Leninist regime and Lenin himself. The nameless party machine - the organizer of the revolution - then acted in two persons: Lenin and Trotsky. Therefore, Trotsky's capitulation to Lenin in the Central Committee, in the form of abstention during the voting, was of epochal significance. If Stalin had abstained at that time, or even voted against Lenin, then this would only have a protocol-arithmetical significance in the sense that Lenin would have received one vote less or more. All the more unfair are Soviet historians when they draw the savior of Lenin

regime as an enemy of Leninism. If not for this move by Trotsky in favor of Lenin, Lenin would not have been lying in the mausoleum on Red Square in Moscow, and no one would have known about the existence of Stalin, except for the Okhrana and relatives of Dzhugashvili himself.

#### Chapter 16 2

##### UP EMERGENCY CONGRESS OF THE PARTY

The UP emergency party congress, convened to ratify the peace, took place on March 6-8, 1918. This was the first party congress after the seizure of power. By this time, the party had about 300 thousand members in its ranks, but only 170 thousand members were represented at the congress in the person of 47 delegates with a decisive vote and 59 delegates with an advisory vote (all members of the Central Committee headed by Lenin had only advisory votes). The agenda of the congress included three main issues:

1. The question of war and peace.
1. Revision of the program and the name of the party.

##### d. Elections of the Central Committee.

Six people were elected to the presidium of the congress, including Lenin, Bukharin and Sverdlov.

On the first question, Lenin was the speaker, and Bukharin was the counter-rapporteur. Lenin's report was reduced to a detailed presentation of his arguments in favor of peace at the meetings of the Central Committee. Lenin referred to two historical examples when there is no other way out than open surrender, but capitulation in order to buy time and create the prerequisites for the final victory. The first example concerned the Treaty of Tilsit (1807), when Napoleon ordered the defeated Prussians to give him troops to conquer other peoples. Speaking of this, Lenin remarked: "Things will come to this with us too, if we only hope for an international field revolution. See that history does not bring you to this form of military slavery" ("The Seventh Emergency Congress of the RCP (6). Verbatim Report", Moscow, 1962, p. 21).

Lenin took the second example from the history of Bolshevism, when, by decision of the Central Committee, the Bolshevik deputies of the 3rd State Duma (1907) were forced to take an oath of allegiance to the tsar, since deputies who refused to take such an oath were considered to have left the Duma, Lenin said that "by signing (then ) monarchist papers, we experienced the same thing on a small scale

compared with the present" (ibid., p. 17). Lenin concluded his report with the words:

"Peace is a respite for war... I will say again that I am ready to sign and will consider it my duty to sign a peace that is twenty times, a hundred times more humiliating... Take a break to maintain contact with the far rear, create new armies there" (ibid., pp. 22, 24).

For the first time in this report on the world, Lenin formulated his famous thesis about

the impossibility, in principle, of the peaceful coexistence of Soviet Russia with the capitalist world, and the tasks of the Bolsheviks to organize an international revolution. This thesis says:

"International imperialism, with all the might of its capital ... could under no circumstances, under no circumstances, get along side by side with the Soviet Republic ... Here conflict is inevitable. Here lies the greatest difficulty of the Russian revolution, its greatest historical problem: the need to solve international problems, the need to provoke an international revolution, to make this transition from our revolution, as a narrowly national one, to a world one" (ibid., p. 11).

In order to carry out this historical mission of Bolshevism, Lenin wanted to preserve Soviet power, taking advantage of the ongoing war between the "two groups of imperialism" - between the Entente and the Quadruple Alliance. Lenin disagreed with the opposition not in that it was necessary to organize a world revolution, but in how and when to organize it. Lenin was for the preservation of Soviet power as the basis of the world revolution, the "left communists" were for organizing the world revolution even at the cost of the risk of losing Soviet power.

Bukharin's counter-arguments against the conclusion of peace were no less convincing than Lenin's arguments for peace. First of all, Bukharin analyzed the reasons for the disintegration of an army that really does not want to fight. Even that famous hegemon of the revolution - the proletariat - also does not want to fight. Why? Bukharin answers:

"At all our meetings, at all rallies, at congresses everywhere and everywhere, only one thesis was put forward as a shock, that now no war is possible ... I affirm that to a large extent the demoralization that is now observed among the proletariat, due to its largely owed to ourselves." And further: "After all, when we were in opposition, when Kerensky called in every possible way for the defense of the fatherland, we in every possible way corrupted the will to defend this fatherland" (ibid., pp. 36, 38).

That was the bitter truth, which Lenin, although he acknowledged, attributed it to the entire party, including Bukharin. Lenin said:

"When Bukharin now smashes us for demoralizing the masses, he is absolutely right, only he is smashing himself and not us" (ibid., p. 110).

Bukharin believed that by making peace on German terms, Lenin only helped the German coalition to continue the war, because "the imperialists of the Austro-German coalition can wage this war only under one condition, only under the condition of a merciless reprisal against Russia - simply for purely economic reasons. ... for in order to wage war against England, she needs raw materials, she needs bread" (ibid., p. 28). Bukharin further pointed out that the Kaiser wanted to feed not only the army, but also the German workers with the same Russian bread, whom the severe economic catastrophe in Germany was impelling to their own revolution. As regards Lenin's thesis of a "respite", Bukharin considers Lenin's entire argumentation connected with this thesis to be completely untenable. Boo-

harin said:

"If Comrade. Lenin says: "Take a respite, if only for a few days, he says that such a respite is in store for us" - I affirm that the game is not worth the candle ... it will not give us anything, because neither to rebuild the railways nor

to train the population in shooting, neither to establish transport, nor to establish economic LIFE, i.e., to resolve all those main tasks that Comrade spoke about. Lenin, it's impossible for a few days" (p. 30).

What are Lenin's "minus points"? Bukharin calculated them as follows: by recognizing the independence of Ukraine and its separation from Russia, Lenin deprives the country of its main grain and coal base; by abandoning the Baltic states, Lenin deprives the country of its advantageous strategic position; recognizing by treaty the inviolability of foreign capital in Russia, with which Russian capital is closely connected, Lenin thereby annuls the decree of the revolution on the nationalization of industry; by refusing by treaty from revolutionary propaganda in other countries, Lenin renounces the whole program of the Bolsheviks in regard to the world revolution; in assuming under the treaty the obligations to support the German position of "independence" of Persia and Afghanistan, Soviet Russia assumes the role of the colonial gendarme of German imperialism against British imperialism. Such were the "minus points" that Bukharin counted in Lenin. Bukharin said that the Germans "are taking away from Soviet Russia the most essential, the most vital, just that, because of which, according to Comrade Lenin's argument, we could go for a respite and sign peace" (ibid., p. 31).

Funny, sentimental, not at all Bolshevik, but opportunistic, Bukharin also considered Lenin's argument that he was "ready to sign a peace twenty times, a hundred times more humiliating, in order to get a few days to evacuate Petrograd," because "I alleviate the torment of the workers by this." who otherwise might fall under the yoke of the Germans" (ibid., p. 22). Bukharin replied that this reasoning of Lenin "is just a phrase, not a cold calculation, but a real passion for feeling, of course, a very good feeling, but far from cold calculation, which tells us that if necessary we can and must sacrifice tens of thousands workers. After all, this is how the opportunists of all countries always reason: "There is no need to go out into the streets, because blood may be shed" (ibid., pp. 32-33). Of course, the Bolshevik truth in this case was on the side of Bukharin, not Lenin. This example also showed Lenin himself that the students began to clearly surpass the teacher. It was symptomatic that such a formulation of the question by Bukharin was passed over by Lenin in complete silence. Nor could Lenin repel another weighty argument from Bukharin, who declared:

"Indeed, it is clear at first glance that if the treaty contained such conditions as the overthrow of the Soviet power, as the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, etc., then we could not sign it" (ibid., p. 31) .

Yes, answered Lenin, in that case we would continue the revolutionary war; But

when he was asked why he could not continue it in conditions when the Germans were taking away from Russia "the most vital thing", when Russia was being dismembered, however, using the slogan of the same Bolsheviks about the "right of the people to self-determination", Lenin did not answer these questions answered, and could not answer.

One exceptionally important, even decisive under the given conditions (as subsequent conditions showed) Bukharin and his supporters completely ignored - this is the guarantee of Russia's allies to provide her with the necessary material assistance for the joint continuation of the war to a victorious end against Germany. How



since in this matter the Bukharinites showed all the dogmatic helplessness and naivety of their political thinking - they considered it fundamentally unacceptable for the revolutionaries to use the help of "the Anglo-American imperialists against the German imperialists." Here Lenin was in his element - he fully allowed the possibility of using such help, it was always clear to him that "the end justifies the means", but he was probably bound by the conditions of German assistance to the Bolsheviks in the revolution, or he became so much a prisoner of his idfix - "respite", which did not allow any other solution than complete surrender, if only to maintain power. However, it must be emphasized right away that Lenin was afraid of losing power not so much from the advance of the Germans, not so much from the fall of Petrograd and Moscow, but from an internal uprising, mainly a peasant uprising and an uprising of the army. Lenin did not forget that he came to power promising precisely unconditional peace. Today, in his discussion with the Bukharinites, he, of course, prudently sidestepped the delicate issue.

The opponents of capitulation, following Bukharin, repeated their well-known objections at the congress. Speaking first, Uritsky declared that he "utterly did not understand the panic of those sitting here" in front of the Germans (p. 42), adding: "The facts are not directed against us, but to a much greater extent against you, comrade Lenin ... having made peace, we beat those comrades who enthusiastically sign up for the Red Army" (pp. 42-43). Another opponent of the capitulation accused Lenin of political unscrupulousness, recalling to him his own words at the [Congress of Soviets in June 1917. Then Lenin said: "There can be no separate peace for us, and according to the resolution of our party there is not even a shadow of a doubt that we reject it like any agreement with the capitalists" (Lenin, Works, 4th ed., vol. 25, p. 20). Radek, blaming Lenin for preparing the surrender, also accused Trotsky of having used the correct tactics in the Brest negotiations to drag out the negotiations and foment the German revolution, and then betrayed himself when he abstained during the decisive vote in the Central Committee on war or peace. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Republic must not abstain when voting on the question of war or capitulation, exclaimed Radek. Radek pointed out to Lenin the whole danger of his open statements with the assertion that, having concluded peace, we began to prepare a new war against Germany. Radek said: "By this you give the Germans the right, at the first disagreement with documents in hand, to prove that we are preparing a new

war, and again stir up chauvinist sentiments" ("Seventh Congress of the RCP (6b)", p. 60). Trotsky explained his abstention in the Central Committee on the question of signing the capitulation for two reasons: "Firstly, I do not consider our attitude towards it (the world) to be decisive for the fate of our revolution ... It is impossible to wage war against the Germans ... and at the same time, to have half or most of the party headed by Comrade Lenin against oneself ... In view of the existing correlation of forces in the Central Committee, a lot depended on my vote ... because some comrades (in the Central Committee) share my position. ... I consider it more expedient to retreat than to sign a peace, creating a fictitious respite, but I could not take responsibility for leading the party in such conditions" (ibid., pp. 65, 66, 69).

Ryazanov accused Lenin of counting not on the European proletariat, but on the Russian petty bourgeoisie, that is, the peasants. He elaborated his point:

"Lenin wanted to use the slogans of Tolstoy, modifying them in accordance with the epoch he was going through. Tolstoy proposed to organize Russia like a peasant, like a fool, Lenin - like a peasant, like a soldier. We are now disentangling the fruits of this policy, of the peasants and the soldiers" (ibid., p. 73).

In response to Lenin's thesis that the signing of peace would preserve Soviet Russia as the center of the world revolution, Ryazanov sharply accused Lenin and his supporters, firstly, of wanting to hide under the protection of the German bayonet, not having the right to propagate such a revolution, and secondly, of open lies in their previous declarations. These ones

Ryazanov's words: the desire to preserve Soviet Russia as a center of revolutionary propaganda for the international proletariat "is the desire to set up in Russia a 'cell under the spruce', under the protection of the German bayonet. Here is the declaration of the rights of the working and exploited peoples (it was published on January 17, 1918, Vol. - A. A.), about which Comrade Sverdlov said in the Constituent Assembly that it would replace the declaration of the rights of the Great French Revolution. Give yourself the trouble to read this piece of paper and ask yourself: how many times have you lied" (ibid., p. 75).

Ryazanov (this man for many years was the director of the Institute of Marx, Engels, Lenin at the Central Committee) ended his speech as follows:

"Lenin is ready to retreat, retreat and retreat, even when Trotsky grabs him by the tails.

I will say that this retreat has a limit. I will not say that it is treason and betrayal" (p. 76), but denying treason, he hinted at it.

Trotsky also spoke about the limit beyond which it is impossible to go. He said that this limit would come for him when the Germans demanded the conclusion of peace with the Ukrainian Rada, and the Central Committee and the government must give a guarantee that they would not reach this limit (p. 72). To this Sverdlov, a supporter of capitulation, replied as follows:

"Yesterday, in the Central Committee, Comrade Trotsky proposed to us an appropriate resolution that peace with Vinnichenko (that is, with the Ukrainian People's Republic. - A. A.) is unacceptable. But we rejected it. We have not considered it impossible to make peace with Vynnychenko" (p. 80). (Interestingly, this minutes of the Central Committee meeting of March 6 is on the list

"not found", because otherwise it would be impossible to blame Trotsky that it was he who was to blame for the fact that the peaceful delegation of the Ukrainian Rada headed by Golubovich in Brest-Litovsk was recognized, while it was recognized by the Central Committee headed by Lenin.)

Very bold, meaningful, revealing the connection between the German course towards the expansion of the Russian army by the Bolsheviks and Lenin's policy of capitulation today was the speech of a prominent figure in the party, Obolensky (Osinsky). He stated that even during the German counter-offensive in the summer of 1917 on the Riga front, "the Germans undoubtedly had an absolute opportunity to crush the Russian revolution, just like the Russian army. Why didn't they do it?

Because they expected to achieve their goals in an even easier way: they waited for internal disintegration ... they expected the victory of the peace party, which they considered the Bolsheviks" (p. 82).

Why, then, are the Germans advancing after the victory of such a "peace party"? Obolensky has an answer: in the eyes of German imperialism, the Soviet government turned out to be "completely inoperable from its point of view, completely incapable of concluding with it the deal that was needed" (pp. 82-83). He finished: "All those promises that Comrade Lenin makes are completely empty speeches" (p. 85).

Kollontai strongly opposed the surrender and ended her speech with an exclamation of "Long live the revolutionary war!", which caused applause in the hall.

Of the supporters of Lenin, members of the Central Committee, in addition to Sverdlov, Zinoviev, Sokolnikov, Smilga, Sergeev also spoke. They basically repeated Lenin's arguments.

On this question, so fateful for Lenin's power, Stalin did not utter a single word in favor of peace. It was very strange and mysterious. Such

Stalin's behavior, even in Stalinist historiography, remained without explanation. We have already seen certain fluctuations in Stalin's position during the discussion of the question of peace at the meetings of the Central Committee, although he voted for Lenin. One Central Committee document of May 13, 1918, has been published, which sheds perhaps some light on Stalin's behavior. On May 13, 1918, at a meeting of the Central Committee, two months after the UP congress, Lenin's "Theses on the Present Political Situation" were discussed. On the subject of foreign policy, it says:

"The foreign policy of the Soviet government must in no way be changed. Our military training has not yet been completed, and therefore the general slogan remains as before: maneuver, retreat, wait ..."  
"(Lenin, Works, 4th ed. Vol. 27, p. 325). In the footnote to these theses in the minutes of the UP congress it is said:  
"13

May

the theses were discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the party. Everyone voted for Lenin's theses except Sokolnikov and Stalin" ("UP Congress of the RCP(b)", p. 229).

But let's get back to the convention.

In his concluding remarks, Bukharin said that the main question to which a clear answer must be given boils down to the following: is it now possible for us to wage war? When Bukharin pointed out that his supporters answered this question

"possible", and Lenin's supporters - "impossible", then Lenin shouted from his place: "It is possible!" This remark by Lenin gave Bukharin a reason to pose another question:

"If this war is possible in the near future, then we must ask the supporters of the trend that Lenin represents, on what, after all, do they base their position? After all, it is precisely the central point of your arguments, all your speeches, resolutions and speeches, rallies and congress and all kinds of other statements, that now, due to objective reasons, with the disintegration of the army, with the current state of the food supply, with the collapse of transport, etc. we cannot wage war" (ibid., pp. 101-102).

In his final speech, Lenin stopped at the speeches of Ryazanov, Radek, Bubnov, Uritsky, Trotsky and Bukharin. He replied to Ryazanov that Ryazanov was right when he said that "Lenin is giving up space in order to gain time" (p. 109). Uritsky's statement that peace with the Germans is "Canossa", "betrayal" - all this is taken by Uritsky from the Left SR criticism (pp. 110-111). Addressing Trotsky, Lenin said that Trotsky demanded from him a promise not to sign peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic (Rada), but he, Lenin, "under no circumstances such a commitment to

he will not take himself... You can never tie yourself down in a war by formal considerations," and addressing the congress, Lenin added, if you think otherwise, "then give positions to Trotsky and others" (p. 112). Lenin's answer to Bukharin was weak and unconvincing. To the sharply posed question - is war possible in the near future, Lenin answered "dialectically": "It is possible, but now we need to make peace. There is no contradiction here" (p. 110)\*.

\*

Together with the speakers, 9 delegates spoke for peace, 11 delegates against peace. Still, the supporters of peace won. But here the secret of victory is very simple - according to a tried and tested method, Lenin organized (and did not convene) a congress from the majority of supporters of his line (this is what Stalin constantly did later). Bukharin had already drawn attention to this fact in his report when he noted that the supporters of peace "have an overwhelming majority at this congress" (ibid., p. 39).

The reports, final words and debate are over. They started voting - Lenin's resolution on the ratification of peace was adopted by a majority: 30 votes in favor, 12 against, 4 abstained (ibid., p. 175).

When they began to discuss the additions and amendments, then sharp disputes broke out around Trotsky's tactics in Brest-Litovsk, which was expressed in the formula "no war, no peace." Three resolutions were introduced:

Krestinsky's resolution: "The tactic of not signing peace in Brest was an absolutely correct tactic."

Zinoviev's resolution: "The Congress hails the Brest Soviet delegation for its tremendous work in exposing the German imperialists, in drawing the workers of all countries into the struggle against the imperialist states" (p. 131).

Zinoviev's resolution, backed by Lenin, diplomatically avoided the question of the correctness or incorrectness of Trotsky's tactics. Guessing the meaning of the maneuver of Zinoviev's resolution, Trotsky declared that in Brest he was conducting tactics approved by the majority of the Central Committee, which was confirmed by Zinoviev himself (Zinoviev: "Trotsky is right in his own way when he said that he acted on the decision of the competent majority of the Central Committee." - p. 134-135).

When both of these resolutions were voted, a completely confused picture was created: 15 delegates voted for Krestinsky's resolution, 4 against; for Zinoviev's resolution - 20, against 3. Therefore, the presiding Sverdlov declared both resolutions adopted, which provoked a protest from Zinoviev.

In order to bring complete clarity and force his opponents to reveal their cards, Trotsky introduced his own resolution condemning Trotsky: "The Congress considers the statement of our delegation that the peace was not signed" (p. 133). After heated debate, Trotsky's resolution, a resolution condemning his tactics at Brest, was rejected by the congress (p. 137), and Zinoviev's more or less rubbery resolution was adopted. Lenin, who in his concluding remarks said that "Trotsky's tactics, inasmuch as they were procrastinating, were correct: they became incorrect when the state of war was declared to be ended and peace was not signed" (p. 111), now, during the debate around Trotsky's tactics, did not say a word. He could not refute Trotsky's statement that in November 1917 it was possible to make peace with the Germans on better terms, but "everyone, including Comrade Lenin, said: "Go and

demand from the Germans clarity in the wording, catch them, break off the negotiations at the first opportunity and go back" (p. 66).

To finish with the theme of the Brest Peace, it is important to answer the following questions:

1. Was there a real danger that the Germans, in their political program of waging war, would go so far as to demand the overthrow of the Bolshevik government, and in their military conquest program, to the occupation of Central Russia?
2. Was Lenin's assessment of the state of the combat capability of the German army correct, his belief that it could advance indefinitely ("this beast jumps strongly")?

We now have vast historical documentation - German, Anglo-Saxon, French, Soviet - to answer these questions satisfactorily. Hidden factors and secret plans of the military-political strategy, like the secret war of the intelligence centers of the participants in the First World War are now in

to a large extent have already been disclosed, studied, available for analysis, comparison, and conclusions (especially noteworthy here are such fundamental German works as the multi-volume work "Ple ogasVen aez daes{ssVen 7mzachven aez daes{ssVen 7mzattergisve\$ pp] abge 1918", published after the first war in Berlin, and "OtzasVen and pa Po]dep, published in West Berlin after the Second World War). To answer the above questions, there is no need to undertake a broad historical excursion into the wilds of

of that era. The main criterion of all criteria - time has shown that Lenin absolutely falsely assessed the material and military capabilities of Germany, overestimated the shock, offensive power of her army, completely underestimated not only the possibilities of organizing a new (revolutionary) defensive war on the part of Russia, but also made gross miscalculations regarding the inevitability victories of the Entente countries over the Quadruple Alliance, especially since America entered the war.

Meanwhile, the leaders of the German army themselves, not to mention the German government, already at the time when Lenin was negotiating surrender, came to the conclusion that they were not in a position to wage a victorious war. The memoirs of Count Chernin, the Austro-Hungarian representative in Brest, were published, who wrote that if there were enough forces, the Germans would not negotiate, but would launch an attack on

Petrograd. Quoting Chernin, Trotsky writes: "On February 10, the delegations of Germany and Austria-Hungary came to the conclusion: "the state proposed by Trotsky must be accepted. . One General Hoffmann spoke out against this "(L. Trotsky, "My Life", part P, p. 114).

Such an authoritative witness as General Ludendorff, still in the wake of the war (his book was published in 1919), wrote that at the beginning of 1918 the task of the German command was only to prevent the Bolsheviks from organizing a new eastern front and therefore inflict a short, a strong blow, but, he adds, "there was no question of a broad operation" (Eisv GadepdogE, "Meshte Kpedzegtpegipdep", Wersh, 1919, \$. 447). The same Ludendorff, quartermaster of the main apartment, head of the extreme right military clique, writes that he was against the destruction of Russia as a state. After the last offensive on February 18, Germany set only such peace conditions that "avoided any interference in the internal political and economic life of Russia and did not impose anything on it that would not be compatible with the honor of an independent state and that would enslave its inhabitants ... It is instructive to compare the world, which Russia then received, with the peace that she could have received "(ibid., p. 450). The general makes two very important messages, why the Bolsheviks were in such a hurry to make peace with the Germans. Firstly, he says, where our army came, "the population felt liberated from Bolshevism" (p. 452); we have already seen above), but "as soon as the Soviet government saw that the Entente wants to overthrow it and put another government at the helm, from which it expects great efforts to wage war, then it (the Soviet government) turned away from the Entente and turned to Germany to strengthen power within the country" (p. 459).

As has already been pointed out, the Germans just needed a capitulation party on the Eastern Front in order to later concentrate all their main forces on the dangerous Western Front. An extremely interesting document from the German Foreign Office has been preserved on the question of how Germany felt about the possibility

the formation in Russia of another, democratic government instead of the Bolshevik one. This is a letter from the Undersecretary of State from Berlin 9

January 1918 to State Secretary Kuhlmann, who was in negotiations with Trotsky in Brest-Litovsk. The letter says that a socialist-revolutionary addressed the German ambassador in Stockholm, who gave the ambassador the contents of the letter of the leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary. Chernov. In this letter, a representative of Chernov's party draws a massive red terror, with the help of which the Bolsheviks are kept in power, but the time is not far off when the whole country will turn its back on Lenin, and then the salvation of Russia will be at stake.

the way of the Constituent Assembly. Chernov's party offers the Germans to abandon their bet on the perfidious Bolsheviks and conclude an honest and lasting peace with democratic Russia. Informing about all this, the Deputy Secretary of State concludes his letter: "If Your Excellency approves, I intend to inform him (representative of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. - A. A.) that at this time we, unfortunately, are not in a position to contact with other Russian parties, since we are engaged to negotiate with the Bolsheviks. Please telegraph your point of view." Kuhlman answered: "I agree" (Segtapu apa Fe Veuoan sh Viza. 1915-1918. Vu 1. A. V. Khetap, pp. 113-115). And this was in those days when Trotsky, rudely interrupting the negotiations, shouted: "No war, no peace!", "Long live the proletarian revolution in Germany!"

There is a well-known German nationalist legend about a "stab in the back" ("Ros zo edepae"), according to which the Germans lost the war they won on the battlefield because of the revolution in the rear. When the National Socialists came to power, this legend played the role of a great explosive force to mobilize the fury of a nation that, due to the mistakes of the rulers, was humiliated, insulted and excluded from the European family of equals by the carefree fathers of Versailles due to the mistakes of the rulers. Actually, there, in Versailles, the seeds of that terrible harvest of human skulls (50 million!), Which mankind gathered at the end of the Second World War, were sown. The headquarters of the Bolsheviks - both the right, led by Lenin, and the left, led by Bukharin - also hit the same point: to win the war by organizing a revolution in Germany. Lenin, however, was impatient and prone to wavering. It was as if he did not believe in his own belief about the inevitability of the German revolution. This belief sometimes seemed so incredible that he was ready to negotiate with the Kaiser's generals on terms "a hundred times worse" (nobody asked Lenin the question - what does a world mean that would be "a hundred times worse" than the Brest Peace?).

At a time when Lenin exaggerated to incredible the overall power of Germany and the invincibility of her army, the leaders of the German army themselves believed that they had already actually lost the war. We have already cited Ludendorff's testimony about the forced limitation of the scale of the operations of the German eastern front, as well as his testimony that Germany did not set itself the goal of occupying ethnographic Russia, and she could not set it because of the internal catastrophic situation. Numerous studies, monographs, books

written by German historians and publicists on this topic. Here we refer to the most recent German evidence - the memoirs of the penultimate Reich Chancellor of the Weimar Republic, Brüning. Brüning recalls that when he told General Schleicher that at the beginning of the First World War, the formation of the battle order (Ayytag \$ sV) of the German army was wonderful, although the war was lost because of the method of formation itself, General Schleicher said: "I spoke as early as March 26 1918, that our cause has long been lost" (Bryuning's Memoirs, Reg spiede!, Mt. 45, 2.X1.1970, 5.196). Note that the general thought so three weeks after Lenin's capitulation and the victory of the war against Russia, as a result of which the reserves of strategic raw materials and supplies (bread, meat, coal, metal of Ukraine) that they needed so much (bread, meat, coal, metal of Ukraine) were transferred to the Germans, and their divisions in the East were released for transfers to the Western Front.

Even more significantly, and as a historical document it is extremely important,

the testimony of Field Marshal Hindenburg, Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, as presented by the same Brüning. Brüning says that when in 1932, as Reich Chancellor, he began to prove to Hindenburg, then President of Germany, that with proper treatment it would be possible to keep the soldiers from rebelling against the Kaiser in 1918, the old man shook his head negatively and said: "No. .. I knew back in February 1918 that the war had already been lost. However, I wanted to give Ludendorff another chance" (ibid., p. 178). Both these testimonies, and especially confirming their subsequent events leading to the revolution in November 1918 and the surrender of Germany in the West, showed that Germany was indebted to Lenin alone for the possibility of resisting in the West for another eight months after Brest.

Lenin's disciples retroactively attribute to him political wisdom and insight in foreseeing the November revolution of 1918 in Germany, meanwhile, it was precisely because of Lenin's capitulation that it happened with a delay of several months. History has shown with absolute clarity that in predicting events, as well as the collapse of the German Empire, it was not Lenin, not even Trotsky, but Bukharin and Hindenburg who were right. Ironically, Lenin was spared from the Brest Separate Peace Treaty, and Russia was given back the territories it had lost by precisely those former Russian allies whom Lenin had so defiantly betrayed: France, England and America.

Although Milyukov wrote that at one time the Germans had an intention to overthrow the Bolshevik government, relying on Russian officers ("Russia at the Turn", vol. I, 1927, Paris), the Bolshevik official historian doubts this. On the contrary, he states: "Even on July 6, when the Left SRs killed the German ambassador Mirbach, the Germans did not bring their soldiers into Moscow, as they had threatened at first, and limited themselves to increasing the staff of the embassy to 300 people" (TSB, 1st ed. vol. 7, p. 461).

What the Kaiser needed was not Milyukov and Chernov, much less Denikin and Kolchak, but he needed the capitulator Lenin at any cost.

In the late sixties, a series of books-documents began to be published in the USSR

"Soviet-German Relations". The documents were selected, of course, one-sidedly, tendentiously, in order to prove the greatness and foresight of Lenin and the short-sightedness and insignificance of his opponents in disputes about the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk separate peace. Despite such a one-sided "class approach", nevertheless, some documents from a German publication, which just refute what Bolshevik historians consider proven, still made it into the first volume of the named series. These German documents of 1918 quite eloquently depict, on the one hand, the internal situation of Germany itself at the beginning of 1918, on the other hand, the attitude of the government and the Supreme High Command to the question of the fate of the Bolshevik regime in Russia.

At a meeting on February 5, 1918 in the Imperial Chancellery in Berlin, in the presence of Reich Chancellor Gertling, Secretary of State Kuhlmann, Austrian Minister Chernin, Field Marshal Hindenburg, General Hoffmann and others, the head of the military party Ludendorff, insisting on an offensive, nevertheless admitted that if new military operations began, then "the latter, however, would be carried out slowly, given the snow, bad roads and insufficient supply of draft power" ("Soviet-German Relations", vol. I, Moscow, 1968, p. 289). Kuhlman on the same

broadcasting, he preferred to make peace with Trotsky, because: "Concluding peace even with Trotsky would still be a gain both in relation to the Entente and in view of our own situation" (ibid., p. 290).

On the day that Trotsky defiantly rejected the German conditions - February 10, 1918 - the Reich Chancellor wrote in a telegram to the Kaiser that "the people believe that

Germany's

interests demand the conclusion of peace", pointing out at the same time that delaying the conclusion of the peace may cause new demonstrations, strikes, and all this will lead to the fact that "we will not have the majority of the people and parliament on our side, so I would not like to take on responsibility for the possible outcome of such a situation" (ibid., p. 315).

At a meeting chaired by the Kaiser on February 13, convened to discuss the situation after Trotsky's statement "no war, no peace" in response to Ludendorff's demand "to end the war in a military way", the Chief of the Main Naval Staff, Golzendorf, with the same definite military language, answered his to a colleague: "There is no chance that a victory will be won soon and that the troops that have been released can be used in the West" (ibid., pp. 325-326).

The decision taken at this meeting speaks of the resumption of hostilities after the armistice expired (according to the terms of the armistice, it expired seven days after it was terminated by one of the parties - since the Germans qualified Trotsky's statement of February 10 as such a termination, hostilities could begin only after February 17). But it is very important to state that in this case, too, the Germans set themselves only limited military goals, more tactical than strategic. Informing the decisions of the meeting to the director of the Press Department of the Foreign Office, Deputy Secretary of State von Radowitz wrote: "After the end of the armistice, military operations must be undertaken,

aimed at restoring order and tranquility in the areas adjacent to the areas occupied by us ... Operations should serve to secure our borders in such a way that they can be guarded with the help of small contingents of troops, thereby freeing troops for the West" (ibid., p. 329).

The same can be said about their political goals - the Germans were not only for keeping the Bolsheviks in power, but also against supporting any anti-Bolshevik movement in Russia.

After this long historical digression, let us return to the congress again.

Reports on the question of the new program of the party were made by the same first speakers:

Lenin - a report, and Bukharin - a co-report. There were no fundamental disagreements either between the speakers or between the speakers in the debate. Some disagreements raised two questions - about renaming the RSDLP (b) into the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks / RCP (b) / and about the characteristics of socialism (communism) on the basis of the withering away of the state. The question of renaming the party was raised in the April Theses of 1917. Lenin motivated his proposal as follows: "Instead of 'Social Democracy,' whose official leaders all over the world have betrayed socialism by going over to the bourgeoisie..., we should call ourselves the Communist Party" (Lenin, 4th ed. vol. 24, p. 6). At the congress, Lenin substantiated this proposal with two more arguments - firstly, Marx and Engels also called their party communist (the famous "Manifesto of the Communist Party"), secondly, the term "communist" instead of "social democratic" is not only more accurate in a scientific sense, but at the same time points to the ultimate goal of the party (the construction of communism). In addition, Lenin considered that the name "Social Democrat" was stained by the leaders of the Second International and that from now on he wanted to drop this "dirty old shirt". Steklov, a prominent figure in the party, came out most sharply against Lenin. He said that he "strongly protests against the change of name and proposes to keep our old glorious name RSDLP", adding the word "communists" in brackets instead of the accidental word "Bolsheviks". When two proposals, Lenin's and Steklov's, were voted on, Lenin received the majority of the votes, especially since Bukharin supported Lenin ("UP Extraordinary Congress of the RCP(b)", pp. 156-158).



Lenin, even in his writings on imperialism before the revolution of 1917, insistently argued that every great war is necessarily the source of the proletarian revolution. In his report on the program of the party, already in the conditions of the victory of the communist dictatorship in Russia, Lenin considered it necessary to remind the party of this doctrine of his and introduce it into the new program. Referring to the work of Engels in 1887, Lenin said:

“Unlike people who distort Marxism ... that socialism cannot be on the basis of ruin, Engels understood perfectly well that any war, even in any advanced society, creates not only ruin, savagery, torment, disasters among the masses who will drown in the blood that it is impossible to guarantee that this will lead to socialism, he says that it will be: “either the victory of the working class, or the creation

conditions that make this victory possible and necessary,” and that the war creates the conditions for the proletariat “to take power into its own hands” (ibid., p. 140).

As is known, the Communist Party of China even today consistently preaches this doctrine of Lenin about the connection between the great war and the communist revolution, in contrast to the CPSU, which, after the 20th Congress, shows hesitation and zigzags on this issue (and this is understandable, because the result of a thermonuclear war, contrary to optimism Beijing, there would be no revolution, but self-destruction of mankind).

A serious disagreement between Lenin and Bukharin caused Bukharin's proposal to define socialism (communism), namely in the sense of how this system, which the Communists hope, will look like in practice. Further, since with the victory of socialism (communism) the state withers away, then fix in the program the pace of the process of the withering away of the state. Lenin rejected these proposals. He did not succumb to the temptation to fantasize about the future socialist society, in the name of which, in fact, power was seized. As much as he highly valued power, so little did he appreciate its social consequences. But in one respect, Lenin fantasized willingly - this is about the fate of the Soviet state. Today, reading Lenin's fantasy on this subject, one is simply surprised to what absurdities such a master of revolution could agree to. Here is what Lenin said in his objection to Bukharin:

“When else will the state begin to wither away? Until then, we will have time to gather more than two congresses (congresses then met annually according to the Charter. - A. A.) to say:

look how this state is dying away” (ibid., p. 162).

This Leninist fantasy, based, of course, on the statements of Marx and especially Engels, was considered official dogma in the CPSU until such a sober master of power as Stalin threw it overboard. An inimitable “dialectician”, Stalin in 1933 stated clearly and unequivocally:

“The withering away of the state will come not through the weakening of state power, but through its maximum strengthening” (Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma*, 1947, p. 394).

By the end of the debate, Lenin proposed that the Central Committee be instructed to draw up the final text of the new program. The congress did not accept this proposal, but preferred to create a special program commission on behalf of the congress. It was decided to create a commission of seven people. When Stalin's name was named among the candidates for the commission, Uritsky, a member of the Central Committee, challenged him, arguing that he did not know any of Stalin's program articles, and suggested that Karl Radek be included in the commission instead of Stalin. The presiding Sverdlov, who had always been on strained terms with Stalin, nevertheless supported Stalin's candidacy, declaring that Stalin was the author of articles on the national question. 9 people were nominated. The voting results are interesting as indicators of the popularity of each of the party leaders as party theorists.

Voted:

for Lenin -37

for Trotsky -37

for Bukharin -36

for Smirnov - 32

for Zinoviev - 30

for Sokolnikov - 25

for Stalin - 21

("UP Congress of the RCP(b)", p. 163)

This seven was elected to the program commission so that it would present its project for the US to the party congress in 1919.

The last item on the agenda of the congress was the election of a new composition of the Central Committee.

The chairman of the congress, Sverdlov, proposed reducing the number of members of the Central Committee to 15 people. He motivated this proposal by the fact that the old composition of the Central Committee was too cumbersome (first 21, then 24 people) and that he had never met in such a composition, and "already in the October period, things reached the point that 9-12 people became the norm" (ibid., p. 164). Therefore, Sverdlov believed that 15 members of the Central Committee was the "most convenient" norm. This proposal undoubtedly came from Lenin and his supporters, who wanted to secure a secure majority in the Central Committee. But, on the other hand, Lenin guessed that the failure to include the leaders of the "left communists" in the Central Committee could lead to a split in the party, which he wanted to avoid for tactical reasons.

Having guessed Lenin's tactics, the "Left Communists" declared that in the interest of creating the "homogeneous Central Committee" that Lenin wanted, they generally refused to enter the new Central Committee. On this question Bukharin, Lomov and Uritsky made statements about their refusal to join the Central Committee. Lenin, however, quickly noticed the danger and retreated. He insisted that some of the "Left Communists", some as members (Bukharin, Krestinsky, Dzerzhinsky), others as candidates (Lomov, Uritsky, Ioffe), be included in the Central Committee even against their will. Lenin said:

"Lomov extremely wittily referred to my speech in which I demanded that the Central Committee be capable of pursuing a uniform line. This does not mean that everyone in the Central Committee has the same conviction. Thinking like that would mean going to a split... I was also

v

The Central Committee was in a position where it was accepting a proposal not to sign peace, and was silent, not in the least closing its eyes to the fact that I was responsible for this

Not

I accept" (ibid., p. 167). Then Lenin pointedly added: "An attempt must be made to find some kind of bridle in order to make leaving the Central Committee out of fashion" (ibid., p. 167).

Lenin forgot that it was he, Lenin, who twice resorted to the same "fashion" to threaten to leave the Central Committee when he remained in the minority - the first time was on September 29, 1917 (see Lenin, PSS, vol. 34, p. 282 -283) and a second time on February 23, 1918 ("Protocols

Central Committee...", p. 211). But now, when his opponents resort to the same "fashion", then He

wanted to find a "bridle" against them. And he found her. He made a proposal unprecedented in the practice and history of political parties:

"Regarding the refusal of the "Left Communists" to enter the Central Committee. Congress believes that the rejection of

entry into the Central Committee, in the present state of the party, is especially undesirable... Therefore, the congress... conducts elections without regard for this statement" ("UP Extraordinary Congress of the RCP (6b)", p. 178).

Lenin's proposal was accepted by a majority of votes. After that, the voting of lists of members and candidate members of the Central Committee began. In total, there were 44 delegates with a decisive vote in the hall. Of these, ten delegates refused to vote for Lenin and for the composition of the Central Committee, which he proposed (the lists were formally announced by Solovyov). Voting was by note - there were 39 valid votes and 5 invalid votes ("white notes"). The vote count showed the following results:

Members of the Central Committee: Lenin - 34, Trotsky - 34, Sverdlov - 33, Zinoviev - 33, Bukharin - 32, Sokolnikov - 32, Stalin - 32, Krestinsky - 32, Smilga - 29, Stasova - 28, Lashevich

27, Schmidt - 26, Dzerzhinsky - 26, Vladimirov - 24, Sergeev - 23.

Central Committee candidates: Ioffe - 24, Kiselev - 20, Winter - 20, Uritsky - 19, Stuchka - 24, Petrovsky - 23, Lomov - 21, Shlyapnikov - 22 (ibid., p. 170).

Thus, Lenin managed to create such a Central Committee, in which the opposition, although it was represented, could not have a decisive influence (three people in the membership and three people in the candidate composition).

The congress adopted one extremely important addition to the resolution on war and peace. This addition is still considered to be the party's valid law and therefore was included in the codification of the CPSU resolutions of 1970 v. (see "CPSU in resolutions", part D, 1970, p. 27). Here is her text:

"The congress especially emphasizes that the Central Committee is given the authority to break all peace treaties with the imperialist and bourgeois states at any moment, as well as to declare war on them" ("UP Extraordinary Congress of the RCP (6b)", p. 176).

If Lenin had used this unique right in that pre-atomic era, it would not yet have threatened the death of civilization. What will happen if some new dictator of the CPSU uses it in our thermonuclear era? Until the Central Committee of the CPSU cancels this terrible decision at its regular or emergency congress, the Kremlin's talk about "peaceful coexistence" cannot be recognized as sincere.

Another addition, although introduced by Lenin, was in glaring contradiction with the main principles of his doctrine of the party. This addition stated that the group of "Left Communists", even while remaining in the Central Committee, could have its own position and not be responsible for the line of the Central Committee ("CPSU in resolutions", part T, 1954, p. 406). Thus, for the first time in the history of Bolshevism, freedom of opinion was legalized not only in the party, but freedom of opinion and, most importantly, freedom of factions or groups.

V

composition of the Central Committee.

Only two years later - in 1921 at the Tenth Congress - Lenin, realizing what a catastrophic mistake he had made here, just in the core of his own

doctrine of discipline and solidity of the party, corrected his mistake. Moreover. He introduced a permanent state of siege in the party, which exists to this day.

In response to the adoption of a separate peace, the Left SRs withdrew from the Soviet government. The old officer corps in the southeast and in Siberia raised the banner of the struggle for the liberation of Russia from the Germans and the Bolsheviks. The civil war began. A White Volunteer Army was created, headed first by Alekseev, Kornilov, and then Denikin, Kolchak, Yudenich, Wrangel ...

All the political parties of Russia, from the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks, the Cadets, to the monarchists, have come out against the unprecedented shameful capitulation of Russia since the time of Ivan the Terrible.

What was the attitude of the Kaiser's Germany to the outbreak of the civil war? Of course, she was on the side of the Bolsheviks.

Four months after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in the midst of the civil war - on July 2, 1918 - under the chairmanship of Wilhelm II, a meeting of the highest political and military leaders of Germany was held, dedicated to Germany's tactics and policy in the Russian civil war. The rapporteur on this issue is the same Ludendorff. He says that "the position of the Bolsheviks has been greatly weakened, and the influence of the monarchist elements has grown considerably. The possibility of a coup at any moment must be reckoned with." The Reich Chancellor joins this assessment, emphasizing that he doubts that the monarchists will recognize the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The formidable dilemma for Germany became more and more clear - whom to support in this historical battle: the Bolsheviks or the "monarchists" (the Germans then considered all Russian anti-Bolsheviks to be monarchists). The monarch Wilhelm and the monarchist Ludendorff, for all their deep hatred of Bolshevism, nevertheless made a choice against the monarchists in favor of the Bolsheviks. The meeting adopted Ludendorff's point of view, which read: "Even if the monarchists are supporters of order (Og4pandze] etesche), we still should not make attempts to overthrow the Bolsheviks at the present time" ("Soviet-German Relations", *ibid.*, p. 567).

The assassination of the German ambassador in Moscow, Mirbach, on July 6, 1918, showed how this position of support for the Bolsheviks turned out to be a firm and far-calculated policy. Even in this case, Berlin limited itself to demanding that a battalion of German soldiers be sent to Moscow to guard the German embassy. The Soviet ambassador in Berlin, Ioffe, on behalf of Lenin, easily convinced the imperial government that such a measure would lead to the overthrow of the Bolsheviks, especially since in Moscow the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries had already raised an uprising against the Bolsheviks, and the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Front, Socialist-Revolutionary Muravyov, had ordered the movement of troops against Moscow against Lenin's regime. The Germans took back their demand. Lenin was saved for the second time by the Germans.

Here it is necessary to dwell a little on the fate of those who paved the way for the Bolsheviks to power - on the fate of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. A more formidable enemy for Lenin after the seizure of power was not the Mensheviks, but the Socialist-Revolutionaries - the ideologists of the Russian peasantry. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels viewed the peasantry as a reactionary force. The same was the attitude towards the peasantry and the early Lenin. But

the revolution of 1905 convinced him that the peasantry was a very explosive class, the skillful use of which could bring him to power. No one was so afraid of the success of P. A. Stolypin's "agrarian reforms" as Lenin. Lenin was well aware that the peasantry would cease to be an explosive force in the revolution if Stolypin succeeded in transforming it from a communal rebel with little land into a well-to-do owner on his own land. Lenin, not without gloating, noted the modesty of Stolypin's successes (because of the opposition of both reactionaries and

revolutionaries). Using the private property, petty-bourgeois instinct of the peasants for a revolution against all private property - such is Lenin's goal.

Proceeding from this, Lenin developed the doctrine of the workers' and peasants' revolution "under the hegemony of the proletariat." In the interests of such a revolution, the most anti-communist demands of the peasantry must be supported, but Lenin, like Marx, does not forget that he is dealing with a reactionary force. That is why Lenin wrote at the height of the first Russian revolution:

"First, we support to the end, by all means, until the confiscation (land of the landowners. - A. A.), - the peasant in general against the landowner, and then ... we support the proletariat against the peasant in general" (Lenin, 4th ed. t 9, p. 213).

The ideal of Lenin's agrarian program is the "nationalization of the land", while the Socialist-Revolutionaries preached the "socialization of the land", that is, the transfer of land into the hands of local peasant committees for division among the peasants (the Mensheviks demanded the "municipalization of the land").

The February Revolution convinced the Bolsheviks of the futility of their slogan "nationalization of the land." Not a single elected Bolshevik deputy was present at the T All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Soviets in June 1917. The entire congress was held under the banner and leadership of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Quickly orienting himself in the situation, at this congress Lenin essentially delivered a pro-SR speech, and three months later, at the 2nd Congress of Soviets in the days of the October Revolution, he committed, as we have already pointed out, a plagiarism unprecedented in the history of political parties: he proposed to the 2nd Congress on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party Bolsheviks agrarian program of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Therefore, the Second Congress of Soviets, with the votes of the Bolsheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, also sanctioned the coup of the Bolshevik Party.

Lenin's acceptance of the Socialist-Revolutionary agrarian program best characterizes the tactical flexibility of Leninism, bordering on unscrupulousness in ideology, when the interests of seizing power require it. Even before the February Revolution, Lenin wrote that "the program (of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. - A. A.) is something absolutely lifeless, internally contradictory" (Lenin, 3rd ed., vol. VSH, p. 257), "The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries is deprived any social basis. It does not rely on any social class" (ibid., vol. U, p. 132), "the Socialist-Revolutionary Party is in essence nothing but a faction of bourgeois democracy ... eclectically uniting the latest

opportunism and old-fashioned populism" (ibid., p. 362).

In addition to Lenin, the Great Soviet Encyclopedia lapidarily testified: "Even before the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Socialist Revolutionaries became a counter-revolutionary bourgeois party - (BSE, 1st ed., vol. 52, p. 289).

Here, from this "counter-revolutionary bourgeois party", Lenin not only takes the entire agrarian "counter-revolutionary" program without a single Bolshevik amendment, but also defends it against those who criticized the Bolsheviks for such an "open daytime robbery" by Lenin of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, as N. Sukhanov wrote about it.

Speaking with the report "Decree on Land" on October 26, 1917, Lenin said: "Voices are heard here that the decree itself and the mandate were drawn up by socialist revolutionaries. Let it be. Doesn't it matter who compiled it... Whether it's in our spirit or in the spirit of the Socialist-Revolutionary program - that's not the point" (Lenin, 3rd ed., vol. KhP, p. 23).

The bottom line is that Lenin was convinced that the road to power lies through the adoption

programs of the "counter-revolutionary bourgeois party" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

If the resourcefulness of Lenin, capitulating ideologically in order to win politically, is quite understandable, then the helplessness and primitivism of party historians is striking when it is necessary to explain why Lenin not only accepted the agrarian program of this Socialist-Revolutionary "counter-revolutionary bourgeois party", but also formed a coalition Soviet government with it (November 1917-March 1918). (On the issue of attitudes towards the Bolshevik coup, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party split in November 1917 into two parties - the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, headed by Viktor Chernov, and the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, headed by Maria Spiridonova). Of course, on Lenin's part, this was not a marriage of love, or even a marriage of convenience. He was, as we have seen, imposed on him by the right wing of the Central Committee headed by Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, Nogin. Lenin from the very beginning stood for the point of view of creating one-party power. Forced to compromise, he waited for an opportune moment to throw the Left SRs out of his government. He didn't have to do this. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves withdrew from the government when Lenin concluded the Brest Separate Peace. But they remained in the Soviets both in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and in the localities. They not only remained, but also began to significantly strengthen their positions in the local Soviets. In the elections to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets (July 1918), despite the monopoly of the one-party dictatorship of the Bolsheviks in local executive committees, despite the high art of political demagoguery of the Bolshevik propaganda machine, despite all the tricks and fakes that this machine resorted to, out of 1164 delegates the congress of Bolsheviks or their sympathizers turned out to be 773 people, the rest of the delegates were distributed as follows: Left Social Revolutionaries - 370 people, Menshevik Internationalists - 4, anarchists - 4, other non-party or party anti-Bolsheviks - 13. At such a congress, Lenin could not still feel complete owner. When the Left Socialist-Revolutionary faction introduced a resolution condemning foreign (separate peace, collaboration with the Germans) and domestic politics (terror, the introduction of the death penalty), the Bolsheviks staged the most

the wild obstruction of the Socialist-Revolutionary orators in order to provoke the departure of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries from the congress hall, which they achieved (it took place in the building of the Bolshoi Theater). Taking advantage of this, as Lenin's Soviet commentator candidly writes, the congress "'adopted a unanimous decision' on all questions in the spirit of the Bolsheviks" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 36, pp. 628-629).

Then there are events that many historians in the West consider "mysterious", but they seem mysterious because they are controlled by the experienced hand of the conspirator - the hand of Lenin. Of course, as long as Bolshevik power exists on the territory of the USSR, we will never know about the details of the "mysterious events". But, as always in such cases, the question must be raised: who benefited from these events? In the context of the outbreak of a civil war with the Whites, Lenin needed to consolidate his power, and for this it was necessary to get rid of the last competitor

and the most dangerous enemy within the Soviets - the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party. But in view of the still exceptional influence of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries among the peasants and partly among the urban population, it

was necessary to find a pretext that would immediately and drastically simplify Lenin's play with fire. And such an offer was found. The operational representative of the Cheka, who was responsible for ensuring the security of the diplomatic corps in Moscow, Blumkin killed the German ambassador in Moscow, Count Mirbach, on July 6, 1918. In his pocket was a personal identity card signed by the head of the Cheka, Dzerzhinsky, but the Soviet government, without denying Blumkin's official position, announced, however, that he was acting on behalf of the Left SRs in order to provoke a war between Germany and Russia. There was no investigation yet, except for the fact that Blumkin was identified as an employee of the Cheka, but Lenin already the next day, July 7, "knows" that the murder was committed on behalf of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Two documents of Lenin dated July have survived: one is an interview with the Izvestia newspaper (why

such a rush?), the other is Stalin's telegram to Tsaritsyn. Both documents clearly show that the murder of Count Mirbach is needed not by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but by Lenin. In an interview, Lenin reports that "a gray, illiterate old woman, indignant, said about the murder of Mirbach: "Look, damned ones, they pushed us into the war!" The old woman does not yet know who these "damned ones" are, but Lenin knows for sure, even without investigation: "Everyone immediately clearly understood and appreciated that after the Socialist-Revolutionary terrorist

act Russia was on the verge of war. That is how the masses of the people assessed the action of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 36, p. 519). After the suppression of the uprising of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, Ya. G. Blyumkin went over to the Bolsheviks, in the same 1918 he was sent to the front, where he joined the Bolshevik Party ("Vo ma MTo sh (Te 9558").

In the second document - in a telegram to Stalin, who was in Tsaritsyn - the order was already given to open mass terror against the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries everywhere: "Everywhere it is necessary to ruthlessly suppress these pathetic and hysterical adventurers ... So, be merciless against the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and inform more often" ("Pravda, January 21, 1936).

Stalin replied in Stalin's style: "Be sure that our hand will not waver..."

(Stalin, Works, vol. 4, p. 118). There was no need for this assurance.\*) Blyumkin killed Mirbach on July 6, but Lenin knows already on July 7 that he was killed by the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Nikolaev killed Kirov on December 1, 1934, and Stalin on the same December 1 knows that he was killed by the Zinovievites, Trotskyites, Bukharinites ... At the Twentieth Congress, we learned that Kirov was killed by Yagoda's Chekists on Stalin's orders, on whose orders Dzerzhinsky's Chekists killed Mirbach? Only later historians will give an exhaustive answer to this question, but now it is important to note the following: regardless of the fact who organized the assassination of Mirbach and what his motives could be, the assassination under the prevailing conditions was necessary not for the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, but for the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks. In addition, in politics, it is not the motives that are important, but the consequences. The consequences were not long in coming - on the same July 6, the Bolsheviks arrested the entire faction of the Left Social Revolutionaries at the congress, headed by Spiridonova. In response to this, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who remained at liberty seized a telegraph office, a telephone exchange, and one of the detachments of the Cheka troops, headed by deputy Dzer-

\*) Not only did Stalin's hand not waver, but, using Lenin's authority, he launched such an orgy of terror in Tsaritsyn that the funeral squad of the Chekists did not have time to bury the victims of the firing squad. Having learned this,

Lenin suggested to Stalin that the fire should be "moderated". Here is a confession published for the first time in 1970: "When Stalin shot in Tsaritsyn, I thought it was a mistake, I thought that they were shooting wrong. My mistake was revealed, after all, I telegraphed: Be careful" ("Leninsky collection", XXHUP, Moscow, 1970, p. 136).

Zhinsky - by the Left Socialist-Revolutionary D.I. Popov (although the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries left the government, some of them still remained in the command staff of the army and the Cheka) seized the residence of the Cheka and arrested Dzerzhinsky and his other deputy, Latsis. Lenin threatened to shoot the entire Socialist-Revolutionary faction at the congress if Dzerzhinsky was not released. He was released, but the Left SRs remained in prison.

From. The Brest "obscene" peace was saved by Lenin by those whom he stabbed in the back with his separate peace: Russia's Western allies - France, England and America - forced Germany to capitulate (there was a revolution, the Kaiser abdicated). November 13, 1918 Moscow annulled the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

## Chapter 17

### LENIN, THE OPPOSITION AND THE US CONGRESS

Soviet Russia could annul the Brest Separate Peace only as a result of Germany's capitulation to the Western powers, but still the Bolsheviks believed that Germany's capitulation "had some negative significance" ("History of the CPSU (6). Short Course", 1953, p. 220). The Bolsheviks saw this negative meaning in the fact that henceforth the powers of the Entente were turning into "the dominant force in Europe and Asia", which, unlike the Germans, could hold

course towards the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime. "The Entente governments decided to launch a military intervention to overthrow the Soviet power," says the above-cited Stalinist textbook (p. 215).

Quite reasonable - the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime through intervention - the Bolsheviks presented as quite inevitable. However, the Entente powers never set themselves the goal of overthrowing the Bolshevik rule by way of a new war.

Mortal danger for the regime emerged from within when, in response to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, a civil war broke out in Russia simultaneously in different regions (albeit without leadership from one center) - in the North, on the Volga, in Siberia, on

North Caucasus, on the Don. Two armies of anti-Bolsheviks turned out to be especially dangerous - the army of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia and the army of General Denikin in the North Caucasus, which slowly but successfully moved towards Moscow.

Under these conditions, the USSh Party Congress took place (March 18-23, 1919), which was devoted to the development of the political and military strategy of the Bolsheviks in the civil war. The congress was attended by 301 delegates with a decisive vote and 102 with an advisory vote (it is interesting to note that representatives of the Menshevik-internationalists from the Martov group were present at the congress with an advisory vote, on whose behalf Lozovsky delivered a greeting to the congress).

The following items were on the agenda of the congress:

Central Committee report.

Adoption of a new party program.

Creation of the Communist International. . Martial law and military policy.

Work in the village.

Organizational matters.

Central Committee elections.

Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Pyatakov, Evdokimov, Smidovich and Preobrazhensky were elected to the Presidium of the Congress. Rykov, Bukharin and Stalin were also put forward from the seats. Bukharin and Rykov withdrew their candidacies, but Stalin did not withdraw, but did not pass the vote. Trotsky was not included in the presidium because he was at the front.

Kamenev participated in this congress for the first time after his resignation from the Central Committee in November 1917 (he then insisted on the creation of an all-Soviet government with the inclusion



there Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries). During the Brest crisis in the Central Committee, Kamenev actively supported Lenin against the "Left Communists". For this, Lenin pardoned him and even immediately introduced him to the presidium of the congress, while the "faithful" Stalin had to sit among the rank and file for the first time after the revolution (the vindictive Stalin never forgave even Ilyich!).

In the report of the Central Committee, Lenin once again emphasized the two most important theses of Bolshevism - that, firstly, only war gives rise to a revolution, and secondly, coexistence between democratic countries and Soviet Russia is absolutely

o h m m s no.

excluded. Lenin said:

"Kautsky used the expression that the Bolsheviks do not have socialism, but militarism, I chuckled and spread my hands. It is as if there really was at least one major revolution in history that was not connected with the war. Of course not! We live not only in a state, but also in a system of states, and the existence of a Soviet republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end, either one or the other will win. In the meantime, this end will come, a series of the most terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable" ("Eighth Congress of the RCP (6). Protocols, 1959, p. 17).

To solve this ultimatum dilemma in favor of the Bolshevik regime, Lenin proposed building and creating a powerful and disciplined Red Army with the help of "bourgeois specialists", that is, former tsarist officers. In the same way, Lenin proposed using the bourgeois technical intelligentsia hostile to Bolshevism for the construction of communism. He said: "We ... have to create a communist society with the hands of our enemies" (ibid., p. 20).

Lenin noted the success of Bolshevism in the international arena in the form of the creation in Moscow in March 1919 of the Communist International. He said that by sending former prisoners of war from there, recruited in Russian prisoner of war camps and instructed in the Central Committee of the party, to the rear of the countries of the West, we achieved that "Bacilli of Bolshevism captured these countries entirely" (ibid., p. 24).

Lenin devoted the last part of the report of the Central Committee to the organizational question. His main idea on organizational matters is expressed in the following words:

"Organizational activity has never been the strong side of the Russians in general and the Bolsheviks in particular, and yet the main task of the proletarian revolution is precisely the organizational task" (ibid., p. 24).

If we talk about the organizational technique of conspiracy of the Bolsheviks on the way to power or about the "technology of power" after the revolution, then this remark clearly contradicted historical facts. It was precisely this Party Congress that played an outstanding role in laying the foundation for that pyramid of power, unprecedented in history, which is called the "dictatorship of the proletariat." If the very basis of the foundations of the pyramid - the political police (CheKa) - was created on December 20, 1917, then the principles of organizing the armed forces of the dictatorship were approved at this congress. At the same congress, that unique leader of the dictatorship, which I call the "party within the party," that is, the hierarchy of the party apparatus, was finally constructed. This same congress also gave a comprehensive ideological justification for the goals and objectives of the dictatorship (the adoption of a new party program). Here we are present for the first time at the beginning of that painful, even tragic process of usurping the power of the Party and the Soviets in favor of the all-powerful

party apparatus. All the more great was the resistance of the party itself to this process. Until now, Lenin fought for the unquestioning of his personal authority.

inside and at the head of the Central Committee - now, after the relative achievement of this goal, he is fighting for the unquestioning authority of the Central Committee and the entire hierarchy of the party apparatus over the party. The Party, represented by its congresses, is beginning to offer resolute resistance to this. The expression of such resistance was the two oppositions: one on organizational questions, the other on military questions, which Lenin encountered at the US Congress. The "organizational opposition" at the congress was headed by N. Osinsky (Obolensky), and the "military opposition" by V. Smirnov (both joined the party in 1907).

Speaking as the first speaker on Lenin's report, Osinsky stated: "Comrade. Lenin at today's meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, in his speech dedicated to the memory of Sverdlov, pointed out that in an era of sharp struggle, exercising a workers' dictatorship, it is necessary to put forward the principle of personal authority, the moral authority of an individual, whose decisions everyone obeys without long discussions" (ibid., p. 28).

Osinsky argued that this very "philosophy of power" of an individual, put forward by Lenin, led in practice to the fact that the party and the country were ruled not by the Central Committee collegium, but by individual "authoritative personalities". He said: "We did not have a collegial, but an individual solution of issues ... The Central Committee, as a collegium, actually did not exist ... Questions were decided from case to case by authoritative comrades ... We need to achieve at this congress that we a Central Committee was born, which would represent a comradely collegium" (ibid.).

The organizational question was especially discussed at a meeting of the special section of the congress, at which Zinoviev made a report on behalf of the Central Committee, and Osinsky, who represented the Moscow provincial organization, made a co-report. Zinoviev reported the point of view of the leaders of the Central Committee that the party and its organs are not built on the principle of a federation of communist parties of the Soviet republics (Ukraine; Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania), but on the principle of the strictest centralization. The central committees of the communist parties of these republics enjoy only the rights of regional or provincial party committees in the RSFSR, and "all decisions of the highest party instance are absolutely binding on the lower ones" (ibid., p. 160), that is, the central committees of the republics, regional committees and provincial committees do not have the right to protest against the decisions of the Moscow Central Committee, but must unquestioningly implement them.

Co-rapporteur Osinsky repeated his old argument: the trouble is that there was and is no such Central Committee as collegiums, and there are only leaders who pursue not a party, but a personal policy. Osinsky asked: "In what way ... was the party policy determined?" His answer read: "Mostly so that t.t. Lenin and Sverdlov resolved the next issues by talking to each other ... all decisions were private decisions ... This explains the degeneration of the party that is taking place ... it is necessary to work the Central Committee on a large scale, it is necessary to introduce a sufficient number of workers there ... to accept the decision that the election of the Central Committee should be made after a thorough discussion of each individual candidate ... The Congress (the last. - A. A.) was given a list, it was voted on, and there were many decorative figures in it ... This is the root of evil.

The congress must put an end to the current state of affairs in the party" (ibid., pp. 166-167).

The delegate Ignatov found that bureaucratization was taking place in the party: "This bureaucratization of our organizations, this alienation from the masses must be overcome by our party," he said (ibid., p. 181). Salvation he saw in the democratization of the party from top to bottom. He added: "And although Ilyich has a head that is not on the whole

earth, it still needs people around this head" (ibid., p. 182).

The delegate Skrypnik also found that after Brest there was neither a collective opinion nor a collective leadership in the party. "I don't remember," he said, "issues, except for Brest, that would have been put up for discussion by the party ... the party discussed them only after they had already been resolved" (ibid., p. 175).

In his closing remarks, Zinoviev expressed the Central Committee's obvious dissatisfaction with the criticism that had unfolded at the congress against the party leadership. He said: "Much more conscientious and impartial criticism could be expected from the members of one's own party than that which was here" (ibid., p. 184).

The discussion of the question of the party apparatus ended with the creation of a commission of five people to work out a resolution. Speaker Zinoviev and counter-rapporteur Osinsky entered there.

At a meeting of the organizational section devoted to Soviet construction and relations between the party and the Soviets, Osinsky emphasized that there was no Soviet government as such. The most important issues of government policy were decided by a few people behind the back of the government itself. He said:

"At the moment, in essence, if we mean the Council of People's Commissars, there is no single government in our country. I had the honor of being a member of the Council of People's Commissars in November, December and January 17-18. At that time, the Council of People's Commissars discussed the main issues of policy... At the present time, this is not observed" (ibid., p. 192).

All this happened because the Central Committee, contrary to the Soviet Constitution, turned itself into the government of the country. Osinsky proposed, in order to restore Soviet legality, to include the majority of members of the Central Committee in the composition of the Soviet legal system.  
government.

Delegate Ignatov also pointed to the usurpation of state power by the Soviets by the party apparatus. He said that we started with the slogan "All power to the Soviets!", and "in the future, our construction went a little differently. We deviated from the original path ... We fixed certain provisions in the constitution, but then departed from these provisions ... Local congresses and councils are gradually losing the role that should rightfully belong to them ... We must not allow party organizations to appropriate functions of councils" (ibid., pp. 197-199).

Delegate Antonov expressed the same thought about the agony of the Soviets more succinctly: "We see that for some reason the Soviets are slowly beginning to die" (p. 200).

Sapronov, defending the theses of the opposition, added that "the opposition was not created

for the sake of opposition, but obviously life itself puts forward new needs, to which we must listen" (p. 201).

Lenin did not participate in the debate on the organizational question, but through the mouth of Zinoviev he made it clear that the Soviets were a screen, albeit an impressive one, and that the power was the Central Committee. The slogan "All power to the Soviets!" was now interpreted as the slogan "All the power of the Central Committee!". Addressing the opposition and recalling Lenin's doctrine of the party, Zinoviev said:

"The Council of People's Commissars spoke, but the Central Committee of the party decided. Should this be changed? No, don't. And if this is so, then all your theses fall down... In your reasonings the Central

Committee of the Party was absent, and therefore, I repeat, all the arguments of the opposition fall down" (p. 222).

Zinoviev's theses were accepted as the basis by the majority of the congress. The final resolution of the congress "On the organizational question" approved the principles of party building, according to which the party and the state were led by party committees of each level. For the first time, the governing bodies of the Central Committee, created back in January-February 1919, were legally fixed - the Politburo of 5 members of the Central Committee for making political decisions between the plenums of the Central Committee and the Orgburo of 5 members of the Central Committee for making organizational decisions; in addition, the Secretariat of the Central Committee was created from one executive secretary, a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee and five technical secretaries. Under the Secretariat, an apparatus of the Central Committee is created from different departments. The number of members of the Central Committee increased from 15 to 19 people.

A concession was also made to the opposition when the same resolution stated that "under no circumstances should the functions of party collectives be confused with the functions of state bodies, which are the Soviets. The party must carry out its decisions through Soviet organs, within the framework of the Soviet constitution. The Party is trying to direct the activities of the Soviets, but not to replace them" (ibid., p. 429).

This was a tactical maneuver on Lenin's part. Going to this forced concession of the opposition part of the congress, Lenin did not even think of allowing a new "dual power" in the country - the power of the Party and the power of the Soviets. According to his conception, there could be only one supreme power: the unified and indivisible power of the Central Committee. Since even in the party elite, represented by the congress, illusions about democracy, people's power, and all-powerful Soviets were still fresh, one had to reckon with them and maneuver accordingly.

The "military opposition" at the congress, directed against the military policy of Lenin and Trotsky, turned out to be very strong in numbers, very dangerous in composition. This opposition arose even before the US Congress, in the autumn of 1918. Its immediate goal is to quarrel Lenin with Trotsky, its further goal is to topple Trotsky as the leader of the Red Army, so that later it would be easier to talk with Lenin. Representatives of the "military opposition" spoke at local party conferences with sharp criticism of Trotsky. Even the Pravda newspaper published articles criticizing Trotsky's military policy and military leadership (Pravda of November 29 and December 25, 1918).

The "military opposition" was encouraged and secretly led by Stalin, but, according to

Trotsky, "Stalin behaved, however, in such a way that at any moment he could jump back" (L. Trotsky, "My Life", part P, p. 173). Stalin's mouthpiece in the "military opposition" was Voroshilov, who commanded the Tsaritsyn Front, and Stalin was from June 1918 a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of this front. Inside the Central Committee and in his correspondence with Lenin, Stalin not only did not hide the fact that he supported the "military opposition", but also made many arguments about the viciousness of Trotsky's military policy (see Stalin's military letters and telegrams of the period 1918-1919, Stalin, Works, vol. 4, 1947). In the "biographical chronicle" of Stalin to the 4th volume of his "Works" it is said: "October 8 (1918) I. V. Stalin and K. E. Voroshilov send a telegram to V. I. Lenin demanding that the Central Committee discuss the issue of Trotsky's actions, threatening the collapse of the Southern Front" (Stalin, Works, vol. 4, p. 453).

How does Lenin react? When the intrigue against Trotsky began to take on a character dangerous to the regime, Lenin decided to respond. The resolution of the Central Committee of December 26, 1918, written by Lenin, says:

"The policy of the military department, like all other departments and institutions, is conducted on the exact basis of the general directives given by the party in the person of its Central Committee and under its direct control" (Pravda, December 26, 1918).

It was then that the "military opposition" decided at the UP congress to speak out against Lenin as well.

and against Trotsky. In order to correctly assess the actions of the opposition, we must dwell on the coverage of its prehistory.

As early as 1930, Trotsky, in his memoirs *My Life*, first published documents of the Central Committee and Lenin's letters, convincingly proving that the "military opposition" is Stalin's party guard in his beginning struggle against Trotsky (these documents have not yet been published in THE USSR). Here is Trotsky's short story:

"Opposition on the military question took shape already in the first months of the organization of the Red Army. Its main provisions boiled down to upholding the elective principle, to protests against the involvement of specialists, against the introduction of iron discipline, against the centralization of the army ... A special place in the Red Army and the military opposition was occupied by Tsaritsyn, where military workers grouped around Voroshilov ... Stalin for several months spent in Tsaritsyn. He combined his behind-the-scenes struggle against me, which already then constituted an essential part of his activity, with Voroshilov's home-grown opposition ... Stalin behaved, however, in such a way that at any moment he could rebound. Complaints from the main and front command against Tsaritsyn were received daily. It is impossible to achieve the execution of the order ... it is impossible even to get an answer to the request. Lenin followed the development of this conflict with anxiety. He knew Stalin better than I did and suspected, obviously, that the stubbornness of the tsaritsyns was due to Stalin's backstage direction ... On October 4, 1918, I spoke directly to Lenin and Sverdlov: "I categorically insist on Stalin's recall. I leave Voroshilov in command of the tenth (Tsaritsyn) army subject to submission to the commander of the Southern Front ... There is no time for diplomatic negotiations." Stalin was recalled. On October 23, Lenin writes to me: "Stalin would very much like to work for

On the Southern Front... Stalin hopes that he will be able to convince him of the correctness of his views at work... In informing you, Lev Davydovich, of all these statements by Stalin, I ask you to consider them and answer, firstly, do you agree to explain yourself personally with Stalin, for which he agrees to come, and secondly, do you think it is possible, on certain specific conditions, to eliminate previous frictions and establish joint work, which Stalin so desires. As for me, I believe that every effort must be made to establish joint work with Stalin. Lenin "" (L. Trotsky, *"My Life"*, part P, pp. 169, 171-177).

Trotsky agreed to a compromise and to the appointment of Stalin as a member of the Revolutionary Council of the Southern Front, whose headquarters was in Kharkov. Voroshilov was also transferred there, at the request of Trotsky. But even there, Stalin and Voroshilov continue the "Tsaritsyn" line of disobedience to the orders of the High Command (Voroshilov himself cited documents, how Stalin imposed a resolution on other orders of the High Command: "Do not take into account"! See K. Voroshilov, *"Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR"*, 1951, p. 27).

Therefore, on January 10, 1919, Trotsky telegraphed Sverdlov: "I declare in a categorical form that the Tsaritsyn line, which led to the complete disintegration of the Tsaritsyn army, cannot be allowed in Ukraine ... The line of Stalin, Voroshilov and company means the death of the whole thing" (Trotsky, *"My Life"*, p. 177). Lenin finds that it is necessary to try again to reach a compromise with Stalin. In response to this demand, Trotsky telegraphs Lenin and Sverdlov on January 11, 1919:

"Compromise, of course, is needed, but not rotten. In fact, all the Tsaritsyn people gathered in Kharkov ... I consider Stalin's patronage of the Tsaritsyn current a most dangerous ulcer, worse than any treason and betrayal of military specialists. Trotsky" (*ibid.*, p. 177).

Trotsky concludes his documented account with the words:

"It is no wonder that military work has created quite a few enemies for me. I did not look around, pushed away with my elbow those who interfered with military success, or stepped on the corns of onlookers in a hurry and did not have time to apologize. There are people who remember all this. The dissatisfied and offended found their way to Stalin, partly to Zinoviev. They, too, felt offended. Each failure at the front caused an onslaught of the dissatisfied on Lenin. Behind the scenes, Stalin was already in charge of these machinations" (ibid., pp. 179-180).

Stalin and the "military opposition" correctly considered that in the struggle for the triumph of their line there was no other more reliable way than to oppose Trotsky to Lenin, in order to remove Trotsky with the help of Lenin, and then it would be easier to talk with Lenin (Bukharin: "Stalin and under Ilyich led underground passages", L. Trotsky, ibid., p. 184).

Deputy Chairman of the Cheka Menzhinsky, reporting to Trotsky on the work of the special departments of the Cheka in the army, informed him that Stalin "inspires Lenin and something else

to whom, that you are grouping people around you specifically against Lenin, "but when, during one of the conversations, Trotsky asked Lenin the question: "Is there really a particle of truth here? - I immediately noticed how excited Lenin was. Even blood rushed to his face. "It's nothing," he repeated, but hesitantly ... But I realized that Menzhinsky was not talking in vain. If Lenin denied without finishing, it was only because he was afraid of conflict, discord, personal struggle ... But Stalin clearly sowed evil seeds. Only much later did I become aware of how systematically he did this" (ibid., pp. 183-184).

Such was the inner-party and inner-army atmosphere when the military policy of Lenin-Trotsky was brought up for discussion at the congress.

The question naturally arises, why, in such a difficult and hostile atmosphere for Trotsky, when the fate of Trotsky's military leadership was literally at stake, did Trotsky decide not to attend the congress?

Was this not a tactical move by Lenin, so that, without irritating the opposition with the inevitably harsh response at the congress of Trotsky, it would be more correct to defend Trotsky's position in his absence? Trotsky does not give an answer to this. Stalinist historiography also avoided this issue. The new "History of the CPSU" gives an answer that surprises with its "non-party spirit". It says:

"Underestimating the importance of raising the military question at the congress, even before the congress, Trotsky filed a petition with the Central Committee that, in connection with the aggravation of the situation on the Eastern and on some other fronts, he and all military delegates should be sent to the active army. This proposal was opposed by delegates from front-line party organizations. It was clear to everyone that the solution of the military question could not be postponed. The plenum of the Central Committee agreed with the delegates ... Trotsky was allowed to go to the front, and he did not participate in the work of the congress" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book P, p. 276).

Let's get back to the convention.

At an open session of the congress, G. Sokolnikov, a member of the Central Committee, spoke as the rapporteur of the Central Committee on the question of the "martial law", and he outlined Trotsky's "theses of the report" approved by the Central Committee. The point of view of the "military opposition" was expressed by V. Smirnov, who acted as a co-rapporteur.

In order to correctly assess the weight and significance of the "military opposition", it is necessary to give some information about its leaders.

The "military opposition" was headed at the congress by:

V. Smirnov (party member since 1907, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Army);

A. Bubnov (member of the party since 1903, former and future member of the Central Committee, member of the Republican Revolutionary Military Council);

F. Goloshchekin (party member since 1903, member of the Central Committee in 1912-1917);

G. Safarov (party member since 1908, party leader of the 3rd army);

A. Alexandrov (member of the party since 1900, deputy commander of the North Caucasian military district);

A. Myasnikov (party member since 1906, former commander of the Western Front,

secretary of the MK RCP (6);

V. Sorin (party member since 1917, chairman of the Military Tribunal of the Eastern Front);

M. Rukhimovich (member of the party since 1913, one of the leaders of the Communist Party of Ukraine);

N. Tolmachev (party member since 1913, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army);

S. Minin (party member since 1905, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Cavalry Army);

R. Zemlyachka (party member since 1898, in 1917 secretary of the Moscow regional party committee, party leader of the 8th army);

G. Pyatakov (party member since 1910, head of the government of Ukraine);

Eat. Yaroslavsky (party member since 1898, head of the Military Organization of the Central Committee, secretary of the Central Committee in 1921);

K. Voroshilov (party member since 1903, commander of the Tsaritsyn Front, under which Stalin was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council).

(Let us immediately note in brackets that the fact that Stalin was the spiritual head of the "military opposition" is also proved by the fact that later, under Stalin's regime, all of them became either members of the Central Committee or the Central Control Commission, or held high positions in the state apparatus, but in during the "Great Purge" in 1936-1939 Stalin acted with them in the Stalinist way - not only the leaders, but also the ordinary members of the "military opposition" were shot, only Stalin saved the lives of his most faithful squires - Zemlyachka, Yaroslavsky and Voroshilov.)

Sokolnikov, outlining the military policy of the Central Committee, stated that the system of volunteer formation of the Red Army with elected command personnel had already become obsolete (following the fresh footsteps of the October Revolution and in fulfillment of its previous promises, the Bolshevik government adopted two decrees on December 16, 1917: 1) "On the elective beginning and on the organization of power in the army", 2) "On the equalization of all servicemen in rights" - now, having strengthened in power, the Central Committee canceled them). The period of volunteering in the army was, according to Sokolnikov, a period "when the state power could not actually lead the army", "in the end, a system of independent small detachments around individual leaders" (ibid., pp. 144-145). Now the time has come when it is necessary to create a large regular army, with the same subordination and discipline, with the massive use of dozens

thousands of tsarist military specialists.

When Lenin and Trotsky became convinced that neither by Soviet decrees, nor by soldiers' elections from non-commissioned officers or party agitators it was in any way possible to make commanders who knew their job, they threw aside all decrees on this subject and began to create a command staff from former tsarist officials appointed from above. officers (According to Trotsky, by the beginning of 1919 there were about 30 thousand such officers in the Red Army. - See Trotsky, "My Life", part P, p. 180.)

Justifying such a new military policy of the Central Committee, Sokolnikov noted: "We were in favor of election when we restored soldiers against the tops who served

to the tsarist, landowner and bourgeois regime... Now, under the regime of the proletarian dictatorship, to cancel the commanding staff that was appointed to it would mean passing a vote of no confidence in this power" ("Eighth Congress ...", p. 147).

Sokolnikov continued: "We are told: by returning former officers to the army, you are thereby restoring the former officers and the former army. But these comrades forget that next to the commander is a commissar, a representative of the Soviet government..." (ibid., p. 147).

Sokolnikov gave examples of the justification of the new military policy of the Central Committee: "It turned out that where military specialists were involved ... military success was achieved there. And vice versa, where ... military specialists sent from the center were sent back or put on a barge, as was the case in the Caucasian army, there we came to the complete disintegration and disappearance of the armies themselves ..." (ibid., p. 146) .

The rapporteur of the Central Committee also pointed to such a practice in the localities, when local communist cells and communists working as ordinary employees in army institutions try to take control and management of the army into their own hands. The leadership of the army can only be centralized. It can only come from the Central Committee, the Soviet government and its military organs.

Sokolnikov ended his report with an expression on behalf of the Central Committee of full confidence in and support for the line and methods of the military department. He said that "only if the military apparatus continues to be built using the methods that we have tried to carry out so far, if these methods are applied in those areas in which they have not yet been fully applied, only in this case, we can create a bulwark of communism out of the Red Army" (ibid., p. 152).

V. Smirnov, co-reporter from the "military opposition", argued that the former tsarist officer corps, recruited to serve in the Red Army, gravitates towards the White Guards by virtue of their origin and ideology. Therefore, its representatives often went over and will continue to go over to the side of the enemy. Meanwhile, the Soviet government appoints them to responsible command posts, granting them more rights than the political commissars under them. In this regard, Smirnov criticized the "Regulations" of the government "On the commander of the armies of the front" of December 12, 1918. These provisions stated that each army and front was headed by the Revolutionary Military Council. Its members, as well as the commanders of armies and fronts, are elected and approved by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. The army commander is granted complete independence in matters of a strategic and operational nature, as well as the right to appoint, move and dismiss from their posts the entire command staff of the troops, military departments and institutions of the army. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Army had the right to limit the power of the commander, except for issues of an operational nature and personnel of the troops, each time reporting its actions to the higher Revolutionary Military Council (all orders and orders of the army commander



must be signed by one of the members of the Revolutionary Military Council).

Smirnov found this order completely wrong. He said that in

In the "Regulations" of the Council of People's Commissars, "the commander of the army, front, etc., is given control of the army, while the political commissar is granted only the right in individual cases to cancel the decision of the army commander or front commander, reporting each such case to a higher institution. In operational matters, they (the commissars, - A.A.) do not have the right to do even this ... In a word, the role of the political commissar is limited to the functions of control" (ibid., pp. 155-156). He demanded that the Congress change this policy. He also criticized the Disciplinary Charter of the Red Army, published in January 1919. He found that this charter restores the old privileges of officers and infringes on the rights of the Red Army, establishing "petty regulation."

Summarizing his criticism of the organization and management of the army, Smirnov said: "Experience has shown that the participation of the commissar in management is necessary, it is impossible to be limited to the functions of control only ... members of the revolutionary councils must be given the right to have a decisive voice in the field of operational issues" (ibid., p. 157). He criticized the "extraordinary cumbersomeness of the central institutions" issuing conflicting orders. He demanded that "the most serious attention" be paid to the organization of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. The political departments in the army build their work on bureaucratic and not on collegiate principles. In a word, the Central Committee's military policy has so far been vicious - it needs to be reconsidered.

The presiding Zinoviev reported that 64 people signed up to speak in the debate. The official historian writes: "It was clear that great importance was attached to the issue and a heated discussion was ahead" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book P, 1968, p. 275). A "military section" of the congress was created, at three meetings of which 85 delegates participated, and 23 delegates spoke in the debate. Both Stalinist and post-Stalinist party historiography regarding the platform of the "military opposition" stubbornly and consistently preaches the point of view that the "military opposition" was directed not against the Central Committee, not against Lenin, but exclusively against Trotsky (See "History of the CPSU (6) Short course", p. 224, "History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book P, pp. 275-276).

This deliberate falsification became possible only because the materials of the entire discussion on the military policy of the Central Committee were excluded from the minutes when the Verbatim Record of the US Congress was published in 1919. This was quite natural in the context of the ongoing civil war in Russia, in order to prevent the enemy from orienting in the scale and nature of the rebellion of the military commissar elite of the party against Lenin and Trotsky. However, these materials of the "military section" and the plenary session of the congress, at which Lenin delivered a long speech, were not published even after the end of the war. Why? Here is Trotsky's answer:

"At the party congress, in my absence - I remained at the front - I spoke with a passionate defense of the military policy pursued by me against the criticism of the opposition. That is why the protocols of the military section of the UP of the Party Congress have not been published so far" (L. Trotsky, "My Life", part P, p. 181).

Here is the answer of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU in the preface to

new edition of the protocols of the UPG congress: "In view of the completely unprocessed secretarial notes, the materials on the fourth question ("Martial law and military policy") - a closed session of the congress held on March 21 - are not

are published"

and further on the materials of the section: "In view of the completely unprocessed secretarial records, the materials of the meetings of the military section held on March 20 and 21 are not published" ("Eighth Congress of the RCP (b.). Protocols", 1959, pp. UP, KhPO. V This argument about "raw secretary notes" is struck not so much by purposeful falsehood as by the very naive calculation of the authors of the preface that its readers are still ignorant of the history of the party and are deprived of any gift of critical thinking.

Meanwhile, any critically thinking reader has a question: why in the minutes of the US Congress the debates at the meetings of the organizational section and the agrarian section turned out to be verbatim in the most detailed way, but the "records" on such an important issue as the debate in the military section and speeches at the plenary session about Lenin's "military opposition" turned out to be "raw"? Even the complete collection of Lenin's works, published after Stalin's exposure, does not include this exceptionally important speech by Lenin, although the authors of the preface widely quote passages from Lenin's speech that are advantageous for their purpose (ibid., pp. XD/-XY).

The explanation must probably be sought not only in Lenin's "passionate defense" of Trotsky's military policy (this goes without saying), but in the distrust expressed by the military section of the congress to both Lenin and Trotsky. In defending Trotsky, Lenin defended himself. This follows even from the meager information published by the party publisher. Thus, in the "Notes" to the minutes of the US Congress we read: "As a result of the heated debate that unfolded at the meetings of the military section, on the afternoon of March 21, the majority (37 against 20) spoke out against the Central Committee and for the adoption of the theses of the "military opposition". Then the minority of the sections, which supported the point of view of the Central Committee, held a separate meeting and demanded that the discussion of this question be postponed to the plenum of the congress" (ibid., p. 539). The same is said in the multi-volume "History of the CPSU": "After a stormy debate, the majority of the section spoke in favor of the theses of the opposition proposed by Smirnov ... The congress delegates who defended the point of view of the PC ... left the meeting of the section" ("History of the 3, book P, p. 276).

Lenin, who up to now did not attach serious importance to the "military opposition" (hence why he signed up not with the "military section" but with the "agrarian section"), saw that things were taking an almost catastrophic turn, and vigorously set to work to subdue the opposition. He convened a closed meeting of the congress, at which a representative of the military department made a report on the situation on the fronts with an unforeseen report on the agenda. The speaker (S. Aralov) reported information that was still considered secret. The main piece of information was that the Red Army lacked up to 60% of military specialists (ibid., p. 276). With this argument, Lenin wanted to knock out of the hands of the opposition its main trump card - military specialists. It didn't produce

no impression on the opposition. Then Lenin himself spoke. As indicated, this speech was never published, but the official historian says that "Lenin spoke with a deep substantiation of the party line in the construction of a regular army. In his speech, a principled criticism of the "military opposition" was given... In the most decisive manner, Lenin refuted the accusations of the "military opposition" against the Central Committee" (ibid., p. 277).\*) Lenin did not limit himself to this. Knowing full well that Stalin and Zinoviev were flirting with the opposition behind his back, he forced them to speak at the same meeting defending Sokolnikov's (Trotsky's) theses and principled criticism of the "military opposition." They were forced to do this, although without any enthusiasm. Stalin said: "The project presented by Smirnov is unacceptable, since it can only undermine discipline in the army and exclude the possibility of creating a regular army" (Stalin, Works, vol. 4, p. 250).

After similar speeches by other members of the Central Committee, Lenin, in the deep conviction that he had finally disarmed the opposition, proposed that the theses of the Central Committee be voted at the congress.

and Smirnov's theses. The unexpected results of the voting at some point discouraged Lenin: 174 delegates voted for the theses of the Central Committee (Sokolnikov - Trotsky), 95 delegates voted for the theses of Smirnov, 3 abstained, did not participate in the vote

- 1. ("Eighth Congress of the RCP (6). Protocols", p. 273). With such a large, compact and

resolute opposition Lenin never dealt in history

\*) About Trotsky, Lenin declared: "When Comrade Goloshchekin spoke here, he said: the policy of the Central Committee is not carried out by the military department. If you make such accusations, if you, speaking as a responsible orator at a party congress, can accuse Trotsky of not

is pursuing the policy of the Central Committee - this is a crazy accusation. You will not give a shadow of arguments" ("Leninsky collection", XXKhUP, Moscow, 1970, p. 136).

Bolshevism. With all the more fury, he attacked the enemy. All types of weapons from Lenin's rich tactical arsenal were used: diplomacy, pressure, threats, and the tried and tested method of individual "treatment" of opposition leaders. Lenin carried out all this work in a fairly short time - during March 22 and 23. On March 22, the presiding Zinoviev announced that the bureau of the Central Committee and the presidium of the congress were making a proposal to the congress:

"We find that at the present moment an attempt should be made to seek rapprochement between yesterday's majority and the minority on such a fundamental question as the question of military policy ... We therefore propose that the Congress not now proceed to a detailed discussion of the resolution that was adopted as the basis (theses comrade Trotsky), but first submit the question to a commission of 5 members" (ibid., p. 273).

The Bureau of the Central Committee and the Presidium proposed the composition of the commission: from the majority - Stalin, Zinoviev and Pozern, and from the minority - Yaroslavsky and Safarov. Lenin could not have imagined a more suitable commission. Not so much the fate of the opposition as the careers of Stalin and Zinoviev were at stake. The "miracle" that Lenin had foreseen happened: the commission came to a "unanimous decision" on military policy. On March 23, Yaroslavsky reported the results of the commission's work to the congress:

"Since the congress laid the basis for the theses of Comrade Trotsky's report, the commission

First of all, after examining these theses, I found it necessary to introduce only editorial changes... when we, the congress members, spoke at the congress criticizing these theses of Comrade Trotsky, which Comrade Sokolnikov defended here, we pointed out that

We do not object in principle to such a formulation of the question as is contained in these theses" (ibid., p. 339).

This astonishing metamorphosis of the opposition, which two days ago "in a sharp and stormy debate" rejected at the military section the theses of Trotsky-Sokolnikov, and today finds it necessary to make "only editorial changes" in them, became possible because of the capitulation of Stalin and the leaders "military opposition", personally associated with him (Voroshilov, Yaroslavsky, Bubnov, Safarov and others). Stalin organized the "military opposition", and he dissolved it when he saw that Lenin had figured out his double game. The theses of Trotsky put to the vote with "editorial changes" of the conciliation commission were adopted by the congress unanimously, with one abstention (ibid., p. 340).

In his concluding speech, Lenin, not without pride, triumphed over the "military opposition":

"We came to a unanimous decision on the military issue. No matter how great the disagreements seemed at first, no matter how contradictory the opinions of many comrades were..., we succeeded extremely easily in the commission in arriving at an absolutely unanimous decision" (ibid., p. 346).

How he succeeded, Lenin did not tell, but we have already spoken about this above.

At the US Congress, a new (second) Party Program was discussed and adopted. This document had propaganda-tactical, least of all programmatic value. The new program was based on the well-known concept of Lenin from his work "Imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism." This work of Lenin, which claims to be a forecast of the future and is ranked by his adherents as a classic work of Leninism, turned out to be a synthesis of utopia and desire in historical verification.

The main idea of Lenin: capitalism, starting from the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, entered its last monopolistic decaying stage - the stage of financial capitalism, the stage of imperialism. Lenin wrote:

"The deepest economic basis of imperialism is monopoly... Like any monopoly, it gives rise to an inevitable tendency towards stagnation and decay. Insofar as monopoly prices are established, at least for a time, the incentives for technical, and consequently for any other progress, advance disappear to a certain extent; furthermore, in so far as it is the economic possibility to artificially retard technical progress... Monopoly, oligarchy, striving for dominance, exploitation of an increasing number of small and weak nations by a small handful of the richest and strongest nations - all this has given rise to those distinctive features of imperialism that make it necessary to characterize it as parasitic and decaying capitalism" (Lenin, *Sobr. soch.*, 3rd ed., vol. KhT, pp. 151, 171-172).

At this stage, capitalism has reached its highest economic and technical level, its zenith, its further development goes down, downhill, towards collapse, the era of inevitable imperialist wars begins and, as their result, the world revolution.

The way out: "only a communist revolution can lead mankind out of the impasse created by imperialism and imperialist wars" (From the Program of the Party, US Congress of the RCP(b), p. 393).

Lenin, who, like Marx and Engels, did not like or consciously avoided fantasizing what a socialist, communist community would look like in reality, willingly fantasized about the fate of capitalism. However, more than half a century of the technical and economic development of "decaying capitalism" and "progressive" socialism most clearly refuted Lenin's bold fantasy: the priorities of all the great inventions of the second industrial revolution (cybernetics, nuclear fission, electronics, etc.) belong to this "decaying capitalism" and not socialism. True, the CPSU is rightfully proud that the first man in space was a "Soviet communist" (there was a specific reason - the Kremlin offered its military engineers to invent a rocket that could reach the United States, and they "overfulfilled" the plan - they invented a rocket capable of fly into space). The "capitalists" blocked this Soviet success by sending a man to the moon.

Utopian was Lenin's doctrine of the "world revolution", set forth in

the same Program. The preamble to Lenin's Program solemnly proclaimed: "The era of the world proletarian, communist revolution has begun" (ibid., p. 390). As a result of this "world revolution", Lenin thought that one unified "World Soviet Republic" without borders would be created. (Lenin: "Perhaps we will have a common program when the World Soviet Republic is created," USS Congress of the RCP(b), p. 101).

However, even the Eastern European countries, where the communist regimes were brought from the USSR on the bayonets of the Red Army, did not want to form one "World Soviet Republic" with the USSR, not to mention the Asian communist states.

The theory of the withering away of the state, proclaimed by Marx and Engels, specially developed by Lenin in the book "State and Revolution" and fixed in the Leninist Program in the words turned out to be utopian: the fight against bureaucracy and "simplification of management functions with an increase in the cultural level of the working people lead to the destruction of state power" (ibid., p. 397).

The Soviet state has developed into a totalitarian superstate, in which the bureaucracy controls not only politics, administration, the national economy, distribution, culture and life, but also every movement of the Soviet person from the cradle to the grave. This is the only state in history that most strictly regulates the morality, feeling, taste, thought of its subject.

Not the state for the individual, but the individual for the state. Therefore, the absolute primacy of the state over man became the "philosophy of power" of the Soviet partocracy. Therefore, here the bureaucrat is not a servant of the people, but his master. This universal and unprecedented power goal required the creation of a universal and unprecedented bureaucracy.

It is quite natural that development therefore did not follow the path of "destruction of state power," as written in the Leninist Program, but, on the contrary, along the path of creating "state superpower." Stalin subsequently quite "dialectically" justified the rejection of the Marxist-Leninist utopian theory of the withering away of the state, declaring: "We will come to the withering away of the state not through the weakening of state power, but through its maximum strengthening" (Stalin, "Problems of Leninism", 1953, p. 429).

Lenin's Program also contained purely propagandist-opportunistic points calculated for a direct agitational effect. Let us recall once again that the UP congress took place in the conditions of a most dangerous civil war for the fate of the Soviet government, when the Bolsheviks needed the support of peasants, workers, "bourgeois specialists", non-Russian peoples and believers. For each of these classes, the Program promised:

1) To the peasantry: Lenin: "We do not allow any violence against the middle peasantry. Even in relation to the rich peasantry, we do not speak with such decisiveness as in relation to the bourgeoisie ... We are talking about suppressing their counter-revolutionary encroachments. This is not a complete expropriation" (ibid., p. 347); Program: agricultural communes (at that time the word "collective farm" did not yet exist) - "completely voluntary unions of farmers" (ibid., p. 405);

2) To the workers: "The trade unions must come to the actual concentration in their own hands of the entire management of the entire national economy, as a single economic entity" (ibid., p. 403);

3) To bourgeois specialists: "Higher remuneration for specialists,

so that they can work no worse, but better than before ... It is equally necessary to place bourgeois specialists in an atmosphere of comradely common labor" (ibid., p. 405);

4) To non-Russian peoples: "Complete equality of nations... the right to state secession" (ibid., p. 398); 5) Believers: "It is necessary to carefully avoid any offense to the senses

believers" (ibid., p. 402);

6) Freedom and rights to all the peoples of Russia: "The deprivation of political rights and any restrictions on freedom are necessary solely as temporary measures to combat the attempts of the exploiters to defend or restore their privileges. As the objective possibility of the exploitation of man by man disappears, the need for these temporary measures will also disappear, and the Party will

to strive for their narrowing and their complete abolition" (ibid., p. 395).

For a person who is more or less familiar with the history of the USSR or with Soviet reality today, comments on these points are completely unnecessary. The Leninist Program fulfilled its organizational-propaganda goal, or, to put it crudely but accurately, its demagogic goal: the Bolsheviks won the civil war. However, Lenin himself admitted that the purpose of his Program was agitation and propaganda. He assessed the overall significance of the Program in the following way: "Our Program will be the strongest material for propaganda and agitation" ("US Congress of the RCP(b)", p. 364).

Therefore, the discussion of the Program at the Party Congress did not give rise to any stormy debate and sharp objections to the reports of Lenin and Bukharin on the Program, made by them officially on behalf of the Central Committee. Therefore, there was no co-rapporteur or counter-rapporteur from any group at the congress, as was the case during the discussion of the organizational question or military policy. Only the official rapporteurs of the Central Committee - Lenin and Bukharin - argued among themselves on a number of abstract questions (about the structure of the Program, about the characteristics of imperialism, etc.), which were of little interest to the delegates. The only controversial issue, which, according to Lenin, "occupied an unreasonable amount of space" in the discussion both between speakers and delegates, was the national question. For the multinational Russian Empire, the national question has always played a prominent role. Now, in the midst of the height of the civil war, when General Denikin wrote "For a United and Indivisible Russia" on his banner, the national question became the Achilles heel of the entire White movement, and especially in its multinational Caucasian rear. The Bolsheviks just aimed at this "heel", putting forward a counter-slogan against the slogan "For one and indivisible": "the right of peoples to self-determination", although Lenin was a much more absolute centralist than not only Denikin and Kolchak, but all Russian tsars together taken. But the flexible tactician Lenin knew that the declarative recognition of the "right of peoples to self-determination" was not only the surest propaganda weapon to win the sympathy of the non-Russian peoples, but also an unmistakable means of opposing them to TsDenikin and Kolchak. Scholastic Bukharin, Great Russian chauvinists from the party (Lenin: "scrape another communist and you will find a Great Russian chauvinist", "Ush congress of the RCP (b)", p. 106) or Russified "nationals" (Lenin: "it is known that Russified foreigners always overdo on the Part of the Truly Russian Mood", PSS, vol. 45, p. 358) could not understand the whole subtlety of the game played by Lenin in the national question. Hence the "Great Russian opposition" at the congress against Lenin.

In Soviet historical textbooks, the legend constantly migrates from one to another that only Bukharin and Pyatakov headed this "Great Russian

opposition", without mentioning that Stalin fully shared her point of view. Instead of the Leninist slogan "the right of peoples to self-determination", Bukharin, relying precisely on the party expert on the national question, Stalin, put forward another slogan: "In the commission, relying on the statement made by Comrade Stalin at the 3rd Congress of Soviets, I proposed the formula: self-determination of the working classes every nationality"

("USH congress of the RCP (6b)", p. 47).

The congress delegate (later director of the Marx, Engels and Lenin Institute) D. Ryazanov also pointed to the source of Bukharin's "Great Russian idea": "The wording that he (Bukharin. - A. A.) repeats after Comrade Stalin is the self-determination of the working classes, - as an objective criterion is just as untenable as the formula of the right of nations to self-determination" (ibid., pp. 68-69).

Excessively zealous Stalinists from the editorial board of the new edition of the "Protocols of the Congress" (1959) made notes: "The presentation of the statement of I. V. Stalin at the Third Congress of Soviets was given by Bukharin incorrectly" (ibid., p. 526) or JV Stalin's formulation "self-determination of the working classes" does not correspond to reality" (ibid., p. 529).

The question is, if this "does not correspond to reality," then why is Stalin stubbornly silent at the congress when his point of view is so unceremoniously distorted, and at the same time Lenin is waging the most desperate argument at the congress precisely against the formulation "the right of self-determination of the working classes"? One has only to look at the above-mentioned speech by Stalin at the PG Congress of Soviets (January 1918) to see that Bukharin and Ryazanov quoted Stalin correctly, and that party historians deliberately distort the truth.

Here is what Stalin said on this issue: "The principle of self-determination was used by the bourgeois-chauvinist circles of Ukraine for their class imperialist purposes. All this points to the need to interpret the principle of self-determination as the right to self-determination not of the bourgeoisie, but of the working masses of a given nation" (Stalin, Soch., vol. 4, pp. 31-32; highlighted by me. - A. A.). Thus, the spiritual leader of the "Great Russian opposition" was Stalin, not Bukharin (we will see this again when we analyze the discussion between Lenin, Trotsky and the Georgian "national deviationists", on the one hand, and Stalin, Dzerzhinsky and Ordzhonikidze, on the other hand, about the "autonomization" of the Soviet republics).

Generally speaking, the "Great Russian opposition" arose on the basis of a sheer misunderstanding. Its leaders sincerely believed (except Stalin!) that Lenin said what he thought. Lenin knew as well as Talleyrand that words were given to hide his thoughts, and he understood as well as Machiavelli that all means are good that reach the goal. He said that "politics is a science and an art" (Lenin, Sobr. soch., vol. XXV, p. 219), "it is necessary to combine the strictest devotion to the ideas of communism with the ability to make all the necessary practical compromises, maneuvering, conciliation, zigzags, retreat ..." (ibid., p. 231), even more: in the interests of gaining influence and power, one must "make all sorts of sacrifices - if necessary - go to all sorts of tricks, cunning, illegal methods, silence, concealment truth" (ibid., p. 199), that is, to lie and deceive, but without expressing it that way.

Later, Stalin will surpass Lenin in this respect as well with his masterpieces of unsurpassed lies, but now he prefers to remain silent (he did not speak at a single plenary session of the congress), but some of Lenin's students spoke, who

much better learned the basics of Leninism. Thus, Tomsy declared: "I think there is not a single person in this

hall who would say that the self-determination of nations, the national movement, is normal and desirable. We regard this as a necessary evil" ("UPSh congress RCP (6b)", p. 82). Osinsky still lifted the veil over Lenin's innermost thought about "self-determination." He said that this slogan has three meanings: "firstly, it is a declarative meaning... We declare that we give the peoples the right to self-determination... Secondly, this is a slogan that neutralizes the most national struggle, and thirdly, this is a revealing slogan" (ibid., p. 92).

Lenin saw in this slogan an outstanding tactical significance in the international arena, not only in the colonies, but in the Western countries in general. Lenin thought that if the outside world establishes that the Comintern is only a branch of the RCP (6), and foreign national communist parties are subordinate to the Central Committee of the RCP (6), then the cause of the world revolution will perish. He said:

"Here, many enthusiastic comrades have agreed to a world Economic Council and to the subordination of all national parties (meaning foreign communist parties. - A. A.) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party ... (Pyatakov: (from the spot): "Do you think that this would be Badly?"). If he now throws a remark that it would not be bad, then I must answer that if something like this was in the program, then there would be no need to criticize it: the authors of such a proposal would kill themselves" (ibid., p. 100).

In this regard, Lenin's other remark turned out to be downright prophetic: "We must arrange things in such a way that the German social traitors (meaning the social democrats. - A. A.) cannot say that the Bolsheviks are imposing their universal system, which it would be possible to bring it to Berlin on Red Army bayonets" (ibid., p. 55).

The discussion on the Program ended with the election of a commission to present the final draft (Lenin, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Stalin, Kamenev, Sokolnikov, Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky, Tomsy, Smidovich, Bubnov). On behalf of this commission, Kamenev reported to the congress the final draft, which was adopted unanimously (with one objection on the national question, it was Pyatakov). A number of minor amendments were made to the Program. The congress, rejecting Pyatakov's amendment on the national question, approved the Program as a whole.

On the last item on the agenda, elections were held for the Central Committee (out of 19 members and 8 candidates), the Audit Commission (out of 3 members). This last session of the congress is presided over by Kamenev (during the entire congress, only three people presided at the plenary sessions - Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, and at one - Evdokimov).

From his message it turns out what was the technique of the PC elections (the elections themselves were secret). One list was presented by a group of leaders of the previous Central Committee, signed by Lenin, Zinoviev, Stalin and others. There was a list presented by another group, there was a list presented by the Moscow, Petrograd and Nizhny Novgorod delegations, then they come:

a list of Ural delegates, a list of the 3rd and 4th armies, a list put up by part of the Moscow delegation, the delegations of the Ukrainian, Saratov, Belarusian, Lithuanian and part of the front-line delegations. The delegates of the Urals, Vyatka and the 11th Army offer their list. Finally, another group offers their list. This enumeration of lists shows that the CPSU once had something like "intra-Party democracy", which today no one even dares to think about. In all these lists, only 6 people are invariably present as generally recognized leaders: Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky, Bukharin,



Kamenev and Stalin.

The chosen ones were:

Members of the Central Committee: 1. Beloborodoe, 2. Bukharin, 3. Dzerzhinsky, 4. Evdokimov, 5. Zinoviev, 6. Kalinin, 7. Kamenev, 8. Krestinsky, 9. Lenin, 10. Muranov, 11. Radek, 12. Rakovsky, 13. Serebryakov, 14.

Smilga, 15. Stalin, 16. Stasova, 17. Stuchka, 18. Tomsy, 19. Trotsky.

Candidates: 1. Artem, 2. Bubnov, 3. Vladimirov, 4. Danishevsky, 5. Mitskevich, 6. Smirnov (I.N.), 7. Schmidt, 8. Yaroslavsky.

Audit Commission: 1. Kursky, 2. Lunacharsky, 3. Tsivtsivadze.

None of the oppositionists got into the membership of the Central Committee (except for Bukharin - on the national question and Stalin - on the military), two "military oppositionists" (Bubnov, Yaroslavsky) were included in the candidate list.

Lenin received a "respite" from the opposition for a whole year - until the next regular party congress.

At the plenum of the Central Committee of the new composition on March 25, its governing bodies were elected: members of the Politburo: Lenin, Kamenev, Krestinsky, Trotsky, Stalin; candidates: Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kalinin.

Members of the Organizing Bureau: Beloborodoe, Krestinsky, Serebryakov, Stalin, Stasova; candidate: Muranov. Executive Secretary of the Central Committee: Stasova ("History of the CPSU", vol. 3, book P, p. 282).

General conclusion: if until now Lenin had to fight oppositions that arose only within the Central Committee and, within its own framework, challenged Lenin's claims that his actions were unopposed and that his hegemony in leadership over the party and the state was categorical, now that the Central Committee has basically been purged or pacified, the struggle unfolds outside the Central Committee. Now party congresses, where dissidents still find their way, are becoming an arena for the struggle of party oppositions. At a time when various intra-party oppositions, under various nicknames, reflect in their platforms the will and aspirations of the broad masses of the party, the Central Committee defends the inviolability of its authority and the unopposed actions of the party apparatus hierarchy. These oppositions also have one more characteristic feature common to all of them: they take the opportunistic postulates of the party apparatus for the true program of the party, propaganda slogans for the real goal.

From this, Lenin drew the necessary conclusions in two documents adopted one at a time.

USh congress - on the first purge of the party under the name "general registration of all members of the party" ("CPSU in resolutions", part D, p. 441), another document is the new Party Charter adopted at the USSh party conference (December 1919 .), which introduced a whole new section on "the strictest discipline", although the item on "democratic centralism" was retained. The new section on discipline subordinated the entire party to the Central Committee and its local committee hierarchy. For the first time, the Charter also included a clause on the obligatory passage of a candidate's probationary period for those wishing to join the party. The purge of the party continued until the end of September 1919, as a result, according to the estimates of the American historian, more than half of the 250,000 communists were expelled. p. 163).